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WHY DO AUTOCRATS DECENTRALIZE?
Yu Xiao, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
Economic decentralization has profound effects on a country’s economic performance, but
not all countries pursue decentralization. Why do some countries see decentralization as a
better strategy for development than others? What political conditions facilitate or inhibit
economic decentralization in autocracies? Studies that focus on democracies have largely
reach a consensus that politically decentralized systems tend to pursue economic decentral-
ization policies. This dissertation contends, however, that there is an opposite relationship
in autocracies. Specifically, it is the politically centralized autocracies that are more likely
to pursue economic decentralization policies. I argue that this difference is because in autoc-
racies, economic decentralization policies often result from a top-down delegation process,
as opposed to a bottom-up bargaining process that often prevails in democracies.
This dissertation develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the top-down economic
decentralization process in autocracies. I demonstrate that political centralization can make
the subnational government more willing to follow the national economic agenda and con-
sequently make the national government more willing to decentralize economic resources. I
test the theoretical model with a comparative case study of China from 1949 to 1962 and
Mexico from 1917 to 1948. The Chinese case confirms that its centralized political system
in the 1950s contributed to the economic decentralization policies during the Great Leap
Forward. The Mexican case corroborates that its decentralized political system in the 1920s
contributed to the Mexican federal government’s consistent efforts to centralize economic
resources at the federal level from the 1920s to the 1940s. A further test analyzes a sample
of 59 countries from 1972 to 2016. The results support that political centralization reduces
iv
economic decentralization in democracies but facilitates economic decentralization in au-
tocracies. The dissertation contributes to our understanding of the different patterns of
economic decentralization and economic governance between democracies and autocracies.
v
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation addresses the puzzle why some authoritarian regimes pursue economic
decentralization policies in a top-down manner. To answer this question, I develop a
game-theoretical model between the national and subnational governments and theorize
the conditions under which political centralization facilitates economic decentralization in
authoritarian regimes. I test this theory qualitatively using the method of difference design
complemented by the theory-testing process-tracing method and quantitatively analyzing
a sample of 59 countries over the period from 1972 to 2016. Leveraging the method of
difference, I compare the postrevolutionary regimes in China from 1949 to 1962 and Mex-
ico from 1917 to 1948 to show that the high level of political centralization contributed to
the economic decentralization policies in China, and the low level of political centralization
helped explain the economic centralization policies in Mexico. Within both cases, I employ
the theory-testing process-tracing method to test the validity of the causal links identified
by the theoretical model, namely whether the levels of political centralization affected the
economic (de)centralization policies in the way predicted by the model. Quantitatively, I
test the different effects of political centralization on fiscal expenditure decentralization lev-
els in different regimes and the evidence supports that different from democracies, political
centralization is positively correlated with fiscal decentralization in autocracies.
In this chapter, I first discuss the relevance of the research question. Then, I introduce
the key concepts of my theory, i.e., political and economic decentralization, and my rationale
for choosing economic decentralization policies as the outcomes of interest. After defining the
main concepts, I summarize the current scholarly understanding of the reasons of economic
decentralization. I then present a summary of my main argument and its contribution to
the literature. The final section lays out the structure of this dissertation.
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1.1 PUZZLE
A well-known failed economic experiment in China’s modern history is the Great Leap
Forward that lasted from 1958 to 1962. During this time, governments at all levels, from the
central government to the local communes, all set unrealistic targets for economic production.
One of the tragic consequences was that the local governments in the rural areas inflated their
grain production figures, resulting excessive procurement and causing large-scale famine in
several provinces. A less well-known fact about this period is that along with the frenzy of
setting the impossible targets, the economic system witnessed a significant decentralization
process, which included granting the local governments more authority in managing the
state-owned enterprises, more fiscal resources, and more control over how to spend the local
budget.
Figure 1.1. Local Government’s Fiscal Revenue Share (1953–1965)
Source: the data are drawn from China Data Online (China Data Online, 2017).
Figure 1.1 shows the local governments’ fiscal revenue shares. The blue line shows only
the budgetary revenue. The red line includes the extrabudgetary revenue. The local gov-
ernments’ revenue share increased from around 20% in 1958 to around 70% in 1959.
Why did the central government decentralize economic resources and authority to local
governments during the Great Leap Forward? It is puzzling because during the Great Leap
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Forward the central government had a firm agenda of making China’s economy develop at
a fast speed. Why at this critical time did the central government choose economic decen-
tralization to realize the developmental goal? Even more puzzling is the consequence. Often
we expect that economic decentralization leads the local governments to better utilize their
local knowledge and enhance economic efficiency. Why after given the economic resources
and authority did the local governments implement policies that did not reflect their local
interests at all, but instead caused the economic disasters that harmed their localities?
These puzzles about the Great Leap Forward boil down to one theoretical question: why
does an authoritarian national government pursue economic decentralization? In this dis-
sertation, I argue that in the authoritarian regimes, political centralization can facilitate
economic decentralization policies. This seems to be counter-intuitive for scholars studying
decentralization in the democratic context, where high levels of political centralization of-
ten lead to economic centralization policies, while economic decentralization outcomes are
often resulted from a high level of political decentralization. One reason for this difference
across regime types is that in authoritarian context, especially regimes that do not face
democratization, the process that leads to economic decentralization is often a top-down
delegation process, where the national government’s initiative is crucial. On the other hand,
in democracies, economic decentralization is often a result of a bottom-up bargaining process
between the national government and the subnational governments, where the subnational
governments’ political autonomy was crucial for understanding the economic decentralization
outcome.
1.2 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
1.2.1 Decentralization
To all countries that have multi-tiered administrative structures, we can raise this question:
how much authority do the subnational governments have? Countries differ widely in terms of
their decentralization levels. Figure 1.2 shows the average fiscal expenditure decentralization
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levels during the period from 1972 to 2016 in the world.
Figure 1.2. Average Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization in the World (1972–2016)
Source: the data are drawn from IMF Fiscal Decentralization Dataset (International Monetary Fund, 2018;
Lledó et al., 2018).
The level of decentralization has both political and economic implications. Political
philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville, praise the benefits of de-
centralization, including that decentralization brings power closer to the people, increases
government’s accountability and fosters democracy (Rodden, 2006, p. 1). Economists ar-
gue that federalism and decentralization influence the efficiency of public goods provision
(Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956) and economic performance (Weingast, 1995; Oi, 1992; Lin and
Liu, 2000; Shah, 1998).
Decentralization levels are crucial for understanding the political dynamics and economic
performance of different countries. If there is an optimal level of decentralization for each
country, why do not all countries settle at that level? Why do some countries stay centralized,
despite the inefficiency associated with centralization? Answering these questions not only
can solve our puzzle about decentralization but can also shed light on the broader questions,
such as why certain countries have better economic performance than others.
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1.2.2 Authoritarian regimes
As the third-wave democratization momentum wanes, we observe authoritarian resilience.
Several democracies in developing countries witness the rise of strongman with populist styles
since the 2000s. Some of these examples include Chávez in Venezuela, Putin in Russia, and
Erdogan in Turkey. Although we can debate whether such regimes are authoritarian, given
that these leaders are popularly elected, these leaders tend to encroach on the independence
of the other branches, the media, and sometimes do not play by the rules resulting in more
difficulties for the challengers to rise and rendering the elections less fair. Lührmann and
Lindberg (2019) position this trend of rising authoritarianism in the historical context, trace
its origin to the 1990s, and refer to it as “a third wave of autocratization” (pp. 8–9).
At this historical juncture, political scientists observe that authoritarianism stays as
countries develop economically, and realize the importance to be and indeed become more
objective when studying regime types. Particularly, more and more scholars challenge the
optimistic view of the modernization theory that claims economic development leads to
democratization. Instead, scholars treat authoritarian regimes as what they are and try
to understand the political dynamics of such regimes without assuming democratization.
This brings about an ongoing heated discussion about the functions and impacts of formal
institutions in authoritarian regimes, including legislatures (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008),
political parties (Magaloni, 2006; Svolik, 2012), and elections (Blaydes, 2011).
This line of research is very focused on the formal political institutions and the logic of
political survival, using the book title of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). The advantage
of the current research agenda is that it generates fruitful dialogues among rational choice
scholars to better understand these formal institutions in the authoritarian contexts and
seems promising to produce a coherent grand theory of authoritarian rule, a task taken up
by Svolik (2012). Its downside is that this narrow focus on the few formal institutions,
i.e., legislatures, parties and elections, which are the formal institutions political scientists
emphasize when studying democracies understandably, limits scholars’ ability to develop a
theoretical framework to understand authoritarian regimes.
Particularly, the recent literature on authoritarian institutions often downplays the eco-
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nomic development goal of the authoritarian regimes, which however is central in the clas-
sic literature on authoritarian rule (Evans, 1995; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1999;
O’Donnell, 1988). A more comprehensive understanding of authoritarian regimes requires
a better understanding of how the economic goal affects the political dynamics in authori-
tarian systems. By studying the causes of economic decentralization, this dissertation aims
to complement the current research agenda by bringing the development goal back into the
studies of authoritarian politics.
1.3 EXPLAINING ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZATION
1.3.1 Definitions of Key Concepts
To explain the variation of economic decentralization levels among authoritarian regimes, I
propose a game-theoretical model that contends a high level of political centralization can
facilitate economic decentralization policies under certain conditions. Chapter 2 discusses
the details of the model. In this section, I introduce the concepts.
My explanatory variable is the level of political centralization. It is the degree to which
political power in a polity is concentrated in the center. Broadly speaking, the center refers
to the national government as well as other types of political forces (e.g., political parties and
the military) at the central level. The degree of power concentration can change via a po-
litical centralization or decentralization process, by shifting political power to or away from
the center respectively. There are two salient aspects of political centralization that the ex-
isting literature emphasizes, which are (1) the center’s control over subnational government
officials’ career prospects (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007) and (2) the decision-making
autonomy of subnational governments (Treisman, 2007). The center’s control over subna-
tional government officials’ career is a unique feature of political centralization. It does not
overlap with other types of decentralization. On the other hand, the decision-making au-
tonomy of subnational governments can overlap with other types of decentralization. For
instance, the decision-making autonomy of the subnational government that involves setting
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the subnational units’ tax rates can be considered as an aspect of fiscal centralization and
economic centralization (Rodden, 2004). In this dissertation, I use political centralization
only to refer to the center’s control over subnational government officials’ career and theorize
its impacts on economic decentralization policies.1
As for the dependent variable, the economic decentralization policies, these are poli-
cies that grant more economic autonomy to the subnational governments. Examples of
such economic decentralization policies include fiscal resource decentralization and funded
administrative decentralization. Fiscal resource decentralization means increasing subna-
tional government’s fiscal resources including subnational government’s own revenues as well
as transfers from the national government. Funded administrative decentralization means
transfering “the dispensation of social services (education, health, housing, etc.) to sub-
national governments” while providing new fiscal resources to afford such services (Falleti,
2010, p. 17).
Falleti (2010) insightfully pointed out that certain policies which the literature refers to
as “decentralization” do not result in more autonomy for the subnational government. An
example is unfunded administrative decentralization, which refers to transferring the dispen-
sation of social services without providing the financial resources. Unfunded administrative
decentralization often leads to the subnational government taking on more fiscal expenditure
that drains their resources and decreases their autonomy (Falleti, 2010, p. 78). Thus, in my
study, economic decentralization policies do not include unfunded administrative decentral-
ization that reduces the subnational government’s economic autonomy.
In addition to fiscal resource decentralization and funded administrative decentralization,
for command economies, the transfer of the administration of the state-owned enterprises
from the national government to subnational government is also one instance of economic
decentralization.
1I am agnostic about the relationship between the decision-making autonomy of the subnational govern-
ments on economic decentralization policies.
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1.3.2 Rationale for Conceptualization
Scholars have conceptualized and classified intergovernmental relations in different ways and
their research questions and answers with regard to the causes and effects of intergovernmen-
tal relations depend on their conceptualization and classification. In this section I explain
my rationale for choosing economic decentralization policies as the dependent variable.
The terminology adopted in political science and economics to describe the intergovern-
mental relations between the national government and the subnational government, i.e., the
state or provincial government, has evolved since the 1960s. Instead of “decentralization,”
in the 1960s, the terms most widely used in the literature on intergovernmental relations
were “federal systems” and “unitary systems” (Riker, 1964).
The term “decentralization” started to gain traction in the 1980s, coinciding with the in-
ternational development agencies’ support for decentralization programs in developing coun-
tries. As one of the most influential scholars, Dennis A. Rondinelli introduced the three types
of decentralization that to a great extent framed the later discussions on intergovernmental
relations: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration means shifting the
workload “from central government ministry headquarters to staff located in offices outside
of the national capital, and the staff may not be given the authority to decide how those
functions are to be performed.” Delegation means delegating “decision-making and manage-
ment authority for specific functions to organizations that are only under the indirect control
of central government ministries.” Finally, devolution means “the strengthening or creation
of independent levels and units of government” (Rondinelli, 1981, pp. 137–139).
These three types of decentralization all describe the policy process of granting more
autonomy to the subnational governments; they differ in the amount of autonomy transferred
to the subnational governments, with deconcentration being granting the least autonomy
and devolution being granting the most autonomy. Although Rondinelli himself only uses
“decentralization” to refer to the process whereby the subnational governments’ autonomy
changes, the later literature picked up the term and used it to describe the institutional
arrangment at a particular point in time.
Compared to “federalism,” using “decentralization” broadens the study of intergovern-
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mental relations by enabling scholars (1) to treat the relative autonomy of the subnational
governments vis-à-vis the national government as a continuous variable, which was treated
by scholars as a dichotomous variable under the federal-unitary divide; (2) to study the
change of the relative autonomy of the subnational governments within a country over time,
even after the country’s constitutional status as a federal or unitary system is fixed; and (3)
to compare the subnational governments’ autonomy in federal systems with that in unitary
systems without assuming that the former is higher than the latter.
In this dissertation, I compare Mexico, a federal system, with China, a unitary system,
to identify the common political causes that explain the economic (de)centralization policies.
Riker (1969) once pointed out that constitutional unitary government was at least as likely to
have local autonomy as was constitutional federalism. In order to understand local autonomy,
Riker emphasized that it was not enough to examine only the constitution, but to examine
political culture. In the case of Mexico, its federal status does not guarantee higher economic
autonomy for the subnational governments. In particular, we observe two waves of fiscal
centralization from the 1930s to 1950s and in the 1970s and 1980s (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp.
6–7). On the other hand, in the unitary China, instead of a centralization trend, we observe
waves of economic decentralization in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s. I concur with Riker that
constitutional federalism does not give us much leverage to explain these trends and we need
to identify the political causes for subnational autonomy beyond the constitution. Because
of its generalizability, the concept of “decentralization” allows us to pool federal and unitary
systems together and identify such causes.
I choose economic decentralization as the outcome of interest because (1) it is the core
political economy variable that scholars have repeatedly identify as influencing economic
outcomes; and (2) it is both general enough to describe experiences in different contexts and
specific enough to be treated as a phenomenon that can be explained.
Economic decentralization, as defined earlier, include fiscal resources decentralization,
funded administrative decentralization, and administration of state-owned enterprises de-
centralization, etc. The early literature on fiscal federalism first theorizes how fiscal and
administrative decentralization affect economic outcomes. For instance, Tiebout (1956) and
Oates (1972) contend that fiscal and administrative decentralization allow efficient allocation
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of public goods.
In the 1990s, a significant number of countries which previously pursued state-led devel-
opment shifted to market-oriented development strategies. Related to the historical back-
ground, there was a burst of literature that emphasized the economic and fiscal aspect of
the decentralization process (Weingast, 1995; Bird, Ebel and Wallich, 1995; Rodden, 2006).
In addition to public goods provision, the more recent literature also studies whether and
under what conditions economic and fiscal decentralization fosters economic growth and
macroeconomic stability.2
Thus, the mainstream literature in the field of intergovernmental relations views economic
decentralization as an important factor that has implications for economic outcomes.
I adopt economic decentralization instead of fiscal decentralization or administrative
decentralization, which are more commonly used in the literature (Manor, 1999; Montero
and Samuels, 2004; Falleti, 2010), mainly because economic decentralization is more general
and allows me to compare experiences in different country and historical contexts.
Neither fiscal nor administrative decentralization, as they are defined in the literature,
captures the important aspect of decentralization in command economies, which is to move
the ownership as well as administration of state-owned enterprises from the national gov-
ernment to subnational governments. However, given that such a decentralization process
grants subnational governments more economic resources and autonomy, it shares similar-
ities with fiscal resources and funded administrative decentralization. By classifying these
policies that grant subnational governments more economic resources and autonomy as eco-
nomic decentralization, I can explore the common political considerations of such policies.
1.3.3 Reasons for Economic Decentralization
Explanations for economic decentralization mostly fall into two camps: socioeconomic ex-
planations and political institutionalist explanations. Economists often theorize how socioe-
2Weingast (2009) called the literature in this period the Second Generation Fiscal Federalism. Compared
to the First Generation Fiscal Federalism literature, the recent wave of literature is more empirically based.
There has been a heated and lasting debate with regard to whether fiscal decentralization is good or bad
for economic growth (Weingast, 1995; Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Wibbels, 2005; Cai and Treisman,
2006).
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conomic factors influence economic decentralization levels. These factors include a coun-
try’s geographic and population sizes, ethno-linguistic diversity, and urban domination, etc.
These theories are often functionalist in nature: they generally argue that a country’s socioe-
conomic factors determine an optimal level of economic decentralization for this country, at
which level economic efficiency is maximized. They assume that countries would settle at
this optimal level. As for how a country reaches this level of economic decentralization, this
approach leaves it in a black box.
The political institutionalist approach complements the socioeconomic explanations. Us-
ing this approach, political scientists emphasize the political process that lead to the economic
decentralization policies. These scholars identify certain institutions that are more conducive
to economic decentralization policies, including democratic institutions, subnational elec-
tions, decentralized party structures, and representation of subnational government officials
in the national policy-making institutions, etc. However, the majority of these approaches
emphasize the bottom-up pressures for economic decentralization.
The theory presented in this dissertation belongs to the political institutionalist camp,
but I adopt a top-down perspective. I theorize that under certain conditions, political cen-
tralization is conducive to economic decentralization through enhancing the national govern-
ment’s trust in the subnational government officials. This explains why certain authoritarian
regimes pursue economic decentralization in a top-down manner without strong bottom-up
pressures. This theory also sheds light on why some other authoritarian regimes choose to
centralize economically despite facing bottom-up pressures for economic decentralization.
One potential factor is the national government’s lack of political control over subnational
governments.
1.3.3.1 Socioeconomic Reasons According to the mainstream literature, economic de-
velopment levels increase fiscal decentralization for the following reasons.3 Firstly, as a
3To clarify, in the literature on the socioeconomic causes of fiscal decentralization, the authors often
do not distinguish between fiscal revenue decentralization and fiscal expenditure decentralization. On the
other hand, as Falleti (2010) pointed out, the political incentives for fiscal revenue decentralization may be
distinct from the incentives for expenditure decentralization. I agree with her and incorporate this idea in
my conceptualization. But for now, for the purpose of reviewing the current understanding of causes of
economic decentralization, I present the findings consistent with the original conceptualization, i.e., to treat
both revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization as fiscal decentralization.
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country develops and its per capita income increases, it is often the case that its public
expenditure increases disproportionately. The absolute increases in local public expenditure
makes it possible for local government to exploit scale economies in local public goods pro-
vision (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005, pp. 1161–1162). From the citizens’ perspective, local
governments are now more capable of providing the public goods they increasingly demand,
in terms of their variety and quality (Letelier S., 2005, pp. 157–158). Secondly, as a coun-
try’s per capita income increases, the labor wages often increase. At the same time, because
the services provided by local government are labor-intensive, such as education, health, and
police, their costs also increase with the wages. Numerically, this can lead to a higher share
of local government expenditure (Letelier S., 2005, pp. 157–158).
Countries with larger geographic areas tend to have higher fiscal decentralization. In
larger countries, the average costs of providing public goods and services are lower at the
subnational level than at the national level. The “spatial theory” argues that the costs
of public goods provision increase as the distance between the receiver and the provider
of public goods increases. “More distant hinterland regions may be poorly served by the
center, due to higher transportation costs, poor information, and inattention of the center to
demands of hinterland regions with different ethnic backgrounds and preferences” (Arzaghi
and Henderson, 2005, p. 1162).
Similarly, countries with larger population size also have higher fiscal decentralization,
because policy-making requires certain information from the local level and the “informa-
tional costs can be expected to increase with population.” “The larger the group, the more
difficult it is to sustain meaningful dialogue” between the center and the periphery (Hooghe
and Marks, 2012, p. 5).
High ethno-linguistic diversity increases fiscal decentralization. Firstly, ethno-linguistic
diversity increases the costs of public goods provision (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). Ethnic
customs and language barriers can create difficulties for central agencies to provide health
and education services. Secondly, in modern democracies, language is an important vehicle
for the democratic process. Citizens’ political activities, including formal and informal partic-
ipation, revolve around the language divides. Thus, institutions, including decentralization
and federalism, are results of such a political process and reflect the underlying linguis-
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tic structure (Erk and Koning, 2010). Erk and Koning (2010) find linguistic heterogeneity
increases fiscal decentralization in Western advanced democracies.
These socioeconomic theories of fiscal decentralization often emphasize the economic
needs for a country to have a certain level of fiscal decentralization but do not explain
how a country realizes this level of fiscal decentralization. Although scholars such as Erk
and Koning (2010) theorize that socioeconomic factors affect fiscal decentralization through
political institutions, they often do not trace the political process.
This socioeconomic approach thus leaves the following question unanswered: why coun-
tries with similar socioeconomic conditions are dramatically different in their economic de-
centralization levels.
Figure 1.3. Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization Levels and Socioeconomic Factors (Popu-
lation Sizes and GDP Per Capita)
Source: the data on fiscal expenditure decentralization levels are drawn from the IMF Fiscal Decentralization
Dataset (International Monetary Fund, 2018; Lledó et al., 2018) and the data on countries’ total population
and their GDP per capita are from the World Bank Open Data (World Bank, N.d.).
Figure 1.3 shows the scatterplots of the fiscal expenditure decentralization levels against
countries’ population sizes and their economic development levels (measured by their GDP
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per capita). These two scatterplots indeed show positive correlations between the fiscal
decentralization levels and countries’ sizes and their GDPPC. However, as the figure also
shows, countries with similar socioeconomic conditions have marked differences on their
fiscal decentralization levels. This pattern suggests that some large and developed countries
do not necessarily have the economic decentralization levels at their supposedly optimal
levels, where economic efficiency can be maximized. Then, why do countries with similar
socioeconomic conditions have different economic decentralization levels?
1.3.3.2 Institutionalist Reasons The institutionalist explanations of economic decen-
tralization policies offer a promising approach to understand why countries with similar
socioeconomic conditions differ in terms of economic decentralization levels. These institu-
tionalist theories, mostly developed by political scientists, tend to emphasize the bottom-up
pressures, i.e., demands from the subnational governments for more economic autonomy.
They often view economic decentralization policies as a consequence of a bargaining process.
a. The Bottom-up Perspective
Scholars have found that democratic regimes are correlated with high levels of economic
decentralization, because democracies have representative government that give a voice to
regional interests (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005, p. 1158).
Among democracies, scholars argue that decentralized party structure is an important
factor determining economic decentralization. Based on Latin American democracies’ expe-
rience, several studies find that more decentralized party structures imply that subnational
government officials have more influence on national legislators, which in turn leads the na-
tional legislators to pursue economic decentralization policies (Willis, Garman and Haggard,
1999; Garman, Haggard and Willis, 2001; Eaton, 2004; Haggard and Webb, 2004).
In addition, some scholars find that democratization process which involves opening up
direct elections of subnational government officials also facilitates economic decentraliza-
tion. The reasons are that (1) such direct elections increase the bargaining power of the
subnational governments; and (2) the elections make the subnational governments more ac-
countable to the local citizens, giving the subnational government officials more incentives
to demand autonomy (Beer, 2004; Falleti, 2010). According to Falleti (2010, Chapter 5),
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in Brazil the introduction of direct election of governors in 1982 significantly increased the
pressure of subnational governments on national government and favored fiscal resources
decentralization. In Mexico, decentralization is more likely in the states where elections are
more competitive, because electoral competitiveness increases politicians’ accountability to
local constituents (Beer, 2004).
In authoritarian regimes such as China, Shirk (1993) and Liu et al. (2015) find that
the representation of subnational governments in the national policy-making institutions
facilitates and sustains economic decentralization policies. Based on the selectorate theory’s
framework, Shirk views fiscal decentralization policies in the 1980s as an outcome of the
central leadership appealing to the members of the selectorate. She defines the selectorate
as “the group within a political party that has effective power to choose leaders” (Shirk,
1993, p. 71), referring to the Central Committee, the revolutionary elders, and top military
leaders in the 1980s Chinese case (Shirk, 1993, p. 10). The selectorate theory relies on
the assumption that the subnational government officials in China prefer more economic
autonomy and emphasizes the bottom-up drive for economic decentralization. The main
incentive of the national government is the power struggle among the leadership, according
to the selectorate theory.
Sharing a similar perspective, Liu et al. (2015) find that the Cultural Revolution resulted
in a strong representation of subnational government officials in the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This change led to the shift of power balance
among political elites, as the subnational governments gained more power vis-à-vis the central
bureaucracy. This political shift helped sustain the economic decentralization policies that
began in the 1970s and lasted until the 1990s, when the balance of power among the political
elites shifted back towards favoring the central bureaucracy. The assumption here is also that
subnational government officials play the deciding role in economic decentralization policies.
Thus, this perspective is similar to Shirk’s selectorate theory in emphasizing the bottom-up
drive for economic decentralization policies.
b. The Top-down Perspective
Compared to the studies that adopt the bottom-up perspective, the size of the literature
that adopts the top-down perspective is smaller. Instead of emphasizing the demands of
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the subnational governments, these top-down approaches emphasize the incentives of the
national government.
To explain the decentralization processes in democracies, O’Neill (2004, 2005) focuses
on the ruling party’s political, especially electoral incentives. She considers a country as
experiencing decentralization only when both political and fiscal decentralization happens.
She finds that the national government is more likely to decentralize when the ruling party
has strong electoral support at the subnational level but weak support at the national level.
The Andes countries’ experiences support this hypothesis.
Several studies adopt the delegation framework to understand decentralization. Gerring
et al. (2011) study the British colonial rule and the political and economic decentralization
levels of modern nation-states. They find that pre-existing institutions, such as “stateness,”
of the subordinate units, enhance monitoring mechanisms between the principal and agent,
and thus facilitates indirect rule for the British empire and both political and economic
decentralization for modern nation-states.
McCann (2015) uses the delegation framework to study the decentralization policies in
the US. She argues that political ideological affinities between the principal, i.e., the national
government, and the agents, i.e., the subnational governments, also facilitates decentraliza-
tion. Empirically she finds that in the US, members of Congress (the principal), are more
likely to decentralize administratively4 when their copartisans are the states’ governors (one
agent), while the national executive (the other agent) is occupied by the opposition party.
This is to contend that the principal is more likely to delegate to those agents that share
the principal’s policy preferences.
Landry (2008) studies the the resilience of the Chinese authoritarian system. He finds
that because the national government maintains strong control over personnel, fiscal and
economic decentralization in authoritarian China does not lead to the collapse of the regime.
Empirically he identifies the main institution of personnel control of the CPC, which is the
“One Level Down” policy in place since 1983. He finds that this appointment system works
well to incentivize local government cadres to pursue policies consistent with the national
4McCann (2015) measures decentralization as to what extent the provisions in a law require the involve-
ment of the national agency. I consider this measure as administrative decentralization.
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government’s policy goals and thus helps to sustain the regime.
1.4 A DELEGATION THEORY OF ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZATION IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
In this dissertation, I adopt the delegation logic to analyze the economic decentralization
problem. The delegation logic allows me to develop a theory that identifies the conditions
under which political centralization contributes to economic decentralization policies in au-
thoritarian regimes. The theory is most helpful for understanding why certain authoritarian
regimes pursue economic decentralization without strong bottom-up pressure. The details
of the theory are discussed in Chapter 2, but the gist of the argument is the following.
The theory assumes that the authoritarian national government ultimately determines
whether and how to pursue economic decentralization policies. To make the decision, the
national government considers the effects of economic decentralization on its three goals: (1)
pursuing economic development, (2) maximizing power in its own hand, and (3) implement-
ing its preferred economic policies.
A high level of political centralization, as an institutional condition, implies that (1) the
national government has a strong capacity to reward the subnational governments for imple-
menting the national economic agenda or punish the subnational governments for deviating
from the national economic agenda; and (2) the policy preferences of the national govern-
ment are similar to those of the subnational governments, because the national government
can select the subnational officials who share the national government’s policy preferences.
These two conditions together further mean a high level of the “deviation threshold,”
which is a crucial concept for the theory. It is defined as the maximum level of economic
decentralization that the national government can grant to the subnational governments,
without triggering the subnational governments’ policy deviations. The deviation threshold
increases with the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism and decreases with the
policy preference divergence between the national and subnational governments.
From the subnational governments’ perspective, sharing policy preferences with the na-
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tional government provides them with the intrinsic motivation to pursue the national eco-
nomic agenda, and fearing the punishment (or seeking rewards) from the national government
adds an external motivation for them to implement the national preferred policies. Thus, a
high level of political centralization makes the subnational governments prefer to implement
the national economic agenda even when the economic decentralization level is high. Under
this condition—the political centralization level is high and thus the deviation threshold is
high, the national government expects that the subnational government would implement
the national economic agenda after the economic decentralization policies, and therefore, the
national government is more willing to pursue the economic decentralization policies.
In the opposite scenario, when the political centralization level is low, the subnational
governments have their own independent economic preferences and the national govern-
ment does not have sufficient tools to reward or punish the subnational governments, the
subnational governments would deviate from the national economic agenda even when the
economic decentralization level is low. In this case—the political centralization level is low
and thus the deviation threshold is low, the national government would be less likely to im-
plement the economic decentralization policies and would rather prefer a highly centralized
economic system. However, to successfully centralize the economic resources and author-
ity requires a certain level of political centralization, as the case study chapter on Mexico
(Chapter 5) shows. Thus, instead of a linear relationship between political centralization
and economic decentralization levels, there could be a U-shaped relationship. When the
political centralization level is low, although the national government has incentives to cen-
tralize economic resources and authority, it lacks the capacity to achieve the goal of economic
centralization. As the political centralization level increases, the national government has
both the incentives and capacity to implement the economic centralization policies, which
result in a low level of economic decentralization. When the political centralization level
is high, the national government no longer needs a centralized economic system to have its
preferred policies implemented at the subnational level and therefore we would expect a high
economic decentralization level again.
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1.4.1 Contribution to the Literature
This top-down theory contributes to the existing theoretical understanding of economic
decentralization in the following three ways.
Firstly, this theory incorporates the economists’ insights that socioeconomic conditions
determine a theoretically optimal level of economic decentralization. In particular, the dele-
gation theory in this dissertation sets one of the goals of the authoritarian national govern-
ment as pursuing economic development, which refers to maximizing the economic efficiency
in the country. The previous institutionalist theories on economic decentralization often
focus only on political drives (Shirk, 1993; Garman, Haggard and Willis, 2001; O’Neill, 2005;
Liu et al., 2015). Although my theoretical and empirical focus is also the impact of a politi-
cal institution—the level of political centralization—this delegation theory offers a unifying
analytical framework to combine socioeconomic explanations with the institutionalist expla-
nations.
Secondly, the theory can deepen our understanding of economic decentralization in au-
thoritarian regimes. By emphasizing the national government’s incentives to pursue the
economic decentralization policies from a top-down perspective, I am able to identify how
a high level of political centralization can lead to economic decentralization policies. This
reverses the expectation based on the previous theories developed in the democratic con-
text, which expect a high level of political centralization leads to a low level of economic
decentralization. The theory developed here specifies the conditions under which the na-
tional government wants more economic decentralization. I expect it to be more relevant for
understanding the economic decentralization dynamics in the authoritarian context, where
the subnational governments often lack bargaining power enjoyed by the subnational gov-
ernments in democracies.
Thirdly, a better understanding of the reasons for economic decentralization can shed
light on the outcomes of economic decentralization. The unresolved academic debates in the
1990s and 2000s on whether economic decentralization can bring about good economic per-
formance can potentially be reconciled by a better understanding of the causes of economic
decentralization. For instance, economic decentralization as a result of a bargaining pro-
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cess and that as a result of a delegation process can have distinct implications for economic
performance.
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
Chapter 2 presents a game-theoretical model of economic decentralization process in author-
itarian regime. The theory identifies two mechanisms through which political centralization
leads to economic decentralization: (1) strengthening the reward-punishment mechanism
which incentivizes the subnational government officials to follow the national government’s
policy directives; and (2) reducing the policy preference divergence between the national
and subnational governments. Based on the model, I identify the conditions under which
political centralization facilitates economic decentralization.
Chapters 3 to 5 test the model’s main theoretical expectation with two historical cases,
China from 1949 to 1962 and Mexico from 1917 to 1948. Chapter 3 is an introduction to
the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. Firstly, Chapter 3 explains the case selection logic.
These two historical cases satisfy the criteria of the method of difference design. They shared
similarities in the theoretically-relevant socioeconomic and political conditions, but differed
in their levels of political centralization (the causes) and the economic (de)centralization
policies (the outcomes). China from 1949 to 1962 was much more politically centralized
than Mexico from 1917 to 1948. In the meanwhile, China experienced its first episode
of economic decentralization during the Great Leap Forward since 1958; while Mexico’s
federal government consistently attempted to centralize the fiscal authority from 1917 to
1948. Confirming the causality between political centralization levels and the economic
(de)centralization policies in these two cases would validate the theoretical expectation that
the levels of political centralization positively affect the economic decentralization policies in
these regimes. In addition, Chapter 3 also explains the rationale for using the theory-testing
process-tracing method to study these two cases. Specifically, using the process-tracing
method within each case tests whether the components identified in the theoretical model
functioned as expected in their respective historical contexts. The key advantage of the
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process-tracing method is to uncover the causal mechanism between the levels of political
centralization and the economic (de)centralization policies.
Chapter 4 tests the causal mechanism between a high level of political centralization and
the economic decentralization policies during the Great Leap Forward in China from 1949 to
1962. I find supportive evidence for all the causal links identified in the theory. Due to the
highly centralized nature of the ruling party, the CPC, which was established several decades
before the regime establishment, the postrevolutionary regime acquired a highly centralized
political structure. The central government, through the CPC, had strong control over the
careers of the local government officials. Consequently, the central government was able to
appoint those officials who shared the central leadership’s economic policy preferences and
replace the independent-minded officials with the like-minded ones, and greatly reduced the
policy preference divergence between the central and local governments. In addition, the
centralized political system also increased the local officials’ career incentives to pursue the
central government’s economic policy agenda, as they feared the career punishments imposed
by the center. These two factors together constituted high deviation thresholds for the local
officials. The local officials’ adherence to the central government’s economic policy agenda
and the centralized political institution further strengthened the central leadership’s trust
in the local officials. Conditional on the hospitable socioeconomic conditions prior to the
Great Leap Forward, the central government initiated the economic decentralization policies.
Also consistent with the theoretical expectation, the local officials continued to pursue the
central government’s economic policy agenda, despite the economic decentralization policies
and despite the disastrous costs of pursuing the central policy agenda on the localities.
Chapter 5 tests the causal mechanism between a high level of political decentralization
and the fiscal centralization policies in postrevolutionary Mexico from 1917 to 1948. For the
Mexican case, I find supportive evidence for all the causal links except that different from the
expectation, the state governments still deviated from the federal government’s fiscal policy
agenda after the fiscal centralization policies from the 1920s to 1948. Unlike the Chinese case,
the Mexican ruling party, the PRI, was established after the regime establishment. Without a
centralized political organization that led the revolution, Mexico’s postrevolutionary regime
was regionally fragmented. The regions were dominated by strongmen, over whom the federal
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government had very weak political control. Consequently, the state governors often had
their independent economic policy preferences, different from the federal government’s. In
addition, the state governors often had their own political bases and it was more difficult for
the federal government to remove the state governors than the Chinese case. As a result, the
state governors had only weak career incentives to pursue the federal government’s economic
policy agenda. The independent policy preferences and the weak career incentives together
caused the state governors to have low deviation thresholds. The state governors indeed
deviated from the federal government’s economic and fiscal policy agenda. The federal
government, on the other hand, was frustrated with its inability to implement its preferred
economic policies, particularly to establish a common national market. As a result, the
federal government consistently attempted to centralize the fiscal authority from the 1920s to
the 1940s. Although I find that after the fiscal centralization policies, the state governments
continued to deviate from the federal government’s policy agenda, I argue that it was resulted
from the federal government’s incapacity to achieve a higher level of fiscal centralization,
rather than an intentional attempt on the federal government’s part to allow the states’
policy deviations.
Chapter 6 incorporates this new theory on the economic decentralization policies in
authoritarian regimes with the previous literature on democracies and tests whether the po-
litical centralization’s effects on economic decentralization are negative in democracies but
positive in autocracies. As mentioned earlier, the effects of political centralization are ex-
pected to be different across regime types, mainly because the democratic institutions allow
more bottom-up demands to be represented and thus the bargaining logic is more applica-
ble, while in autocracies, the top-down policymaking process is more prevalent and thus the
delegation logic is more relevant. Using the within-between random effects model to analyze
a sample of 59 countries over the period from 1972 to 2016, this chapter offers supportive ev-
idence for the different effects of political centralization, conditional on countries’ autocratic
levels. In addition, this chapter also provides some evidence for the U-shaped relationship
between political centralization and economic decentralization levels in autocratic regimes.
Also consistent with the theoretical expectation, the results show that the effects of political
centralization are stronger in the large and more developed countries.
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In Chapter 7, I conclude that in autocracies, a high level of political centralization can
facilitate the economic decentralization process by increasing the national government’s trust
in the subnational officials, so that the national government anticipates that the subnational
governments would implement the national economic agenda after economic decentraliza-
tion. On the other hand, a low level of political centralization can disincentivize the na-
tional government from pursuing economic decentralization policies and make it prefer a
high level of economic centralization. The case study evidence confirms the causal mecha-
nisms and the results from the statistical analyses support the positive correlations between
political centralization and economic decentralization levels. This theory itself can help us
better understand the economic decentralization logic in autocracies. Combined with the
previous literature, this theory can help shed light on and refine the theoretical expecta-
tion that democracies tend to have higher economic decentralization levels than autocracies.
Specifically, not all autocracies have centralized economies. But the top-down policymaking
process in autocracies can indeed limit the level of economic decentralization, compared to
the bottom-up process more prevalent in democracies. Moreover, this theory can also po-
tentially contribute to the understanding of how regime types influence countries’ economic
performance, because the economic decentralization level is widely considered as a crucial
factor determining the economic performance of a country and regime types affect economic
decentralization levels. Finally, this chapter concludes with proposals for future research to
deepen our understanding of economic decentralization.
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2.0 A GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC
DECENTRALIZATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I develop a game-theoretical model to analyze the top-down economic decen-
tralization processes in authoritarian regimes. I theorize that the level of political central-
ization affects a national government’s willingness to implement economic decentralization
policies via two mechanisms: (1) with a high level of political centralization, the national
government maintains a strong reward-punishment mechanism that can incentivize the sub-
national governments to implement the national economic policy agenda; and (2) a high level
of political centralization can reduce the policy preference divergence between the national
and subnational governments. Both mechanisms make the subnational governments more
willing to pursue the national economic policy goals. This in turn increases the national
government’s incentives to decentralize economic resources and authority.
The next three sections set up the model. Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 discuss the theo-
retical justifications for the national and subnational governments’ utility functions. Section
2.4 presents the game-theoretical model that formalizes the interaction between the national
and subnational governments. In Section 2.5, I analyze the subgame perfect nash equilibria
(SPNE). Firstly, I discuss one critical concept of this model, the subnational government’s
“deviation threshold.” It is defined as the maximum level of economic decentralization that
the national government can grant without triggering the subnational government’s policy
deviations. Secondly, I analyze how political centralization affects economic decentralization
levels through changing the two determinants of the deviation threshold: the strength of the
reward-punishment mechanism and the policy preference divergence between the national
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and subnational governments. The discussion focuses on one type of the national govern-
ment, the ideological developmental type. This national government type is the focus of
the following three case study chapters. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes the results of this
chapter and discusses the model’s limitations and its potential modifications.
2.2 CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
In this section, I discuss the considerations of the national government. These considerations
form the bases of the national government’s utility function discussed in Section 2.4.
When deciding whether to pursue economic decentralization, the national government
needs to weigh the impacts of economic decentralization on the following three aspects: (1)
maximizing its own economic resources and authority; (2) maximizing the overall economic
efficiency in this country; and (3) implementing its preferred economic policies.1
Authoritarian national governments apparently pursue many different goals, for instance,
regime stability, national security, international prestige, economic development, and for
many regimes rents for government officials, etc. For my theory, I only focus on the three
considerations listed above, because economic decentralization policies have direct implica-
tions for these three considerations.
It is important to note that considering these three aspects does not mean all authoritar-
ian national governments value these to the same degree. Rather, the theory assumes that all
authoritarian national governments value them but the rank order of their importance can
1I focus on the implementation of the economic policies, because economic decentralization, defined
as granting more economic autonomy to the subnational governments in this dissertation, directly affects
the economic policies at the subnational levels. For instance, allowing the subnational governments to
design their local taxes give the subnational governments more autonomy to decide which economic sectors
to foster. Similarly, transferring the management authority of state-owned enterprises to the subnational
levels directly increase the subnational governments’ economic policymaking authority. On the other hand,
because economic resources are fundamental to a government’s functions, economic decentralization can have
implications for the policy implementation in other policy areas, broader than the economic sphere. However,
I choose to limit the theory’s scope to the implementation of the economic policies in this dissertation, because
economic decentralization’s link with the implementation of non-economic policies is less direct and more
nuanced than its link with the implementation of the economic policies. It is likely that the logic identified
for the economic policies can be applied to other policy areas and scholars can explore this logic further in
the future.
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change across regimes and within a regime over time. This variation is one of the sources of
the different economic decentralization levels across regimes and within a regime over time.
2.2.1 Maximizing Economic Resources and Authority
Economic decentralization policies directly reduce the national government’s relative eco-
nomic resources and authority, which the national governments prefer to maximize. Thus,
the authoritarian national governments are expected to oppose economic decentralization
policies.
According to the definition in Chapter 1, economic decentralization policies grant more
economic autonomy to the subnational governments. This implies that the national govern-
ment loses a share of its own economic resources and autonomy.
The recent institutionalist literature on the political incentives of economic decentral-
ization contends that each level of government prefers to control economic resources and
authority at its own level. Falleti (2010) argues that the national government, including the
national executive, national bureaucracies, and national unions, are “generally opposed to
decentralization because these reforms threaten the bases of their power and, in some cases,
their own existence” (2010, pp. 42–44). Subnational government officials, such as governors
and mayors, “on the other hand, will almost invariably favor decentralization . . . of fiscal
resources” (2010, p. 44).
Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999) point out that the national executive has two con-
flicting tendencies. On the one hand, the national executive prefers economic efficiency gains
derived from economic decentralization policies. On the other hand, the national executive
also wants to control economic resources in his/her own hands for two reasons. Firstly, with
centralized economic authority and resources, the national executive is able to redistribute
across different regions. His/her ability to redistribute allows the national executive to pro-
mote economic equality among regions and/or exchange government expenditures for politi-
cal, especially electoral support. Secondly, centralized economic authority and resources also
ensure that the objectives of the national executive are carried out, which is more difficult
under an economically decentralized system, due to the informational asymmetries between
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the national government (the principal) and the subnational government (the agent).
Although Willis, Garman and Haggard point out the conflicting tendencies of the na-
tional government, in their study they do not theorize when the decentralization tendency
outweighs the centralization tendency or vice versa. Instead, they claim it is often the case
that the president is “more inclined to transfer responsibilities than the resources” (1999,
p. 209). They build their theory that decentralized party structure is conducive to fiscal
decentralization policies based on this assumption that each level of government prefers to
maximize fiscal resources at its own level.
The national government values maximizing its own control over economic resources and
autonomy, which are the bases of their power (Falleti, 2010) and enable the national executive
to redistribute among different regions for benevolent or political reasons (Willis, Garman
and Haggard, 1999). Thus, given that economic decentralization reduces the national gov-
ernments’ economic resources and authority, the national governments have incentives to
oppose such policies.
2.2.2 Maximizing Economic Efficiency
Economic decentralization policies can potentially increase economic efficiency in a coun-
try. Authoritarian national governments value good economic performance and thus have
incentives to pursue economic decentralization based on this consideration.
In the socioeconomic causes literature summarized in Section 1.3.3.1, there is a consen-
sus that socioeconomic conditions of a country, including its economic development level,
population size, area size, and ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity, determine an optimal level
of economic decentralization at which economic efficiency is maximized. To state it in a
different way, economic decentralization policies affect economic efficiency in a country.
Relatively economically centralized systems can potentially increase economic efficiency by
adopting economic decentralization policies. Such potential gains include more efficient pub-
lic goods provisions (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005) as well as
better economic growth performance (Weingast, 1995).
As Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999) point out, the national executive can claim cred-
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its for efficiency gains through economic decentralization policies. In democracies, regular
elections provide opportunities for voters to reward the incumbents for good economic per-
formance, which creates incentives for the national government to value economic efficiency
(Powell Jr and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Duch, 2007).
In spite of lacking free and fair elections, authoritarian national governments do have
incentives to value economic efficiency gains.
Firstly, since the industrial revolution, modern states are increasingly situated in a com-
petitive global environment. These states need to provide domestic sociopolitical order by
being autonomous from foreign intervention (Skocpol, 1985, p. 8). This requires states
to develop economically and stay competitive in the international arena. Thus, modern
authoritarian regimes have incentives to develop economically for security reason.
Secondly, authoritarian regimes value economic efficiency gains for legitimacy reasons.
Modern authoritarian regimes not only lack the rational-legal institutions which legitimize
democratic governments, such as competitive elections; but most of them as modern republics
can no longer obtain legitimacy on the “traditional” grounds, such as through the concept of
divine right of the kings. Therefore, many modern authoritarian regimes often rely on good
economic performance to win legitimacy (White, 1986).
In addition to the above theoretical arguments, empirical case studies on modern au-
thoritarian regimes also confirm that the national governments do indeed value economic
development.
For instance, Magaloni (2006) finds that in Mexico’s authoritarian period, the hegemonic
party the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)2 has strong incentives to follow economic
policies that promote economic growth, although it also has incentives to keep a solid base
poor so that these people are trapped by the party’s clientelistic practices (2006, pp. 72–73).
In China, the Communist Party’s pursuit of economic development is also widely recognized
(Riskin, 1987; Yabuki and Harner, 1999; Landry, 2008), although this enthusiasm does not
guarantee success and in fact occassionally led to economic disasters, such as the Great Leap
Forward.
In sum, provided that economic decentralization policies improve economic efficiency at
2Its acronym is based on its name in Spanish, Partido Revolucionario Institucional.
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the national level and that authoritarian national governments value good economic perfor-
mance, the national governments are expected to support economic decentralization policies.
2.2.3 Economic Policy Implementation
Economic decentralization can be viewed as a typical delegation process. By transferring
economic resources and authority to the subnational governments, authoritarian national
governments (the principal) also delegate the implementation of certain economic policies
to the subnational governments (the agent). As a delegation process, economic decentral-
ization creates agency loss for the authoritarian national governments, if the subnational
governments do not implement economic policies in the way that the national governments
desire. For instance, when the national government prefers socialist economic policies and
the subnational government prefers capitalist economic policies, economic decentralization
gives the subnational government the opportunity to implement their own preferred policies
that may go against the national agenda. Thus, authoritarian national governments are
expected to oppose economic decentralization policies.
Authoritarian national governments not only value economic outcomes, such as efficiency
and growth, but also value the means to achieve those goals, including the economic policies
and their implementation. In particular, economic decentralization policies can potentially
influence the following two aspects of economic policy implementation: (1) the policy content;
and (2) the priority level which the governments attach to these policies.
In terms of the policy content, nationalizing private enterprises is an example of imple-
menting state-led economic policies; while attracting foreign direct investment is an example
of implementing market-oriented economic policies. Economic decentralization grants more
autonomy to the subnational governments which enable them to pursue economic policies
that the national government may oppose.
In addition, economic decentralization can also affect economic policy implementation
in a subtler way by changing the policy priority. Governance involves capitalizing on a
limited government budget to pursue a comprehensive set of policy goals. Prioritization
is therefore key to the success, failure, and progress of the specific economic policies. By
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granting economic resources and authority to subnational governments, the authoritarian
national government also leaves more space for the subnational governments to determine
the priority of different economic policies.
One common scenario in which authoritarian national governments value economic pol-
icy implementation is when they are driven by strong ideologies. In the 1960s and 1970s,
the military juntas in several Latin American countries preferred economic policies that
transformed their countries into modern capitalist states because of the military’s neoliberal
ideology (O’Donnell, 1988). In the communist regimes, such as the Soviet Union and China,
the national governments pursued nationalization and collectivization to build the command
economies due to the communist ideology.
However, having a strong ideology is sufficient for the national government to value
pursuing a certain economic policy but it is not a necessary condition. It is possible that
an authoritarian national government may value policy implementation even when they do
not have a strong ideology, such as for the purpose of maximizing the ruler’s own personal
wealth or sustaining the regime which relies heavily on a certain economic policy, etc. In
the Mexican case discussed in Chapter 5, the national administrations highly valued the
establishment of a common national market over the years, despite their lack of a strong
ideology.
Economic decentralization policies can result in agency loss in the following two ways.
Firstly, if the subnational governments have different ideological leanings as the national
government and they are also strongly driven by their ideologies, they are expected either
not to implement the economic policies the national government prefers or to give such
policies low priority.
Secondly, subnational government officials rely on a different constituency and thus have
a different territorial interest from the national government officials (Falleti, 2010). Even
without strong ideological drives, subnational government officials may pursue policies that
are appealing to their own constituency, instead of following the national government’s di-
rectives. In the Chinese context, Zhang and Liu (2016) find that in Zhejiang Province after
1949, those county government officials who did not have strong political connections with
the central leadership relied on the grassroots constituencies for political survival, including
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township or urban district level officials or merchants. The local officials’ incentives in turn
led to economic policies that protected property rights and allowed the local private sector to
prosper. These policies were inconsistent with the central policy agenda at the time. Their
study shows that even in authoritarian contexts, subnational government officials are also
accountable to a subnational constituency that is different from the national government,
giving them incentives to implement economic policies contradicting the national govern-
ment’s preferences.
In sum, economic decentralization as a delegation process grants the subnational gov-
ernments autonomy to implement economic policies, which can go against the national gov-
ernment’s policy preferences. Authoritarian national governments are expected to oppose
economic decentralization policies due to the potential agency loss.
To conclude, economic decentralization has implications for three aspects that the au-
thoritarian national governments value: maximizing their economic resources and authority,
maximizing economic efficiency in the country, and implementing their preferred economic
policies. Among these three aspects, the authoritarian national governments only prefer
economic decentralization policies because they can potentially increase economic efficiency,
while these policies are viewed negatively because they can reduce the national governments’
economic resources and authority, and decrease the national governments’ ability to imple-
ment their preferred policies.
2.3 CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
In this section, I discuss the considerations of the subnational government, which form the
bases of the subnational government’s utility function discussed in Section 2.4.
The existing bottom-up approach views economic decentralization as a bargaining pro-
cess, where the subnational governments directly influence the economic decentralization
policies with their political power. They participate in the policy-making process of eco-
nomic decentralization either themselves or via other political actors who represent them,
such as the national legislators.
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Different from the previous bottom-up approach, the top-down approach here focuses
on the indirect effect of subnational governments on the economic decentralization policies.
Specifically, this approach examines how the subnational government’s decision on whether
to implement the national governments’ preferred economic policies affects the national gov-
ernment’s incentives to pursue the economic decentralization policies.
To make the decision of whether to implement the national governments’ preferred eco-
nomic policies, the subnational governments need to weigh the potential benefits and costs.
If they follow the national governments’ directives, they cannot implement their own pre-
ferred economic policies, but they may be rewarded for their loyal behavior. On the other
hand, if they deviate from the national governments’ policy preferences, the subnational
governments can pursue their own policy agenda but may receive punishments imposed by
the national governments.
2.3.1 Economic Policy Preferences
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the subnational governments can have their own economic
policy preferences that are different from the national governments’. Firstly, the subnational
governments may be driven by different ideologies than the national governments. Secondly,
the subnational governments rely on a different constituency which may lead them to prefer
a different economic policy agenda from the national government’s agenda (Falleti, 2010;
Zhang and Liu, 2016).
Thus, when considering whether to pursue the national governments’ economic policy
agenda, they need to evaluate the discrepancy between their own preferences and the na-
tional governments’ preferences. The larger the discrepancy is, the more opportunity costs
the subnational governments incur when they pursue the national governments’ preferred
economic policies.
The level of political centralization, defined as the center’s control over subnational gov-
ernment officials’ career in Chapter 1, affects the discrepancy between the national and
subnational governments’ policy preferences. To clarify, the model developed in this dis-
sertation assumes the level of political centralization to be exogeneous. It analyzes how
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political centralization levels affect the national government’s incentives to pursue economic
decentralization policies.
The authoritarian national governments, which appoint the subnational government of-
ficials, are more likely to have subnational government officials that share their economic
policy preferences, than those in countries where subnational government officials are elected
for two reasons. Firstly, the national governments that appoint subnational government of-
ficials have more leverage to ensure that the subnational government officials share the same
party labels and ideologies as themselves. Secondly, compared to local elections, appoint-
ment process reduces the accountability of the subnational officials to the local constituency,
which may drive the subnational governments to pursue a different economic policy agenda
from the national one.
Thus, in a highly politically centralized regime, it is expected that there is a smaller
divergence between the national and the subnational governments’ economic policy prefer-
ences. This means that the subnational governments tend to have lower opportunity costs
for following the national government’s policy directives.
2.3.2 Rewards and Punishments
In addition to their own economic policy preferences, the subnational governments also need
to consider the rewards and punishments they may receive conditional on whether they follow
the national government’s policy agenda.
If the subnational government officials implement the national government’s preferred
economic policies, they may get rewards from the national government. If they on the
other hand do not follow the national government’s economic policy directives, the national
government may punish them. The extent to which the national government can reward or
punish the subnational government officials also depends on the political centralization level.
In an authoritarian regime with a high level of political centralization, the national
government is more capable and likely to reward or punish the subnational government
officials for implementing or deviating from the national government’s preferred economic
policies.
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In particular, high political centralization implies strong control of the national govern-
ment over subnational government officials’ career. In a highly politically centralized regime,
the national government can punish the subnational government officials by demoting them
or removing them from office if they do not implement the national government’s preferred
economic policies; and the national government can reward the subnational government of-
ficials by promoting them if they implement the national government’s preferred economic
policies. On the other hand, in a regime where political centralization is low, the national
government cannot control the career of the subnational government officials and thus has
fewer tools to reward or punish the subnational government officials.
Thus, the national government in a highly centralized political regime is expected to
have more tools to reward and punish the subnational government officials.
2.4 A GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section, I present a game-theoretical model to analyze the top-down decision of
economic decentralization in authoritarian regimes. The game tree is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. A Model of Economic Decentralization
N
S
0
x
D I
1
UN = −θ(x− x0)2 + (1− θ)(1− x)− λNxd,
US = −λS(1− x)d− c
UN = −θ(x− x0)2 + (1− θ)(1− x)
US = −λSd
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In this game, there are two players, the national government (N) and the subnational
government (S). The national government first determines the economic decentralization
level, i.e., the share of economic resources and authority it would like the subnational govern-
ment to have, denoted as x, where x ∈ [0, 1].3 The economic decentralization level set by the
national government, x, is the level of economic autonomy of the subnational government.
The subnational government then decides whether or not to implement economic policies
consistent with the national government’s policy agenda, using its share of economic resources
and authority, i.e., x. In Figure 2.1, I represents that the subnational government implements
the national government’s policy agenda, and D denotes that the subnational government
deviates from the national government’s agenda and implements its own preferred economic
policies.
2.4.1 National Government’s Utility Functions
The utility function for the national government (N), when N decides x and the subnational
government (S) deviates from N ’s preferred economic policies is
National Government’s Utility Function for (x,D)
UN(x,D) = −θ(x− x0)2 + (1− θ)(1− x)− λNxd, (2.1)
where x0 ∈ (0, 1) is the optimal economic decentralization level dictated by the socioe-
conomic conditions; θ ∈ (0, 1) is a weighting parameter denoting the relative importance
of economic efficiency vis-à-vis maximizing economic power for the authoritarian national
government; λN > 0 is a weighting parameter denoting the relative importance of the imple-
mentation of national government’s preferred economic policies for the national government;
and d > 0 denotes the difference between the national government’s policy preferences and
the subnational government’s policy preferences.
This utility function is based on the national government’s considerations discussed in
Section 2.2. This model assumes that the decision on economic decentralization affects three
3To clarify, x in this model describes the authoritarian national government’s preferred level of economic
decentralization. To understand the reasons for economic decentralization policies, it is important to identify
x, which is the target of the economic decentralization policies.
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aspects that the national government values: the overall economic efficiency in the country,
the share of economic resources and authority controlled by the national government, and
whether the national government’s policy agenda is implemented.
In Equation 2.1, given x level of economic decentralization, −θ(x − x0)2 is the utility
that the national government obtains from economic efficiency, (1− θ)(1−x) is the national
government’s utility from controlling economic resources and authority, and −λNxd is the
national government’s utility loss due to the subnational government deviating from the
national government’s policy agenda.
Firstly, −θ(x − x0)2 builds on the literature on the socioeconomic causes of economic
decentralization. According to this literature, a country’s socioeconomic conditions, such as
its geographic and population sizes and ethnic heterogneity, determine an optimal level of
economic decentralization (x0). It is the optimal level in the sense that at this level the coun-
try’s economic efficiency is maximized. This inverted-U shaped utility set-up, −θ(x− x0)2,
is based on this literature. In particular, the overall economic efficiency of a country is rep-
resented by −(x− x0)2. It is maximized when the real economic decentralization level (x) is
equal to the optimal economic decentralization level (x0). As the real economic decentraliza-
tion level (x) moves further away from the optimal level (x0), the overall economic efficiency
decreases. Because θ > 0, the national government’s utility from economic efficiency is also
maximized at x0 and decreases as x moves further away from x0.
Secondly, (1 − θ)(1 − x) is based on the literature that the national government values
controlling economic resources and authority. As the economic decentralization level, i.e.,
the subnational government’s share of the economic resources and authority (x), increases,
the share controlled by the national government (1 − x) decreases. Because 1 − θ > 0,
the national government’s utility from controlling economic resources is a monotonically
decreasing function of x.
As a weighting parameter for economic efficiency and economic resources at the national
level, θ ∈ (0, 1) measures the location of the authoritarian national government on the preda-
tory vs. developmental dimension, using the terminology of Evans (1995). When θ is close to
0 and 1− θ is close to 1, the national government resembles a predatory government, which
hardly values the country’s overall economic efficiency but instead prioritizes controlling
36
economic resources at the national level. On the other hand, when θ is close to 1 and 1− θ
is close to 0, the national government resembles a developmental government, which places
high priority on maximizing the country’s overall economic efficiency instead of maximizing
its own economic resources and authority.
Finally, −λNxd captures the loss for the national government when the subnational gov-
ernment deviates from the national government’s economic policy agenda. This formulation
assumes that when the subnational government deviates from the national government’s
policy agenda, the subnational government uses all its share of economic resources and au-
thority to pursue its own preferred policies. The loss, thus, is determined by two factors.
Firstly, it increases with x, i.e., the subnational government’s share of economic resources
and authority. Secondly, it increases with d ∈ (0, 1], which is the economic policy preference
divergence between the subnational government and the national government.
xd denotes the gap between the national government’s ideal policy agenda and the final
policy agenda being implemented. This formulation relies on the following assumptions.
Different policy agendas, as different combinations of economic policies, are assumed to fall
on a one-dimensional interval, [0, 1]. I denote the national government’s ideal policy agenda
as pN ∈ [0, 1] and the subnational government’s ideal policy agenda as pS ∈ [0, 1], where
pN ̸= pS. d denotes the difference in economic policy preferences between the national
government and subnational government, i.e., d = |pN − pS|. d falls in the interval (0, 1].
The closer pS is to pN , the closer d is to 0, while as pS becomes further away from pN , d is
closer to 1. When subnational government deviates from the national government’s policy
agenda, it uses its share of economic resources (x) to pursue its own policy agenda, pS;
while the national government uses its own share of resources (1 − x) to pursue its policy
agenda, pN . Thus, the final policies being implemented is pF = pN(1 − x) + pSx. The
gap between the national government’s ideal policy agenda and the final policy agenda is
|pN−pF |= |(pN−pS)x|. Thus, the gap between the national government’s ideal policy agenda
and the final policy agenda, |pN − pF |, becomes xd. As stated in Section 2.3, a country’s
level of political centralization can affect d. A highly centralized political system can have a
d close to its theoretical minimum (d→ 0), because the national government can and often
appoint subnational officials who share their economic policy preferences, and secondly, the
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subnational officials also lack the incentives to be accountable to the local constituencies.
To the contrary, a highly decentralized political system can have a d close to its theoretical
maximum (d→ 1).
λN > 0 is a parameter capturing the extent to which the national government prioritizes
the implementation of its preferred economic policies. The national government’s utility
derived from the policies being implemented is thus −λNxd, which decreases as the gap
between the final policies and the national government’s preferred economic policies, xd,
increases. As emphasized before, the more ideological the national government is, the more
weight it places on the economic policy implementation. Thus, I refer to λN as the parameter
capturing the ideological adherence of the national government. Theoretically, there are other
possible reasons beyond the ideological adherence that can motivate the national government
to value the implementation of its preferred economic policies. For instance, in the Mexican
case discussed in Chapter 5, the Mexican national government valued creating a common
national market, although the national elite was often regarded as pragmatic.
Table 2.1. A Typology of the National Governments (NG)
θ
High (Developmental) Low (Predatory)
λN
High (Ideological) Ideological Developmental NG Ideological Predatory NG
Low (Pragmatic) Pragmatic Developmental NG Pragmatic Predatory NG
It is worth noting that in this theory, whether the national government is developmental
or predatory, i.e., the value of θ, does not determine the priority that the national government
assigns to the implementation of its policy agenda, which is the value of λN . A developmental
national government that prioritizes the overall economic efficiency may or may not value the
implementation of the economic policies. There can be ideological developmental national
government with high λN and high θ or pragmatic developmental national government with
low λN and high θ. Similarly, a predatory national government that prioritizes controlling
the economic resources at the national level may or may not value the economic policy
implementation. There can be ideological predatory national government with high λN and
low θ and pragmatic predatory national government with low λN and low θ. I list these four
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types of national governments in Table 2.1.
The utility function for the national government (N), when N decides x as the eco-
nomic decentralization level and the subnational government (S) implements N ’s preferred
economic policies is
National Government’s Utility Function for (x, I)
UN(x, I) = −θ(x− x0)2 + (1− θ)(1− x), (2.2)
where x0 ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1).
As in UN(x,D) in Equation 2.1, x0 represents the optimal economic decentralization level
based on the socioeconomic conditions and θ represents the location of the authoritarian
national government on the predatory vs. developmental scale. The condition that the
subnational government implements the national government’s preferred economic policies
does not change how the economic decentralization level (x) affects economic efficiency and
the national government’s control over economic resources and authority, i.e., the first two
components in UN(x,D).
What the condition changes is the third component in UN(x,D), i.e., −λNxd. In the
case that the subnational government implements the national government’s policy agenda,
the subnational government uses its share of economic resources (x) to implement pN . The
national government uses its own share (1−x) to pursue its preferred policies as well. Thus,
there is no gap between the final policy being implemented and the national government’s
policy agenda. The third term drops and we get the utility function in Equation 2.2.4
2.4.2 Subnational Government’s Utility Functions
The utility function for the subnational government (S), when the national government
decides x and the subnational government deviates from the national government’s preferred
economic policies is
4Specifically, the final policy agenda being implemented, pF , is equal to pNx + pN (1 − x) = pN . The
gap between the national government’s ideal policy agenda and the final policy agenda implemented is
|pN − pF |, which becomes 0. Given that λN denotes the importance of policy implementation for the
national government, the national government’s utility from policy implementation is −λN ∗ |pN − pF |,
which is 0 in this case.
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Subnational Government’s Utility Function for (x,D)
US(x,D) = −λS(1− x)d− c. (2.3)
where d ∈ (0, 1] denotes the difference in economic policy preferences between the national
government and the subnational government, same as in the national government’s utility
functions; c > 0 denotes the punishments that the national government imposes on the
subnational government’s officials; and λS > 0 is a weighting parameter denoting to what
extent the subnational government values economic policy implementation.
Firstly, c > 0 captures the punishments that the national government imposes on the
subnational government for deviating from the national government’s preferred economic
policies. I specifically focus on the career aspects of the punishments, including demot-
ing and removing the subnational government officials, and reducing their chance of being
promoted. As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.2, a high level of political centralization, re-
ferring to that the center has a strong control over subnational government officials’ career
prospects, increases the punishments the national government can impose, i.e., the c term.
On the other hand, a low level of political centralization, for instance, when the subnational
government officials are locally elected, reduces the national government’s ability to punish
the subnational government officials.
To note, the model allows the possibility for the national government to reward the subna-
tional government for implementing the national government’s preferred economic policies. I
group these potential rewards in the c term, as negative punishments. Specifically, when the
subnational government does not implement the national government’s preferred economic
policies, it forgoes the potential rewards. c is the sum of the punishments, such as removal
and demotion, and the forgone rewards, such as promotion. Similar to the punishments, the
forgone rewards also increase with the level of political centralization, because the national
government’s strong control over the subnational government officials’ career also allows the
national government to promote the subnational government officials. Therefore, the level of
political centralization positively affects c. Since I group the forgone rewards in the c term,
I no longer include a term for rewards in the subnational government’s utility function when
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it implements the national government’s economic policies, i.e., US(x, I) in Equation 2.4, to
avoid double counting.
Secondly, −λS(1−x)d is the subnational government’s utility derived from the economic
policies implemented. Same as the utility setup for the national government, UN(x,D), I
assume that all economic policies fall on the one-dimensional interval [0, 1] and the national
government’s and the subnational government’s ideal policy agendas are pN ∈ [0, 1] and
pS ∈ [0, 1] respectively, where pN ̸= pS. d denotes the policy preference difference between
the national government and the subnational government, i.e., d = |pN − pS|, and d ∈
(0, 1]. When the subnational government deviates from the national government’s preferred
economic policies, the subnational government uses its share of economic resources and
authority (x) to pursue its own policy agenda, pS. The national government uses its share
(1 − x) to implement its preferred economic policies, pN . The final policy agenda being
pursued is pF = pN(1−x)+pSx. The gap between the final policy agenda and the subnational
government’s ideal policy agenda is |pS − pF |= |(pN − pS)(1− x)|= (1− x)d.
λS is a weighting parameter, capturing the relative importance of realizing its own eco-
nomic policies for the subnational government. Thus, the subnational government’s utility
from the economic policies being implemented is −λS(1−x)d. The utility function decreases,
as the gap between the final policy agenda and the subnational government’s preferred pol-
icy agenda, (1− x)d, increases. Like λN for the national government, high λS is referred to
as the ideological adherence of the subnational governments. But again, theoretically there
can also be other reasons than ideological adherence that cause the subnational government
officials to value the implementation of their preferred economic policies. For example, the
local government officials may prefer a specific economic policy because it can help them
seek local rents or maximize the local government revenues.
The utility function for the subnational government (S), when the national government
decides x and the subnational government implements the national government’s preferred
economic policies is
Subnational Government’s Utility Function for (x, I)
US(x, I) = −λSd, (2.4)
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where λS > 0 and d ∈ (0, 1].
Firstly, this utility function does not include a separate term for subnational government
officials’ potential career rewards for implementing the national government’s policy agenda.
As explained earlier when I discuss the c term in US(x,D), the punishments term c includes
both the direct punishments and the foregone rewards.
Secondly, −λSd is the subnational government’s utility derived from the economic policies
implemented. The difference between this term and −λS(1−x)d in US(x,D) is a result of the
change in the final policies being implemented, which leads to a change in the gap between
the final policies and the subnational government’s preferred policies. Specifically, when the
subnational government implements the national government’s preferred economic policies,
the final policy agenda being implemented is pF = pN . The gap between the final policy
agenda and the subnational government’s ideal policy agenda is |pS − pF |= |pS − pN |= d.
λS is the same weighting parameter as in US(x,D), capturing the relative importance
of economic policies for the subnational government. Thus, the subnational government’s
utility from economic policies is −λSd.
So far, I have presented the game setup and clarified the utility functions for the national
and subnational governments in Figure 2.1. Because it is an extensive form game, I analyze
the SPNE in the following sections.
2.5 DISCUSSIONS
2.5.1 Subnational Government’s “Deviation Threshold”
This section introduces the concept of the subnational government’s “deviation threshold,”
which is a key link in the causal mechanism of how a country’s political centralization level
affects the national government’s incentives to pursue the economic decentralization policies.
The deviation threshold derived from the model refers to the maximum level of economic
decentralization that the national government can grant the subnational government with-
out triggering policy deviations by the subnational government. This section (2.5.1) shows
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how the deviation threshold depends on the political centralization levels and the next sec-
tion (2.5.2) shows how it affects the national government’s calculation when deciding which
economic decentralization level it desires.
Using backward induction, provided that the subnational government’s utility functions
are  US(x,D) = −λS(1− x)d− cUS(x, I) = −λSd,
the subnational government chooses to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda,
when US(x,D) > US(x, I). Solving for x, we obtain x >
c
λSd
. Thus, when the economic
decentralization level is below c
λSd
, the subnational government implements the national
government’s policy agenda. When the economic decentralization level exceeds c
λSd
, the
subnational government deviates from the national government’s policy agenda and uses its
share of economic resources and authority to implement its own preferred economic policies.
xτ =
c
λSd
is therefore the economic decentralization threshold, above which the sub-
national government chooses to deviate from the national government’s preferred economic
policies. I call xτ the subnational government’s “deviation threshold.” Because the deviation
threshold is crucial in determining the SPNE outcomes, I discuss its characteristics first in
this section.
2.5.1.1 Deviation Threshold and Economic Decentralization Level Why is there
a deviation threshold? The deviation threshold exists because (1) the subnational govern-
ment’s utility of policy deviation increases with the economic decentralization level, and (2)
the national government punishes the subnational government for policy deviation.
Firstly, as the economic decentralization level increases, the option of deviating from the
national government’s policy agenda becomes more attractive for the subnational govern-
ment. This is because with more economic resources and authority, the policy deviation by
the subnational government would shift the final policies closer to the subnational govern-
ment’s agenda and thus would generate higher utilities.
When economic decentralization level is low, for instance, when 10% of economic re-
sources are under the subnational government’s control, the subnational government has
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much less resource to realize its policy goals than when 50% of economic resources are un-
der its control. When the economic decentralization level is 50% and if the subnational
government deviates from the national government’s policy agenda, the deviation is more
rewarding because the subnational government can achieve more with these resources.
On the other hand, the national government imposes a fixed punishment on the subna-
tional government for policy deviation. When the economic decentralization level is below
the threshold (xτ ), although higher economic decentralization levels generate a higher utility
of policy deviation, the benefits of policy deviation are not worth the punishment and the
subnational government does not deviate. When the economic decentralization level is above
this threshold (xτ ), the benefits of deviation outweigh the punishment and the subnational
government chooses to deviate.
When the deviation threshold is very high, even if the national government decentralizes
to a great extent, the subnational government would not choose to deviate. An extreme
example is when the deviation threshold is greater than 1, even when the national government
chooses to grant the subnational government 100% of economic resources, the subnational
government would follow the national government’s policy agenda. On the other hand, when
the deviation threshold is low, even if the economic decentralization level is not high, the
subnational government would still deviate. For instance, if the deviation threshold is 0.1,
even when the economic decentralization level is as low as 11%, the subnational government
would still use these limited economic resources to pursue their own policy agenda.
2.5.1.2 Determinants of Deviation Threshold The deviation threshold increases
with the relative strength of the reward-punishment mechanism ( c
λS
), holding the policy
preference divergence (d) constant. It decreases with the policy preference divergence (d),
holding c
λS
constant.
c
λS
reflects the relative strength of the reward-punishment mechanism. It is a ratio of the
potential punishment received by the subnational government for policy deviation over the
importance the subnational government attaches to realizing its own policy agenda. If the
punishment term increases at the same rate as the importance of policy implementation for
the subnational government, the relative strength of the reward-punishment mechanism stays
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the same. It is only when the ratio increases, I consider the reward-punishment mechanism
becomes relatively stronger.
It is often the case that a high level of political centralization implies a strong reward-
punishment mechanism. By increasing the national government’s political control over sub-
national government’s personnel, political centralization not only increases the potential
punishment it can impose on the subnational government for the latter’s policy deviation
through demoting or removing the officials, but also reduces the priority the subnational
government attaches to pursuing its preferred economic policies, because now the subna-
tional government officials are more accountable to the national government instead of their
local constituencies.
Theoretically it is possible that political centralization is accompanied by a weakening
of the reward-punishment mechanism. The definition of political centralization implies that
there is an increase in c. If for some exogenous reason the subnational government sud-
denly cares about pursuing a certain economic policy to a great extent, although political
centralization increases the punishment, the reward-punishment mechanism still weakens.
Figure 2.2. Deviation Threshold and the Relative Strength of the Reward-Punishment
Mechanism
Figure 2.2 shows the deviation threshold as a function of the relative strength of the
reward-punishment mechanism, when d = 0.5. As the reward-punishment mechanism pa-
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rameter ( c
λS
) increases from 0.3 to 0.4, the deviation threshold increases from 0.6 to 0.8,
and the subnational government becomes less likely to deviate from the national govern-
ment’s policy agenda.5 As c
λS
continues to increase from 0.4 to 0.6, the deviation threshold
continues to increase to 1.2, greater than 1. In this case, regardless of the economic decen-
tralization levels, the subnational government never deviates from the national government’s
policy agenda, because the economic decentralization level is always less than the deviation
threshold. Holding the policy preference divergence term constant, there always exists a
theoretical value of c
λS
, so that the deviation threshold is greater than 1 and the subnational
government always implements the national government’s policy agenda.6
Because a higher political centralization level implies a stronger reward-punishment
mechanism in most cases, the subnational governments in such a system also have a lower
deviation threshold, if we hold the policy preference divergence term (d) constant.
Figure 2.3. Deviation Threshold Depends on the Policy Preference Divergence
In the meanwhile, holding the reward-punishment mechanism ( c
λS
) constant, the devi-
ation threshold is a monotonically decreasing function of the policy preference divergence
5Deviation is less likely in the sense that as the deviation threshold increases, there is an increasing range
of economic decentralization levels within which the subnational government chooses to pursue the national
government’s agenda.
6For any d0 ∈ (0, 1], there always exists a pair of c and λS , so that c
λSd0
> 1.
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between the two levels of governments (d). Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the
deviation threshold and the policy preference divergence, when c
λS
= 0.2.7 As the policy
preference divergence term (d) decreases from 0.6 to 0.4, the deviation threshold increases
from 0.33 to 0.5. This means that as the policy preferences between the subnational gov-
ernment and the national government become more similar, the subnational government
becomes less likely to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda. As the diver-
gence term (d) continues to decrease from 0.4 to 0.15, the deviation threshold continues to
increase to 1.33, which is greater than 1. For such a high deviation threshold, no matter
how high the economic decentralization level is, the subnational government never deviates
from the national government’s policy agenda.
For a highly politically centralized country, the national government controls the sub-
national government officials’ appointment and removal and is more capable to appoint a
subnational government official who shares the national government’s policy preference and
thus has a lower d term and a higher deviation threshold. Moreover, in a highly politically
centralized authoritarian regime, the subnational government is also less accountable to the
local constituency or local interests in general. As discussed earlier, subnational government’s
accountability to local interests is a source of policy preference differences between the two
levels of governments. Low accountability to the local interests, thus, also reduces the policy
preference divergence (d). Therefore, high political centralization levels decrease the policy
preference divergence between the national and subnational governments and increase the
deviation threshold.
So far, I have introduced the concept of the subnational government’s “deviation thresh-
old,” which is the maximum economic decentralization level that the national government
can set without triggering the policy deviations from the subnational governments. The
subnational government’s deviation thresholds are higher in systems with higher political
centralization levels, because higher political centralization levels imply a stronger reward-
punishment mechanism and a lower policy preference divergence between the national and
7For the subnational government, when the reward-punishment mechanism is too strong, i.e., when
c
λS
> 1, regardless of the policy preference divergence (d), the deviation threshold is always greater than 1
and the subnational government never deviates from the national government’s policy agenda. Thus, one
condition for the policy preference divergence to affect the deviation threshold is that the relative strength
of the reward-punishment mechanism is not too high.
47
subnational governments.
2.5.2 Deviation Thresholds and the SPNE Outcomes
The game can reach four pure strategy SPNE outcomes. The SPNE outcomes are different
for the different types of the national government in Table 2.1. The following discussion
centers around one type of the national government, the ideological developmental type. In
a country that has a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
level, the positive effects of political centralization on the economic decentralization policies
are most significant under the ideological developmental type among all national government
types. This type is also the empirical focus of the comparative case studies of China (in
Chapter 4) and Mexico (in Chapter 5). For this type of national government, two SPNE
outcomes are possible. In addition to the ideological developmental type, I also discuss the
other types to provide a benchmark and show the conditions under which the other two
SPNE outcomes are possible. The comparative statics for how the equilibrium economic
decentralization levels change with the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism and
the policy preference divergence between the two levels of the government are discussed in
Appendix A.
Depending on the values of the six parameters, including x0 (depending on the country’s
socioeconomic conditions), θ and λN (capturing the types of the national government), and
d, c, and λS (depending on the political centralization level), the game has four possible pure
strategy SPNE outcomes. They are (0, I), (xD, D), (xτ , I), and (xI , I), where
Three Possible SPNE Economic Decentralization Levels
xD = x0 − 1− θ
2θ
− λNd
2θ
xτ =
c
λSd
xI = x0 − 1− θ
2θ
.
(2.5)
(0, I) means that the national government implements complete economic centraliza-
tion, and the subnational government implements the national government’s economic policy
agenda.8
8In this case, whether the subnational government implements or deviates from the national agenda is
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(xD, D) happens when the national government sets the economic decentralization level
higher than the subnational government’s deviation threshold and anticipates policy devia-
tions from the subnational government. In this way, the national government sacrifices the
implementation of its preferred economic policies at the subnational level in exchange for
the economic efficiency gains promised by the economic decentralization. The subnational
government deviates from the national government’s preferred economic policies.
(xτ , I) happens when the national government sets the economic decentralization level
at the subnational government’s deviation threshold to ensure the policy implementation at
the subnational level, and the subnational government implements the national government’s
economic agenda.
Finally, (xI , I) means that the national government sets the economic decentralization
level at a rather high level that only depends on the socioeconomic conditions and its own
desire of economic development without worrying about the subnational government’s policy
deviations, and the subnational government implements the national economic agenda.
Which SPNE outcome is reached depends on the values of the model’s six parameters. For
an ideological developmental national government (the focus of the next three chapters), if it
governs a country with a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
level (x0)—for instance, the country is large in terms of its population and geographic size,
ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, or economically developed—the theory predicts
that there are two possible SPNE outcomes. They are (xτ , I) and (xI , I).9 Between them,
whether the outcome is (xτ , I) or (xI , I) depends on the relative quantities of xτ and xI (see
Equation 2.5).
Firstly, being a developmental national government in a country with a high socioe-
conomically optimal economic decentralization level, shown in the shaded area in Figure
2.4, makes the two SPNE outcomes—(xτ , I) and (xI , I)—possible.10 In contrast, if the na-
trivial, because the subnational government does not have any economic resources to affect the final policy
outcome.
9The exact conditions required for the SPNE outcomes to be either (xτ , I) or (xI , I) are{
λNd ≥ 2θx0 + θ − 1
2θx0 + θ > 1.
10Specifically, θ and x0 should satisfy 2θx0 + θ > 1.
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Figure 2.4. The Effects of the Socioeconomically Optimal Economic Decentralization Level
(x0) and NG’s Developmentalism (θ) on the Four SPNE Outcomes
tional government is predatory (regardless of whether it is ideological or pragmatic) or the
country has a low socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, shown in the
unshaded area in Figure 2.4, only the SPNE outcome (0, I), namely the complete economic
centralization outcome, is possible.
Secondly, being an ideological developmental national government makes (xD, D) impos-
sible. (xD, D) is only possible for the relatively pragmatic developmental national govern-
ment, because only when λN is relatively low, is the national government willing to sacrifice
the policy implementation at the subnational level in exchange for the economic efficiency
gains through economic decentralization.11 It is worth noting that whether (xD, D) is pos-
sible depends on λNd. Holding the policy preference divergence d constant, the ideological
parameter λN then determines whether (xD, D) is possible. When d is high, the national
11The conditions for (xD, D) to be a possible SPNE outcome are{
λNd < 2θx0 + θ − 1
2θx0 + θ > 1.
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government can be relatively pragmatic, namely λN can be relatively low, while (xD, D)
still cannot be the SPNE outcome. On the other hand, when d is very low, the national
government can be relatively ideological, while (xD, D) is still possible. This is illustrated in
Figure A9 in the Appendix.
Figure 2.5. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level (x∗) and the Deviation Threshold
(xτ ) for an Ideological Developmental National Government
Now provided that a national government is the ideological developmental type and it
governs in a country with a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentraliza-
tion level, how does the level of the political centralization affect the national government’s
incentives to pursue the economic decentralization policies? As discussed earlier, a higher
political centralization level can increase the subnational government’s deviation threshold
through strengthening the reward-punishment mechanism and reducing the policy prefer-
ence divergence between the national and subnational governments. At the same time, an
increase in the deviation threshold can increase the equilibrium economic decentralization
level.
Illustrated in Figure 2.5, the equilibrium economic decentralization level depends on
the subnational government’s deviation threshold xτ . When the subnational government’s
deviation threshold xτ is less than or equal to xI , illustrated by the three values xτ1 , xτ2 , and
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xτ3 in Figure 2.5, the equilibrium outcome is (xτ , I). When the subnational government’s
deviation threshold xτ is greater than xI , such as xτ4 in Figure 2.5, the equilibrium outcome
is (xI , I).
Thus, for an ideological developmental national government in a country with a rel-
atively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, the national gov-
ernment would either set the economic decentralization level at the deviation threshold, if
the political centralization level is low; or set it at the highest level ever desired by the
national government (constrained by the socioeconomic conditions and the national govern-
ment’s predatory tendency12), if the political centralization level is high. In all cases, the
subnational government implements the national government’s preferred economic policies.
In summary, being an ideological national government makes the national government
strongly dislike the subnational government’s policy deviations, which makes it impossible
for (xD, D) to be an SPNE outcome. Being a developmental national government in a
country with a high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level makes the
national government unwilling to have a completely centralized economic system. Thus,
(0, I) is impossible. When all the conditions (high λN , high θ, and high x0) are met, a higher
political centralization level can increase the national government’s incentives to pursue the
economic decentralization policies.
In the comparative case study chapters on the postrevolutionary regimes in China and
Mexico, I test whether and how the levels of political centralization affected the subna-
tional governments’ deviation thresholds and whether and how the subnational governments’
deviation thresholds affected the national government’s incentives to pursue the economic
(de)centralization policies. These two cases satisfy the conditions identified by the theoretical
model, which include the national governments in both countries were relatively ideological
and developmentally oriented during the historical period being studied, and both countries
are large enough to have relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
levels. The case selection criteria and the case study method will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3.
Now I briefly discuss the SPNE outcomes for the other types of national government.
12Recall that xI = x0 − 1− θ
2θ
. xI is a monotonically increasing function of x0 and θ.
52
Firstly, as mentioned earlier, for a predatory national government or a relatively developmen-
tal national government that governs a country with a very low socioeconomically optimal
economic decentralization level, the SPNE outcome is expected to be (0, I).13
In order for the complete economic centralization to be the SPNE outcome, the values
of θ (the degree of developmentalism of the authoritarian national government) and x0 (the
socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level) need to fall in the unshaded area
in Figure 2.4. When the national government is extremely predatory, i.e., when θ ∈ (0, 1
3
],
the SPNE economic decentralization level is always zero, regardless of how high the socioe-
conomically optimal level (x0) is. This implies that being an extremely predatory national
government is a sufficient condition for the complete economic centralization. As the na-
tional government becomes increasingly developmental (as θ increases), whether the SPNE
outcome is the complete economic centralization depends on the socioeconomically optimal
economic decentralization level (x0). A developmental national government prefers the com-
plete economic centralization outcome, when the country has a very low socioeconomically
optimal economic decentralization level. It needs to be a relatively small country in terms
of its geographic and population sizes, or ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, or eco-
nomically not very developed. On the other hand, for a predatory national government, its
socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level can be relatively high while it still
pursues complete economic centralization.
When (0, I) is the SPNE outcome, the level of the political centralization no longer
affects the equilibrium economic decentralization level, because the national government
would always prefer complete economic centralization.
Finally, for a pragmatic developmental national government in a country with a relatively
high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, three SPNE outcomes—
(xD, D), (xτ , I), and (xI , I)—are possible. Which one of these three is reached depends on
the level of the political centralization.
When the political centralization level is low and thus the subnational government’s de-
viation threshold is low, the pragmatic developmental national government would prefer to
set the economic decentralization level at a level higher than the subnational government’s
13The exact condition for (0, I) to be 2θx0 + θ < 1.
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deviation threshold and thus allow policy deviations at the subnational level in exchange
for higher economic efficiency. In this case, (xD, D) is the SPNE outcome.14 As the po-
litical centralization level increases, the subnational government’s deviation threshold also
increases. At one point, the subnational government’s deviation threshold is high enough
that if the economic decentralization level is set at the deviation threshold, the national
government could obtain sufficient economic efficiency that it is no longer willing to allow
policy deviations at the subnational level. In this case, (xτ , I) becomes the SPNE outcome.15
As the political centralization level and the subnational government’s deviation threshold
continues to increase and exceeds xI—the highest economic decentralization level ever de-
sired by the national government constrained only by the socioeconomic conditions and the
national government’s predatory tendency—the national government no longer sets the eco-
nomic decentralization level at the subnational government’s deviation threshold. Instead,
it sets the economic decentralization level at xI , and the SPNE outcome is (xI , I).16
For the pragmatic developmental national government, the equilibrium economic decen-
tralization level no longer simply increases with the political centralization level, like the
case for the ideological developmental type. It is possible for an increase in the political
centralization level to result in a decrease in the economic decentralization level. This is
a phenomenon caused by the national government’s pragmatism. In particular, such a na-
tional government would tolerate the subnational level’s policy deviations when the political
centralization level is low, rather than set the economic decentralization at a low level and
lose economic efficiency. As mentioned earlier, this aspect of the theoretical prediction is
not tested in the case study chapters, but is worth exploring in future research.
2.5.3 Empirical Implications
This section discusses the empirical implications of the theoretical model. One advantage of
deriving the empirical implications from the theoretical model is that the model can, in a
14When xτ < xI −
√
λNd
θ
(xI − λNd
4θ
), (xD, D) is the SPNE outcome.
15When xI −
√
λNd
θ
(xI − λNd
4θ
) ≤ xτ ≤ xI , (xτ , I) is the SPNE outcome.
16When xτ > xI , (xI , I) is the SPNE outcome.
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clear manner, identify the scope conditions under which a high level of political centralization
facilitates the economic decentralization policies.
Hypothesis 1 In authoritarian systems, when the national governments are ideological and
developmental and the countries have relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic de-
centralization levels, a system with a higher political centralization level has a higher economic
decentralization level.
This is the main hypothesis tested in the later case study chapters on the postrevolu-
tionary regimes of China and Mexico. As stated in the hypothesis, the model identifies four
scope conditions for the political centralization level to increase the equilibrium economic
decentralization levels.
The first condition is that the system is authoritarian. Because the theoretical model
analyzes the economic decentralization process as a top-down delegation process as opposed
to a bottom-up bargaining process, the implications drawn from the model are more appli-
cable to the cases where the bottom-up mechanisms are weak. These are likely to be the
authoritarian systems, because in authoritarian systems the channels through which the sub-
national governments would voice their demands for more economic decentralization, such
as the legislatures and the media, are relatively weak and lacking autonomy. Moreover, in
authoritarian systems, the subnational governments also often lack the power to sustain a
strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the national government, compared to the subnational
governments in democracies. Although the top-down mechanisms are more likely to operate
in authoritarian regimes than in democracies, being an authoritarian system is neither a suf-
ficient nor a necessary condition for the process to be a top-down process. Admittedly, there
are authoritarian cases where the economic decentralization policies are resulted from the
bottom-up pressures, for instance, Yugoslavia granted both political and economic authority
to its republics in the 1970s due to the bottom-up mobilizations prior to 1971. Also, there
are potential democratic cases where the economic decentralization policies can be results
of a top-down process. Being authoritarian is a loose scope condition that proxies a system
where the top-down mechanism is strong.
The second condition is that the national government is the ideological type. This con-
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dition ensures that the relationship between the level of political centralization and the
economic decentralization outcomes is a monotonically increasing one. Unlike the pragmatic
type, which tolerates the subnational government’s policy deviations when the political cen-
tralization level is low, the ideological type values the policy implementation at the subna-
tional level to a sufficient extent that it is unwilling to sacrifice the policy implementation
in exchange for higher economic efficiency promised by the economic decentralization. The
pragmatic type allows for a non-monotonic relationship, because the national government’s
preferred economic decentralization level is not only high when the political centralization
level is high (like the ideological type) but also high when the political centralization level
is low (due to its pragmatism). On the other hand, for the ideological type, the national
government’s preferred economic decentralization level monotonically increases with the po-
litical centralization level, due to the national government’s unwillingness to tolerate policy
deviations at the subnational level. Although this theory intends to capture the overall level
of economic decentralization and as a result the discussions so far describe the overall ideolog-
ical level of the national government, in fact this model can be applied to a narrower context,
where the decentralization level in a particular economic policy area depends on how much
the national government values the policy implementation in this particular policy area. In
this case, even when the national government appears pragmatic in general, if it values the
implementation of a particular economic policy enough, it is expected to behave like other
ideological national governments in the sense that its preferred decentralization level in this
economic policy area monotonically increases with the level of political centralization.
Although the pragmatic type is not the focus of this dissertation, understanding the eco-
nomic decentralization logic for the pragmatic type can clarify the scope condition. Moreover,
the economic decentralization logic for the pragmatic type is an important empirical impli-
cation derived from the theory and worth future empirical examinations. Thus, I present
the hypothesis for the pragmatic type in the following.
Hypothesis 2 In authoritarian systems, when the national governments are pragmatic and
developmental and the countries have relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic
decentralization levels, the economic decentralization level has a non-monotonic relationship
with the political centralization level: when the level of political centralization is low, the
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economic decentralization level is high; when the level of political centralization passes a
threshold, the economic decentralization level drops to the subnational government’s deviation
threshold and increases with the political centralization level; and when the level of political
centralization is high, the economic decentralization level remains high.
Finally, the third and fourth scope conditions are that the national governments are
developmental and the country has a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic de-
centralization level. These two conditions allow the political centralization level to have an
effect on the economic decentralization level. As explained in the earlier section (in Figure
2.4), the opposite cases include a predatory national government or a weakly developmental
national government in a country with a low socioeconomically optimal economic decentral-
ization level. In either case, the equilibrium outcome is that the national government pursues
complete economic centralization, regardless of the political centralization levels. Thus, the
political centralization level no longer affects the economic decentralization levels.
Again, although this is not the empirical focus of this dissertation, it is an important
theoretical prediction that clarifies the scope condition for Hypothesis 1 and worth empirical
examinations in the future. Thus, I present the hypothesis here.
Hypothesis 3 In authoritarian systems, when the national governments are predatory or
when the national governments are developmental but the countries have relatively low so-
cioeconomically optimal economic decentralization levels, the economic system is completely
centralized. The economic decentralization level does not depend on the political centralization
level.
In summary, this section first introduces the concept of the subnational government’s de-
viation threshold, which is the maximum level of economic decentralization level the national
government can set without triggering the subnational government’s policy deviations. The
subnational government’s deviation threshold depends on a country’s political centralization
level, because the political centralization level influences the national government’s ability
to reward and punish the subnational officials and affects their policy preferences. Then, I
present the SPNE outcomes for the different types of the national government, with an em-
phasis on the ideological developmental type, which is the focus of the case study chapters.
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For the ideological developmental national government in a country with a relatively high
socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, the equilibrium economic decen-
tralization levels are constrained by the political centralization levels. Specifically, when the
political centralization level is low, which results in a low deviation threshold for the sub-
national government, the ideological developmental type would prefer to set the economic
decentralization level at the deviation threshold to ensure the implementation of its pre-
ferred economic policies at the subnational level. The equilibrium economic decentralization
level increases as the political centralization level increases, until it reaches the highest level
ever desired by the national government. From that point on, the equilibrium economic
decentralization level stays constant and no longer increases with the political centralization
level. I also discuss the SPNE outcomes for the other types of the national government. The
predatory national government, regardless of whether it is ideological or pragmatic, prefers
the complete economic centralization outcome. The pragmatic developmental national gov-
ernment is willing to sacrifice the implementation of its preferred economic policies at the
subnational level in exchange for a higher economic efficiency, when the political central-
ization level is low. When the political centralization level is high enough, the behavior of
the pragmatic developmental national government is similar to an ideological developmental
national government, in the sense that it would also either set the economic decentralization
level at the deviation threshold or at a rather high level when the political centralization
level is high enough. The detailed comparative statics of how the equilibrium economic de-
centralization levels change with the strength of the reward-punishment mechanisms and the
policy preference divergence between the national and subnational governments are shown
in Appendix A. Finally, I summarize the empirical implications of the theoretical model in
three hypotheses. The main focus of the dissertation is to test Hypothesis 1, but I also
present the other two hypotheses because they not only help explain the scope conditions of
Hypothesis 1, but are also crucial empirical implications drawn from the theory and worth
further empirical examinations.
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter proposes a game-theoretical model to analyze the political conditions for eco-
nomic decentralization in authoritarian regimes from a top-down perspective. The theoretical
model produces several empirical implications. This dissertation focuses on testing one of
them, summarized as Hypothesis 1. Under the four scope conditions (the regime is authori-
tarian, the national government is the ideological and developmental type, and the country
has a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level), a high level
of political centralization can increase the economic decentralization levels in a country.
To recap the theoretical model, the game has two players, the national government and
the subnational government. The national government moves first and decides the country’s
level of economic decentralization in a top-down manner; the subnational government then
chooses whether to use the economic resources, which the national government grants it,
to pursue the national government’s economic agenda or deviate from the national agenda
and implement its own preferred economic policies. The national government’s decision
on the economic decentralization level depends on its weighing the costs and benefits of the
economic decentralization with regard to the following three aspects: the economic resources
and authority at its own hands; the overall economic efficiency in the country; and the
implementation of its preferred economic policies at the subnational level. The subnational
government’s decision to pursue the national economic agenda or its own economic agenda is
based on its calculation of the costs and benefits with regard to the two aspects it values: the
implementation of its own preferred economic policies within its jurisdiction; and the reward
and punishment that it would receive from the national government for implementing the
national economic agenda or its own preferred policies.
The game-theoretical model produces a crucial concept that links the political central-
ization level and the economic decentralization level, which is the subnational government’s
deviation threshold. The subnational government’s deviation threshold refers to the max-
imum level of economic decentralization level the national government can grant the sub-
national government without triggering their policy deviation behaviors. The subnational
government’s deviation threshold depends on two political conditions: the strength of the
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reward-punishment mechanism, with which the national government can incentivize the
subnational government to implement the national economic agenda; and the policy prefer-
ence divergence between the national and subnational governments. In particular, the sub-
national government’s deviation threshold increases as the reward-punishment mechanism
strengthens and the policy preference divergence shrinks. Because an increase in the polit-
ical centralization level—defined as the national government’s control over the subnational
government’s personnel—is expected to both strengthen the reward-punishment mechanism
and reduce the policy preference divergence; an increase in the political centralization level is
expected to raise the subnational government’s deviation threshold and as a result influence
the economic decentralization outcomes.
How the subnational government’s deviation threshold affects the equilibrium economic
decentralization level depends on the type of the national government and the socioeconom-
ically optimal economic decentralization level. As the empirical component of this disser-
tation focuses on one type of the national government—the ideological developmental type,
the discussion in this section emphasizes the economic decentralization logic for this type of
national government. In particular, for the ideological developmental national government
in a country with a relatively high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
level, the equilibrium economic decentralization monotonically increases with the political
centralization level. Being the developmental type in a country with a relatively high socioe-
conomically optimal economic decentralization level ensure that the national government
does not just pursue complete economic centralization, and thus allow the political central-
ization to have an impact on the economic decentralization level. Being the ideological type
implies that the national government is unwilling to tolerate the subnational government’s
policy deviations when the political centralization level is low, which makes the relationship
between the political centralization level and the equilibrium economic decentralization level
a monotonically increasing one. This is summarized in Hypothesis 1. Additionally, I also
present two other empirical implications drawn from the theoretical model for the pragmatic
developmental type (Hypothesis 2) and the predatory type (Hypothesis 3), although they
are not the focus of this dissertation.
This theoretical model has other empirical implications that can be evaluated by future
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research efforts and, if found valid, can help us better understand the economic decen-
tralization outcomes in the top-down cases. Firstly, although I only focus on the ideological
developmental type of the national government to test the monotonically increasing relation-
ship between the political centralization level and the equilibrium economic decentralization
levels, the model makes other predictions for other types of the national governments that
can be tested in future research. Secondly, this dissertation adopts a perspective that centers
on how political centralization levels affect the economic decentralization levels and thus fo-
cuses on the concept of the deviation threshold. Future researchers can draw other empirical
implications from other perspectives, for instance, to explore the comparative statics of how
the equilibrium economic decentralization levels change with the level of ideological adher-
ence of the national government, holding the political centralization level constant; similarly,
how the equilibrium economic decentralization levels depend on the national government’s
level of developmentalism, holding the political centralization level constant.
In addition, one can also modify this model to further incorporate other important factors
in the economic decentralization process and apply the model to a broader range of cases.
Firstly, from this top-down perspective, the model predicts that the authoritarian national
government always sets the economic decentralization level lower than its socioeconomically
optimal level, x0. Among all the SPNE outcomes, the highest economic decentralization
level is xI , which is less than x0. This sheds light on the previous scholarly observation that
authoritarian regimes tend to be more fiscally centralized than democracies. One of the po-
tential reasons is that political systems that rely mostly on top-down decisions rather than
bottom-up bargaining processes limit the economic decentralization levels. Furthermore, the
previous literature that emphasizes the bottom-up pressures for economic decentralization
often assumes that the national government prefers controlling more economic resources and
thus obstructs economic decentralization. By theorizing the top-down incentives, this model
clarifies that the national governments are not unequivocally against economic decentral-
ization. There are factors that make some national governments more prone to economic
decentralization than others. In this way, future studies that emphasize on how political
bargains affect economic decentralization can use this model as a basis to gauge the national
government’s position.
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Secondly, this model assumes that the national government prefers economic decentral-
ization because it brings higher economic efficiency. If one broadens the idea of economic
decentralization to include unfunded administrative decentralization, the national govern-
ment sometimes prefers to reduce its fiscal burden by decentralizing fiscal expenditures, as
observed by several decentralization scholars (Eaton, 2004; Falleti, 2010; Willis, Garman
and Haggard, 1999). This is to say that in addition to improving economic efficiency, there
are other incentives for the national government to pursue economic decentralization. One
can adapt this model to analyze such cases by changing the utility function for the national
government.
However, there is one important theme that this model leaves out. This model theorizes
the incentives of the national government to pursue economic decentralization and does not
theorize its capacity to decentralize. For a weak national government that does not have
the capacity to centralize, either because it would trigger regional revolt or it just lacks the
state capacity to maintain a centralized system, even if the national government prefers a
high level of economic centralization, it is not able to achieve it. But this does not mean
this theory is useless for such cases, because once such national governments consolidate or
strengthen their capacity, this model would help shed light on whether such countries pursue
economic centralization or decentralization.
All in all, this chapter offers the theoretical basis for the following empirical chapters. In
the case study chapters on China and Mexico, I test one empirical implication drawn from
the model, which is for the ideological developmental national government with a relatively
high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, a higher level of political
centralization increases the economic decentralization level through raising the subnational
government’s deviation threshold.
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3.0 COMPARING CHINA AND MEXICO
In Chapters 4 and 5, I qualitatively compare the early periods of two long-lived party-
based authoritarian regimes, China from 1949 (the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China [PRC]) to 1962 (the end of the Great Leap Forward) and Mexico from 1917 (the
promulgation of the Mexican Constitution) to 1948 (the establishment of the national sales
tax). In this chapter, I discuss the justifications for and methods of comparing these two
cases. In particular, the case study chapters analyze the two countries using two methods:
(1) comparatively, I use the method of difference design (Skocpol and Somers, 1980); and
(2) within each case, they are analyzed using the process-tracing method with guidelines
provided by Beach and Pedersen (2013). The cross-regime comparison tests the validity of
the following historical statement:
Statement 1 A relatively high level of political centralization in China in the 1950s con-
tributed to the economic decentralization policies in late 1957 and 1958. A relatively high
level of political decentralization in Mexico in the 1920s contributed to the economic central-
ization policies in the 1920s, which lasted during the period under analysis from the 1920s
to the 1940s and beyond.
The within-regime analyses test the following two causal mechanisms. A relatively high
level of political centralization in China in the period of 1949–1962 is expected to result
in local government officials’ high deviation thresholds, by maintaining a strong reward-
punishment mechanism and a low policy preference divergence between the central and local
governments. The high deviation thresholds in turn are expected to be manifest in the
local officials’ faithful implementation of the central economic policy agenda and to lead the
central government to trust the local officials. Such a trust then facilitated the economic
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decentralization process at the early stage of the Great Leap Foward.
Compared to China, the level of political centralization in Mexico from the 1920s to
the 1940s is expected to be lower. The relatively low level of political centralization is
expected to lead to low deviation thresholds for the state governments, because the reward-
punishment mechanism is expected to be relatively weak—with regard to enforcing the
federal economic policy agenda—and the economic policy preference divergence between
the federal and state governments is expected to be relatively great. The low deviation
thresholds then are expected to cause the state governments to deviate from the federal
economic agenda and make the federal government unable to trust the state officials with
the economic resources. This low level of trust then led the federal government to pursue
the economic centralization policies from the 1920s to the 1940s.
In this chapter, Section 3.1 introduces the reasons for comparing the two seemingly
uncomparable cases and illustrates the logic of using the method of difference design. Section
3.2 explains why and how I use the theory-testing process-tracing method to test the causal
mechanisms in both cases.
3.1 WHY COMPARING CHINA AND MEXICO?
Both China and Mexico are large populous developing countries, we would expect that
they have similar levels of economic decentralization. Moreover, constitutionally China is a
unitary system while Mexico is a federal system, so we would expect that Mexico is more
economically decentralized than China. However, in reality China under the CPC is more
fiscally decentralized than Mexico under the PRI. Why is this the case?
During the years between 1953 and 2008, China’s fiscal revenue decentralization level on
average was around 58%, while between 1923 and 1982, Mexico’s fiscal decentralization level
on average was around 21%.1 Table 3.1 juxtaposes the levels of fiscal revenue decentralization
for China and Mexico for their first six decades after they overthrew the old regime.2 In fact,
1The values are calculated by the author based on data drawn from China Data Online (2017) and
Díaz-Cayeros (1995, p. 65).
2For China’s baseline year, I use the year of 1949, when the PRC was founded as Year 0; and for Mexico’s
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Table 3.1. Fiscal Revenue Decentralization Patterns in China (1955–2012) and Mexico
(1923–1980)
China Mexico
Regime Age Year SNG Rev. Share (%) Year SNG Rev. Share (%)
6 1955 22.2 1923 27.4
13 1962 63.9 1930 31.3
18 1967 59.0 1935 32.5
23 1972 75.9 1940 28.6
28 1977 66.7 1945 22.4
33 1982 69.4 1950 21.7
38 1987 63.0 1955 19.1
43 1992 63.4 1960 21.4
48 1997 61.9 1965 12
53 2002 53.7 1970 13.6
58 2007 51.4 1975 9.9
63 2012 52.1 1980 10.5
Sources: the raw data on China are drawn from China Data Online (2017) and the subnational government’s
revenue share is calcuated by the author; the data on Mexico are from Díaz-Cayeros (1995, p. 65).
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in the early period of the two authoritarian regimes, they had similar levels of fiscal revenue
decentralization, 22.2% for China in 1955 and 27.4% for Mexico in 1923. While at the end of
the 63rd year, they were starkly different, with China’s fiscal revenue decentralization level
at 52.1% in 2012 and Mexico’s fiscal revenue decentralization at 10.5% in 1980.3
Figure 3.1. Fiscal Revenue Decentralization Patterns in China (1955–2012) and Mexico
(1923–1980)
Sources: the raw data on China are drawn from China Data Online (2017) and the subnational government’s
revenue share is calcuated by the author; the data on Mexico are from Díaz-Cayeros (1995, p. 65).
Based on the data in Table 3.1, Figure 3.1 plots the time trends of fiscal revenue decen-
tralization levels for these two regimes. The two trends share similar beginning levels and
start to diverge in the early periods: in their respective 13th year, China reached a peak
of fiscal revenue decentralization at 63.9% in 1962 and Mexico stayed at 31.3% in 1930, a
little higher than its initial level. Ten years later, China’s fiscal revenue decentralization
level reached a maximum level at 75.9% in 1972 while Mexico started a trend of fiscal rev-
enue centralization, when its fiscal decentralization level dropped to 28.6% in 1940. Over
the next twenty years, China’s fiscal revenue decentralization levels stayed at around 65%
from 1977 to 1997, while Mexico continued the fiscal centralization process and its subna-
tional government’s revenue share dropped from 22.4% in 1945 to 12% in 1965. When these
baseline year, I use the year of 1917, when the current Mexican constitution was promulgated.
3The years listed in Table 3.1 are selected based on the availability of data on Mexico.
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regimes reached their 53rd, 58th, and 63rd years, Mexico stayed highly centralized, with
its subnational government’s fiscal revenue share at around 10%; while China experienced
fiscal revenue centralization that brought the subnational government’s revenue share down
from 61.9% in 1997 to around 52% in 2012. The high level of fiscal revenue centralization in
Mexico by the 1970s is partly resulted from a significant increase in oil revenue during the
1970s, which directly went to the federal government through the nationalized oil company,
PEMEX (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 132), but as the figure illustrates and as the previous schol-
ars have shown, the fiscal centralization process began much earlier than the 1970s. The fact
that the oil revenue exclusively belonged to the federal government in the 1970s is a conse-
quence of the fiscal centralization process that began as early as the 1920s (Aboites Aguilar,
2003; Díaz-Cayeros, 2006).
Given that both are party-based authoritarian regimes established after a revolution and
both have relatively large geographic and population sizes, why do they diverge in their
fiscal decentralization trajectories and have very different fiscal decentralization levels after
six decades of their respective rule? What are the different potential explanatory variables
that drove the different outcomes? To solve this mystery, Table 3.2 lists the similarities and
differences in the potential explanatory variables and the outcome variable.
Shown in more detail in Table 3.2, China and Mexico are both large countries in terms
of their population and geographic sizes. According to the economics literature, we would
expect both countries to be economically decentralized (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). In
the early periods of their respective authoritarian rule, neither of them was very urbanized,
so this potential variable identified by the earlier literature (Letelier S., 2005; Samuels, 2004),
cannot explain the different outcomes. Since both were party-based authoritarian regimes
established after their respective revolutions, neither can this political regime variable explain
the different economic outcomes. Mexico under the PRI had a more open political system, as
the PRI government allowed opposition parties to exist and compete in the federal, state, and
local elections. On the other hand, China under the CPC formally allows other non-ruling
parties to exist but does not hold elections where such parties can compete with the CPC.
If we expect the less authoritarian system to be more economically decentralized (Arzaghi
and Henderson, 2005), then it is puzzling why a more closed political system such as China
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Table 3.2. Similarities and Differences between China and Mexico
Note: for the following rows, population sizes, urban population shares, and GDPPC, the years to which the
statistics correspond are in parentheses.
Sources: The geographic sizes are drawn from Encyclopaedia Britannica (2017a) and Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica (2017b). The population sizes and the GDPPC data are based on Maddison (2001, p. 213, p. 193, and
p. 90). The urban population shares are drawn from Chan and Xu (1985, p. 598) and Snyder (1966, p. 79).
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implemented economic decentralization policies while a less closed system such as Mexico
under PRI pursued the economic centralization policies.
With regard to the differences between these two regimes (highlighted in grey), in the
early periods of their authoritarian rule, Mexico was more economically developed than
China. Based on the economics literature (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Letelier S., 2005),
we would expect Mexico to be more economically decentralized than China, contrary to the
outcome observed. Similarly, the economic systems in these two regimes also point to the
opposite direction than the real outcomes. In particular, China initially adopted the Soviet-
style command economy in the 1950s and Mexico pursued nationalist but still capitalist
economic policies after its revolution, we would expect Mexico to be more economically
decentralized than China. Finally, according to their respective constitutions, China is a
unitary country while Mexico is a federal country, based on which we would again expect
Mexico to be more economically decentralized.
The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that the explanation may lie in the final
potential difference, which is the different political centralization levels of these two regimes.
In particular, with a highly disciplined and centralized party, China’s regime was highly
politically centralized in the 1950s. On the other hand, Mexico’s system was much less
politically centralized than China from the 1920s to the 1940s, although it experienced a
political centralization process in this period. According to the theoretical expectation, a
high level of political centralization can create the necessary political conditions for the
subnational governments to follow the national economic agenda, increase the national gov-
ernment’s trust, and consequently facilitate the economic decentralization policies; while a
low level of political centralization can cause the subnational governments to be more likely
to pursue their own economic agenda and hence deviate from the national economic policies,
reduce the national government’s trust, and as a result lead the national government to
prefer economic centralization policies.
Stating that Mexico was politically decentralized is likely to cause controversies among
the Mexican scholars, many of whom would consider the system under the PRI to be highly
politically centralized, in which the Presidents in Mexico City were the ultimate decision-
makers (Tannenbaum, 1964; Brandenburg, 1964; Langston, 2017). Before I discuss how I
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test the causal mechanisms in China and Mexico, here I present the two reasons for why
Mexico is treated as a politically decentralized case in this study.
Firstly, the Mexican political system was relatively politically decentralized during the
period that this study focuses on, which is the period from the 1920s to the 1940s when the
first economic centralization episode happened. This is the first three decades of the Mexican
authoritarian regime, with its beginning marked by the end of the revolutionary conflicts and
its end marked by President Miguel Alemán’s push for creating the national sales tax. The
regionally fragmented nature of the Mexican revolution led to a political scene dominated
by the regional strongmen who frequently engaged in regional revolts against the national
leadership in the 1920s. Thus, classifying the Mexican system in the 1920s as politically
decentralized should not be controversial among the Mexican scholars. This study examines
how this condition of political decentralization triggered the economic centralization policies
in the 1920s. From the late 1920s to the 1940s, Mexico witnessed consistent and successful
federal efforts of both political and economic centralization, and as a result, the political
system was much more centralized in the late 1940s than in the 1920s. Empirically we can
ask the following questions: Can Mexico still be considered as politically decentralized in
the late 1940s? Were the economic centralization policies under President Alemán resulted
from political decentralization? I examine these empirical questions in Chapter 5 and my
conclusion is that the system was still relatively politically decentralized and the economic
centralization policies could be traced back to the political decentralization. This is probably
a controversial conclusion for the Mexican scholars, but this is related to my second reason
for treating the Mexican case as politically decentralized.
Secondly, I consider the Mexican system as politically decentralized, because in this
study’s comparative framework, the baseline case is the Chinese system in the 1950s. Despite
the political centralization process from the 1920s to the 1940s, as I will show in more detail in
Chapter 5, the Mexican system did not achieve a similarly high level of political centralization
as the Chinese case. Consequently, the Mexican federal government did not have the strong
trust in the state governors during the three decades, which the Chinese central government
had in the provincial leaders in the 1950s. Although by its own standard or if we use other
federal democratic countries as baseline cases, the Mexican political system in the 1940s
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seems highly politically centralized, if we bring in the even more centralized systems, such as
the Chinese case, there is still a big difference between them and the Mexican system. This
difference, as I will argue in the case study chapters, makes a difference in their economic
(de)centralization policies. In fact, by using a different benchmark, namely the Chinese case
in the 1950s, this study problematizes the economic centralization process in Mexico, and
identifies a new causal relationship. Gaining this new perspective is one of the advantages
of comparative case studies. Similarly, by using Mexico as a baseline case, this study also
problematizes the economic decentralization policies in China in the 1950s and shows that
such policies depended on the high level of political centralization during that historical
period.
In sum, based on Table 3.2, these two authoritarian cases can help us better understand
whether the levels of political centralization cause the economic decentralization outcomes as
predicted by the theory in Chapter 2. To further take advantage of the small-N approach, I
examine each case using the theory-testing process-tracing method to test the causal mecha-
nisms between the levels of political centralization and the economic (de)centralization policy
outcomes.
3.2 TESTING CAUSAL MECHANISMS
The advantage of the process-tracing methods is that these methods understand and test
causality as a mechanism. In addition to just showing the correlation between/copresence of
the independent and dependent variables, the process-tracing methods aim to open up “the
black box of causality to study more directly the causal mechanism whereby X contributes
to producing Y ” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). Specifically, I apply the process-tracing
method to test two causal mechanisms derived from the theory in the early periods of these
two regimes: (1) for China from 1949 to 1962, I test the causal mechanism that links political
centralization to economic decentralization policies; and (2) for Mexico from 1917 to 1948,
I test the causal mechanism that links political decentralization to economic centralization
policies. The expected causal mechanisms are summarized as follows:
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In the early period of the PRC, political centralization allowed the central government
to maintain a strong reward-punishment mechanism and a low policy preference divergence
between the central and local governments. These two factors contributed to high deviation
thresholds for the local government officials, whereby the local officials implemented the
central government’s economic policy agenda. These behaviors of the local officials further
caused the central government to anticipate that the local officials would follow through
the national economic policy agenda after economic decentralization. Provided these polit-
ical conditions, the central government pursued economic decentralization policies, when it
desired a rapid economic development during the Great Leap Forward.
After the Mexican revolution, the political system of Mexico in the 1920s was highly
decentralized with strong regional governors and a relatively weak political center. Political
decentralization led to a weak reward-punishment mechanism so that the federal government
was not able to hold state government officials accountable for their economic policy devi-
ations. Moreover, due to the high level of political decentralization, the state government
officials had their own economic policy preferences that were different from the federal gov-
ernment’s economic policy agenda. These two factors, a weak reward-punishment mechanism
and a high policy preference divergence between the two levels of government, created a low
deviation threshold for the state government officials. Thus, state governments deviated from
the federal government’s economic policy agenda. The federal government was frustrated
by its own inability to pursue its preferred economic policies, when the economic resources
and policy-making authority were decentralized. As a consequence, the federal government
chose to pursue the economic centralization policies from the 1920s to the 1940s.
Before testing these causal mechanisms, in the following I clarify two research design
issues that Beach and Pedersen (2013) identify as critical for conducting the theory-testing
process-tracing research, which are (1) the conceptualization of the causes and outcomes,
and (2) the scope conditions (p. 147).
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3.2.1 Conceptualizing the Causes and Outcomes
Because the process-tracing methods assume causality to be a mechanism as opposed to a
regularity, to implement a process-tracing method, Beach and Pedersen recommend that the
concepts be defined as conditions, instead of variables. The research focus is thus on the
concept itself and its negation, namely the presence and absence of a condition, instead of
the full variation of the concept (2013, pp. 47–48). To follow the guideline of Beach and
Pedersen (2013), I define the causes (X) and the outcomes (Y ) as the following: (1) for
China, political centralization (Xc) resulted in economic decentralization policies (Yc); and
(2) for Mexico, political decentralization (Xm) resulted in economic centralization policies
(Ym).
For the Chinese case, the cause and the outcome are a centralized political system and
the economic decentralization policies, respectively. As conditions, I define a centralized
political system to be that the national government had a tight control over the subnational
government personnel, and the economic decentralization policies as the policies that granted
more economic autonomy to the subnational governments. The detailed manifestations of
these two concepts in the Chinese case are discussed in Chapter 4.
When selecting the Chinese case, I expect both conditions to be present. This is consis-
tent with Beach and Pedersen’s recommendation that to execute the theory-testing process-
tracing method, the researcher should select cases where the cause and the outcome were
present. Only when they were present can the researcher evaluate whether the causal mech-
anism linking the cause and the outcome was present and whether it functioned in the way
predicted by the theory (2013, p. 147).
For the Mexican case, the cause and the outcome are a decentralized political system and
the economic centralization policies. As conditions, a decentralized political system is defined
as that the federal government had only a weak control over the state government personnel,
and the economic centralization policies are defined as those policies that took the economic
autonomy away from the state governments. The concrete instances of these two concepts
are discussed in more detail in the case study chapter (Chapter 5). Again, the Mexican case
is selected, because I expect both conditions, political decentralization and the economic
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centralization policies, were present. The goal of the research is to evaluate the evidence
of the causal mechanism linking the cause and the outcome, and to a lesser degree the co-
presence of the cause and the outcome. As mentioned earlier, the Mexican political system
changed dramatically within the three decades from the 1920s to the 1940s. In particular,
the level of political centralization increased significantly and the system was considered by
scholars to be politically centralized in the late 1940s (Tannenbaum, 1964; Brandenburg,
1964; Langston, 2017). Hence, in Chapter 5, I also examine how the political centralization
process affected the political interactions between the federal and state governments, the
level of political centralization in the 1940s, and their implications for the final economic
(de)centralization outcomes.
3.2.2 Scope Conditions
Another key aspect with regard to case selection is the scope conditions. “In process-tracing,
scope conditions refers to the context under which a particular mechanism is theorized as
able to be activated” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 181). The two cases are expected to
satisfy the scope conditions identified by the theoretical model in Chapter 2.
Firstly, both cases are authoritarian regimes, where the economic decentralization process
or economic centralization process is more likely to be a top-down process and the delegation
framework would apply.
Secondly, the model in Chapter 2 identifies conditions under which the effects of polit-
ical centralization on economic decentralization levels are stronger (the causal mechanism
between political centralization and economic decentralization and the causal mechanism be-
tween political decentralization and economic centralization are likely to be activated): (1)
the national government values economic development; (2) the countries have higher socioe-
conomically optimal economic decentralization levels; and (3) the national governments are
ideological and the political centralization levels are not too high. Recall that if the first two
conditions are not satisfied, we would expect complete economic centralization, regardless of
the political centralization levels. This is to say that the causal mechanism between political
centralization levels and economic decentralization policies is not expected to be activated.
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If the third condition is not satisfied, then the relationship between political centralization
and economic decentralization policies is expected to be non-monotonic (when the national
government is pragmatic); or an increase in the political centralization level is not expected
to affect the economic decentralization outcomes (when the political centralization level is
too high).
These three scope conditions were satisfied in the two historical cases selected. (1)
After the revolutions, the national governments in both China and Mexico valued economic
development. (2) Both are large and populous countries that are expected to be economically
decentralized based on the socioeconomic factors (see Table 3.2). (3) Finally, both national
governments were established after their respective social revolutions. Their revolutionary
agenda led the national governments to value the policy implementation at the subnational
level. Thus, the condition that the national government was relatively ideological is expected
to be present in both cases.4 Moreover, both cases were newly established regimes, so their
political centralization levels were not too high.
3.2.3 What to Expect?
In the next two chapters, I test the two causal mechanisms: one that links political central-
ization and the economic decentralization policies in China from 1949 to 1962 and the other
one that links political decentralization and the economic centralization policies in Mexico
from 1917 to 1948. The two causal mechanisms are shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 5.1 in
the case study chapters.
Specifically, in the Chinese case, I examine the evidence for the following causal links
predicted by the theory: (1) the political system was centralized; (2) political centralization
increased the deviation thresholds of the local government officials; (3) the local officials’
high deviation thresholds made them implement the central government’s economic policy
agenda; (4) the local officials’ behaviors and the centralized political system increased the
4Although the Mexican federal government was more pragmatic than the Chinese central government in
those historical moments being studied, the theory predicts that when the policy preference divergence is
great, a more pragmatic national government would still prefer to set the economic decentralization level at
the deviation threshold (see Figure A9). And as a result, it is still expected that a high level of political
decentralization would result in the national government’s strong incentives to pursue economic centralization
policies in the Mexican case.
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central government’s trust in the local officials; and finally (5) the central government pursued
the economic decentralization policies and the local governments continued to implement the
central economic policy agenda after the economic decentralization policies.
Similarly, in the Mexican case, I examine the evidence for the following causal links: (1)
the political system was decentralized; (2) political decentralization lowered the state gov-
ernment officials’ deviation thresholds; (3) the state officials’ low deviation thresholds made
them deviate from the federal government’s economic policy agenda; (4) the federal gov-
ernment was frustrated by its inability to pursue its preferred economic policies and desired
a higher economic centralization level; and finally (5) the federal government pursued the
economic centralization policies and the state governments followed the federal government’s
economic policy agenda after the economic centralization.
The confirmation of causal mechanisms in these two cases can enhance our confidence
in the causal relationships between political centralization and economic decentralization
and between political decentralization and economic centralization. One limitation of the
process-tracing method, emphasized by Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 152), is that a single
process-tracing test cannot “produce cross-case inferences but can only update our confidence
in the presence/absence of a causal mechanism in a particular case, enabling strong within-
case inferences to be made.” However, the next two chapters test two causal mechanisms
(instead of one) predicted by the theoretical model in two historical cases. Together with
the method of difference design, the inferential power of the two cases are stronger than the
single process-tracing test in a single case. We can gain more confidence in the theoretical
model in Chapter 2. In the meantime, following the two case studies, Chapter 6 conducts a
large-N statistical analysis to evaluate the generalizability of the theory.
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4.0 CHINA (1949–1962)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter tests the causal mechanism between a high level of political centralization and
economic decentralization policies against the Chinese case in the 1950s. I use theory-testing
process-tracing method to examine whether and how the mechanism identified in the game-
theoretical model worked in the historical context of China’s Great Leap Forward.
The next section (4.2) provides a brief introduction to the important historical events
and offers a background for the following process-tracing analyses. Section 4.3 presents
the predicted causal mechanism between a high level of political centralization of the PRC
and the economic decentralization policies during the Great Leap Forward, based on the
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2.
The subsections in Section 4.4 discusses the historical evidence for each link of the pre-
dicted causal mechanism. Section 4.4.1 provides supportive evidence for the first link, namely
the political system of the PRC was highly centralized prior to the Great Leap. I discuss the
contributing factors for this highly centralized political system, including not only the uni-
tary constitutions but also the highly centralized Marxist-Leninist ruling party, the CPC. In
Section 4.4.2, I examine the historical evidence for the second pair of links, namely the local
government officials shared similar economic policy preferences with the central government
and had strong career incentives to implement the central government’s economic policies.
These two factors together constituted local governments’ high deviation thresholds. Section
4.4.3 examines evidence from the case of Guangdong, which supports the third link that the
local provincial, county, and village governments indeed implemented the economic policies
made by the central government. Section 4.4.4 discusses the evidence for the fourth link
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that the central government trusted that the local officials would implement the central
government’s economic policy agenda after economic decentralization policies. Such a trust
constituted a political incentive for the central government to pursue economic decentraliza-
tion. Additionally, this section also presents the central government’s economic incentives
for economic decentralization. Finally, Section 4.4.5 discusses the outcomes: (1) the central
government decentralized economic resources and authority at the beginning of the Great
Leap Forward; and (2) despite the economic decentralization and the disastrous impacts of
the Great Leap’s radical targets on the local economies, the local governments followed the
central government’s economic policy agenda.
Finally, in Section 4.5, I summarize the main findings and discuss their implications for
understanding the Great Leap Forward and more broadly for understanding the impacts of
economic decentralization on economic performance of a country.
4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first economic decentralization episode of the PRC’s history happened during the Great
Leap Forward (1958–1962). Before analyzing the political conditions that fostered this eco-
nomic decentralization episode, in this section, I introduce the important historical events in
China’s political history from the fall of Qing dynasty in 1912 to the end of the Great Leap
Forward in 1962, in a chronological manner. It was against this historical background that
the political conditions for the economic decentralization, discussed in the later sections,
were formed.
The last dynasty, Qing, ended in 1912, after most of China’s provinces declared their
independence during Xinhai Revolution in 1911. In 1912, the last emperor Puyi abdicated,
the Republic of China was established, and the revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen established
the Nationalist Party (KMT). Due to the lack of military strength of the KMT, Sun Yat-sen
could not keep the presidency of the new republic in 1912. Instead, the national govern-
ment was controlled by President Yuan Shikai, who once commanded the Beiyang Army of
the imperial Qing dynasty and gained presidency through arranging for the last emperor’s
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abdication in 1912 (MacKinnon, 1980; Young, 1983).
Yuan’s death in 1916 marked the beginning of the so-called Warlord Era (1916–1928).
During this period, the regions were increasingly dominated by the warlords, over whom the
central Beiyang Government often had very little control. The warlords controlled strong
military forces and established their relatively autonomous governments in their regional
territories. This period lasted until 1928, when the KMT army led by Chiang Kai-shek
defeated warlords, such as Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang of Zhili Clique, and coopted other
warlords, such as Feng Yuxiang of the Northwest Army, Yan Xishan of the Shanxi Clique,
and Zhang Xueliang of the Fengtian Clique (Ch’i, 1976; Sheridan, 1983).
It was in 1921 during the Warlord Era that the CPC was established in Shanghai. At its
early stage, the CPC was a congregation of intellectuals, who were scattered across China’s
provinces and organizing study societies. In 1921, the Party had a membership of around 50.
As a result of the small size of the CPC, the newly established Soviet Union did not give the
CPC much priority in the early 1920s; instead, the Soviet Union collaborated with the KMT,
which was then led by Sun Yat-sen. In the meantime, Sun also relied on the support of the
Soviet Union to fight against the Beiyang government and build KMT’s own military forces.
In exchange of Soviet Union’s support, Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist government incorporated
the CPC into the KMT and established an alliance between the two parties, namely the
First United Front (1923–1927). In the 1920s, the CPC’s membership grew rapidly. After
the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the divisions between the rightist factions of the KMT,
including Chiang Kai-shek, and the CPC and the Soviet Union intensified, resulting the
eventual collapse of the First United Front in 1927. The Nationalist government by then
had a strong military force led by Chiang and purged the CPC members from the KMT and
the government (Ch’en, 1983; Wilbur, 1983).
In August 1927, the CPC led the Nanchang Uprising in Jiangxi Province, beginning the
military confrontation between the CPC and the KMT. In 1930, the Party leader Li Lisan’s
strategy to call for armed uprisings in the cities and extending the revolution to the whole
country failed and resulted in a nearly complete destruction of the CPC. The remaining CPC
forces established bases in the rural areas where the KMT had weaker control. In November
1931, the CPC established the Soviet Republic of China in Ruijin County, Jiangxi Province.
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From 1930 to 1934, the KMT carried out five Encirclement Campaigns against the CPC
bases across China. The CPC was able to defend its bases in the first four campaigns, but
lost to the KMT in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign in 1934. The Party leadership thus
left Jiangxi Province, began the Long March in October 1934. In January 1937, the Party
Center moved to Yan’an in Shaanxi Province (Ch’en, 1986).
Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces in 1927
and became an influential military leader since then. But in the Ningdu Conference held in
October 1932, Mao’s strategy of relying on the rural bases to carry out guerrilla warfare was
criticized by the central leadership and Mao was marginalized and replaced by Zhou Enlai.
It was during the Long March in 1935 that Mao Zedong regained his military leadership
position (Ch’en, 1986).
In July 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began. The Japanese army launched its
full-scale invasion of China, taking control of large cities, such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
and Nanjing (the Capital of the Nationalist government at the time). The KMT and the
CPC formed the Second United Front, which lasted from 1937 to 1941, to fight the Japanese
invasion as an alliance. In 1937, the Red Army was incorporated into the KMT’s National
Revolutionary Army, although the de facto control remained in the CPC’s hands. The Red
Army forces that did not embark on the Long March in 1934 and stayed in the South were
reorganized into the New Fourth Army, led by the CPC members Ye Ting and Xiang Ying.
The Red Army forces that undertook the Long March were grouped as the Eighth Route
Army, commanded by Mao Zedong and Zhu De (Van Slyke, 1986).
Despite the alliance, the CPC and the KMT continued to compete for territorial control.
The Anti-Japanese War and the temporary truce between the CPC and the KMT offered an
opportunity for the CPC to recover from the KMT’s suppression in the late 1920s and early
1930s. In the meantime, the Second United Front was increasingly weakened and eventually
broke down in 1941. In September 1945, the Japanese forces surrendered (Van Slyke, 1986).
During this Anti-Japanese War period, Mao Zedong became the paramount leader within
the CPC. Through the Yan’an Rectification Campaign (1942–1944), Mao completely weak-
ened his prominent rivals in the Party, namely the returned student group, including Wang
Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian, and consolidated his own authority. From April to June
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1945, the CPC held the Seventh National Congress in Yan’an, which passed a Party Con-
stitution that incorporated Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s official ideology (Schram,
1986).
After the surrender of Japan, the CPC and the KMT resumed the civil war in 1945. After
four years’ fighting, by October 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the CPC took
control of the majority of China’s territory. As the PLA fought against the KMT’s forces in
the southern provinces in September 1949, the CPC began the process of establishing a new
revolutionary regime in Beijing. In late September of 1949, the CPC held the First Plenary
Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) with several
democratic parties and drafted the Common Program as the provisional constitution. On
October 1, 1949, the PRC was founded (Teiwes, 2011).
The CPC led a rapid and successful regime establishment and consolidation process from
1949 to 1953. By December 1949, the new regime took control of all mainland provinces
except Tibet, which was incorporated into the PRC’s territory in 1951. To consolidate
the revolutionary regime, the CPC-led government carried out two major domestic move-
ments, including the land reform movement (1950–1953) and the suppression of the counter-
revolutionaries (1950–1953). As will be discussed in more detail later, these two movements
helped the new regime to weaken the traditional elites in the rural and urban areas and
consolidate the new government. In addition to these two lengthy movements, the CPC
also carried out several shorter political campaigns, including the Rectification Campaign of
1950, the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns (1951–1952), and the New Three-anti Cam-
paign of 1953. The first wave anti-localism campaign in Guangdong, which will be discussed
in more detail, also happened during this period (Teiwes, 2011; Zhang and Liu, 1995).
From 1953 to 1956, the government carried out the socialist transformation of agriculture,
handicrafts and and capitalist industry and commerce and established public ownership of the
means of production. The central government also established a central planning apparatus
and several central ministries that mimicked the Soviet command economic system. In
September 1954, the First National People’s Congress held its first session and passed the first
Constitution of the PRC. By 1957, the government had also successfully accomplished the
targets of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), which gave top priority to the development
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of heavy industry (Teiwes, 2011; Lardy, 1987b).
Encouraged by these economic successes, the central ministries and local governments
began to set high targets that required large investments and imposed excessive demands
on state resources. In a few months the central leaders who were in charge of the economic
policies, including Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yun, noticed that such targets
were unsustainable and called for the program of “opposing rash advance (fanmaojin)” in
February 1956. Although Mao was still eager to see the economy develop at a faster speed
and had reservations about the “opposing rash advance,” he allowed Zhou and Chen to take
charge. But after one year, in October 1957, during Mao’s concluding speech at the Third
Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, he made a sudden change and criticized “opposing
rash advance.” His attitudinal change foreshadowed the Great Leap Forward, which was first
announced in November 1957 in People’s Daily (Luo, 2014).
While Mao was dissatisfied with the slow speed of economic development, politically he
also initiated the Anti-Rightist Campaign (fanyoupai yundong), which lasted from 1957 to
1958. In September 1956, the CPC held the First Session of the Eighth National Congress,
in which the Party leaders announced that the contradiction between the proletariat and
the bourgeoisie in China had been basically resolved as a result of the successful socialist
transformation. The principal contradiction now became the contradiction between the peo-
ple’s demand for the construction of an advanced industrialized country and the reality of
being a underdeveloped agricultural country (Wu, 2007). In April 1957, the CPC started
a rectification movement within the Party to fight against bureaucratism, factionalism, and
subjectivism, and also called for the non-Party members to participate in the movement,
express their opinions freely, and offer suggestions to the Party and the government. How-
ever, the non-Party members’ opinions criticized not only individual Party members and
government officials, but also the CPC-led party-state regime. In June 1957, Mao initiated
the Anti-Rightist Campaign to target the non-Party members, including the leaders of the
democratic parties and intellectuals, and purge the Party members as well. Another wave of
anti-localism movement within the Party happened along with the Anti-Rightist Movement.
Against the backdrop of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the CPC held the Second Session
of the Eighth National Congress in May 1958, mobilizing the Party to carry out the Great
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Leap Forward movement. In this Congress, the Party redefined the principal contradiction
as the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the struggle of the socialist
line against the capitalist line. In terms of the economic policy, Mao harshly criticized the
“opposing rash advance.” Under Mao’s leadership, the Congress passed the general line for
socialist construction—“go all out, aim high, and build socialism with greater, faster, better,
and more economical results.” In August 1958, the Party held the Beidaihe Conference, an
enlarged meeting of the Politburo, and raised the steel production target and grain target
of the year to 10.7 million tons and 300 to 350 million tons respectively. The Conference
also passed a resolution to transform the agricultural cooperatives to people’s communes
nationwide (Lardy, 1987a).
It did not take long for the central leadership, including Mao, to notice the disorder caused
by the Great Leap Forward. The Party leaders began to change certain targets but did not
reverse the course. At the Zhengzhou Conference held in February 1959, Mao criticized the
left-deviationism, but also warned the Party against the right-deviationism. In April 1959,
at the Second NPC, Liu Shaoqi became President of the PRC, replacing Mao Zedong, while
Mao continued to be the Chairman of the CPC. Although the central government adjusted
the steel production target in mid-1959, Mao continued to insist his approach of pursuing
“greater, faster, better, and more economical results.” In July and August 1959, the CPC
held the Lushan Conference, another enlarged meeting of the Politburo, with an agenda
to correct the previous mistakes. However, a letter penned by Minister of Defense Peng
Dehuai to Mao Zedong that criticized the Great Leap Forward led the Conference to its
opposite direction. The Lushan Conference resulted in political purges against the cadres
who questioned the Great Leap Forward, including Peng Dehuai, as right opportunists until
mid-1960. During this period from August 1959 to mid-1960, the Party continued to set
high targets for industrial and agricultural production (Lieberthal, 1987).
The intensity of the Great Leap Forward decreased after June 1960. In the winter of
1960, Mao began to correct the left-deviationist mistakes in agriculture, which officially
halted the Great Leap Foward. In January 1962, the CPC held the Seven Thousand Cadres
Conference in Beijing. Its participants included political leaders and representatives from
districts, counties, and industrial enterprises. During this Conference, Mao performed self-
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criticism. Although the Conference did not reject the Three Banners, namely the General
Line for Socialist Construction, the People’s Communes, and the Great Leap Forward, this
Conference became a turning point for Mao and planted the seed for the cultural revolution,
as the failures of the Great Leap Forward made Liu Shaoqi his serious political competitor
within the Party (Lardy, 1987a).
In summary, this section enumerates the important political events in a chronological
order. In the following, I present the predicted causal mechanism that links a centralized
political system and the economic decentralization policies during the Great Leap Forward
and discuss the historical evidence for the causal mechanism.
4.3 PREDICTED CAUSAL MECHANISM
Based on the theoretical model in Chapter 2, I draw the causal mechanism between a central-
ized political system and the economic decentralization policies of the Great Leap Forward
in Figure 4.1. The context of the Great Leap Forward implies a national government that
greatly values subnational governments’ policy implementation. It is under this context that
the theory predicts a high level of political centralization facilitated the economic decentral-
ization policies through the links summarized in Figure 4.1.
The political system of the PRC prior to the Great Leap Forward is expected to be
highly centralized, which means that the central government had strong political control
over the local officials’ career. The high level of political centralization is expected to have
the following two consequences: (1) the central government could appoint the personnel who
shared the central leaders’ economic policy preferences. This is to say, the local officials lacked
independent policy preferences and the policy preference divergence between the central and
local governments was small. (2) The high level of political centralization implies that the
central government had strong reward-punishment mechanism to induce the local officials to
implement the central government’s economic policy agenda. As a result, the local officials
were afraid of the career punishments imposed by the central government. These two factors
together constituted the local officials’ high deviation thresholds, namely the local officials
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Figure 4.1. The Predicted Causal Mechanism between Political Centralization and Eco-
nomic Decentralization in China
were unlikely to deviate from the central government’s economic policy agenda. Thus, the
third link is that the local officials implemented the central government’s economic policy
agenda. As a result, the central government trusted that the local officials would implement
the central policy agenda after the economic resources and authority were decentralized. This
political trust functioned as a political condition for the central government that greatly
valued the local governments’ policy implementation to pursue economic decentralization
policies. Finally, the theory predicts that under other hospitable socioeconomic factors, such
as China’s large geographic and population sizes and the central government valued economic
development, the equilibrium outcome is that (1) the central government implemented the
economic decentralization policies, while (2) the local officials still implemented the central
government’s economic policy agenda.
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4.4 PROCESS-TRACING EVIDENCE
In this section, I test the expected causal mechanism in Figure 4.1 by examining the historical
evidence for each link in each subsection.
4.4.1 Centralized Political System
The political system of the PRC established under the CPC leadership was centralized. The
central government had strong political authority over the local governments, as a result of
both the de jure guarantee offered by the interim constitution, namely the Common Program,
and later the 1954 Constitution; and the de facto institutional capacity of the CPC.
4.4.1.1 Unitary Constitutions Right before the founding of the PRC, in September
1949, the CPC and other political parties held the First Chinese People’s Political Consulta-
tive Conference (CPPCC). On September 29, the Conference passed an interim constitution,
entitled the Common Program of the CPPCC (Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi
Gongtong Gangling). The Common Program was in effect until 1954, when the first consti-
tution of the PRC was promulgated.
According to the Common Program (CPPCC, 1950), the central government had au-
thority to determine the personnel of both the provisional military administrations in new
liberated areas (before the civilian governments were established) and the civilian people’s
governments. For the military governments, the Common Program stipulated that in the
places recently liberated by the PLA, the central government or military and political or-
gans at the front should appoint personnel to organize Military Control Commissions (junshi
guanzhi weiyuanhui), before the civilian governments were established (Article 14). The cen-
tral government should determine the duration of military control, according to the military
and political conditions of the localities (Article 14). For the civilian governments, the Com-
mon Program stated that the local people’s congresses at each level should elect the people’s
governments at their corresponding levels (Article 12), but “the appointment of the People’s
Governments of each level shall be ratified by the People’s Government of the higher level”
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(Article 15). In addition, “the People’s Governments of the lower levels shall obey the Peo-
ple’s Governments of the higher levels and all local People’s Governments throughout the
country shall obey the Central People’s Government” (Article 15).
Moreover, the central government also had exclusive authority to determine the juris-
dictions of the different levels of the governments. “The jurisdiction of the Central People’s
Government and the local People’s Governments . . . shall be prescribed by decrees of the
Central People’s Government Council” (Article 16).
In 1954, the First National People’s Congress (NPC) held its first session and passed the
first constitution of the PRC,1 which replaced the Common Program. It is believed that
Mao was not eager to write such a constitution, but Stalin played a key role in persuading
Mao to hold elections and promulgate the constitution as soon as possible to legitimize the
communist regime. Once Mao agreed to writing the constitution, he was deeply involved
in the drafting process (Li, 2001, pp. 34–43). Although Mao would like to establish a one-
party system and the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the influence of Stalin, the 1954
Constitution was less radical (Li, 2001, p. 41). For instance, instead of establishing the
dictatorship of the proletariat, in the preamble of the 1954 Constitution, it is stated that
the PRC is a people’s democratic dictatorship (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng). In addition
to the proletariat, the ruling classes of the people’s democratic dictatorship also included
the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. Rather than establish
a one-party state, the preamble also allowed the political participation of the democratic
political parties and groups, as part of the people’s democratic united front. In addition, the
constitution did not mention the leadership of the CPC in the main text.2
With regard to the central government’s and local governments’ administrative authority,
the 1954 Constitution established a top-down structure based on the principle of democratic
centralism. The higher levels of governments had the power to revise or annul inappropriate
1Since the establishment of the regime, the PRC has promulgated four constitutions in 1954, 1975, 1978,
and 1982. The current constitution was enacted in 1982.
2The 1975 and 1978 Constitutions made changes on these two points. Both constitutions included the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership position of the CPC in Article 1 and Article 2 in the main
texts. The original 1982 Constitution is similar to the 1954 Constitution, in that it again established the PRC
as a people’s democratic dictatorship and did not include the CPC’s leadership in the main text. However,
the 2018 amendments added that “the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the
CPC’s leadership” (Article 1).
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decisions issued by the lower levels—not only the people’s governments at the lower level
but also the people’s congresses at the lower level. At the same time, the lower levels of
governments should carry out the decisions issued by the higher levels. Specifically, according
to the Constitution, the State Council, namely the Central People’s Government, had the
power to “co-ordinate and lead the work of local administrative organs of state throughout
the country” (Article 49, Section 4) and “to revise or annul inappropriate decisions and
orders issued by local administrative organs of state” (Article 49, Section 6). The local
people’s councils, namely the local people’s governments, “carry out the . . . decisions and
orders issued by administrative organs of state at higher levels” (Article 64). “The people’s
councils at county level and above direct the work of all their subordinate departments and
of people’s councils at lower levels . . . The people’s councils at county level and above
have power to suspend the carrying out of inappropriate decisions by people’s congresses at
the next lower level; and to revise or annul inappropriate orders and directives issued by
their subordinate departments, and inappropriate decisions and orders issued by people’s
councils at lower levels” (Article 65). “The local people’s councils are responsible to . . . the
administrative organs of state at the next higher level, and report to them. The local people’s
councils throughout the country are administrative organs of state, and are subordinate to
and under the co-ordinating direction of the State Council” (Article 66).
In terms of the personnel policies, unlike the Common Program, the 1954 Constitution
did not formally grant the authority to elect the heads of the local governments to the local
people’s congresses. The 1954 Constitution only stipulated that the NPC had the power “to
elect the Chairman the Vice-Chairman of the People’s Republic of China” (Article 27, Section
4) and “to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon recommendation by
the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, and of the component members of the State
Council upon recommendation by the Premier” (Article 27, Section 5). But it did not include
articles with regard to the election mechanisms for the heads of the local governments. In
practice, it was the CPC that determined the personnel of the local people’s governments.
In summary, both the Common Program (1949) and the 1954 Constitution established
a unitary system and granted the central government the highest authority. Although the
Common Program stipulated that the local governments should be elected by the local
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people’s congresses, the appointments required ratification from the higher level of the gov-
ernment. The 1954 Constitution dropped the article that the local governments should be
elected by the local people’s congresses. In addition, both the Common Program and the
1954 Constitution stipulated that the lower levels of governments should obey the deci-
sions of the higher levels. The 1954 Constitution specifically added that the higher levels of
governments could revise and annul the decisions issued by the lower levels.
4.4.1.2 Centralized CPC Prior to 1949 In addition to the de jure unitary constitu-
tions, the highly centralized structure of the CPC also provided the de facto institutional
conditions for the CPC to establish a politically centralized postrevolutionary regime. Con-
trary to the Mexican case discussed in the next chapter, the ruling party of the Chinese
regime was founded much earlier than the establishment of the regime and acquired a cen-
tralized structure over the years prior to 1949. In the following I emphasize the evolution of
the CPC’s organizational centralization in three areas: the general party organization, the
Party’s control over the military, and the Party’s control over the members’ ideologies.
The centralization in these three areas was an intertwined process. For instance, the
centralized structure of the general party organization facilitated the centralized control of
the CPC over its armed forces and the central control over the members’ ideologies. The
other two aspects also contributed to the sustained centralized structure of the CPC. I
discuss them separately only for the analytical purpose. To further explore their interaction
is a worthwhile endeavor but beyond this dissertation’s scope.
The CPC was founded in 1921. The original organization of the Party was decentralized,
as a result of its bottom-up establishment process and grass-roots origins. In particular,
its structure reflected the “influence of local study societies established in various cities by
Marxist and anarchist intellectuals” (Sullivan, 1992, p. 71). But over the years from 1921
to 1949, multiple historical factors contributed to the building of a highly centralized CPC
organization.
For instance, one factor was the rapid growth of its membership: from around 50 in
1921 to 57,000 in 1927, 1,200,000 in 1945, and 4,480,000 in 1949 (CPCCC Organization
Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000a, p. 3 and
89
p. 10; 2000c, p. 1; 2000d, p. 1).3 The large size of the CPC membership demanded a more
structured party organization to efficiently mobilize the party members, especially during
the war period.
Secondly, the precarious political conditions also forced the CPC to develop a centralized
organization. The Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek was especially hostile to
the CPC. Prior to 1927, the KMT under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen allowed the CPC
individuals to join the KMT as long as they supported the KMT’s party ideology and
adhered to the KMT’s party discipline. But after the death of Sun, between 1927 and 1934,
the rightist KMT leader, Chiang Kai-shek, initiated purges against the CPC members and
later military campaigns against the CPC’s Red Army that almost destroyed the CPC. The
CPC was forced to undertake the Long March and reestablished itself in Yan’an, Shaanxi
Province, in 1936. These harsh political conditions also led the CPC to develop a disciplined
and centralized organization that finally helped the Party to survive.
Finally, the relatively stable environment during the Yan’an period (1936–1947) provided
hospitable conditions for the CPC to further its centralization trend. It was during this period
that Mao Zedong defeated his political rivals and became the ultimate authority within the
CPC and Mao Zedong Thought became the CPC’s official ideology. The Yan’an period
helped the CPC to reach a peak of political centralization and prepared the Party for the
regime establishment after 1949.
The CPC experienced its first major political centralization episode in 1927, as a response
to both the growing party members in the mid-1920s and the increasingly hostile environment
under the Nationalist government. In April 1927, the military forces led by Chiang Kai-shek
carried out a violent purge of the CPC organizations in Shanghai. Responding to this
emergency, the CPC held its Fifth National Congress from April 27 to May 9 in Wuhan,
Hubei Province, during which it was proposed that the party constitution would be changed
to adjust to the rapidly growing party membership. From May 9 to May 30, the Standing
Committee of the CPC Central Committee (CPCCC) held several meetings and expanded
and formed the Office of Secretary (mishu ting), the Organization Department (zuzhi bu), the
3During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the CPC membership decreased from 60,000 to 10,000, as a result
of both the KMT’s suppression and CPC’s strategy of political strikes and urban insurrections (CPCCC
Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000b, pp. 1–22).
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Propaganda Department (xuanchuan bu), and the Military Department (junshi bu), among
other working organs (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research
Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000a, p. 32).
On June 1, 1927, the Politburo of the CPCCC passed the Third Amendment to the
CPC Constitution,4 which systematically changed the CPC organization and strengthened
the central authority. The amended party constitution incorporated the Leninist principles
of democratic centralism. Based on the democratic centralism principles, the CPC Con-
stitution set up specific rules with regard to: (1) the approval procedures of establishing
party organizations; and (2) the relationship between the higher and lower levels of party
organizations, and the departments that the different levels of party organizations should es-
tablish. Moreover, the Party Constitution also stipulated rules to set up party organizations
corresponding to the administrative structure of the government, namely the Party Branches
(zhibu) at the grassroots level, the District Party Committees (qu wei), the County (Mu-
nicipal) Party Committees (xian (shi) wei), the Provincial Party Committees (sheng wei),
and the Central Committee (zhongyang weiyuanhui) at the top level, replacing the previous
Central Executive Committee (zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui) (CPCCC Organization De-
partment, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000a, pp. 32–33;
CPCCC Politburo, 1989, Chapters 2 to 7, pp. 141–151). Finally, the CPC also formed
investigation committees (jiancha weiyuanhui) at the central and provincial levels to ensure
the consistency and authority of the Party (CPCCC Politburo, 1989, Chapter 8, p. 151).
As a result of the centralization in 1927, “[a]t every level of the [party] apparatus, power
was concentrated in the standing committees . . . which increasingly relied on investigation
committees . . . to subject the rank and file to intense perusal” (Sullivan, 1992, p.72).
The antagonistic policies of the Nationalist government pushed the CPC to confront the
KMT regime and actively engage in military mobilizations against the KMT’s suppression.
In August 1927, the CPC led the Nanchang Uprising, which marked the establishment
of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the predecessor of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). Initially, the CPC leadership under Li Lisan supported urban insurrections, but after
4It was the only time that the amendment to the CPC Constitution was not passed in the National Party
Congress, but rather by the Politburo, because of the precarious political environment in 1927 (Gongchan-
dangyuanwang, 2016).
91
several failed attempts in the late 1920s, the CPC shifted its focus to the rural areas in the
1930s. The shift of the CPC’s strategic focus to “land revolution and armed struggle against
the KMT regime” in the 1930s contributed to the formation of another distinct feature of
the CPC’s centralized organization, that is, the centralized control of the military forces.
By 1949, at the central level, the CPC had the Central Military Commission (zhonggong
zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui or zhongyang junwei, CMC), under the direct control of the
CPCCC Politburo. The CMC then led the General Political Department (zong zhengzhi bu,
GPD), which controlled the Political Commissar (PC) system that was responsible for the
political work at different levels of the armed forces.
In May 1927, the CPC established the Central Military Department (zhongyang junshi
bu, CMD). The Sixth National Congress of the CPC in 1928 decided that “all military affairs
of the CPC should be led by the CPC CMD. The localities should establish the Military
Commissions (junshi weiyuanhui), which are led by the local party organizations. On the
military technological affairs, the Military Commissions should obey the CMD. The CMD
and the local Military Commissions all obey the plan made by the CPCCC” (CPCCC Orga-
nization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000b,
pp. 95–96). In January 1929, the CPCCC Politburo formed the CMC to be led directly by
the Politburo, but still confirmed that the CMD was the highest military leading organ. In
1930, the CPCCC Provisional Politburo decided to merge the CMD and the CMC and called
the new organ the CPC CMC, under the direct leadership of the Politburo. In November
1931, the CPC established the Soviet Republic of China in Ruijin County, Jiangxi Province,
and established the Central Revolutionary Military Commission (zhongyang geming junshi
weiyuanhui or zhongge junwei, CRMC). The CRMC functioned both as a military lead-
ing organ of the CPCCC and of the provisional central government of the Soviet Republic
of China (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and
CPCCC Archives, 2000b, pp. 96–97). As the CPCCC moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi in
1933, the CPC CMC merged with the CRMC and the organ was called the CRMC (Li, 2002,
p. 55).
During the Anti-Japanese War period (1937–1945), the CPC and the KMT formed the
Second United Front as an alliance against the Japanese invasion. As a result of this alliance,
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the Red Army was regrouped into the New Fourth Army (xinsijun) and 8th Route Army
(balujun) under the National Revolutionary Army, supposedly led by the KMT. But as a
matter of fact, despite the alliance, the CPC did not give up its army to the KMT. Instead,
it maintained its control over the army through the CRMC,5 its subordinate departments
and the commission branches (fenwei) (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party
History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000c, pp. 65–74). After the Anti-Japanese
War ended, in August 1945, the CPCCC Politburo Enlarged Conference decided to elect a
new CMC to confront the KMT. The leadership personnel remained the same during the
Liberation War period, eventually leading the CPC to defeat the KMT and establish the
PRC in 1949 (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre
and CPCCC Archives, 2000d, p. 84).
Supporting the central military organ was a vertical organizational structure that ensured
the policy implementation by the armed forces at the lower levels. One of the most crucial
vertical organizations was the political commissar (PC) system, which the CPC learned from
the Soviet model and developed.
As a military and political leader that led the Autumn Harvest Uprising in September
1927 in Hunan Province, Mao Zedong was a fervent advocate of strengthening the CPC’s
control of the Red Army, which was summarized in his famous quote, “political power grows
out of the barrel of a gun.” At the famous Gutian Conference held in 1929, the party del-
egates of the Fourth Red Army led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, passed a resolution that
clarified the nature of the Red Army, namely “an armed force to execute the political tasks
of the revolution” and decided that the Red Army must absolutely obey the leadership of
the CPC (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and
CPCCC Archives, 2000b, pp. 2157–2158). From the Gutian Congress, the Political Com-
missar (zhengzhi weiyuan or zhengwei, PC) system, which represented the CPC in the Red
Army at the regiment (tuan) level and above, took charge of the political affairs, educa-
tion, personnel, security, and discipline of the army. Party branches were also established
at the company (lian) level and the party branch secretary was given the title of “political
5The CRMC was called the “8th Route Army Yan’an Headquarter” (“balujun yan’an zongbu”) externally
(CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000c,
p. 65).
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instructor” (zhidaoyuan), instead of a PC.
Mao’s rise and fall in the CPC leadership also influenced the development of the PC
system. For instance, when he was criticized and marginalized by the CPC leadership in
the Ningdu Conference in 1932, the political commissars were temporarily weakened while
the military commanders were given more authority. But as the CPC’s strategy of urban
insurrections failed and Mao regained the military leadership after the Zunyi Conference in
1935, the PC system was strengthened again. Throughout the PLA’s history, the PC system
remained crucial for the CPC to control the PLA (Wortzel, 2002, pp. 226–231).
The third feature of the CPC’s centralized structure developed prior to 1949 was the
center’s ideological dominance within the party, especially the supremacy of Mao Zedong
Thought, which was established in 1945 as the official party ideology. Like the other two
aspects of the centralized CPC (the Party’s organizational structure parallel to the adminis-
trative structure of the government and the centralized control over the military through the
PC system), the central importance of ideology also bears resemblance to the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.
As Linden (1983) insightfully observed, there was a tendency towards “ideological despo-
tism” in the original Marxism. Marxism distinguishes the “knowers,” who understand the
science of humanity and are the only true revolutionary forces, from the rest of the soci-
ety. The final liberation of humanity then depends on the leadership of the “knowers” who
grasped the “science.” On the other hand, in practice, Marx’s theory of human history was
not supposed to be understood fully by the ordinary workers. Instead, its intellectual com-
plexity required a disciplined study that only a small group of intellectuals could afford.
This leaves the task of leading the revolution to “a necleus knower-intellectuals or theorists.”
In this way, the original Marxism provided a justification for the institution of the Politburo
as a “dominating ruling nucleus of the Soviet and other party-states” (Linden, 1983, pp.
12–23). As a result,
[a]lmost invariably the victor [of the power struggles for primacy within the Politburo] seeks
the mantle of “theorist”—that is, a leader who can guide the regime’s practice with the
authority of an unfailing Marxist knowledge (Linden, 1983, p. 24).
In the case of the Soviet, Lenin made use of these Marxist ideas and advanced “him-
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self and those whom he gathered into his faction as heirs and possessors of the Marxian
knowledge” (Linden, 1983, p. 32). Moreover,
Lenin makes the Marxian notion of the dictatorship the fulcrum of his revolutionary strat-
egy. He concentrates all the energies of his faction on its attainment, and once it is attained
makes it the animating principle of the party-state. The Politburo, the circle of revolution-
ary professionals, is the institutionalization of Marx’s notion of the theoretical guidance
and practical direction of the proletariat by the special stratum of communists (Linden,
1983, p. 32).
Ideology was crucial for the CPC as well. Consistent with Linden (1983)’s observation
about the Soviet Union, the policy differences since the 1920s within the CPC leadership
were formulated in terms of the true or false interpretations of the science of Marxism. The
victors of the power struggles claimed that they had the correct interpretations of Marxism
while those who lost were considered to be deviating from the “truth.” Political purges within
the CPC were thus justified on the ideological ground.
For instance, in the aftermath of the KMT’s suppression in 1927, with the guidance from
the Communist International (Comintern) representative Vissarion Lominadze, the CPCCC
held an emergency conference in Hankou, Hubei Province, known as the August Seven Emer-
gency Conference (baqi huiyi). The founder of the CPC and the secretary general at the
time, Chen Duxiu, was deposed during the meeting (CPCCC Organization Department,
CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000b, p. 2). In one of the
conference reports, the nature of the failure suffered by the CPC was determined as a result
of a huge opportunism mistake (jihui zhuyi cuowu) made by the party leadership, represented
by Chen Duxiu. According to the report, this opportunism was a deviation from Marxism
and Leninism. It made the party leadership lack the determination to act firmly, adopt
false and non-revolutionary theories, and carry out non-revolutionary actions (CPC Central
Executive Committee, 1989, p. 251; p. 279). Similarly, the downfall of the other leaders in
the following years, such as Li Lisan, Zhang Guotao, and Wang Ming, was also justified on
the ideological ground that their policies deviated from the “truth” of Marxism-Leninism.
The ideological centralization reached its peak in the 1940s, through the Yan’an Rec-
tification Movement that finally made Mao Zedong Thought the CPC’s official ideology.
Yan’an Rectification Movement lasted from 1942 to 1944. It was the first time that a polit-
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ical movement was carried out by the whole party to implement the thought reform of all
party members.
The movement targeted “three bad work styles”(zhengdun sanfeng), which included
“subjectivism” (chu kuan chu i) in the study and analysis of problems, “sectarianism” (tsung
p’ai chu i) in political life and organizational matters, and “stereotyped Party writing” or
“formalism” (tang pa ku) in methods of expression (Teiwes, 1979, p. 67).
It formally began in Yan’an in February 1942, marked by Mao’s two speeches that laid down
the guidelines for the movement. Later in June 1942, the CPCCC decided to extend the
movement to various anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, although the rectification
measures were not strictly implemented due to the war conditions. By 1944, through the
Rectification Movement, Mao Zedong successfully established his undebatable authority in
the ideological sphere, by completely marginalizing the returned student group (liusu pai),
such as Wang Ming and Zhang Wentian, who previously dominated the propaganda de-
partment (Teiwes, 1979, pp. 69–73). In the milestone Seventh National Congress held in
1945, Mao Zedong Thought was officially added to the party constitution: “the CPC takes
the Mao Zedong Thought that integrated Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the
Chinese revolution as the guideline for all its work” (CPC, 1991, p. 115). In the report
on the revision of the party constitution, Liu Shaoqi emphasized that through the Recti-
fication Movement, the CPC “has overcome various kinds of erroneous ideas and achieved
unprecedented ideological, political and organizational unity and solidarity” (Liu, 1984, p.
318).
This section demonstrates that by 1949, when PRC was founded, the ruling party, namely
the CPC, had obtained a highly centralized structure. This high level of political centraliza-
tion manifested itself in the highly disciplined party organization, the party’s tight political
control over its armed forces, and the center’s ideological control over the party members.
The politically centralized ruling party facilitated a regime consolidation process and the
creation of a politically centralized government.
4.4.1.3 Regime Consolidation Process (1949–1953) The three aspects of the cen-
tralized CPC sprior to 1949 (in Section 4.4.1.2) facilitated a rapid regime establishment and
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consolidation process that led to a centralized government structure by 1953. Particularly,
the centralized organizational structure of the CPC that paralleled the administrative struc-
ture of the government set up in the Party Constitution of the Fifth National Congress
(1927) ensured that the CPC permeated through all levels of government from the central
level to the village level. The CPC’s centralized control over the armed forces ensured that
the military forces obeyed the CPC’s order to install the system desired by the CPC. Finally,
the CPC continued to value the ideological unity of the party members, who now became
the government officials. As the regime consolidation process approached to an end in 1953,
the CPC established a multi-level government that was to a great extent a duplicate of the
CPC. The new political regime of the PRC thus retained the nature of high political cen-
tralization of the CPC. The central government now had a strong political control over the
appointment and removal of the local government officials.
Prior to 1949, the CPC’s presence in China was regionally heterogeneous. Specifically
the Party had a stronger presence in the north of China than the south. Based on the timing
of the revolutionary victories, which is shown in Figure 4.2, the party leadership categorized
China into two types of areas, which are the “old liberated areas” and the “new liberated
areas.”
The old liberated areas refer to the areas where the CPC had established its power before
1947 and 1948. They include North China, the Northeast, and parts of the Northwest and
East China. In these areas, the CPC had a strong organizational presence and had made
substantial progress in social reform programs that lent it mass support among the rural
society. The new liberated areas are the areas where the Party lacked organizational resources
and mass support. They include much of East and Central China, the overwhelming portion
of the Northwest, and the south of the Yangtze. The Party gained control over these regions
mostly by military conquest instead of revolutionary social programs (Teiwes, 2011, pp.
21–22).
In 1949, as a transition measure, six greater administrative areas (da xingzheng qu) above
the provincial level were established, which included North China, the Northeast, East China,
the Central and South, the Northwest, and the Southwest. For each greater administrative
area, a CPC’s bureau (zhonggong zhongyang ju) was set up to ensure the party center’s
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Figure 4.2. The Timing of the Liberation
This map shows the timing of the liberation of each provincial capital.
Source: Renminwang (N.d.).
control over the area (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research
Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 3). Among the six areas, the new liberated areas,
such as the Central and South, East China, the Northwest, and the Southwest, were run
by military-administrative committees, because these regions fell to the PLA only recently
and the regime’s first task was to eliminate the remaining bandit opposition. In contrast,
in the old liberated areas, such as North China and the Northeast, because the Party had
already built strong mass support through social reforms and did not need the military-
administrative committees, the CPC directly established people’s governments. It did not
take long for all administration to transition from military to civilian rule. By 1951, the
functions of the Military Control Commissions were “largely reduced to security and garrison
matters as local governments now issued decrees alone” (Teiwes, 2011, pp. 29–30). In 1954,
the system of six greater administrative areas was abolished, whereby the central government
began to administer the provinces without an intermediary level.
The CPC’s tight political control over the PLA was crucial for this rapid regime consol-
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idation process, especially when we compare it with the Mexican case that will be discussed
in the next chapter. In the Mexican case, the consolidation of the postrevolutionary regime
took a much longer period partly due to the decentralized military forces which were con-
trolled by regional strongmen without a central authority.
In addition to the the six CPC bureaus corresponding to the six greater administrative
areas, in 1949, the CPC also set up four CPC Branches (zhonggong zhongyang fenju), 24
Provincial Party Committees (sheng wei), 17 Regional Party Committees (qu dang wei),
134 Municipal Party Committees (shi wei) (including the 6 Municipal Party Committees
directly under the CPCCC), 218 Prefecture (League) Party Committees (di (meng) wei),
2,142 County (Banner) Party Committees (xian (qi) wei), 15,494 District Party Committees
(qu wei), and around 200,000 Party Branches. The Party Committees were established
to be the highest responsible organs (zuigao fuze jiguan) at their respective administrative
levels and had the unified leadership over the work in their localities (CPCCC Organization
Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 3). In
terms of the personnel, the CPC maintained the unified leadership style (yiyuanhua lingdao)
that it developed during the war period. The Party Committee members directly led local
governance in all issue areas, including the party, government, military, and people (dang
zheng jun min).
Along with the organizational installation, the CPC led three major movements to solidify
the new regime’s control over the society, including the land reform (1950–1953) in rural
areas, the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries (1950–1953), and the Three-anti and
Five-anti Campaigns (1951–1952) in urban areas.
Land reform was a central element of the CPC’s successful strategy during the war
period, which was to focus on the rural areas and build popular support and establish bases
there. This strategy helped the CPC to build its strength during the Anti-Japanese War in
the late 1930s and early 1940s and defeat the KMT during the civil war after 1945. Thus,
by 1949, the CPC had already implemented land reform in the old liberated areas. During
the period from 1950 to 1953, the CPC-led government continued these land reform policies
in the new liberated areas. Initially, the PLA units went to the countryside, suppressed the
bandits, disarmed the local population, and carried out security functions. The CPC then
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sent small groups, often composed of students, urban intellectuals, “young rural intellectuals
with family ties to landlords and rich peasants, urban unemployed, and, where available,
local Communist underground workers” to the villages to carry out the land reform. In the
early stage, these small groups sought to collect taxes, organize peasant associations, carry
out a program of rent and interest reduction, and conduct struggles against the old elite. In
the second stage, the county-level land reform committees dispatched work teams to identify
the classes of all village inhabitants and confiscate and redistribute the landlord lands based
on the central government’s guidelines in 1950 (Teiwes, 2011, pp. 34–36).
Consequently, the land reform “succeeded in redistributing about 43 percent of China’s
cultivated land to about 60 percent of the rural population.” Politically, the old elite of the
landlords was weakened and replaced by a new elite of village cadres drawn from poor and
middle peasants, who also adopted the CPC’s ideologies. The CPC’s propaganda machinery
also played an important role in the implementation of the land reform (Teiwes, 2011, p.
37).
In urban areas, the CPC led the campaign to supress the counterrevolutionaries and the
Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns. As a measure to defend the new regime against the
potential comeback of the KMT forces, Mao decided to “kill all those reactionary elements
who deserve to be killed.” The main targets of the suppression of the counterrevolutionaries
were “former members of the KMT and KMT-linked organizations, as well as secret society
leaders.” In addition, from 1951 to 1952, the new regime also initiated the Three-anti Cam-
paign that aimed to combat corruption, waste, and bureaucratism (fantanwu, fanlangfei,
fan guanliao zhuyi) among the urban cadres, and the Five-anti Campaign that were against
bribery, theft of state property, tax evasion, cheating on government contracts, and stealing
state economic information among the urban bourgeoisie. According to Teiwes (2011), these
three urban movements attacked and severely weakened the urban non-Communist social
forces and their values. Moreover, they also reshuffled the personnel at the lower-level po-
sitions in economic enterprises and government, replacing the non-Communist forces with
worker activists (Teiwes, 2011, pp. 39–40).
This section shows how the CPC’s centralized control facilitated a rapid regime consoli-
dation process and resulted in a politically centralized political system that was led by and
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also resembled the essential features of the CPC. By 1953, the regime consolidation process
had been completed. With the machinery of the CPC, the central party leaders, who were
now also the government heads, obtained absolute authority over the personnel at the local
levels.
So far, I have shown that the evidence supports that China established a centralized
system quickly after the founding of the postrevolutionary regime in 1949. Not only did the
constitutions guarantee a centralized system, the political conditions also led to a de facto
centralized system. I specifically emphasize the key role played by the centralized Marxist-
Leninist CPC. The fact that the CPC was established more than two decades earlier than the
regime establishment proved to be critical for the centralized nature of the postrevolutionary
regime. Specifically, the CPC became highly centralized during the two decades. During
the war periods, it developed a centralized and disciplined organization, formed a military
force that was under its tight political control, and achieved a high level of ideological unity
under Mao’s central leadership. After the CPC defeated the KMT during the civil war,
these characteristics of the CPC helped the Party to rapidly establish and consolidate a
regime with CPC organs at each level of the governments, from the central level down
to the village level. By making the members of the Party Committees at each level of
the governments take government leadership positions and take charge of all government
affairs, the CPC’s centralized structure, especially its tight organization and strong discipline,
directly translated into the central government’s political control over the local government
officials. These pieces of evidence hence support the first link in the causal mechanism in
Figure 4.1 that China had a centralized political system.
4.4.2 SNG: High Deviation Thresholds
This section presents the evidence for the second pair of links in the causal mechanism: (1)
the provincial governments had similar policy preferences as the central government; and
(2) the provincial officials had strong career incentives to pursue the central government’s
economic policy agenda.
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4.4.2.1 SNG: Similar Policy Preferences The centralized political system, combined
with the CPC’s heavy emphasis on ideological unity among the party members during this
period, together caused the “survival of the most like-minded.” The local officials who shared
the policy preferences with the central government, especially with the personal leader Chair-
man Mao Zedong, stayed in power while those who held their own relatively independent
policy preferences were purged. There were two main mechanisms that the central party
leaders employed to increase the ideological unity with the party-state: (1) the central lead-
ers imposed the personnel that shared central governments’ policy preferences as leaders of
the local governments; (2) the central leaders initiated a sequence of political movements
that specifically aimed to unify the minds of the local leaders. These two measures directly
led to a reduction of the policy preference divergence between the central government and
the local governments, by purging certain independent-minded regional leaders and deterring
the rest.
Two aspects of the CPC and the party-state it founded facilitated the preference con-
vergence process: firstly, coherently adhering to the official party ideology was an inherent
feature of the CPC, especially during this period, so the party leaders had incentives to pur-
sue ideological unity within the Party; and secondly, the high level of political centralization
of the Party provided the organizational capacity which enabled the Party to directly re-
place local leaders who were not in line with the central leadership, using specific campaigns
involving “rectification” and “purging.”
a. Challenges to Ideological Unity
As discussed earlier, like other Communist parties, the CPC had always emphasized
the ideological aspect since its founding. Especially, since the mid-1940s, the Yan’an Rec-
tification Movement led the CPC to achieve an unprecedented level of ideological unity.
Through the movement, Mao Zedong became the paramount party leader with the Mao Ze-
dong Thought reaching the same status as Marxism-Leninism and being incorporated into
the party constitution as the official party ideology. Thus, it was natural for Mao to place
great emphasis on unifying the minds of party members to conform to his own ideas since
the late 1940s. In fact, in both writings and speeches, Mao had repeatedly stressed the role
of ideological unity in party-building (Yu, 2017).
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On the other hand, the historical process of the revolution and the subsequent regime
consolidation produced several outcomes that challenged ideological unity, including: (1) to
rule the vast country, the Party recruited a significant number of new members in a short
period of time; and (2) to combat the KMT’s army, the CPC sent its army from the north
(the old liberated areas) to the south (the new liberated areas) and the CPC personnel from
the north later assumed governing positions in the south. These outcomes challenged the
ideological unity of the CPC for the following reasons.
The recruitment of new members challenged the ideological unity, firstly, because the
lack of revolutionary experience of the new members made them less committed to the
revolutionary causes of the CPC, at least this was the anticipation and concern of the party
leadership. According to the official account, the Party recruited about two million new party
members around the first years of the regime. “Many of these two million new party members
did not have pure ideological styles (sixiang zuofeng) and had not had the opportunity to
receive systematic education or training” (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party
History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 4).
Secondly, the appointment and promotion of the new members triggered frustration
among the old members who believed they should be treated differently due to their sacrifice
during the wars. “The depth of these frustrations was reflected in a saying attributed to old
cadres: ‘Old revolutionaries were treated worse than new revolutionaries; new revolutionaries
were treated worse than non-revolutionaries; and non-revolutionaries were treated worse than
counterrevolutionaries” (Teiwes, 1979, p. 126). Moreover, as the CPC shifted its task from
fighting for regime control to governing, in the eyes of the party leadership, the old cadres
faced other ideological challenges. According to the official account, among the old party
members and old cadres, some became conceited and self-satisfied as war heroes. These
sentiments encouraged bureaucratism, commandism, and even very serious problems, such
as corruption, political degeneration, political decay, and violation of laws and disciplines
(CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC
Archives, 2000e, p. 4).
In addition to the division between the new and old members, the revolutionary process
also created a disunity in the new liberated areas between the native cadres (bendi ganbu)
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and the cadres sent from the north (nanxia ganbu). After liberating the Northeast and
North China in early 1949, field armies from the old liberated areas were sent to the south.
With the assistence of local guerrilla forces that remained in the south since the 1930s,6
the field armies from the north liberated southern provinces, such as Zhejiang, Fujian, and
Guangdong. Along with the field armies, old cadres were also sent from the old liberated
areas to the new liberated areas. One important reason for the CPC to send the old cadres
was that the old cadres from the north had previous experience in governing, especially in
implementing the land reform. Zhang and Liu (2016, p. 46) also point out a second reason
for sending northern cadres to the south: compared to the leaders of the southern guerrilla
forces, the cadres from the north enjoyed higher trust by the Party’s central leadership,
because they had maintained a much closer contact with the party center throughout the
1930s and 1940s.7
Similar to the personnel conflicts which arose between the old and new cadres discussed
earlier, in the new liberated areas, personnel conflicts arose between the native cadres who
had always been fighting in the south and the northern cadres who were sent down only after
1949. For instance, the northern cadres in Fujian Province often despised native cadres,
because they believed they were more experienced and competent than the native cadres
(Zhong, 2013, p. 22). These personnel and political conflicts extended to the policy and
ideological spheres. In particular, in the early 1950s the native cadres were more likely
to adopt a pragmatic approach to land reform, i.e., to pursue collectivization in a gradual
manner; while the northern cadres, due to their lack of local connections, often adopted
a more radical approach. This policy preference difference showed up in several southern
provinces, including Zhejiang (Zhang and Liu, 2016) and Guangdong (Han, 2004).
b. Rectification Campaigns to Increase Ideological Unity
6The CPC initially had military bases in the south. But in the early 1930s, the KMT launched a series of
encirclement campaigns (weijiao) against the CPC forces, eventually driving the party center and its armies
to embark the Long March and later establish its base in Yan’an, Shaanxi. However, there were army units
that stayed in the south and engaged in guerrilla warfare against the KMT throughout the 1930s and 1940s,
except in a short time period (1937–1941) when these guerrilla forces were grouped as the New Fourth Army
during the brief alliance between the CPC and the KMT to defeat the Japanese invasion.
7Zhang and Liu (2016, p. 46) add that one of the leaders of the New Fourth Army, Xiang Ying, was
very close to Wang Ming, who was Mao’s political rival but lost his influence after Yan’an Rectification
Movement. This could make the guerrilla forces even less trustworthy in the eyes of the party leadership in
1949.
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Because ideological disunity as a reality did not match the party leadership’s aim of
achieving ideological unity, the CPC launched a series of political and ideological campaigns
in the 1950s leading up to the Great Leap Forward. The high level of political centralization
of the CPC proved to be essential in the “successful” implementation of such campaigns.
They were considered “successful” in the sense that no rebellion was observed and they
indeed created a certain level of ideological unity among the party members, including the
regional leaders.
As mentioned earlier, Mao as the paramount leader had been using “rectification (zhengf-
eng)” and “purges (qingxi)” to defeat political rivals and unify the party ideology before 1949.
One of the most influential campaigns was the Yan’an Rectification Movement, which was
led by Mao and helped him consolidate his authority and incorporate his thoughts into the
Party Constitution. After the founding of the PRC, due to the new ideological challenges,
the Party implemented a series of rectification campaigns to unify the ideologies of the cadres
as well as other groups of the society. These movements include a rectification campaign
(zhengfeng yundong) in 1950, a rectification movement (zhengdang yundong) which lasted
from early 1951 to early 1954 and included the Three-Anti Campaign of 1951–52 and New
Three-Anti Campaign of 1953, and a new rectification campaign (zhengfeng yundong) which
started in April 1957 and later led to the Anti-Rightist Struggle (fanyoupai douzheng). Both
the rectification campaign and the Anti-Rightist Struggle ended in the summer of 1958.
These above-mentioned rectification campaigns vary in their duration and intensity, but
they share a common goal, which is to educate the heterogeneous party members, both old
and new, in order to transform the “backward” behaviors and values inconsistent with Com-
munism. For instance, the rectification campaign of 1950 aimed to improve the ideological
level and political level of the cadres and the rank and file party members. The Three-Anti
Campaign of the rectification movement from 1951 to 1952 aimed to combat corruption,
waste, and bureaucratism (fantanwu, fanlangfei, fan guanliao zhuyi). The New Three-Anti
Campaign of 1953 was against bureaucratism, commandism and violations of law and dis-
cipline (fan guanliao zhuyi, fan mingling zhuyi, fan weifa luanji). The new rectification
campaign (zhengfeng yundong) from 1957 to 1958 targeted bureaucratism, factionalism, and
subjectivism (guanliao zhuyi, zongpai zhuyi, zhuguan zhuyi).
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c. Anti-Localism Movement
With regard to reducing the local cadres’ independent policy preferences, the “anti-
localism movement” that swept the new liberated areas was particularly relevant. During
the anti-localism movement, the CPC conducted systematic purges against the native cadres
who were more locally oriented and promoted those cadres sent from the north, who were
more likely to support the central government’s directives. These native cadres being purged
ranked from as high as Provincial Party Secretaries to the County Party Secretaries and
County Heads (xian zhang). These anti-localism purges played a crucial role in reducing the
policy preference divergence between the central and local governments.
Guangdong Province, the most southern province of China (see Figure 4.3), was the
first one that weathered the “anti-localism” movement. Its experience can shed light on the
mentalities of the central and local government officials and how the high level of politi-
cal centralization of the CPC facilitated the reduction of the policy preference divergence
between the central and local governments.
Figure 4.3. Guangdong Province
Hainan was under the administration of Guangdong Province before 1988.
Before and during the Great Leap Forward, Guangdong experienced two waves of anti-
localism movement: one lasted between 1952 and 1953 and the other started in 1957 and
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lasted until 1962.
In the first wave, the central leadership charged Fang Fang, the then Third Party Sec-
retary of the South China Branch (huanan fenju),8 to have committed two mistakes: right-
deviation (youqing) in pursuing land reform; and localism in dealing with cadre appointment
issues (Chen, 2001, p. 27). Fang Fang was demoted from the Third Party Secretary, at first
to the Fifth Party Secretary in 1952 and then to the Minister of Transportation of the South
China Branch in 1953. In 1955, Fang Fang was transferred away from Guangdong to be the
Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC and in charge of overseas
Chinese affairs.
Fang Fang was born in Puning, Guangdong, in 1904. He became a party member in
1926. In 1932, as a county party secretary, he led counter encirclement campaigns in western
Fujian’s Soviet areas. After the party leaders began the Long March, Fang Fang stayed in
the south and engaged in guerrilla warfares in Southwestern Fujian. Between 1934 and 1949
except the short period of the Second United Front, Fang Fang was unable to maintain
close contact with the party leadership in Yan’an. Despite the challenges posed by the
KMT, Fang Fang helped establish seven guerrilla columns in seven southern provinces. In
September 1949, the cadres sent from northern China, including Ye Jianying,9 arrived in
Jiangxi Province, where they joined local guerrilla leaders, including Fang Fang, and formed
the South China Branch, of which Ye Jianying was the First Party Secretary, and Fang Fang
became the Third Party Secretary (Zhang and Liu, 1995).
Like in other new liberated areas, the northern cadres constituted a significant portion
of the new government in Guangdong Province. For instance, in Guangzhou, the capital
city of Guangdong, at the beginning of its liberation in 1949, the total number of cadres
was 5,618. Among them, 39% were non-native cadres, including both northern cadres and
northern army personnel who became local government cadres after the war. Only 3,436
(61%) were cadres drawn from the personnel who were originally in the south as guerrilla
8Guangdong Province did not have a Provincial Party Committee before 1955, because Guangdong was
led directly by the South China Branch, which was in turn led by the CSCB (Central and South China
Bureau) (zhongnan ju). In 1954, the CSCB was revoked. In 1955, the South China Branch was abolished
and the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee was established.
9Ye Jianying was born in Guangdong. Unlike Fang Fang, Ye participated in the Long March and worked
closely with other central party leaders in the north.
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forces or underground party members (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party
History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 197).
The heterogeneous composition of cadres in Guangdong Province also created divergent
policy preferences. The native cadres, including both Fang Fang and Ye Jianying (born in
Guangdong), emphasized Guangdong’s special local conditions, such as its closeness to Hong
Kong and Macau, being home to many overseas Chinese, and relatively developed industry
and commerce, and preferred to protect the interests of overseas Chinese and the industry
and commerce (Zhang and Liu, 1995, p. 35). For instance, when carrying out the land
reform, the native cadres often preferred a gradual approach, to limit mass mobilization and
maintain order. As the Third Party Secretary, Fang Fang was in charge of land reform. In
1951, in a report where Fang Fang summarized the land reform progress in the three pilot
counties, he stated that the masses were generally moblized, while at the same time, land
reform did not encroach on industry and commerce, did not harm the middle peasants, did
not engage in disorderly killing, reserved rich peasant economy, and showed consideration
for overseas Chinese, etc. (Song, 2007).
The northern cadres, on the other hand, due to a lack of both local knowledge and local
connections, preferred a more radical approach. They complained that the land reform in
Guangdong did not mobilize the masses, neither did the land reform topple the land owners
and local tyrants. They believed that land reform should use violent methods in order to
bring the land owners to ruin (Song, 2007).
The CSCB, which directly administered the South China Branch, suspected that the
slow speed of land reform and the lack of mass mobilization in Guangdong were results of
the impurity of the cadres. They contended that some local cadres’ close connections with
landowners, previous bureaucrats, KMT, and capitalist overseas Chinese were the reasons for
the “peaceful land reform” (“heping tugai”) (Song, 2007). The central party leadership, Mao
in particular, believed the CSCB’s judgement and decided to reshuffle the local personnel.
Specifically, the Party sent Zhao Ziyang from Henan Province to Guangdong in April 1951
to lead land reform. Meanwhile, both the party center and the CSCB criticized the South
China Branch for its gradual approach to land reform. A new wave of more radical land
reform hence began and the northern cadres became more influential in this process. Mass
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mobilization created disorder and violence on the ground. Although the native cadres, such
as Ye Jianying and Fang Fang, attempted to moderate the process, they soon received harsh
criticisms from the CSCB (Song, 2007).
In December 1951, the CSCB sent Tao Zhu from Guangxi Province to Guangdong to
replace Fang Fang and lead the land reform. The CSCB then implemented massive purges
in Guangdong. By May 1952, the whole province punished 6515 “localism” cadres (Chen,
2001, p. 27). During that time, the CSCB proposed the guiding principle of “relying on
the army, relying on the cadres from the north, and letting the army and the northern
cadres take command.” Henceforth, the leaders—the first in command (yibashou)—of the
Party Committees at all local levels were selected from the army and/or the northern cadres
(Song, 2007).
In 1952, Ye Jianying and Fang Fang attended a meeting in Beijing chaired by Mao
Zedong, during which Mao criticized both of them for the slow speed of land reform in
Guangdong. Fang Fang was later demoted to the Fifth Party Secretary of South China
Branch. In 1953, during the New Three-Anti Campaign, Fang Fang became a target again
for his alleged “bureaucratism” (guanliao zhuyi) and “decentralism” (fensan zhuyi). With
Mao’s approval, Fang Fang was removed from the Party Committee of the South China
Branch. In 1955, Fang Fang was transferred to the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs
(Zhang and Liu, 1995, p. 37).10
Amid the new rectification campaign that started in 1957,11 some cadres voiced their
discontent with the previous anti-right deviation and anti-localism movements and demanded
reconsideration of the unfair punishments. The Provincial Party Committee, on the other
hand, regarded such grievances as a revival of localism and therefore decided to launch a
second wave of anti-localism movement whilst the Anti-Rightist Struggle (Chen, 2001, p.
10During the Cultural Revolution, Fang Fang was attacked again and died in 1971.
11This new rectification campaign (zhengfeng yundong) happened after the Eighth Congress of the CPC
(1956), when Mao judged that China’s socialist revolution had achieved a decisive victory and there were no
more “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy (diwo maodun)”; instead, there were only “contradic-
tions among the people (renmin neibu maodun).” Because of this judgment, Mao confidently decided to allow
non-party members to participate in the new rectification campaign and criticize the Party. The high level of
openness did not last long. The amount and severity of the criticisms received by the Party exceeded Mao’s
expectations. Within months, the new rectification campaign was turned into the Anti-Rightist Struggle.
The main task changed from correcting party members’ ideologies and behaviors to fighting against the
“rightists,” who were alleged to be the enemies of the new regime.
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28).
This wave of anti-localism movement again punished “localism” cadres at all levels of
Guangdong Province. Among the top provincial leaders, Gu Dacun (Deputy Provincial
Party Secretary) and Feng Baiju (Deputy Provincial Governor) were labeled and criticized
as an “Anti-Party Localist Group” (difang zhuyi fandang jituan). In April 1958, Gu Dacun
was removed from office and Feng Baiju was demoted to the countryside for rectification.12
It is debatable whether the native cadres, such as Fang Fang, Gu Dacun, and Feng Baiju,
indeed intentionally defied the central government and purposefully adopted localist land
reform and personnel policies. In the eyes of the central leadership at the time, they pursued
such policies. The central leadership of the CPC, which was a heavily ideological party led
by an idealist revolutionary Mao Zedong, was indeed concerned about the consequences of
“localism.” With the centralized party organization, the center was able to either demote the
“localist” cadres or remove them from office, while at the same time appointing the cadres
that shared the central government’s policy preferences, such as Tao Zhu, Zhao Ziyang, and
non-native personnel from the army and northern cadres.
The personnel reshuffling brought by the two waves of anti-localism had an impact on
the county level, shown by an example of Mei Xian, a county in northeastern Guangdong,
where Ye Jianying was born.
Table 4.1 shows the Party Secretaries of the County Party Committee from 1949 to 1962,
including the native places of the First Party Secretaries (di yi shuji) and the non-native
Party Secretaries’ share among all Party Secretaries in a given year. As Table 4.1 shows, the
two First Party Secretaries before 1952, Liu Jian and He Yongwei, were both native cadres.
The first wave of anti-localism movement in 1952 changed this pattern. From 1952 to 1955,
the county was led by two First Party Secretaries from the northern provinces, Yu Zong
from Henan province and Huang Qingbo from Hebei province. In 1956, the party leadership
role returned to a native cadre, Yang Yang, for two years. The second wave of anti-localism
movement in 1957 again brought the northern cadres to power. Since 1958, the County
Party Committee was led by Sun Jingye from Shandong province and Zhang Zhengfu from
12Chen (2001) and Han (2004) detail the stories of how Gu Dacun and Feng Baiju were accused of localism
and punished in the 1950s respectively.
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Table 4.1. The Native Places of the First Party Secretaries and the Percent of Non-Native
Party Secretaries in Meixian, Guangdong (1949–1962)
Year First PS First PS’s Native Place % of Non-Native PS No. of PS
1949 Liu Jian Guangdong 0.00% 2
1950 He Yongwei Guangdong 0.00% 1
1951 He Yongwei Guangdong 0.00% 1
1952 Yu Zong Henan 100.00% 3
1953 Yu Zong Henan 100.00% 2
1954 Huang Qingbo Hebei 33.3%1 4
1955 Huang Qingbo Hebei 66.7%1 4
1956 Yang Yang Guangdong 40.00% 5
1957 Yang Yang Guangdong 40.00% 5
1958 Sun Jingye Shandong 100.00% 5
1959 Zhang Zhengfu Shanxi 75.00% 8
1960 Zhang Zhengfu Shanxi 62.50% 8
1961 Zhang Zhengfu Shanxi 66.70% 6
1962 Zhang Zhengfu Shanxi 66.7%1 7
1 For the years of 1954, 1955, and 1962, among the 4, 4, and 7 Party Secretaries respectively, there was one
Party Secretary whose native place was not recorded in the gazetteer. For these three years, I calculated the
share using the rest Party Secretaries’ information.
Notes: The table is constructed based on the Party Secretaries that in office on December 31 for each year.
Source: Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee (1995, pp. 667–669).
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Shanxi province.
Figure 4.4. The Share of Non-Native Party Secretaries and Non-Native (Deputy) County
Heads in Meixian, Guangdong (1949–1962)
Source: Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee (1995, pp. 667–669; pp.
752–753).
The share of non-native Party Secretaries among all Party Secretaries in Table 4.1 con-
firms the impact of the anti-localism movement in this county. The solid line in Figure 4.4
plots the non-native Party Secretaries’ share from 1949 to 1962. In 1952, namely during
the first wave anti-localism movement, all three Party Secretaries were from the northern
provinces (Henan, Shanxi, and Hebei). The share decreased in 1954 and stayed at 40% in
1956 and 1957. But the second wave anti-localism movement again boosted the share of
non-native Party Secretaries to 100% in 1958. Throughout the Great Leap Forward, the
non-native Party Secretaries’ share stayed above 60%.
Table 4.2 shows the native places of the County Heads over the years and the non-native
(Deputy) County Heads’ share among all County Heads.13 Following a similar pattern as the
Party Secretaries, the northern cadres became the County Heads during the anti-localism
movement. In December 1952, the County Head was Huang Qingbo from Hebei province.
He stayed as County Head for two years. Between 1954 and 1957, this county had three
13The total number of County Heads in each year, which often included one County Head and a varying
number of Deputy County Heads (fu xian zhang), increased from one or two during the period from 1949 to
1953 to around seven during 1957 to 1962, see Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2. The Native Places of County Heads and Percent of Non-Native (Deputy) County
Heads in Meixian, Guangdong (1949–1962)
Year County Head CH’s Native Place % of Non-native (D)CH # of (D)CH
1949 Wang Zhi’an Guangdong 0.00% 2
1950 Wang Zhi’an Guangdong 0.00% 2
1951 Lai Yunru Guangdong 50.00% 2
1952 Huang Qingbo Hebei 100.00% 1
1953 Huang Qingbo Hebei 100.00% 1
1954 Yang Yang Guangdong 33.30% 3
1955 Ren Qingran Hebei 33.30% 3
1956 Chen Jian Guangdong 0.00% 3
1957 Ye Fen Guangdong 14.30% 7
1958 Xu Jinyi Shandong 50.00% 6
1959
Xu Jinyi Shandong
57.1%1 7Song Jinying Hebei
1960 Song Jinying Hebei 57.10% 7
1961 Song Jinying Hebei 57.10% 7
1962 Song Jinying Hebei 57.10% 7
1 For Year 1959, there were two County Heads.
Notes: This table is constructed based on the County Heads who were in office on December 31 for each
year.
Source: Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee (1995, pp. 752–753).
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County Heads who were native cadres. But the second wave anti-localism movement brought
in a cadre from Shandong province as the County Head, who was followed by a cadre from
Hebei.
The non-native County Heads’ share also followed a similar trend, shown in Table 4.2
and the dash line Figure 4.4. Specifically, all County Heads were native in 1949 and 1950.
During the first wave anti-localism movement, the share increased to 100%, as in 1952 and
1953 the county government only had one County Head from Hebei and none Deputy County
Head. The share went down to between 33.3% and 0% from 1954 to 1957. Then the second
wave anti-localism movement raised the non-native County Heads’ share to 50% in 1958 and
stayed at 57% from 1959 to 1962, ensuring the non-native cadres’ majority in the county
government leadership. Figure 4.4 also shows an interesting pattern that most of the time
the County Heads positions were more native than the Party Secretary positions, except in
1951.
The county gazetteer did not document the first wave anti-localism. But according to
the gazetteer, the County Party Committee carried out an anti-localism struggle in April
1958. The First Party Secretary, two Party Secretaries, and one Deputy County Head
were punished for organizing an “Anti-Party Localist Group” (Guangdong Provincial Local
Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, pp. 674–675).
The example of anti-localism in Guangdong Province shows how the centralized political
system was able to shape local officials’ policy preferences and reduce the policy preference
divergence between the central and local governments. The northern cadres were sent along
with the northern armies to liberate Guangdong Province, and ensured the CPC’s leadership
from the beginning. After the regime was consolidated, as the central government perceived
the different policy preferences held by the local officials, it led an anti-localism movement
that reshuffled the local leadership from the provincial level to the county level, replacing
native cadres who were often more locally oriented with non-native cadres, especially cadres
from the northern provinces, who were more inclined to carry out the central policy directives.
The first wave of anti-localism movement in Guangdong between 1952 and 1953 was
the earliest anti-localism instance since the founding of the PRC. The second wave of anti-
localism movement, however, was not limited to Guangdong Province. It concurred with
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the Anti-Rightist Struggle and swept other provinces in both old and new liberated areas.
“The charge of localism or local nationalism” was raised in seven other provinces during
the two years at the very beginning of the Great Leap (1957–58). These provinces include
Zhejiang, Gansu, Guangxi, Liaoning, Shandong, Xinjiang and Yunnan Teiwes (1979, p. 358).
Additionally, in the same time period, some of the provincial-level leaders in another four
provinces (Anhui, Qinghai, Hebei, and Henan) were also purged under the ideological charges
for being Rightists (youpai) and Right Opportunists (youqing jihuizhuyi).
Provincial leaders purged in 1957 and 1958 include Sha Wenhan (Governor of Zhejiang
Province), Sun Diancai (Vice Governor of Gansu Province), Chen Zaili (Vice Governor of
Guangxi Province), Wang Zheng (Secretary of the CPC Secretariat of Liaoning Provin-
cial Committee), Li Feng (First Secretary of the CPC Huimin Special District Commit-
tee in Shandong Province), Savlayev (Secretary of the CPC Committee of Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region), Zheng Dun (Director of the Organization Department of Yunnan
Province), Li Shinong (Third Party Secretary of the CPC Anhui Provincial Committee), Sun
Zuobin (Second Party Secretary of the CPC Qinghai Provincial Committee), Liu Hongtao
(Director of the United Front Department in Hebei Province), and Pan Fusheng (First Party
Secretary of the CPC Henan Provincial Committee).14 The provinces where the provincial-
level leaders were purged in 1957 and 1958 are shown in Figure 4.5.
Through removing the top provincial leaders who had shown a tendency to pursue policies
inconsistent with the national directives, the political system achieved a very high level of
policy consensus among the central and local leaders before the Second Session of the Eighth
Party Congress (May 1958) when the Great Leap Forward officially began. It was against
this backdrop that the whole country plunged into the Great Leap Forward.
It is important to note that the provincial purges did not stop in 1958. For instance,
Zhou Xiaozhou (First Party Secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee) and Jiang
Yizhen (Party Secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee) were purged in 1959
after the Lushan Conference. The centralized party structure of the CPC guarantees the
possibility for the central government to regularly replace the relatively independent-minded
14For more provincial cadre members who were purged during Anti-Rightist Struggle and this wave of
anti-localism movement, see Teiwes (1979, p. 350).
115
Figure 4.5. The Provincial Purges in 1957–1958
Source: Teiwes (1979, p. 350).
officials with the more like-minded ones. This organizational capacity is crucial for the
central government to sustain a low level of policy preference divergence between the two
levels of the government. In the case of China, by constantly engaging in such personnel
changes, the national leadership—in particular Mao Zedong—was able to sustain the Great
Leap Forward for three years despite its economically decentralized nature and the soon-
discovered economically disastrous consequences for the localities.
To summarize this section, I find that in the early years of the PRC, the CPC faced
ideological challenges, both due to the recruitment of a large number of new cadres and
due to a high level of regional heterogeneity. As a highly ideological party at the time, the
CPC devoted great efforts to combating ideological disunity in order to unite all cadres in
the construction of Socialism and Communism. It was through this process that the rela-
tively independent-minded local cadres, such as the native cadres in Guangdong Province,
were purged and replaced by cadres who shared the central government’s policy preferences,
especially the intensive enthusiasm for pursuing Socialism and Communism with a radical
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approach. As a result, the policy preference divergence between the central and local govern-
ments was reduced to a significant extent at the early stage of the Great Leap Forward.15 A
highly centralized political system proved to be a necessary condition in this process, because
the centralized organization not only enabled effective personnel changes but also prevented
the potential political instability that could have been resulted from such large-scale purges
if political centralization had been low.
4.4.2.2 SNG: Strong Career Incentives Besides reducing the policy preference di-
vergence between the central and local governments, the centralized political system also
sustained the local officials’ strong career incentives to implement the central government’s
economic policies.
As discussed in Section 4.4.1.3, the political system of the PRC was established as a
Leninist-Marxist party-state, so that the CPC had party organs and held the unified lead-
ership at all levels of government. Although the 1954 Constitution stipulated that the NPC
and the local people’s congresses at each government level elected the local officials, in prac-
tice, it was the CPC that determined the personnel for the local government offices. The
organization of the Party determined the organization of the government.
In the meanwhile, the reward-punishment mechanisms were crucial components to the
CPC’s centralized structure, which were manifested in the Party’s heavy emphasis on the
Party discipline and the organizations that sustained the strong Party discipline. It was
these strong reward-punishment mechanisms that created the robust career incentives of the
local leaders to obey the central leadership.
Firstly, the CPC consistently valued the party discipline since its founding, and such an
emphasis strengthened after 1927, when the survival of the CPC heavily depended on its dis-
cipline. For instance, the third amendment to the Party Constitution in 1927 incorporated
the principles of “democratic centralism,” which on the one hand allowed free discussions
among the Party members before the Party made decisions while on the other hand required
“quick and correct” implementation of Party resolutions once they were made. The punish-
15As hinted in early discussions, the series of ideological campaigns in the 1950s not only decreased the
policy preference divergence at the intergovernmental level, i.e., between the central and local governments,
but also at the central level among the central leadership and in the society among non-party members.
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ments towards the Party organizations and Party members that did not follow the resolutions
made by the higher levels included the following: (1) if a Party organization violates the
Party discipline, “the Party organization would receive a warning, be reorganized, or there
would be a complete re-registration (the dissolution of the Party organization).” (2) if an
individual Party member violates the Party discipline, “the individual Party member would
receive a warning. For the Party members who receive a public warning in the Party, they
would be removed from their positions in the Party, the KMT, the nationalist government,
and other organizations. The individual Party member would be placed on probation within
the Party, or be expelled from the Party” (CPCCC Politburo, 1989, Chapter 9, Articles 65
and 66, p. 152).
The amendment of the Party Constitution in the Seventh National Congress (1945)
further elaborated on the principles of the “democratic centralism,” which was defined as
“a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized
guidance.” It required that the individual Party members were surbordinate to the Party
organization, the lower Party organizations were subordinate to the higher Party organi-
zations, and all the constituent organizations and members of the Party were subordinate
to the Central Committee of the Party (CPC, 1991, Chapter 2, Article 14, pp. 122–123).
Chapter 10 of the Party Constitution (1945) included six articles and specified the condi-
tions for rewards and punishments. For instance, it stipulated that the Party members or
the Party organizations would be rewarded, if in their work, they demonstrated that they
were completely loyal to the Party and the people, became role models for adhering to the
Party’s and the revolutionary government’s discipline, and were ingenious at realizing the
Party’s guidelines, policies, and the CPCCC’s and higher levels’ resolutions. On the other
hand, if they violated the Party discipline, they would receive punishments. For the Party
organizations, the punishments included criticism (zhi ze); partially reorganizing the leading
organization; abolishing the leading organization and appointing the provinsional leading
organization; and dissolving the whole organization and carrying out the re-registration of
the Party members. For the individual Party members, the punishments included giving ad-
vice or warning in person; giving advice or warning in public; removal from office; probation
within the Party; and expulsion from the Party (CPC, 1991, pp. 134–135).
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The Party Constitution passed in the Eighth National Congress (1956), which was also
the first Party Constitution after the establishment of the PRC, for the most part continued
with the 1945 Party Constitution, reiterating the principles of “democratic centralism” and
that the party members should implement the Party resolutions unconditionally. Articles 25
and 26 of the Party Constitution specifically dealt with the relationship between the Party
center and the local Party organizations. They granted some degree of local autonomy, but
also stated clearly that the lower level resolutions must not contradict the higher level res-
olutions, and if the lower level Party organization believed that the resolution made by the
higher level was not suitable for the conditions of their localities or departments, the lower
level organization should make a petition to the higher level to change the resolution; but if
the higher level decided to execute the original resolution, the lower level must uncondition-
ally execute it. With regard to policies concerning the whole country, before the central level
publicized its opinions and made its resolutions, except organizing discussions and offering
suggestions to the central leading organs, the lower levels were not allowed to freely express
their opinions or make resolutions (Eighth National Congress of the CPC, 1957, Chapter 2,
pp. 829–831). Different from the previous Party Constitutions, The 1956 Party Constitution
did not have one chapter specifically devoted to “Party Discipline;” instead, it included the
contents of Party discipline in Chapter One on “Membership.” Article 2 of Chapter One
stated that the Party members were considered to be violating the Party discipline if they
“severely deviated from their responsibilities, disrupted the Party unity, violated the laws of
the state, acted against the Party resolutions, and harmed the Party’s interests and deceived
the Party” (Eighth National Congress of the CPC, 1957, Chapter 1, Article 2, p. 826).
Article 13 of Chapter One listed the punishments for Party members who violated the Party
discipline. Based on the specific violations, the various levels of Party organizations could
punish the Party members in the following ways: warning, serious warning, removal from
Party posts, probation within the Party, and expulsion from the Party (Eighth National
Congress of the CPC, 1957, Chapter 1, Article 13, p. 828).
These three Party Constitutions (1927, 1945, and 1956) show clearly that the CPC
heavily valued the unity and discipline of the Party, with a particular emphasis on the
unconditional implementation of the Party guidelines and policies by the Party members and
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the Party organizations at all levels. According to the Party Constitutions, disagreements
could be voiced via the internal channels, but the decision-making authority rested at the
higher levels and the ultimate authority was at the CPCCC Politburo. (However, in reality,
many Party members who voiced their disagreements through the Party channels were still
purged in the series of movements.) Individual Party members should implement the Party
resolutions; and the Party organizations at the lower levels should implement the resolultions
made by the Party organizations at the higher levels. If the Party members or organizations
did not carry out the Party resolutions, they would be punished. The punishments of
individual Party members ranged from receiving a warning to being removed from office and
to the ultimate punishment, being expelled from the Party.
Secondly, besides formally emphasizing Party discipline in the Party Constitutions, the
CPC also established a Party agency responsible for monitoring the behaviors of the Party
members. The agency was initially established in 1927, which was called the Supervisory
Commission (jiancha weiyuanhui; also translated as the Control Commission). It was set
up at the central and provincial levels. During the war periods in the 1930s and 1940s,
the disciplinary body adopted various names, including the Review Committees (shencha
weiyuanhui) at the central, provincial, county, and municipal levels in 1928, the Central Party
Affairs Committee (zhongyang dangwu weiyuanhui) at the central level and the Supervisory
Commissions at the provincial and county levels in 1933, and the Supervisory Commissions
at the central and local levels in 1945 (Gong, 2008, pp. 141–142; Wu, 2009, pp. 19–21).
However, the disciplinary organs did not have substantial authority during the war periods.
Instead, the work of discipline inspection was carried out by the Party Committees at the
central and local levels (Wu, 2009, p. 21).
In 1949, as the CPC transitioned from an opposition party to the ruling party, it decided
to establish the Commission of Discipline Inspection (CDI, jilv jiancha weiyuanhui) at the
central and local levels, where there were Party Committees. The Central CDI had three
main functions: (1) to inspect the Party discipline violation behaviors of the departments
directly under the CPCCC, the Party organizations at all levels, Party cadres, and Party
members; (2) to receive, review, and decide on the punishments or cancelation of the pun-
ishments for the Party discipline violation of the departments directly under the CPCCC,
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the Party organizations at all levels, and Party members; and (3) to strengthen Party dis-
cipline education, so that the Party members and cadres would strictly adhere to the Party
discipline, implement the Party resolutions and government decrees, and realize the unity
and centralism of the whole Party (Wu, 2009, p. 21). But from 1949 to 1955, the CDI only
played a minor role (Li, 2016, p. 452).
In 1955, triggered by the “anti-Party conspiracy” of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, to further
strengthen the Party discipline, the National Congress of the CPC decided to replace the
CDI with the central and local Supervisory Commissions, upgraded the organ’s rank within
the Party, and expanded its functions. Now, the Central Supervisory Commission had four
main tasks: (1) to regularly inspect and handle the cases, where the Party organizations and
Party members that belonged to the CPCCC departments and the departments of the central
government violated the Party Constitution, Party discipline, state laws, and state decrees;
(2) to regularly inspect and handle the cases, where the local Party organizations and, if
necessary, the members of the local Party organizations, violated the Party Constitution,
Party discipline, state laws, and state decrees; (3) to lead the work of the local Supervisory
Commissions; and (4) to hear the cases, where the Party members and the masses reported
on and accused the Party organizations and Party members, and where the Party members
refused to accept the punishments and made an appeal (Wu, 2009, p. 21). “From 1956 to the
Cultural Revolution, the [Supervisory Commissions] functioned as an enforcement agency
for the party’s successive political campaigns” (Li, 2016, p. 452).
Finally, in addition to the formal emphases on the Party discipline and formal institution,
such as the Supervisory Commissions, the Party also utilized rectification movements and
purges to punish the behaviors of disloyalty to the Party. As discussed in Section 4.4.2.1, the
movements and purges that happened in the 1950s not only reduced the policy preference
divergence between the central and local officials by removing those independent-minded
officials with the more like-minded ones, but also created strong incentives for the remaining
officials to implement the policies made by the higher levels.
For instance, during Guangdong’s second wave anti-localism movement mentioned ear-
lier, when the Deputy Party Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, Gu Dacun, and
the Deputy Provincial Governor, Feng Baiju, were denounced, all the levels within Guang-
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dong Province were mobilized to expose and criticize them. People were asked to review
their previous dialogues with Gu Dacun—even the trivial chats had to be examined again—
and make a clean break with him (Chen, 2001, p. 29). Through involving all officials in
the purging processes, the local officials could personally observe the severe consequences of
being considered as deviating from the higher levels’ policy agenda.
In summary, I show that the second consequence of having a centralized political system
was that the local officials had strong career incentives to implement the central govern-
ment’s policies. In particular, the CPC’s total control over the state implies that the Party’s
organization determined the state’s government organization. This section identifies three
aspects of the CPC that fostered the local officials’ strong career incentives to implement
the central policy agenda, including the CPC’s heavy emphasis on Party discipline since the
late 1920s, the formal setup of the disciplinary organs, and finally the less formal mechanism
of periodic rectification movements and purges.
This section shows that the centralized political system in postrevolutionary China led
to both similar policy preferences between the central and local government officials and
strong career incentives for local officials to implement the central policy agenda. These
two conditions together contributed to high deviation thresholds for the local officials, which
imply that the local officials were unlikely to deviate from the central government’s policy
agenda.
4.4.3 SNG: Policy Implementation
This section presents supportive evidence for the third link of the causal mechanism in Figure
4.1: the local officials faithfully implemented the central government’s economic policies. In
particular, I show examples of how the local governments in Guangdong at various levels,
including the provincial, county, and village levels, implemented the agricultural policies from
1949 to 1956, including land reform movement and socialist transformation of agriculture.
4.4.3.1 Land Reform (1949–1953) With regard to the land reform movement, the
regions in China had different initial conditions. As mentioned in Section 4.4.1.3, even before
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the establishment of the PRC, land reform was mostly accomplished in the old liberated
areas, such as the Northeast and North China. The new government’s main focus was to
implement land reform in the new liberated areas.
This section (4.4.3.1) specifically discusses the land reform movement at the provincial
level in Guangdong, at the county level (with the example of Mei Xian), and at the village
level (with the example of Qiaoxiang Village in Mei Xian). The evidence at all the three local
levels supports the causal link that the local officials carried out the land reform policies.
It is also clear that the anti-localism movement (discussed in Section 4.4.2.1) had a strong
impact on the implementation of the land reform policies.
At the central level, land reform was an essential revolutionary goal and critical for
consolidating the new regime, as accomplishing land reform could strengthen the peasants’
support—a majority of Chinese population at the time—for the new regime as well as de-
stroying the revolutionary regime’s enemies, namely the landlords and other traditional
elites. Thus, land reform occupied a high priority for the new government.
The Common Program of 1949 stated that the PRC “must systematically transform
the feudal and semi-fedual land ownership system into a system of peasant land ownership”
(CPPCC, 1950, Article 3, p. 3). In January 1950, the CPCCC issued a directive to start
the preparatory work for land reform in the new liberated areas. The Party leadership set
the general line and general policy of land reform in the new liberated areas, which was “to
depend on poor peasants and hired laborers, unite middle peasants, neutralize rich peasants,
abolish feudal land ownership step-by-step and discriminatorily, and develop agricultural
production.” The basic tasks of land reform in the new liberated areas included conficating
the landlords’ land and redistributing it to the peasants who had none or very little land,
and also distributing an equal share of land to the previous landlords to transform them
into “new men” through physical labor. In June 1950, the Central People’s Government
Committee passed the Land Reform Law of the PRC, which became the legal basis of land
reform.
As one of the provinces in the new liberated areas, the case of Guangdong demonstrates
how the local leaders implemented the land reform policies. Guangdong Province did not
have a strong CPC presence prior to 1949. To the contrary, it had been a strong base for
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KMT’s nationalist government and one of the last provinces being liberated by the CPC.
The fact that the land reform goals were accomplished in Guangdong shows the significant
impact of the high political centralization level in China at the historical moment on the
economic policy implementation.
To clarify, by faithful implemention of the land reform policies, I do not assume that the
central government’s policy agenda was completely consistent without policy changes, nor
do I assume the implementation process was completely smooth. As the previous discussion
on the anti-localism movement shows, there were quite some policy preference differences
among cadres at the local levels (for instance, between the CSCB and the South China
Branch and between the native and non-native cadres). Besides, as the following discussion
shows, the speed of land reform also changed within the four-year period (1949–1953).
However, these inconsistencies did not contradict my argument that at any point during
the four years, none of the local officials went against the central government’s directives.
They all implemented the land reform. Their disagreements were limited to how to imple-
ment the land reform, such as gradually or rapidly, peacefully or violently. And once the
central government issued a directive, the local officials could only follow the central order.
The land reform process, in particular, illustrates this strong adherence.
The provincial leaders who led the land reform from 1949 to 1951 (prior to the anti-
localism movement) were often native cadres, who had local connections and local knowledge,
and pursued the land reform policies in a gradual manner, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.1.
Under their leadership, Guangdong’s provincial government passed three decrees with regard
to how to carry out the land reform movement. The basic principles included the following:
(1) the fundamental goals of land reform were to abolish the feudal land ownership, abolish
the feudal exploitation of peasants, and liberate the agricultural productivity; (2) the land
reform must pay attention to uniting all the people, organize a strong and broad rural
united front, give preferential treatment to those who need preferential treatment, stabilize
the mood of people from various social classes, in order to promote the provincial and
national development; and (3) the land reform must be compatible with the development of
productivity (Huang, 1995, p. 38).
Shortly after Guangdong’s liberation, the South China Branch and Guangdong Provincial
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People’s Government carried out the movement of “weeding out bandits and countering
despotic landlords, reducing rents and interests” (jiao fei fan ba, jian zu jian xi).16 In June
1950, Guangdong Province organized the first Provincial Peasants’ Congress and established
the CPC-led Peasants’ Association. By October 1950, the Peasants’ Association had more
than two million members (Huang, 1995, p. 40). From October 1950 to February 1951, the
provincial government carried out the land reform gradually, by first piloting the movement
in three counties in October 1950, and then expanding the movement to include another
eight counties in November 1950 and two more counties in January 1951 (Huang, 1995, p.
40).
As discussed in Section 4.4.2.1, such a gradual process was criticized by the CSCB led
by Lin Biao (First Secretary) and Deng Zihui (Second Secretary). The CSCB thus sent Tao
Zhu in December 1951 to replace Fang Fang to lead the land reform in Guangdong and
implemented the first wave anti-localism movement which eventually resulted in the purging
of 6,515 cadres.
In April 1952, under Tao Zhu’s leadership, the South China Bureau decided to devote
more resources to land reform and give land reform the top priority. The South China
Bureau would resolutely follow the guiding principle set by the CSCB: “relying on the army,
relying on the cadres from the north.” The land reform under Tao Zhu’s leadership put more
emphasis on mass mobilization. Specifically, the movement aimed to (1) effectively satisfy
poor peasants’ needs; (2) focus on fighting the big landlords and local tyrants and completely
destroy the rule of landlord class; and (3) carefully cultivate the village leadership (Huang,
1995, p. 41).
Before the anti-localism movement and Tao Zhu took over the provincial leadership, the
land reform was more gradual. For instance, in the year of 1951, the land reform was carried
out in areas that had a total population of 4.7 million. After the end of 1951, the land reform
was accelerated. By the summer harvest of 1952, the areas that carried out land reform had
a total population of more than 10 million. Before the fall harvest of 1952, areas of another
10 million population completed land reform (Huang, 1995, p. 41).
16The movement later became “weeding out bandits and countering despotic landlords, reducing rents and
returning deposits” (qing fei fan ba, jian zu tui ya) (Huang, 1995, p. 40).
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The provincial-level dynamics shows that both the native provincial leader, Fang Fang,
and the non-native provincial leader, Tao Zhu, implemented the land reform policies. They
differed on their approaches. The native leader Fang Fang preferred a gradual and peaceful
approach, while the non-native leader Tao Zhu followed a more radical and violent approach.
The central government and the higher subnational level (the CSCB) had the power to decide
on how to implement the land reform. If the local officials could not satisfy the higher level’s
requirements, the local officials would leave office, guaranteed by the centralized political
system. The new personnel, which was Tao Zhu in this case, would follow the orders issued
from the higher levels. If hypothetically he had not followed such orders, he would have
been replaced. Thus, the system provided strong incentives for the local officials to follow
the central directives and the land reform process confirms this mechanism.
This mechanism was effective not only at the provincial level, but due to the CPC’s
pervasiveness in the society, it was also effective at the lower levels, such as the county and
village levels. The following examples of Mei Xian and Qiaoxiang Village show how land
reform was carried out at the county and village levels.
Prior to 1949, the land ownership in Mei Xian was private. According to a study done
by the County Land Reform Committee (Tudi Gaige Weiyuanhui, LRC) in 1953, the county
had 101,911 households and a population of 389,136. The total area of arable land was
395,021 mu (around 26,335 hectares). To implement the land reform, the LRC carried out
an identification of the class structure and differentiated the following classes: landlord (di
zhu), rich peasants (fu nong), industrialists and commercialists (gong shang ye jia), previous
bureaucrats (jiu guan li), lessors and managers of small plots (xiao tudi chuzu, xiao tudi
jingying zhe), middle peasants (zhong nong), poor peasants (pin nong), farm laborers (gu
nong), and workers (gong ren), among others. The average land owned by a landowner was
1.77 mu (around 1,180 m2), while the average land owned by a poor peasant or a hired
laborer was 0.33 mu (around 220 m2) (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and
Compiling Committee, 1995, pp. 239–240).
Mei Xian was peacefully liberated and the County People’s Democratic Government was
established in May 1949. But in July 1949, the KMT army led by Division Commander
(shi zhang) Hu Lian took back the urban area of Mei Xian, forcing the newly established
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people’s democratic government to retreat to the mountainous region. In August 1949,
the PLA defeated Hu Lian’s army. In September 1949, the People’s Government of Mei
Xian moved back to the urban area (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and
Compiling Committee, 1995, pp. 45–46).
Beginning in October 1949, the Mei Xian county government initiated the program of
rent and interest reduction. This policy allowed the private land ownership to continue to
exist, but reduced the rents and interests that the peasants owed to the landlords. This
program, called “‘25%’ Rent Reduction” (“‘er wu’ jian zu”), resulted in peasants receiving
a return of three-million grain rent (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and
Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 240).
In May 1951, the Mei Xian County LRC was established, which organized more than
1,000 cadres (including the working personnel dispatched from the provincial level) into land
reform work teams, and dispatched these cadres to the villages to carry out the land reform
movement. After Tao Zhu became the provincial leader, in early 1952, a group of cadres
sent from the north and cadres who were veterans also joined the land reform movement
(Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 240).
Mei Xian’s land reform had three stages. The first stage lasted from May to July 1951,
during which the county government carried out a movement of “weeding out bandits and
countering despotic landlords, returning rents and deposits” (qing fei fan ba, tui zu tui
ya), called “eight-character movement” (ba zi yundong). In this stage, in the county’s 639
villages, 3,303 Poor Peasants’ and Farm Laborers’ Groups were formed and had a total
membership of 48,900. The total membership of Peasants’ Associations reached 149,000.
The number of despotic landlords and counterrevolutionaries identified was 1,549, among
whom six were sentenced to death and 103 received fixed-term imprisonment. The total
number of landlords and people from similar classes being scrutinized (qingsuan) was 9,665,
2,968 of whom returned the rents to the peasants. More than 259,000 people joined the
movement, and more than 224,000 of them received benefits from the movement (Guangdong
Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 240).
The second stage was from September 1951 to Novebmer 1952, the county government
mobilized and organized the masses to differentiate classes (huafen jieji), redistribute land,
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and consolidate the new regime. In the earlier period of this stage, the County Party Com-
mittee chose four districts to launch a pilot movement and dispatched all of the county’s
land reform teams to these four districts. In August 1952, the movement spread to all parts
of the county (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee,
1995, p. 240). The anti-localism movement in Mei Xian (summarized earlier in Tables 4.1
and 4.2 and Figure 4.4) also ensured the acceleration of land reform process. By November
1952, all 15 districts (150 townships) in Mei Xian had completed most of the second-stage
tasks of class differentiation and land confiscation and redistribution (Guangdong Provincial
Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 240).
The third stage happened in Spring 1953. During this period, the county government or-
ganized a verification process of the land reform (tugai fucha). The verification process ended
by the end of March 1953. In April 1953, the county government conducted the land survey
and fixed production quota, collected the old land leases, and issued certificate of property
ownership (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995,
pp. 240–241).
Mei Xian’s land reform movement lasted for almost two years. During the two years, the
county suppressed 2,016 landlords, sentenced 80 despotic landlords and counterrevolutionar-
ies to death and 117 fixed-term imprisonment. In Mei Xian, 2,926 households were classified
as the landlord class and 1,462 households as the rich peasant class. 65,500 households
(64.3% of all rural households in the county) and 237,100 people (60.9% of the county’s
rural population) received land, houses, farm cattle, farm tools, and other benefits. The
members of the landlord family also received a share of land, corresponding to their family
sizes (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p.
241).
An example of Qiaoxiang Village (qiaoxiang cun) in Mei Xian County shows the policy
implementation at the village level. Qiaoxiang Village is an administrative village named
after its strong emigration culture. Qiaoxiang Village includes three natural sub-villages
(ziran cun), namely Siqian, Gaotian, and Tangdu. Before the land reform, Siqian and
Gaotian sub-villages belonged to one natural sub-village, called Siqianpai. During the land
reform in 1953, for administrative purposes, Siqianpai (sub-village) was divided into two
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sub-villages (Pan, 2015, p. 21).
Like many other villages in the new liberated area, Qiaoxiang Village did not have a
strong CPC presence before 1949. The first Party Branch in Qiaoxiang Village was estab-
lished in March 1952, when the land reform work team was sent to the village from the
county government of Mei Xian. In February 1953, five villagers from Qiaoxiang Village
became the first CPC members in the village history. One of the first Party member, He
Yaxi, became Party Branch Secretary of Nanhu Township, which administered Qiaoxiang
Village (Pan, 2015, p. 138). Although anti-localism movement put non-native cadres into
leadership positions at the county level, in Nanhu Township and Qiaoxiang village, it was
the local people that governed.
In 1953, Qiaoxiang Village carried out the land reform movement. The land of landlords
and rich peasants were confiscated. Farm cattles, farm tools, extra grain and houses, were
first taken over by the Township Peasants’ Association, and later distributed to the villagers
according to their family sizes. The landlords and rich peasants also received shares of
the land in this equalizing manner. Villagers received the land certificate. The ancestral
temples and private schools all became public property. According to the Land Reform Law
and Decisions on Differentiating the Classes in the Rural Areas, the village carried out the
verification process (Pan, 2015, p. 124).
Qiaoxiang Village’s experience demonstrates the effectiveness of the CPC organization.
Although the township and villages were led by the native cadres, some of whom only joined
the CPC in the early 1950s, the CPC organization still ensured the implementation of the
land reform policies in a village that did not have a strong CPC presence prior to 1949.
The land reform process in Guangdong is illustrative of how the centralized political
system ensured the implementation of the economic policies at the local levels. First, the
case shows that the high deviation thresholds created by the centralized political system
indeed had its expected effects—the anti-localism movement indeed accelerated the land
reform process. Second, the case shows that because the CPC permeated all government
levels, the centralized system ensured that the land reform movement was carried out at the
most local levels.
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4.4.3.2 Socialist Transformation of Agriculture (1953–1956) In this section, I
present the evidence of how the socialist transformation of agriculture was carried out at
the local levels, using Mei Xian (County) and Qiaoxiang Village as the examples. During
this period, Tao Zhu continued to lead at the provincial level. The political conditions were
stable, since there were no salient political movements in this time period.17 This section
shows that the socialist transformation of agriculture moved forward smoothly at the local
levels.
In 1952, the CPCCC put forth the “general line for the transition period.” According to
Chairman Mao (1977), the Party’s general task was “to gradually accomplish the country’s
industrialization along with the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and cap-
italist industry and commerce over a relatively long period of time. This general line should
be the beacon illuminating all our work, and wherever we deviate from it, we shall make
Right or ‘Left’ mistakes” (p. 102).
Guided by the general line for the transition period, Mei Xian pursued the socialist
transformation of agriculture in the following stages.
In the first stage, beginning in Spring 1952, peasants were organized into seasonal mutual
aid teams (linshi huzhuzu) and year-round mutual aid teams (changnian huzhuzu). At first,
peasants joined the seasonal mutual aid teams and often voluntarily helped each other during
the busy seasons in various ways, such as exchanging labor for labor, and exchanging labor
for cattle work, etc. There were more than 3,000 seasonal mutual aid teams in 1952. 34
of these seasonal mutual aid teams were organized into year-round mutual aid teams. The
year-round mutual aid teams were more organized and centralized. They had production
plans, evaluated peasants’ work and recorded points. Beginning in December 1952, the
County Party Committee strengthened its leadership over the “mutual aid and cooperation
movement.” It held training courses for the leaders of the mutual aid teams and formed a
Department of Cooperation to lead the mutual aid and cooperation movement. By the end
of 1953, more than 11,400 mutual aid teams were formed. 75,600 households (70.3% of total
rural households) joined the mutual aid teams. Among them, 1,647 were year-round mutual
17The rectification campaign, the anti-rightist struggle, and the second wave anti-localism movement all
happened after 1956.
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aid teams. 12.2% of total households joined these year-round mutual aid teams (Guangdong
Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 241).
The second stage began in the winter of 1953. In this stage, the mutual aid teams
were transformed into the semi-socialist primary agricultural producers’ cooperatives (chuji
nongye shengchan hezuoshe). The peasants handed over land and capital to the agricultural
cooperatives and “were remunerated for their land shares and labor contributed to produc-
tion” (Crook, 1972, p. 1). The basic production unit in the agricultural cooperatives was
the operation team. The team leaders were in charge of assigning production tasks, setting
work quotas and work-point standards, evaluating peasants’ labor, and recording their work
points (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p.
244).
The County Party Committee of the CPC first chose three year-round mutual aid teams
to form three primary agricultural cooperatives in 1953. In the spring and summer of 1954,
another ten townships were selected to create ten more primary agricultural cooperatives
from the year-round mutual aid teams. By the spring of 1955, 146 primary agricultural
cooperatives were established in 109 small townships (68.55% of all small townships). The
number of households that joined the agricultural cooperatives reached 5,486 (5.03% of total
rural households). In the fall of 1955, to implement Mao’s directive on agricultural collec-
tivization, Mei Xian started a new upsurge of forming agricultural cooperatives, resulting
in the establishment of 1,562 new primary cooperatives and a total number of 1,708 pri-
mary cooperatives The number of rural households that joined the cooperatives expanded
to 44,300, reaching 40.4% of total rural households (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer
Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, p. 241).
The third stage lasted one year, from the winter of 1955 to the winter of 1956, when Mei
Xian transformed the primary agricultural producers’ cooperatives into advanced agricultural
producers’ cooperatives (gaoji nongye shengchan hezuoshe) and mostly accomplished the
socialist transformation of agriculture (Guangdong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and
Compiling Committee, 1995, pp. 241–242).
The advanced agricultural cooperatives was considered fully socialist, as they had collec-
tive ownership and performed distribution according to labor. From the winter of 1955 to
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the spring of 1956, Mei Xian first chose two townships, in which the primary cooperatives
were merged and expanded to form the dvanced agricultural producers’ cooperatives. From
the summer of 1956, Mei Xian merged and upgraded the cooperatives on a large scale. By
December 1956, 587 advanced agricultural producers’ cooperatives were formed. A total
number of 108,597 rural households that constituted 98.7% of total rural households joined
the advanced cooperatives. The sizes of the advanced agricultural cooperatives ranged from
the smallest that had 100 households to the largest that had 600 to 800 households (Guang-
dong Provincial Local Gazetteer Editing and Compiling Committee, 1995, pp. 241–242).
At the village level, Qiaoxiang Village began the agricultural cooperative movement in
1955. In the fall of 1955, 16 households in Tangdu (one natural sub-village) organized a
mutual aid team. Because all households were relatives of overseas Chinese, the mutual
aid team was called Qiaoxiang Mutual Aid Team. Later, 32 relatives of overseas Chinese
were organized into a primary agricultural producers’ cooperative, which continued to use the
name of the mutual aid team and was called Tangdu Village Qiaoxiang Primary Agricultural
Producers’ Cooperative. Around 1956 and 1957, the primary agricultural cooperatives in
the three natural sub-villages were merged into one advanced cooperative. As 90% of the
members were relatives of overseas Chinese, the cooperative was called Qiaoxiang Advanced
Cooperative. Throughout the transformation, the CPC local branch in Qiaoxiang Village
organized a propaganda team and a yangge team (a type of popular folk dance) to advocate
the agricultural collectivization policies (Pan, 2015, p. 22; pp. 140–141).
In summary, this section provides strong evidence for the third link of the causal mech-
anism that the local governments indeed implemented the economic policies made by the
central government in the early 1950s. Moreover, the evidence also strongly supports that
the centralized political system played a crucial role, as the case of Guangdong demonstrates
how the anti-localism movement accelerated the land reform process. Besides, the central
government’s control permeated to the village level, as the evidence drawn from Mei Xian
(county) and Qiaoxiang Village shows. These pieces of evidence are particularly illuminat-
ing, given that the CPC had a rather weak presence in Qiaoxiang Village, Mei Xian, and
Guangdong Province. The influence of the central leadership is expected to be stronger in
areas where the CPC had a stronger presence prior to 1949, such as the old liberated areas.
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4.4.4 NG: Strong Trust and Desire of Economic Decentralization
This section presents the evidence for the fourth link of the causal mechanism in Figure 4.3:
the central government trusted that the local officials would implement the central govern-
ment’s policy agenda after economic decentralization. Given that the central government
also considered centralized economic system was obstructing rapid development, the central
government desired a higher economic decentralization level.
4.4.4.1 The Central Government (Mao) Trusted the Local Officials The fast
completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry
and commerce from 1953 to 1956 showed the impacts of the centralized political system on
policy implementation at the local levels. As a result, the central leaders, including Mao
Zedong, became more confident in leading the local officials from Beijing, knowing that they
had the political tools offered by the Party organization to discipline the local leaders.
Firstly, the central government had the political tools to control the local officials. In ad-
dition to continuing the emphasis on Party discipline through formal institutions (discussed
in Section 4.4.2.2), the central officials also resumed the less formal mechanisms, such as
carrying out political movements within the Party to replace the local officials who doubted
the central policy agenda with the more allegiant cadres, both before and after economic
authority was decentralized.
For instance, although Fujian Province, a southern province neighboring Guangdong,
did not fully engage in the anti-localism campaign in 1957, in October 1959 after the Lushan
Conference, the Standing Member of the Provincial Party Committee, Jiang Yizhen, was
purged under the charge of leading a “Rightist Opportunism Anti-Party Group” (youqing
jihui zhuyi fandang jituan) (CPCCC Organization Department, CPCCC Party History Re-
search Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 521). A similar case happened in Henan
Province, where during the Great Leap Forward, the First Secretary of Henan Provincial
Party Committee Pan Fusheng was purged in August 1958, because he was not as radical
as the other top provincial leader, the Second Secretary Wu Zhipu (Zhao, 2011). The CPC
appointed Wu Zhipu to replace Pan Fusheng as the First Secretary (CPCCC Organization
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Department, CPCCC Party History Research Centre and CPCCC Archives, 2000e, p. 559).
Mao’s confidence in the center’s capacity to control the local officials politically fostered
his trust in the local officials to pursue the policy agenda set by the central government.
Secondly, in fact, Mao’s decision to pursue the radical policy goals of the Great Leap
Forward was based on the local officials’ persuasion. Thus, Mao had few reasons to doubt
the local officials’ intention to implement the national policy goals.
The previous personnel arrangement ensured the survival of the radical type of provincial
leaders, who shared Mao’s radical approach to pursue social and economic transformation.
The consequence was that Mao trusted such radical provincial leaders for policy proposals.
Moreover, because such radical provincial leaders shared Mao’s preferences, Mao was also
able to use them to counterbalance other central government leaders who held moderate
views. This high level of consensus between Mao and the provincial leaders made Mao trust
the latter’s willingness to implement the radical policies of the Great Leap.
In late 1956, the local officials played an important role in Mao’s change of attitudes
from consenting to the “opposing rash advance” to criticizing it. During the Third Plenum,
Mao discussed with the provincial and prefectural leaders and he commented that discussing
with local leaders could be crucial for combating rightism. Moreover, “the raising of the duo,
kuai, hao, sheng [more, faster, better, and more economical] slogan by local leaders made the
Chairman ‘very excited’ (hen xingfen) at the plenum” (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, pp. 68–69).
In fact, the provincial officials had consistently been enthusiastic about more rapid
growth. In late 1955, the subnational governments significantly increased their growth
targets, because doing so offered the subnational governments an opportunity to expand
spending in their local areas. Moreover, in early 1956, they directly participated in drafting
the ambitious “40 Article 12-year Draft Program for Agricultural Development” (hereinafter
referred to as “40 Article”) when they complained about overcentralization and inadequate
central government funding (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, pp. 22–23). It was the economic planners
at the central government, such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun, who supported the “oppos-
ing rash advance,” whereas the localities opposed it. For instance, after the People’s Daily
published an editorial that was critical of the blind rash advance in June 1956, the First
Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Ke Qingshi, expressed his objections.
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Teiwes and Sun (1999) found that there was no evidence suggesting the objections of the
provincial leaders were enouraged by Mao (p. 32). Instead, because Mao did not articulate
his support for the “opposing rash advance” program, the subnational governments had cer-
tain leeway and their discontent was their spontaneous response. The spontaneity of the
provincial leaders’ strong distaste for “opposing rash advance” reflects their intense desire
for rapid development, which is highly consistent with Mao’s policy preferences. Such a
consistency was resulted from the high level of political centralization and led Mao to trust
the provincial leaders so much that he authorized significant economic decentralization along
with the Great Leap.
From Mao’s perspective, because it was the subnational governments’ strong advocation
of increasing targets beyond what was allowed objectively that contributed to his decision to
stop the “opposing rash advance” program, he had few reasons to doubt that the provincial
officials would adopt policies inconsistent with the radical national policy agenda. The
purging of several top provincial officials in 1957–58 (see Figure 4.5) further replaced the
more independent-minded provincial officials, whereby Mao was able to trust the provincial
officials even more for implementing the Great Leap policies.
In sum, the highly centralized political system and the radical tendency of Mao combined
led to the selection of the radical type of local officials prior to the Great Leap Forward.
Moreover, the centralized political system continued during the Great Leap, reflected in
the sustained political movements. Under these conditions, Mao trusted that the local
officials would implement the centrally-made economic policies, since they were the ones
who proposed to set radical policy targets. In case that other officials may question or
disobey the central policy agenda, Mao could continue to remove such local officials from
office.
However, I do not claim that the centralized political system made all provincial govern-
ments totally homogeneous in their desire to follow the central government’s policy agenda.
Indeed, scholars do find significant variations in provincial leaders’ enthusiasm towards the
Great Leap and in its impacts on localities.18 I argue that the high level of political central-
18For more on the causes and effects of provincial variation during the Great Leap Forward, see Yang
(1996) and Kung and Chen (2011).
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ization ensured the high deviation thresholds and Mao’s trust in local officials to an extent
so significant that Mao was willing to decentralize the economic authority.
4.4.4.2 The Central Government’s Economic Incentives for Economic Decen-
tralization So far, I have shown that during the Great Leap Forward, the deviation
thresholds were high enough for Mao to trust the local officials’ willingness to obey the
central government’s economic policy agenda. In the following, I briefly show the other two
conditions identified in the game theoretical model: (1) the national government in this
period valued economic development; and (2) China’s socioeconomic conditions required a
high economic decentralization level.
a. The Desire for Rapid Economic Development
There is little doubt that the national government in this period valued economic de-
velopment. For over 100 years before the establishment of the PRC, China had endured
frequent wars and constant political instability. The establishment of the PRC for the first
time promised a peaceful environment where the nation could recover from the previous vi-
olent history. In this sense, it was not a coincidence that the whole nation was enthusiastic
about achieving higher economic targets in the mid-1950s. In this context, Mao proposed the
Great Leap Forward as a program to take advantage of the popular enthusiasm to construct
a socialist economy.
According to the game theoretical model, the desire of the national government to develop
the economy forms one additional condition for the top-down economic decentralization. In
the case of the Great Leap, such a strong desire for economic development can be reflected
in the goals set by the national leadership. For instance, as Mao visited the Soviet Union
in 1957, he was inspired by the Soviet sputnik and ICBM and the Soviet Union’s growth
rate. “When Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States
economically in 15 years, Mao . . . set his own goal for China to surpass Britain in the same
period” (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, p. 70). As Teiwes and Sun (1999) discuss the causes of the
Great Leap, they observe the following.
Undoubtedly the Chairman’s oft-expressed desire, even when endorsing opposition to rash
advance in 1956, for rapid growth was a fundamental consideration, one which perhaps
became more salient by fall 1957 as the likelihood of continued slower growth sunk in. At
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this juncture Mao seemingly was at once impatient with slow growth, encouraged by the
completion of FFYP targets ahead of schedule, and angry that, in his view, fanmaojin had
prevented greater economic achievements (p. 77).
This strong desire for rapid growth led to the later dramatic increase in the targets of steel
production, from producing 10 million tons for 1962—which was set by Mao in August 1956—
to 50 million tons—set again by Mao in 1958 (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, pp. 102–103).19 It is
thus clear that the national government during this period valued economic development.
b. The Need for More Economic Decentralization
In the meantime, to achieve a faster economic development, the socioeconomic condi-
tions in the mid-1950s demanded a more decentralized economic system than the one that
China imported from the Soviet Union. Subjectively, the central leadership also realized the
inadequacy of the centralized economic system.
In the early 1950s, the new PRC government successfully eliminated the private sector,
which dramatically “increased the number of enterprises under the direct jurisdiction of the
central planning apparatus.” Moreover, by eliminating the role of the market in the distri-
bution of goods and services, the government now had to take on more responsabilities in
such economic activities. As the economy developed and became more complex in the 1950s,
the limitations with the centralized economic system became more salient. By April 1956,
the excessive centralization revealed many problems of coordination, control and motivation.
These problems included that (1) central decisions were based on inadequate information;
(2) local governments could not coordinate activities in their own jurisdictions; and (3) local
governments did not have many incentives to engage in local development efforts (Riskin,
1987, p. 102).20
Such objective limitations, especially the suppression of provincial governments’ initia-
tives, were expressed by provincial officials to the national government, including to Mao
himself. In December 1955 and January 1956, Mao conducted investigations and held meet-
ings with provincial leaders, during which local officials, including Zeng Xisheng from Anhui
19Once more, Teiwes and Sun (1999, pp. 83–118) provide an excellent detailed account of the histori-
cal progression of how the optimism evolved and illustrate how the radical provincial government officials
facilitated such a progression.
20Riskin (1987) provides a more detailed discussion on the benefits and costs of the centralized economic
system during this period (pp. 100–103).
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and Tao Zhu from Guangdong, complained that “central control was choking productive
activity, binding them hand and foot and leaving the localities no room for economic man-
agement, and they demanded a devolution of economic power” (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, p.
58). Mao appreciated provincial leaders’ enthusiasm and spoke on several occassions on the
need to pursue economic decentralization.
When, as part of the briefing process leading to the “Ten Great Relationships,” the Chair-
man listened to the report of the Ministry of Heavy Industry on February 4, he noted that
local cadres were very dissatisfied, and accused the assembled officials of ignoring requests
from below and binding the localities. In early March he sent a note to top leaders Liu
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, and Deng Xiaoping observing that while the Party Center
had been listening to the ideas of ministries concerning changes in the economic manage-
ment system, from then on it was necessary to listen to the views of provincial, municipal,
and other local Party Committees (Teiwes and Sun, 1999, p. 58).
Therefore, the central government also had strong economic incentives to pursue eco-
nomic decentralization policies, because the central government desired rapid economic de-
velopment while the centralized economic system proved to be limiting economic develop-
ment.
In summary, this section shows that the central government, especially its core leader Mao
Zedong, trusted that the local officials were loyal Party members who had high deviation
thresholds and would pursue the economic policies made by the central government. In
addition, the central leaders also had the toolbox offered by the Party organization to rectify
the local leaders, if some of the local officials doubted the Party line. In addition to the
political incentive based on trust, the central government also had economic incentives to
pursue economic decentralization, including its desire of a rapid economic development and
perception of the limitations of an economically centralized system for a country as large
and diverse as China.
4.4.5 Economic Decentralization Policies and Provincial Responses
This section presents the evidence for the final link in Figure 4.1: the central government
pursued the economic decentralization policies and the provincial leaders implemented the
central government’s economic policy agenda despite the economic decentralization policies.
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4.4.5.1 Economic Decentralization Policies Along with the dramatic increase of eco-
nomic targets, the Great Leap also witnessed a radical shift of economic authority and
resources from the national to the provincial governments, both in the area of the adminis-
tration of the state-owned enterprises and in terms of fiscal autonomy.
In the area of administration of state-owned enterprises, according to the directives
announced by the State Council on 18 November 1957, the control over a vast majority of
light industrial enterprises (with the exception of textiles) were transferred from the national
to provincial governments, “along with heavy industrial enterprises other than large-scale
units in strategically important sectors” (Riskin, 1987, p. 104). Moreover, to all enterprises
still under central control, the principle of “dual leadership” by both national and provincial
authorities were applied.
In terms of economic resources, previously “under the consolidated state budget system,
local expenditures were determined by the centre and bore no relation to local revenues”
(Riskin, 1987, p. 102). According to the directives in late 1957 and 1958,
the profits of the newly decentralized enterprises were to be split between centre and
province with the former retaining 80 per cent. The same 80–20 division was applied for the
profits of enterprises (e.g., textiles) still under central control, except for those in certain
large-scale and/or strategically important heavy industries. The result of these provisions,
was, at least on paper, a substantial increase in the share of total industrial profits going
to localities. Provincial governments were also given greater authority over distribution of
output of provincial factories producing goods subject to unified distribution; and over the
allocation of personnel in centrally operated enterprises (Riskin, 1987, pp. 104–105).
Decentralization also occurred in the fiscal area:
Provincial tax authority was expanded by setting forth a number of cases in which provinces
could adjust tax rates and change the coverage of certain taxes. Decentralization of finan-
cial management expanded the scope of revenues and expenditures of local governments
and in addition gave provincial governments more control over the composition of their
expenditures. Extrabudgetary revenues of local governments also were expanded and local
governments were given increased authority over the use of budgetary surpluses (Lardy,
1978, p. 33).
On the other hand, according to both Riskin (1987) and Lardy (1978), although the
economic decentralization process was very significant, the central government maintained
strong power “over the interregional allocation of resources, the level and nature of capital
investment, the production quantities of the most important industrial and agricultural
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goods, the total expenditures (and even their composition) of provinces, and the total wage
bill” (Riskin, 1987, pp. 106–107).
[F]or example, before the reforms each province’s annual revenues were provided by the
central government in the amount required by the centrally approved expenditure plan for
the year in question. After the reforms the provinces had in their expanded tax base and
profit-sharing powers a broad, independent, and expanding source of revenues. However,
the size of their revenue base was carefully calculated to cover only about three-quarters of
their expenditures, so that they continued to depend upon annually adjusted central subsi-
dies, which could be used to control the growth and composition of provincial expenditures
(Riskin, 1987, p. 107).
There are two points worth noting. Firstly, the economic decentralization process as
a component of the Great Leap agenda began in November 1957, when the Anti-localism
Movement and the Anti-Rightist Struggle were happening but had not yet finished. This
shows that the national leadership had strong confidence in the CPC’s organizational capac-
ity to follow through the necessary personnel changes and believed that the policy preference
divergence would be even lower. It was this perception of theirs that contributed to their
confidence in pursuing the economic decentralization.
Secondly, there was also regional variation in the economic decentralization policies.
Specifically, the most developed provincial units, including Shanghai, Liaoning, Beijing, and
Tianjin, did not enjoy as much resources/authority decentralization as other provinces. In
contrast, the least developed areas, such as the autonomous regions, were granted more fis-
cal and economic resources (Riskin, 1987, p. 107). Because this chapter’s focus is to show
that political centralization of the CPC led to the overall drastic economic decentralization
process during the Great Leap, I do not intend to explain the regional variation. However, I
conjecture that this can be explained by the θ term in the formal model, i.e., the importance
the national government placed on economic development vis-à-vis controlling the economic
resources. Quite consistently throughout the PRC’s history, including, for instance, the eco-
nomic decentralization process in the 1980s, the national government preferred to maintain
strong control over the more economically developed regions while allow the less developed
areas more autonomy to experiment with different economic policies. The mentality is that
even if such policy experiments fail, the national government would still be able to maintain
economic stability with the resources from the most developed regions. Given that the more
140
developed regions function as the insurance of policy experiments, the national government
values maximizing the extraction of such regions’ economic resources more than the speed of
their economic development. On the other hand, for the least developed regions, the national
government places higher priority on their local economic development than extracting their
economic resources. According to the result of the game theoretical model, I conjecture
that on the regional level, the higher priority the national government places on the region’s
local economic development vis-à-vis maximizing the national resources from this region, the
higher the economic decentralization level is. This explains why more economically devel-
oped provinces did not experience as much economic decentralization as the less developed
provinces.
4.4.5.2 Provincial Governments’ Responses Consistent with the theoretical expec-
tation, after the economic decentralization policies in late 1957 and 1958, the provincial
governments all responded positively to the national government’s call to pursue economic
development in a radical manner. Again, there was indeed variation in provincial enthusi-
asm, but the overall provincial participation was active. No provincial leader contradicted
the national government’s policy agenda directly and all provinces followed the Great Leap
policies.
For instance, in January 1958 Mao drafted the “Sixty Articles on Work Methods” (here-
inafter referred to as “Sixty Articles”). In Article 9, Mao proposed that there ought to be
three targets when planning the economic production. The central government has two tar-
gets (liangbenzhang): one must be fulfilled (bicheng de), which is publicized, and the other
one needs to be strived for (qicheng de), which is not publicized. The local governments need
to set two targets as well. Their “must-be-fulfilled” target needs to be the central govern-
ment “strived-for” target and they ought to have their own “strived-for” targets. To create
incentives for the local governments, there will be periodic assessments of the provinces,
municipalities, and counties, etc. Such assessments will be based on the achievements of
the “strived-for” targets, instead of the “must-be-fulfilled” targets. This proposal led each
level of the local governments to emulate the central government and set two targets. Each
level added on the “strived-for” targets they obtained from their higher level and passed the
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new target down as “must-be-fulfilled” one to their lower level, causing dysfunction of the
economic planning.
Another example is the local governments’ implementation of the radical agricultural
policies, which have been shown to contribute to the Great Famine from 1959 to 1961. Par-
ticularly, the local governments facilitated a rapid and widespread collectivization process in
rural China, i.e., forming the people’s communes. In four months from August to December
1958, the proportion of rural households that joined communes increased from around 30
percent to virtually 100 percent (Riskin, 1987, p. 123). This means that all local govern-
ments faithfully implemented the national government’s policy directives in establishing the
people’s communes. As Riskin (1987, p. 123) observes, the varying local conditions, which
made rural collectivization more suitable in some regions, e.g., the North China Plain, than
others, did not prevent local governments from enthusiastically engaging in the collectiviza-
tion efforts.
Table 4.3. Agricultural Collectivization Level: Participation in the Mess Halls
Province Mess hall Province Mess hall
Henan 97.80% Fujian 67.20%
Hunan 97.60% Jiangxi 61.00%
Sichuan 96.70% Shaanxi 60.80%
Yunnan 96.50% Jiangsu 56.00%
Guizhou 92.60% Ningxia 52.90%
Anhui 90.50% Gansu 47.70%
Xinjiang 85.10% Shandong 35.50%
Zhejiang 81.60% Qinghai 29.90%
Guangxi 81.00% Jilin 29.40%
Guangdong 77.60% Heilongjiang 26.50%
Hebei 74.40% Liaoning 23.00%
Shanxi 70.60% Inner Mongolia 16.70%
Hubei 68.20%
Source: Yang (1996, p. 57).
In a classic study on the Great Leap, Yang (1996, p. 57) collects data on the agricultural
collectivization efforts at the provincial level, which he measures as the percentage of rural
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Figure 4.6. Agricultural Collectivization Level
(a) Participation in the Mess Halls
(b) The Relative Increase in Mortality Rates
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(c) The Mortality Rates in 1960
Map (a) shows the percentage of the rural population that eat in the communal mess halls.
Map (b) shows the relative increase in the mortality rates in each province in 1959–62. The formula that
Yang uses is: “Percentage increase in mortality rate = (highest mortality rate during 1959–62 − average
mortality rate for 1956–58) ÷ average mortality rate for 1956–58” (Yang, 1996, p. 57).
Map (c) shows the provincial mortality rates (per 1,000) in 1960.
Data source: Yang (1996, p. 57).
population who participated in the commune mess halls, shown in Table 4.3. Because as of
late 1959 the commune mess halls had not been mandated by the central government, there
still was variation in provincial participation rates, which can illustrate the provincial fervor
(Yang, 1996, p. 56). In Figure 4.6a, I map these data to show the nationwide pattern. The
map shows that the least radical provinces were in the northeast, including Liaoning (23%),
Jilin (29.4%), Heilongjiang (26.5%), and Inner Mongolia (16.7%), while the most radical
ones were in the South. Guangdong Province’s participation rate was 77.6%, making it a
member of the more radical provinces.
Comparing this map with the timing of the liberation map in Figure 4.2, there is a
pattern that the new liberated areas showed more radicalism than the old liberated areas.
In his book, Yang (1996, p. 59) also pinpoints this pattern. According to the data collected
by Yang (1996, p. 57), this pattern was not only reflected in the provincial participation
rates of commune mess halls, but also reflected in the relative increase of mortality rates
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during the four years from 1959 to 1962 as well as the mortality rate in 1960. I show these
statistics in another two maps (Figure 4.6b and Figure 4.6c). Yang (1996, p. 59) argues that
this pattern was resulted from the early stage of the CPC’s organizational development in
the new liberated areas. Particularly, the new liberated areas had a lower density of party
members. Compared to the old liberated areas, the new ones had more lower-level elites
who wished to join the CPC and were motivated to participate in the radical policies. Yang
refers to this phenomenon as loyalty compensation.
Yang’s argument seems inconsistent with the argument of Zhang and Liu (2016). The
latter two authors find that in Zhejiang province the local elites who did not have the close
connections with the central government and thus lacking the top-down political support were
more likely to protect local interests than pursue the radical policies that pleased the central
government but harmed the local interests. Based on the evidence presented on Guangdong
in the earlier discussion, I concur with Zhang and Liu (2016) that the native cadres in the
southern provinces, such as Fang Fang, Gu Dacun, and Feng Baiju in Guangdong, were more
likely to protect local territorial interests than pursue radical national policies, compared to
the non-native ones, such as Tao Zhu and Zhao Ziyang. But if native cadres in the south
were likely to protect their local interests, how do we explain this pattern that the new
liberated areas in the south were more radical than the old liberated areas in the north?
The reason partly lies in the nature of the centralized political system. In particular,
the central government constantly screened and purged the more independent-minded local
cadres. After such purges, only the “loyal” cadres survived. They were “loyal” in the sense
that they tended to faithfully follow the national government’s policy agenda. Among these
“loyal” cadres, the ones who were less connected to the central leadership, i.e., those in the
southern provinces, were more motivated to demonstrate their “loyalty” by enthusiastically
engaging in radical policies, compared to their northern counterparts. Conceptually, we
can distinguish two stages: the pre-screening stage, when “nativism” played a more salient
role; and the post-screening stage, when “loyalty compensation” was of more importance.
Thus, the findings of Yang (1996) and Zhang and Liu (2016) are not entirely incompatible.
Their arguments’ validity depends on whether one examines the pre-screening stage or the
post-screening stage.
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The Great Leap happened at a time after China went through a series of tight political
screenings in the form of rectification campaigns and purges. Thus, at that point in history,
the political institution had filtered out a great deal of “nativism” and therefore enabled
the “loyalty compensation” logic to play a greater role in shaping the pattern we observe in
Figure 4.6. In this sense, this intriguing pattern, i.e., the new liberated areas showed more
radicalism than the old liberated areas, confirms that the political campaigns had significant
impacts on the policy preferences of the provincial leaders. Counterfactually, if the previous
political personnel reshuffle had not been very effective, I expect that we would observe the
opposite pattern, i.e., the native cadres in the south who were less connected with the central
leadership would protect local interests and would not engage fully with the radical economic
policies desired by the national government.
To summarize this section, at the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, there was
a process of significant economic decentralization. As the central government anticipated,
after the economic decentralization, the provincial governments faithfully implemented the
radical economic policies despite their great costs for local economies. Theoretically, this is
consistent with the equilibrium outcome where the national government chooses to have a
high level of economic decentralization (setting x∗ at xI) and the subnational government
chooses to implement the national policy directives.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.5.1 Main Findings
In summary, this chapter tests the theoretical model against the first historic economic
decentralization episode in the PRC: the economic decentralization process during the Great
Leap Forward in the 1950s. I find supportive evidence for all the links of the predicted causal
mechanism in Figure 4.1. In addition, the case also supports the effects of two economic
factors that are identified in the theoretical model but are not emphasized in the political
story of Figure 4.1, namely the national government’s desire of economic development and
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the limitations of a centralized economic system for a large and diverse country.
Firstly, I find evidence to support that the postrevolutionary regime in China was highly
politically centralized. The high level of political centralization was not only guaranteed by
the unitary constitutions (the Common Program and the 1954 Constitution), but was also
resulted from the centralized system of the ruling party, the CPC. Specifically, I emphasize
three features of the CPC that contributed to the centralized system of the PRC, namely (1)
the CPC’s highly disciplined party organization, (2) its tight control over the armed forces,
and (3) the center’s ideological control over the Party members. The fact that the CPC
was established two decades before the PRC proved to be a critical initial condition that led
to the PRC’s centralized regime, because these centralized features of the CPC helped the
Party to rapidly consolidate the new regime after 1949.
Secondly, I find supportive evidence for the second links of the causal mechanism: the
local governments had similar economic policy preferences as the central government and
the local officials had strong career incentives to pursue the central government’s economic
policy agenda. These two factors together constituted high deviation thresholds for the local
officials, which imply that the local governments were unlikely to deviate from the central
government’s economic policies.
Through personnel control, the centralized political system of the PRC ensured the local
officials shared the central government’s economic policy preferences. Such personnel control
included sending cadres from the old liberated areas to the new liberated areas, and organiz-
ing waves of rectification movements and purges, such as the anti-localism movement. The
logic and impact of the anti-localism movement were illustrated by the case of Guangdong.
In addition, the centralized political system also led to strong career incentives for the local
officials to implement the central government’s economic policies. Specifically, the CPC’s
heavy emphasis on Party discipline, the formal setup of the disciplinary organs in the CPC,
and the less formal mechanism of periodic movements and purges all strengthened the cen-
tral government’s reward-punishement mechanisms and enhanced the local officials’ career
incentives.
Thirdly, the evidence drawn from the Guangdong case confirms the third link that the
local governments indeed implemented the central government’s economic policy agenda
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in the early 1950s. The Guangdong case is illustrative, since it shows the impacts of the
centralized political system on a province where the CPC had very weak presence prior
to 1949. Specifically, it shows that by putting the non-native cadres in charge, the anti-
localism movement indeed accelerated the land reform process. In addition, the evidence
from Mei Xian and Qiaoxiang Village also confirms that the Party permeated all levels of
local governments and ensured policy implementation at the county and village levels.
Fourthly, I also find supportive evidence that the central leaders, particularly Mao Ze-
dong, anticipated that the local leaders would pursue the central economic policy agenda
after the economic decentralization. The centralized political system helped Mao to select
the local leaders who shared his own policy preferences, namely the radical type, and to
continuously screen and select the loyal local leaders. The local leaders, in turn, proposed
the radical economic targets that Mao preferred. Mao then leveraged this coalition of rad-
ical local leaders to balance against the pragmatist central leaders and advance his radical
agenda of the Great Leap Forward. The local leaders’ enthusiasm was on one hand a re-
sult of the centralized political system, while on the other hand increased Mao’s trust in
their willingness to carry out the Great Leap. Such a trust constituted a political incen-
tive for Mao to decentralize the economic authority to local governments. In addition, the
economic incentives for higher economic decentralization included Mao’s desire of a rapid
economic development and perception that a centralized economic structure would impede
the development for a large and diverse country like China.
Finally, the evidence confirms that at the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1958
the central government decentralized economic authority and resources to local governments.
In addition, the evidence also supports that despite economic decentralization, the local
governments pursued the central government’s radical economic policy agenda, despite the
costs incurred on the local economies. This outcome is consistent with the equilibrium
outcome derived from the theoretical model.
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4.5.2 Implications
The findings of this chapter has implications for better understanding the Great Leap For-
ward in China. Currently, there is an ongoing debate in the political science literature that
analyzes the provincial variation during the Great Leap Forward. Kung and Chen (2011)
theorize that the career prospects of the provincial leaders drove them to behave differently.
Those provincial leaders that had more promotion opportunities were more likely to imple-
ment radical policies and as a result their provinces were more severely harmed by the Great
Famine. Yang, Xu and Tao (2014) question both the theoretical premises and the empirical
evidence of Kung and Chen (2011). They believe the other direction of the causal chain
was stronger in shaping the provincial performance during the Great Leap Forward: rather
than promotion incentives driving performance, it was the officials’ previous background
that determined both their careers and their performance. Specifically, they find that the
provincial leaders appointed in 1956 and in 1958 took their positions because they belonged
to Mao’s faction. Therefore, these newly appointed leaders were loyal to Mao and behaved
more radically than others.
Based on the discussions in this chapter, I consider these two mechanisms proposed
by these two prominent studies function as two sides of the same coin—the high level of
political centralization of the CPC. The first mechanism—career prospects—describes the
reward-punishment mechanism. Kung and Chen (2011) only examined the provincial leaders
and empirically measured their career prospects as whether they were alternate members of
the CPCCC, which was sharply criticized by Yang, Xu and Tao (2014). However, the
criticisms of such an empirical strategy and even the statistical results could not disconfirm
their theory that provincial leaders’ career incentives mattered. As this chapter shows, even
though promotion may not be the main driving factor for provincial leaders’ behaviors,
political purges were very real and thus were expected to be on the provincial leaders’ minds
and shape their behaviors. This is to say that even if we can disprove the effects of the
rewards,21 we still cannot disconfirm the effects of the career punishments.
21Even disproving the impacts of the career rewards requires more evidence. The critical evidence provided
by Yang, Xu and Tao (2014) is very convincing; however, it only shows that the motivations of the provincial
leaders did not work as the way hypothesized by Kung and Chen (2011), i.e., the alternate members of the
CPCCC were more radical than the full members. But provincial leaders could be motivated in other more
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In the meantime, the second mechanism identified by Yang, Xu and Tao (2014) and
theorized and empirically supported by Arcand et al. (2016)—the appointment of Mao’s fac-
tional members to provincial leadership positions—describes the policy preference divergence
mechanism. Building on the contract theory, Arcand et al. (2016) argue that the reason for
Mao to promote his factional members was because he did not have the perfect information
on the unobserved “loyalty” level of the provincial leaders. By offering promotions, Mao was
able to elicit the information about the provincial leaders’ loyalty. The key in their theory
is “loyalty,” which they conceptualize as the subnational governments’ discount factor of
pursuing radical policies preferred by the national government (Arcand et al., 2016, p. 11).
This is perfectly consistent with the policy preference divergence hypothesis developed in
this chapter. The more “loyal” the provincial leaders were, the more conforming they were
to the national government’s radical policy agenda. Belonging to Mao’s faction, according
to Arcand et al. (2016, p. 15), means that their loyalty passed “some minimum threshold.”
Thus, by appointing his factional members, what Mao achieved was to appoint officials who
shared his radical policy preferences. As their statistical results show, Mao was indeed more
likely to appoint his factional members and these factional members were also more radical
than their counterparts (Arcand et al., 2016, pp. 41–46).
It should not be controversial that in a highly centralized political system, both mech-
anisms were at work. In fact, the central leadership was able to maintain a strong reward-
punishment mechanism to incentivize the subnational government officials while at the same
time ensure the low level of policy preference divergence between the central and local gov-
ernments through personnel reshuffle. Instead of competing theories, these two mechanisms
are two aspects of the same feature of China’s political system at the time: a high level of
political centralization. If this conclusion is valid, i.e., the career incentives and the pattern
of Mao appointing his factional members coexist as a result of the highly centralized CPC,
complex ways. As Yang, Xu and Tao (2014, p. 867) also state in their paper, the full members could be
similarly motivated as the alternate members. To show the null statistical results between full and alternate
members does not mean that such a motivation did not exist. It only means the alternate members and full
members were similarly motivated. In addition, in Mao’s “Sixty Articles,” Mao specifically designed that
there ought to be competition among each level of the subnational governments to motivate local leaders
in implementing the national government’s policy agenda. If Mao designed such competitions, it is hard to
imagine that local leaders would not be rewarded if they pleased the national government, or at least be
motivated by the potential rewards.
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it is more helpful to understand how each mechanism worked and how they complemented
each other than treat them as competing hypotheses to find the “correct” theory.
Understanding how political and economic (de)centralization worked during the Great
Leap Forward in China, one of the worst economic disasters in China’s history, can also
shed light on how different levels of economic decentralization affect a country’s economic
performance. In particular, the Great Leap experience shows that a high level of economic
decentralization is not a panacea for economic growth, if the subnational governments did
not have the right incentives to develop their local economies.
This skeptical view of economic decentralization per se is not new. For instance, Rodden
and Rose-Ackerman (1997) present various scenarios when economic decentralization could
be costly for economic performance. Under the authoritarian context, instead of protecting
the market, local governments could be incentivized to extract rents, engage in corruption
and confiscation (1997, p. 1545). Moreover, they are skeptical that the combination of a
strong benevolent regulatory central government and a high level of economic decentraliza-
tion is sustainable. As a conclusion, they propose that approaching the problem only from
the economics perspective is not enough. Instead of making assumptions about the polit-
ical institutions and dynamics, scholars should better understand the interaction between
political and economic institutions and identify those political conditions under which the
economic decentralization works or does not work. Along the same line, by comparing the
experience of Russia and China, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that Russia’s experi-
ence shows economic decentralization alone is not sufficient for good economic performance.
The cause for China’s good economic performance since the 1980s lies in the fact that China
combines economic decentralization with political centralization. China scholars also con-
firm the positive impacts of the high level of political centralization on China’s economic
performance during the reform era (Landry, 2008).
On the one hand, China’s experience during the Great Leap confirms that we need
to continue the route pointed by the above studies: political institutions are essential for
understanding the effects of economic decentralization. Moreover, the evidence here suggests
that it is very likely that political centralization and economic decentralization interacts
with each other. In this case, the high level of political centralization facilitated economic
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decentralization. This conclusion supports the idea that only assuming political institutions
as if they are exogenous is problematic.
On the other hand, adding to the current understanding, the evidence in this chapter
suggests that the combination of political centralization and economic decentralization could
lead to economic disasters as well. With such a combination, the economic outcome for the
most part depends on the national government’s decisions, which can be good or bad. When
they are bad as in the case of the Great Leap, the economic outcome could be catastrophic,
even when the national government’s intentions are benevolent, i.e., to develop China’s
economy at a fast speed.
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5.0 MEXICO (1917–1948)
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter tests and confirms the causal mechanism between a high level of po-
litical centralization and the economic decentralization policies in China in the 1950s. This
chapter tests the causal mechanism between a high level of political decentralization and
the economic centralization policies in the first three decades of Mexico’s postrevolutionary
regime. As discussed in Chapter 3, each of the two chapters uses the theory-testing process-
tracing method to test the causal mechanisms between the two variables of interest: political
centralization levels and economic (de)centralization policies. These two chapters together
constitute a method of difference design, to demonstrate the causal relationship between the
levels of political centralization and economic (de)centralization.
In the next section (5.2), I briefly summarize the main relevant historical events fol-
lowing a chronological order to set the historical background. In Section 5.3, I present the
causal mechanism predicted by the theoretical model (Figure 5.1), which is tested in Section
5.4. Each subsection in Section 5.4 discusses the historical evidence for a link of the causal
mechanism. Section 5.4.1 provides supportive evidence for the first link, namely the polit-
ical system in Mexico was politically decentralized. In this section, I also elaborate on the
impact of the Mexican revolution on the level of political decentralization of the postrevolu-
tionary regime. Section 5.4.2 discusses the evidence of the state governments’ low deviation
thresholds, including the analyses of the two determining factors of the deviation thresholds,
namely the state governments’ independent policy preferences and their lack of career incen-
tives to follow the federal government’s economic policy agenda. Section 5.4.3 presents the
evidence of the state governments’ economic policy deviations, including two cases that show
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how the strong governors in the 1920s and 1930s were able to pursue economic policies differ-
ent from the federal government’s policy agenda, as well as the general pattern of the state
governments’ fiscal policy deviations. In Section 5.4.4, I show that although the Mexican
federal government was more ideologically pragmatic than the Chinese central government,
the federal officials were indeed frustrated by their inability to create the common national
market and desired a high level of fiscal centralization. Section 5.4.5 discusses the evidence
for the final link of the causal mechanism: the fiscal centralization policies pursued by the
federal government from the 1920s to the 1940s and the state governments’ responses. Fi-
nally, in the concluding section (5.5), I summarize the main findings, discuss the limitations
of the model and two alternative explanations, and comment on the broader implications.
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The period studied in this chapter covers around three decades from 1917, the year of the
promulgation of the Mexican Constitution, to 1948, the year of the establishment of the
national sales tax (Impuestos sobre Ingresos Mercantiles, ISIM). The rationale for selecting
this period, notably much longer than the period covered in the Chinese case, was for it to
cover the first episode of the fiscal centralization process in the Mexican regime, which took
longer than the first episode of economic decentralization in China.
Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. It became a republic in 1824. The
country was dominated by a caudillo1 president, Antonio López de Santa Anna, from 1824
to 1854. Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican-American War in mid-19th century weakened Santa
Anna’s regime, which was eventually overthrown by the liberals. The liberals implemented
the Liberal Reform and established a new constitution in 1857, which codified the liberal
principles and weakened the power of the Church. The Reform in turn triggered a civil war
between the liberals and the conservatives. But as the conservatives were defeated militarily
by the liberals, they invited France to intervene. In 1861, the French troops invaded Mexico
and installed Maximilian as the emperor of Mexico in 1864. During this period, the US
1Caudillo refers to a political strongman who often has a military background.
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did not intervene due to its own Civil War. But as the American Civil War ended, the US
began to support the liberal forces and oppose the French intervention in Mexico, resulting
the French troops’ retreat. In 1867, the liberal leader Benito Juárez regained full power as
president while Maximilian was executed. Juárez stayed in office until his natural death in
1872. The regime continued under the presidency of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejeda (1872–1876),
until Porfirio Díaz’s military coup in 1876.
Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico for more than three decades (1876–1911). The period was
commonly known as the Porfiriato. The rule of Porfirio Díaz was a typical neocolonial dic-
tatorship (Chasteen, 2016, pp. 208–209). Díaz intervened in the elections to make sure only
his candidates were elected, weakened the regional caudillos, and controlled the press. In the
meantime, Díaz prioritized the economic modernization, by encouraging foreign investment,
expanding public expenditure on building infrastructure, and ruthlessly repressing labor and
peasants.
The social forces that were repressed during the Porfiriato joined a revolution in the 1910,
forcing Díaz to resign in 1911. The leader of the rebellion, Francisco I. Madero, became the
president in 1911. As a moderate liberal, Madero faced opposition from both the radical
groups and the conservative forces. In 1913, the conservative general Victoriano Huerta
organized a military coup, arrested and assassinated Madero. This tragedy further inflamed
the revolutionary forces to rise again and led to the violent wars between the old regime and
the revolutionary forces, as well as among the revolutionary factions.
The Mexican revolution was spontaneous. In a large and diverse country, the revolution-
ary actors and their demands were heterogeneous and regionally specific. This resulted in
a regionally fragmented revolution, which implied not only the scatter of conflicts, but also
the emergence of many factions with different demands, including the three major factions,
namely the Zapatistas, the Villistas, and the Constitutionalists. As an initial condition, this
regionally fragmented nature of the revolution is crucial for understanding the postrevolu-
tionary regime. It will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.1.2. In 1915, the Con-
stitutionalists defeated the Zapatistas and Villistas and the leader of the Constitutionalists
Venustiano Carranza emerged as the national leader (Tannenbaum, 1964, pp. 58–59).
In 1917, Carranza promulgated the Mexican Constitution, which also incorporated the
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demands of the Zapatistas and Villistas. Carranza served as the constitutional president
until the Agua Prieta revolt in 1920, initiated by the Sonoran generals, Adolfo de la Huerta,
Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Elías Calles. The rebellion was joined by other generals
throughout the country, resulting in Carranza’s fleeing from Mexico City and eventual death
in May 1920 (Tenenbaum, 2005).
The successful Agua Prieta rebellion began the 15-year so-called “Sonoran Dynasty”
(1920–1934), during which the Sonoran leaders, Obregón and Calles, dominated the na-
tional stage. During Obregón’s presidency (1920–1924), the regional caudillos were strong.
Obregón gradually demilitarized the country by lending his support to the young and civil-
ian governors, who relied on the labor unions and agrarian leagues vis-à-vis military troops.
From 1924 to 1928, when Calles was the president, the federal government sought to cen-
tralize both political power and fiscal authority. Politically, Calles’s approach was blunter
than Obregón’s. He deposed and killed those politically vulnerable governors who were
not Callistas. But some powerful regional caudillos remained untouched. Fiscally, during
Calles’s presidency, the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y
Crédito Público, SHCP) organized the First National Tax Convention in 1925, in an attempt
to centralize fiscal authority and reform the constitution. But the fiscal efforts faced strong
opposition from the states and failed. In 1928, Obregón won the presidential election again
but was assassinated by a religious fanatic. Calles seized this opportunity to establish the
official party, the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR),
as a way to internalize the conflicts among the regional chiefs. Fiscally, the failures to sys-
tematically centralize fiscal authority forced the Calles administration to adopt a gradual
approach, namely to federalize the excise taxes on large industries and natural resources2
one industry at a time. Calles did not run for relection but remained the leader for the
next six years, which was referred to as the period of the Maximato (1928–1934). The PNR
maintained its territorial structure as the federal leaders were unable to impose a centralized
structure (Scott, 1959; Benjamin, 1990; Aboites Aguilar, 2003).
The “Sonoran dynasty” ended in 1934, when the most socially progressive president,
2The excise taxes (impuestos especiales) refer to the indirect taxes imposed by the federal as well as
state governments on a specific activity, for instance, the mining industry, the oil industry, or the henequen
industry (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 391).
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Lázaro Cárdenas, became the president. Cárdenas built his political support by organizing
the labor and the agrarian interests. This strategy not only helped him to weaken the for-
mer chief, Calles, but also facilitated a political centralization process. In 1938, Cárdenas
dissolved the PNR and replaced it with the new Party of the Mexican Revolution (Par-
tido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM), which had a more centralized corporatist structure.
Economically, Cárdenas implemented redistributive policies, such as the land reforms that
promoted the ejidos, which granted peasants a collective ownership of the land, and corpo-
ratist labor policies, which positioned the government as an intermediary between labor and
the industrialists. Fiscally, Cárdenas continued with the gradual process of federalizing the
excise taxes (Scott, 1959; Aboites Aguilar, 2003).
The presidency of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946) was less eventful than his prede-
cessors, but the political and fiscal systems steadily became more centralized. Politically,
Ávila Camacho reformed the party again, without drastic structural changes except abolish-
ing its military sector and shifting its members to the popular sector, renaming the party as
the PRI in 1946. He also turned to a more conservative direction, by bringing conservatives
to power in the labor sector and reducing the influence of the labor and peasant sectors. Fis-
cally, during his term, he again continued with the gradual strategy of federalizing individual
excise taxes. The Congress of the Union passed constitutional reforms to codify the existing
practices without radical fiscal reforms. Despite the lack of radical changes, both the polit-
ical and fiscal systems steadily became more centralized (Benjamin, 1985; Aboites Aguilar,
2003).
The final presidency covered in this chapter is that of Miguel Alemán (1946–1952). Po-
litically, Alemán further strengthened the central authority through the PRI. For instance,
the national elites imposed more governors than Ávila Camacho and Alemán’s immediate
successors, President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and President Adolfo López Mateos (Anderson,
1971, p. 89). Fiscally, Alemán and his SHCP reassumed the more systematic fiscal cen-
tralization agenda of Calles. In particular, he organized the Third National Tax Convention
and established the national sales tax, the ISIM, in 1947. His fiscal centralization efforts
again faced state opposition and received setbacks, which will be discussed in more detail
later, but his presidency was considered to be a peak of the fiscal centralization process in
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the postrevolutionary regime (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 216). Thus, I end this chapter’s
discussion with the establishment of the ISIM in 1948.
5.3 PREDICTED CAUSAL MECHANISM
As introduced in Chapter 3, the goal of this chapter is to test whether the causal mechanism
which links political decentralization and economic centralization functioned as predicted by
the theoretical model in the early period of the Mexican authoritarian regime. Figure 5.1
draws the expected causal mechanism.
Figure 5.1. The Predicted Causal Mechanism between Political Decentralization and Eco-
nomic Centralization in Mexico
In the Mexican case, political decentralization—defined as the national government’s
lack of control over the political career of the subnational government officials—is expected
to have two consequences: (1) to survive the political competition that was relatively in-
dependent from the national government’s influence, the subnational government officials
developed their own independent economic policy preferences; and (2) because the national
government’s lack of leverage over the subnational government officials’ careers, the sub-
national government officials were not afraid of the negative consequences for ignoring the
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national government’s economic policy agenda. These two factors are expected to result
in a rather low deviation threshold, which means that the subnational government officials
are highly likely to deviate from the national economic policy agenda to pursue their own
preferred economic policies. Conditional on that the national government valued the imple-
mentation of its preferred economic policies but lacked the political capacity to make the
subnational officials do so, the national government would desire a higher level of economic
centralization. It is expected that the national government would consequently pursue eco-
nomic centralization policies so that the economic centralization level is high enough that
the subnational officials would follow the national government’s economic policy directives
as an equilibrium outcome.
Before I present the process-tracing evidence in the next section, I acknowledge that
treating the Mexican system from the 1920s to the 1940s as a politically decentralized sys-
tem may seem odd to the Mexican scholars, since the previous literature on Mexico often
considers the Mexican political system under the PRI governments to be highly centralized
(Tannenbaum, 1964; Brandenburg, 1964; Langston, 2017). As discussed at the end of Section
3.1 in Chapter 3, I have two main justifications for selecting the Mexican case as a polit-
ically decentralized one. Firstly, the Mexican political system was relatively decentralized
in the early years of the PRI’s authoritarian rule. There was indeed an aggressive political
centralization process from the 1920s to the 1940s and I will discuss this process and its im-
pacts on the political interactions between the federal and state governments. But as I will
show in more detail later, the political system by the 1940s was not centralized enough for
the federal government to trust that the state governors would pursue the federal economic
agenda. Secondly, the benchmark case with which I compare the Mexican system is the
Chinese system in the 1950s. The Mexican system was much more politically decentralized
throughout the three decades than the Chinese system in the 1950s.
The following section evaluates the validity of each statement shown in Figure 5.1 to test
whether the historical evidence supports the expected causal mechanism linking political
decentralization and the economic centralization policies.
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5.4 PROCESS-TRACING EVIDENCE
In this section, I follow the order of the causal mechanism in Figure 5.1 and discuss the
historical evidence for each link in each subsection.
5.4.1 Decentralized Political System
Two factors contributed to the high degree of political decentralization in the Mexican regime
from 1917 to 1948: (1) its de jure federal system that stipulated that state governors must
be elected; and (2) the highly decentralized nature of the Mexican revolution. These two
factors together contributed to a high level of political decentralization at the early stage of
the postrevolutionary regime in the 1920s. Over time in the three decades from 1920s to the
1940s, however, the level of political decentralization in Mexico did not stay constant. As
the postrevolutionary regime consolidated, the national leaders gradually took power away
from the regional strongmen and established the central authority through the establishment
of the official party, banning consecutive elections of all political posts, and reducing the
political influence of the military (Langston, 2017, pp. 32–38; Eckstein, 1977, pp. 34–35).
This political centralization process markedly reduced the state governments’ incentives to
confront and defy the federal government, but as the following discussions show, because the
system was highly decentralized in the 1920s, after three decades of political centralization
efforts, the system was still relatively decentralized compared to the Chinese case.
5.4.1.1 Federal Constitution Firstly, the 1917 constitution established a federal sys-
tem in Mexico, although historically the country had a centralist tradition and had both
centralist and federal constitutions (Mecham, 1938). The formal institutions established by
the 1917 constitution required that Mexico’s state governors to be elected to their offices,
which provided a legal foundation for Mexico to maintain a politically decentralized system.
However, the constitution alone could not determine a country’s level of political central-
ization. In the Mexican case, after Mexico had adopted the federal Constitution of 1857, its
political centralization levels still fluctuated. During the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz prior to
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the revolution, the political system was relatively centralized. During his reign, Díaz built
a personalist political system and he maintained strong control over the personnel of the
state governors and the jefes políticos (the president-appointed district commissioners). The
subsequent regime under President Francisco I. Madero (1911–1913) attempted to revive
the federal tradition and restore the authority and democratic elections for governors. But
Madero’s democratic ideal failed to be realized because of the political instability. A coup
led by the conservative general Victoriano Huerta in 1913 overthrew and killed Madero. The
ensuing decade of the 1910s witnessed violent revolutionary civil wars, which resulted in a
disintegration of the central political authority and a very high level of political decentral-
ization (Beezley, 2009, pp. 2–3).
5.4.1.2 A Revolution without Party In addition to the federal constitution of 1917,
the decentralized nature of the Mexican revolution also significantly contributed to the high
level of political decentralization of the postrevolutionary regime.
One of the key differences between the Chinese revolution that ended in 1949 and the
Mexican revolution of the 1910s is that in China, the highly centralized and ideological CPC
was established in 1921 prior to the establishment of the regime. The CPC controlled the
revolutionary army and thus was able to quickly establish a centralized political system after
1949. In comparison, in Mexico, the revolutionary civil wars in the 1910s involved regional
armies led by powerful regional strongmen, who were not organized under a centralized polit-
ical institution. The hegemonic party PRI was only established in 1946, whose predecessors
came into existence as the PNR in 1929 and the PRM in 1938. The PNR was initially
founded as an institutionalized solution to contain the violent factional conflicts among the
regional revolutionary forces in the 1920s.
As the initial condition, the order of the two events, namely the ruling party establish-
ment and regime establishment, led to China’s and Mexico’s distinct paths of intergovern-
mental relations.
Lacking a unified revolutionary army which was commanded by a centralized political
authority entails that the revolutionary forces in Mexico were highly decentralized. The
highly decentralized nature of the Mexican revolution resulted in the strengthening of control
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of the caciques (regional bosses) (Middlebrook, 1995, p. 23).
In Mexico in the early 1910s, three major regional factions engaged in the revolution
to overthrow the old regime. Their different regional origins with distinct economic and
social conditions gave rise to their distinct ideologies. These regional forces included: (1)
the peasant insurgents led by Emiliano Zapata in central Mexico; (2) the middle-class Con-
stitutionalists in northern Mexico, mainly in the states of Coahuila and Sonora; and (3) the
military force led by Pancho Villa that incorporated both the rural poor and the middle
class in Chihuahua, another northern state (Tutino, 1990, pp. 44–53).
The Zapatista movement in central Mexico was mainly driven by the long-standing con-
flict between villagers and the landowning elites. The villagers were dominated by the
Spanish colonists since the colonial period, but their conditions deteriorated during the Por-
firiato since the 1880s, as a result of the rapid sugar production expansion that seized more
land and water resources from the villagers. Compared to the other two regional factions,
the Zapatista movement had coherent social and economic bases. Its ideological program
focused on “village rights to land for peasant production and local political independence”
(Tutino, 1990, p. 44–46).
The middle-class Constitutionalists who emerged mainly in the two northern states,
Coahuila and Sonora, had their grievances originated from the development during the Por-
firiato. Firstly, because Porfirio Díaz appointed his loyal dependents to important political
positions, the traditional families lost political power. Secondly, the rapid development of
the silver and copper mines, cattle ranches, and other enterprises during the Porfiriato also
led to grievances among the northern working majority. Different from the Zapatistas, the
resulting ideology of the Constitutionalists was “liberal, statist, nationalist, and populist”
(Tutino, 1990, pp. 48–49).
It was liberal in promoting an entrepreneurial, capitalist vision of Mexico’s future,
insisting on private property, social individualism, and a limited role for the traditional
church. It was statist in demanding a strong national state as the necessary means to
promote the liberal economic goals. It was nationalist, not by seeking to isolate Mexico
from international influences, but by demanding more Mexican control over Mexican politics
and Mexican involvement in the international economy. And it was populist in insisting
that the state and economic elites would provide for the well-being of the masses (Tutino,
1990, p. 50).
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The third faction, led by Pancho Villa, arising from another northern state, Chihuahua,
insisted on recruiting the rural poor as well as the middle class. But the rural poor of northern
Mexico were different from central Mexico, the origin of the Zapatistas. The rural poor in
the northern states often owned private property. They were mobile and were often hispanic
individuals and families. Unlike the Zapatistas who demanded collective land ownership by
the villages because of their indigenous traditions, the rural poor in the north demanded
land to be returned and the creation of small holdings. In addition to the rural poor, Villa
also incorporated members of the middle class and elites who were dissatisfied with the
old regime. These different social groups contributed to the large size of the Villista army,
but their heterogeneous demands also created fatal internal contradictions. The Villista
movement was not able to develop a clear ideology (Tutino, 1990, pp. 51–52).
In 1915, the Constitutionalists defeated the other two major factions and Venustiano
Carranza secured his power as the national leader of the revolutionary regime. But the
legacy of the revolution’s decentralized nature lasted beyond the defeats of the Zapatistas
and Villistas. It took the next three decades for Mexico to establish the PRI, a ruling
party that was not dominated by military generals and structured in a relatively centralized
manner. Compared to the half decade in the 1950s when the CPC consolidated a highly
centralized and civilian political system, the time that the Mexican revolutionary leaders
spent on regime consolidation was much longer and the subsequent political system was also
far less centralized.
5.4.1.3 Postrevolutionary Regional Fragmentation As a consequence of both the
federal constitution and the de facto decentralized revolutionary process, the 1920s were
marked by regional fragmentation The states were ruled by the regional caudillos, many
of whom obtained their political power through fighting the revolutionary wars with the
winning side, namely the Constitutionalist army.
Some of these regional leaders later took the national political stage. Among them were
the two influential postrevolutionary presidents, President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928
as the president; 1928–1934 as the maximum leader [jefe máximo]) and President Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934–1940). Some others who were unable to become national leaders remained
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influential in their regions, and some of these leaders’ political legacy lasted for decades
through their political and family ties. For instance, Maximino Ávila Camacho, the governor
of Puebla from 1937 to 1941 and brother to the Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho
(1940–1946), “founded a political dynasty that would come to include the six subsequent
state governors (including Maximino’s brother, Rafael) as well as numerous state and union
officials who dominated political scene into the 1970s” (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009, p.
157). I will discuss Governor Maximino in detail in Section 5.4.3.2.
The Plan of Agua Prieta in 1920 is one example that can showcase the weak federal
government’s control over strong regional leaders in this period. It was the last successful
regional revolt that overthrew the federal government and resulted in the death of the first
post-1917 constitutional president, Carranza. The direct cause for the revolt was that the
Sonoran generals resented Carranza’s attempt to impose the little-known civilian Ignacio
Bonillas, then the Mexican ambassador to Washington, as his puppet successor. Instead, the
Sonoran faction preferred their own candidate, General Álvaro Obregón, who had fought and
won numerous campaigns for the Constitutionalist forces and played a key role in defeating
the Zapatistas and Villistas (Tenenbaum, 2005, p. 265). There was also an indirect but
equally important cause for Carranza’s downfall, which was his loss of popularity. He did
not pursue the social revolutionary agenda prescribed in the 1917 constitution. Instead, he
“ordered the wholesale restitution of haciendas seized during the revolution” and also ended
his alliance with the Mexican City workers (Knight, 2008, p. 137). Such policies of Carranza
frustrated his previous supporters and caused social unrest.
As a result, in April 1920, the generals from Sonora, including Adolfo de la Huerta,
Obregón, and Calles, declared in the Plan of Agua Prieta that President Carranza had
repetitively violated the sovereignty of the states and distorted the organization of the re-
public and proclaimed that they were in revolt against the Carranza government (Obregón,
1920). “Within a week the rebellion had won the support of most of the generals throughout
the country; President Carranza fled Mexico City on 14 May” (Tenenbaum, 2005, p. 265)
and died in May 1920. De la Huerta, then the governor of Sonora, became the provisional
president from June to November 1920. In December 1920, the Sonoran general Obregón
became the constitutional president, marking the beginning of the 15 years of the so-called
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“Sonoran Dynasty” (1920–1934), during which the Sonoran chiefs stabilized the political
system and began to institutionalize the revolution (Knight, 2016, pp. 75–78).
Two aspects of the Agua Prieta revolt illustrate the low degree of political control that the
federal government held over the state governments. Firstly, the strength and final victory
of the Sonoran chiefs exemplifies how regional strongmen who had gained their political
positions and military prestige during the revolution were able to overthrow an unpopular
federal government. Especially for General Obregón, the revolutionary wars enabled him
to become a national political figure with great military prestige and thus made it possible
for him to form a coalition to challenge and finally defeat Carranza. Secondly, it would not
have been possible for the Sonoran chiefs to overthrow the Carranza government without
the support from the other generals in other states. Thus, Carranza’s relatively conservative
policies also contributed to his downfall, because these unpopular policies led to the formation
of a coalition between the Sonoran chiefs and the generals in the other states. During
this period, despite their status, neither Carranza nor Obregón was able to dominate the
Mexican political arena and keep the caudillos in line. It was also virtually impossible for the
presidents to send their loyal followers to the states where they had weak popular support,
unlike the postrevolutionary regime in China. The national leaders had to carefully build
coalitions with the regional caudillos in order to maintain their rule at the federal level.
To visualize the distribution of the regional strongmen, Figure 5.2 maps the career back-
grounds of the state governors after the Plan of Agua Prieta in late 1920.
The majority of the Mexican federative entities (at least 22 among the 32 entities) had
governors with military experiences in the revolutionary wars. Among these 22 governors,
about half had obtained the military rank of general officer by 1920. In the Mexican case, the
decentralized nature of the revolution led to a decentralized armed forces, meaning that the
armed forces were controlled not by the federal leaders but by the local generals. With these
armed forces under their command, the local generals were able to translate their military
power into political influence. Thus, the pattern in Figure 5.2 not only displays the high
prevalence of military men as governors, but also implies that the political system was highly
decentralized. The decentralized armed forces both led to and sustained the decentralized
political system. Since then the Mexican political system experienced a political centraliza-
165
Figure 5.2. The State Governors in 1920
Sources: Camp (1991), Coahuila State Government (N.d.), Naranjo (1935), Romero Flores (1985),
Careaga Viliesid and Higuera Bonfil (2010), Rendón Garcini (1996), and Martínez Marañón (1962).
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tion process. However, this legacy left by the decentralized revolution limited the degree of
political centralization that the Mexican system reached in the later years of the twentieth
century, especially when compared with the Chinese case.
5.4.1.4 The Political Centralization Process (1920–1946) Since 1920, the federal
administrations were able to consistently pursue political centralization, as the revolutionary
regime consolidated and became institutionalized. By 1948, the political system was indeed
more centralized, as the President and the federal government obtained more authority, but
it was still much less centralized than the Chinese case prior to the Great Leap Forward.
The Pacification Phase (1920–1928): The 1920s were marked by the federal gov-
ernment’s efforts to decrease the strength of the military chiefs in the states and establish
unified command over the army. By the end of the 1920s, Obregón and Calles “succeeded
in using their own military prestige to reduce the military’s size and budgetary resources
and to channel the ambitions of revolutionary generals into private enterprise and political
positions such as state governorships” (Middlebrook, 1995, p. 24).
Against the backdrop of the Agua Prieta revolt in 1920, Obregón adopted a pragmatic
strategy to decrease his dependence on the military chiefs: on the one hand, the Obregón’s
government (1920–1924) did not radically try to control the regional caudillos. Instead, he
restrained from interfering with local matters and tolerated both conservative and progressive
caudillos and governors. On the other hand, Obregón also carefully lent his support to the
“young governors whose local power was based upon control of the bureaucracy of the state
governments and the creation ‘from above’ of labor unions and agrarian leagues” to tip the
balance of state politics against the military chiefs “whose power was based upon troop
strength” (Benjamin, 1990, pp. 72–73).
During Calles’s presidency (1924–1928), he continued to strengthen the federal govern-
ment’s control by establishing alliances with campesino and worker organizations. But unlike
Obregón who allowed for local autonomy, Calles went a step further in strengthening the
federal authority in Mexico City. In particular, different from Obregón’s strategy of relying
on the progressive governors to build popular support to balance the regional military chiefs,
Calles relied on a federal organization, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (Con-
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federación Regional Obrera Mexicana, CROM) led by Luis Morones to rein in the state labor
organizations (Benjamin, 1990, p. 80). Moreover, as an ambitious president, Calles strate-
gically built up his own political base that was independent from that of Obregón. Since
Obregón still enjoyed the support of the agrarian interests, Calles relied more heavily on
the labor unions. The consequence of Calles’s strategy was a growing division between the
agrarista and laborista camps by 1928 (Scott, 1959, p. 120). In terms of his relationship
with the regional leaders, Calles adopted a blunter approach. Calles deposed and killed those
“progressive and radical governors and agrarian leaders who were politically vulnerable,” re-
sulting in the “ousting of over twenty-five governors in fifteen different states.” Despite such
blunt measures, powerful regional caudillos who had strong control over their states, such
as Emilio Portes Gil in Tamaulipas and Saturnino Cedillo in San Luis Potosí, were able to
“resist Calles’s political offensive” and kept their power (Benjamin, 1990, p. 80).
By building political alliances with the campesino and worker organizations, Obregón
and Calles not only facilitated the demilitarization process but also won themselves enough
support to avoid being overthrown by the regional revolts (Tannenbaum, 1964, pp. 65–69).
Moreover, the successful repression of regional revolts in the 1920s, which include “the de
la Huerta rebellion, the Gómez-Serrano revolt of 1927, and the Cristero rebellion of 1926–
1929,” was in turn instrumental for the strengthening of the federal government (Benjamin,
1990, p. 82). For instance, when General Adolfo de la Huerta launched a revolt against
Obregón in late 1923, “more than fifty generals and about 60 percent of the federal army
deserted the central government. Some of the most powerful military caudillos . . . joined
the revolt.” Therefore, by successfully crushing the revolt with support from the regional
radicals, the federal government also “decreased the power and independence of the Federal
army and increased the power of the center in many states” (Benjamin, 1990, pp. 79–80).
As a result of these eight years’ centralization process, the federal government’s politi-
cal control over the state governments indeed increased, but the effect was only marginal.
Regional caudillos would still engage in revolts, although none of these revolts succeeded in
overthrowing the federal government. By 1928 the ruling party had not yet been established
and there was not a clear institution that controlled the personnel of the state governors
or unified the mindsets of the governors in the form of an ideology. Instead, “the state
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organization continued to be dominated domestically by a fragile, personalistic alliance of
regionally based military and civilian bosses” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 82).
The Institutionalization Phase (1928–1946): Prior to 1928, the political orga-
nizations, including political parties, associations, and labor unions, centered around the
revolutionary chiefs and their allies. The political parties were often regionally based, some
of which served as political machines for the caudillos. As a result, they often lacked a
political ideology or a solid organization (Garrido, 1982, p. 63; Middlebrook, 1995, p. 26).
But the assassination of Obregón in 1928 (after he was reelected to be the next president)
by a religious fanatic, served as an opportunity for Calles to establish the official party, the
PNR, in 1929, marking the beginning of an institutionalization process of the revolution.
Since 1929, the official party evolved gradually and played a pivotal role in stabilizing the
political system and centralizing political power. Initially during the period of the Maximato
(1928–1934) when Calles was the de facto maximum leader despite not holding the presi-
dency, the official party (PNR) was structured loosely as “a coalition of semi-independent
local organizations dominated by individual military or civilian bosses” (Scott, 1959, p. 116).
This was because at the time the regional bosses were relatively strong, Calles was unable
to impose a centralized structure. Instead, he had to negotiate with the caudillos to build
the party. Consequently, the local organizations of the regional caudillos were included in
the coalition without losing their organizational identity. But over time, because the PNR
could mobilize more resources—for instance, it took the advantage of having the access to
the government expenditures—the PNR grew and served to undermine “the heads of local
political machines and the leadership of functional interest organizations” (Scott, 1959, pp.
122–124). In 1932, the PNR was restructured to abolish “the confederation of regional and
local parties” and establish “a hierarchy of municipal, state, and national conventions which
were to decide policy and select candidates” (Scott, 1959, p. 124). Moreover, “in 1933, fed-
eral deputies from the PNR passed a constitutional prohibition against consecutive relection
. . . for all posts,” which strengthened the national leadership’s influence at the expense of
the governors, because local politicians now could not just rely on governors for their future
jobs, but also needed to appeal to the national leaders (Langston, 2017, p. 35).
After the Maximato, the most socially revolutionary president, Cárdenas, took power in
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1934. During his six-year term, he furthered the institutionalization process. To reduce the
political influence of Calles, in the first two years of his presidency, Cárdenas “realigned the
principal functional power groups participating in national politics and particularly in the
PNR” (Scott, 1959, p. 127). Because during his presidency and the Maximato, Calles had
turned more conservative and lost touch with the interests of labor and agrarians, Cárdenas
could build his political support by organizing the labor and agrarian interests. Specifically,
Cárdenas relied on the union leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano to establish a new agency,
the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de México, CTM). In
addition, Cárdenas also built political support through establishing Peasant Leagues in each
state, which were later united in the National Farmers’ Conferation (Confederación Nacional
Campesina, CNC) in 1938. By early 1936, Cárdenas had successfully strengthened his own
power through organizing the interest groups and making their leaders personally loyal to
him (Scott, 1959, pp. 128–129).
In 1936, with the newly garnered political support, Cárdenas successfully exiled the for-
mer chief, Calles. What followed was a restructuring of the official party that continued the
political centralization trend. In 1938, Cárdenas dissolved the PNR and replaced it with a
new revolutionary party, the PRM. The new party established a corporatist structure to re-
place the territorially based structure of the PNR: previously the PNR’s national convention
corresponded to the state conventions and its national directorate was selected by the state
directorates; after the transformation, the PRM’s national assembly corresponded to the four
corporatist sectors, namely the peasant, worker, military and popular ones (Díaz-Cayeros,
2006, p. 86).
More relevant for the political centralization was that the PRM changed the state elec-
tions’ candidate selection process, which gave more authority to the national-level organiza-
tions. Previously, popular primaries were used to elect candidates during the state elections,
and local political forces exerted more influence over the candidates. Now with the new
PRM, the authority was shifted to the sector organizations, which determined the number
of candidates for each sector, and each sector’s leadership nominated candidates for the
offices allocated to this sector. The military sector was an exception, because it did not
nominate or participate in subnational elections (Scott, 1959, p. 131).
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The restructuring of the official party had a centralizing effect. The revolutionary party
now dominated the most active interest groups through their national-level sector organi-
zations. The fact that the PRM now had the formal selection powers weakened the state
political bosses, who previously selected all the candidates personally. Moreover, the PRM
also collected dues and contributions which previously went to the political machines of the
political bosses, thus weakening such political machines. Such a weakening effect on local
political machines was particularly strong when the state political bosses were less power-
ful; while the powerful bosses remained unchallenged (Anderson, 1971, p. 74). Cárdenas’s
restructuring of the official party into the corporatist structure proved to be a critical mile-
stone in the party’s history. This corporatist structure played a central role in achieving the
electoral successes for the PRM and later the PRI and sustaining its hegemonic position for
the following decades.
However, even after Cárdenas’s restructuring, compared to the Chinese political system
under the CPC, the Mexican system under the PRM was still much more politically decen-
tralized. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the Chinese system, the CPC’s central leaders in
Beijing had the indisputable authority to impose and remove the provincial governors and
party secretaries. In comparison, after Cárdenas’s transformation, the PRM’s national lead-
ers still had to respect the political forces in the states when selecting the PRM’s candidates
for governorship. According to Anderson (1971, p. 71),
[t]he President of Mexico, in many cases, made the final selection but only after consulting
his advisers, the incumbent governor, military zone commanders, and major interest group
leaders . . . If a regional boss dominates the state, the President usually lets him select
the candidate. Once the President or regional boss, as the case may be, has approved the
precandidate, the Party leaders, the incumbent governor, the Secretary of Gobernación
[Secretary of the Interior], the military zone commander, and the sector leaders are noti-
fied. Then the sectors meet individually to select the precandidate formally, and in turn,
the Party officially ratifies the decision, and preparations are made for the gubernatorial
election.
During President Ávila Camacho’s term (1940–1946), he abolished the official party’s
military sector, shifted its members to the popular sector, and in 1946 renamed the party as
PRI. It became imperative for Ávila Camacho to reform the PRM, as the party began to lose
its prestige as a representative organization for the labor and peasants’ interests. Its non-
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democratic activities in the elections in the 1940s, such as the 1940 presidential election and
1945 imposition of municipal governments led to its delegitimization and caused widespread
protests. Moreover, the public also became more politically aware in the 1940s as a result
of the World War II. The PRM with the old functional organizations could not represent
the growing number of Mexicans outside of the established sector organizations (Benjamin,
1985, pp. 211–212; Scott, 1959, pp. 139–140). Therefore, when Ávila Camacho became
president in 1940, he distanced himself from both Cardenismo and the PRM. He “eliminated
the military sector, suppressed the party’s newspaper, brought conservatives to power in
the labor sector, integrated the ‘popular’ sector into the party (which further reduced the
influence of the labor and campesino sectors), and reduced the PRM to being simply the
electoral apparatus of the state” (Benjamin, 1985, p. 212).
With regard to the political centralization process, during his sexenio, Ávila Camacho
continued weakening the state machines, but again he was not able to eliminate all. “The op-
position to PRM can didates, either in the form of national minority parties or state machines,
continued to play a role in at least twelve states” (Anderson, 1971, p. 76). Particularly,
certain gubernatorial elections show that the outgoing governors as well as different factions
within the PRM could constitute political challenges to the official PRM candidates. The
conflicts in some of these cases, such as the 1941 gubernatorial election in Coahuila, were
so severe that they led to political violence and the involvement of the federal troops.3 Al-
though the end results for these elections were that the PRM candidates, with the support
of the federal government, won the elections without exceptions, these political struggles
showed the lack of control of the federal government and the official party over the state
political forces. Such evidence confirmed that despite the political centralization process
after the Mexican revolution, by 1946, namely three decades after the Mexican revolution,
the regional political forces were still much stronger in Mexico than their counterparts in
China in the 1950s.
As a president with “a very strong personality,” Miguel Alemán (1946–1952) adopted
a more authoritarian approach when selecting his governors. According to Brandenburg
3For instance, Anderson (1971) discussed in detail how during Ávila Camacho’s administration, the PRM’s
official candidate faced challenges from state political forces in gubernatorial elections in Guerrero, Coahuila,
Morelos, Nuevo León, and Guanajuato (pp. 79–85).
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(1964), President Alemán seldom consulted anyone on gubernatorial nominations. For in-
stance, his “placing Sánchez Colín in the state of México governorship . . . constituted an
outright refutation of CTM leadership. Alemán ran counter to intense local antipaty toward
Dr. Ignacio Morones Prieto by making this nonresident of Nuevo León governor of that
important northern entity” (Brandenburg, 1964, p. 151). But such measures were more of
an exception than the norm in the 1940s and 1950s. As Brandenburg (1964) adds, when
President Alemán’s successor, President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, came to power, he “reduced
the tension there [in Nuevo León] by bringing Morones Prieto into his own national cabinet”
(p. 151).
Scholars who study Mexico in this period often conclude that by the 1950s Mexico had
already established a relatively centralized political system, as the nominations of governors
had to be agreed by the Presidents (the Revolutionary Family head) (Brandenburg, 1964,
p. 151; Langston, 2017, p. 30). But if we compare the Mexican case with the Chinese
case, we can tell that the Mexican case was still far less centralized politically even by the
1950s. For instance, in the case of President Alemán, even placing unpopular governors
was unsustainable, as his successor would remove these governors from offices, it is hard
to imagine the Mexican federal government could wage a nationwide purge against local
leaders for not pursuing the national economic agenda faithfully without triggering political
instability. Such purges were, however, what happened in China in the 1950s.
In summary, this section explains that the Mexican political regime established after its
revolution was much more decentralized than the Chinese political regime under the CPC.
Compared to the Chinese case, one main reason for Mexico’s high level of political decen-
tralization was its lack of a centralized political party that won the revolution. The regional
revolutions ended with the Constitutionalist faction defeating the Villistas and Zapatistas
and taking the national political stage, while the regions were dominated by strongmen who
rose to political leadership positions through participating in the revolutionary conflicts.
This aspect of the Mexican revolution left a decentralized political legacy where the system
was unable to move too far away from. Although the following administrations under Pres-
idents Carranza, Obregón, Calles, Cárdenas, and Ávila Camacho strived to centralize the
political authority through various tactics, and although the system indeed went through a
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political centralization process, the situation by 1946 was still that the national leader had to
respect the state political forces and state interests when they decided whom to nominate as
an official PRI candidate for the governorship. This political system was in a stark contrast
to the Chinese system after its revolution, where the national leaders of the CPC quickly
established an indisputable authority over the appointment and removal of provincial gov-
ernors and party secretaries. Unlike the CPC, the PRI was not a disciplined or ideological
revolutionary party that won the revolutionary wars. Instead, when Calles first established
the PNR, it was a product of the revolutionary elites to internalize the conflicts among
the caudillos, who also represented the heterogeneous territorial interests. Later, Cárdenas
transformed the party into a corporatist party and centralized the decision-making author-
ity, but the PRM and later the PRI still lacked the discipline and ideological unity that was
the essential feature of the CPC. Indeed, the PRM and later the PRI contributed to the
political centralization process, but given its own relatively loose structure, it was deemed
unable to lead to a centralized political system in Mexico. Thus, by tracing the Mexican
regime establishment process, this section establishes that the postrevolutionary regime in
Mexico was politically decentralized.
5.4.2 SNG: Low Deviation Thresholds
The high level of political decentralization is expected to result in low deviation thresholds
for the subnational governments, by affecting the policy preference divergence between the
two levels of governments and also the career incentives of the subnational officials. These
factors are presented as the second links in Figure 5.1, which are discussed in the following
two subsections.
I focus only on the differences in the economic policy preferences between the federal
and state governments, because the theoretical model is mainly concerned with economic
(de)centralization policies.4
4It is probably that political centralization levels can affect other policy areas as well and I conjecture
that the delegation process in those policy areas share a similar logic as in the economic sphere. But to
discuss those policy areas is beyond this dissertation’s scope.
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5.4.2.1 SNG: Independent Policy Preferences There are three political institutional
reasons that contributed to the policy preference divergence between the federal and state
governments in Mexico.
Firstly, as discussed in Section 5.4.1, the political system from 1917 to 1946 was highly
decentralized. This high level of political decentralization means that the federal govern-
ment was more constrained when appointing or removing state governors. They had to
respect state political forces and interests, especially for those states where regional pow-
ers were strong. Thus, unlike the Chinese system where the central leaders could shape
the provincial leaders’ economic policy preferences by appointing the loyalists and removing
the independent-minded ones, the Mexican state governors could remain in office with their
relatively independent economic policy preferences.
Secondly, compared to the Chinese case, the official party in Mexico lacked a clear eco-
nomic ideology. This resulted in a lack of consistency in the economic policies of the federal
governments over time. Each new president came to power with his own economic policy
agenda.
Thirdly, the staggered timing of the elections of the presidents and governors and their
fixed term limits meant that the presidents could not influence the personnel of most states’
governors for the first few years of their administrations. The original 1917 constitution
stipulated that the term limits for both the president and the state governors to be four
years. But the 1928 constitutional amendment extended the presidential term limit from
four to six years, making Cárdenas who was elected in 1934 the first president to enjoy the
six-year term. Only more than a decade later, in 1943, did the constitutional amendement
extend the governors’ term limit from four to six years. Moreover, states gradually adopted
the six-year term limit and only in 1948 did all states had six-year term limit.5 As a result,
the dates of the gubernatorial elections and inaugurations also varied across states. A typical
Mexican president after 1943 could only nominate a majority of the governors until the fourth
5According to Anderson (1971, p. 67), “[b]y 1943, seven states, Campeche, Colima, Guanajuato, Nuevo
Leon, Queretaro, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora, permitted six year terms; the following year, seven additional
states, Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Zacetecas, adopted the six
year term. In 1945, eight more states, Coahuila, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mexico, Puebla, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas,
and Tlaxcala, switched to six year terms. Three states, Morelos, Nayarit, and Yucatan, continued the trend
in 1946. Jalisco and Tabasco adopted the idea in 1947 and finally, in 1948, Chiapas became the last state to
change to the six year term.”
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year of his government (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 89).
The second and third reasons together mean that even after the Mexican regime became
more centralized politically in the 1940s and when the presidents could play a stronger role
in selecting the state governors, for the early years during their presidencies, they had to
govern with governors selected by the previous presidents.
Thus, before the 1940s, the political centralization was not high enough and the presi-
dents were constrained by strong regional powers when choosing the state governors; while
after the 1940s, when the political centralization increased, as the state political machines
were weakened by the PRM and later the PRI, the presidents were still unable to control
all the state governors when they first took power, as a result of the staggered timing of the
gubernatorial elections.
These three political institutional conditions together caused that the state governors
often had their independent economic policy preferences, different from the federal govern-
ment’s.
Díaz-Cayeros’s finding based on his study of the state representatives’ voting patterns
in the First and Second National Tax Conventions in 1925 and 1933 confirms the policy
preference divergence between the federal and state governments in terms of the fiscal policies
before the 1940s.
The First National Tax Convention (1925) was a fiscal centralization effort. In particular,
it was held to “eliminate the multiplicity of . . . the ‘anti-economic’ (i.e., inefficient) taxes
levied by state governments, and sought to substitute them with general income and sales
taxes exclusively in the federal jurisdiction” (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 47–48). Based on
the 10 recorded roll call votes during this convention, Díaz-Cayeros finds that states can be
classified into three categories: the unconditional block, the pivotal block, and the adamant
block. Among these three blocks, the unconditional block (6 states) always voted with
the federal delegation that aimed to implement the fiscal centralization reforms; the pivotal
block (11 states) stood in the middle and voted with the federal delegation sometimes but not
always; finally, the adamant block (8 states) usually voted against the federal government.
Díaz-Cayeros conducted a statistical analysis, which shows that the state delegates’ voting
was not random. Instead, it reflected certain state characteristics. For instance, large states
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and more developed states were more likely to vote against the federal government (2006,
pp. 49–64).
The First National Tax Convention concluded with a proposal for the constitutional
reform to establish a revenue-sharing system, so that “each level of government would have
exclusive jurisdiction over some taxes, and states would receive revenue shares from federal
taxes” (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 63–64). This proposal, however, was not approved by the
Congress. As a result, the federal government adopted a different strategy: it exempted those
states that adopted the recommendations of the First National Tax Convention from paying
the federal contribution (contribución federal), a fiscal transfer from the state governments
to the federal government. This selective granting of exemption created a sense of inequality
among the states and led to the Second National Tax Convention in 1933, which mainly
aimed at eliminating the unequal treatment of the states (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 66).
Similar to the First Convention, Díaz-Cayeros’s analysis of state delegates’ 28 roll call
votes reveals the discrepancy between certain states’ policy preferences and the federal gov-
ernment’s. Such states included “Sonora, Tamaulipas, Tabasco, Yucatán, the Federal Dis-
trict, Puebla, Chiapas, and Nuevo León” (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 67). Moreover, different
from the First Convention, Díaz-Cayeros also finds that the issues in the Second Conven-
tion were multi-dimensional, meaning that states did not form stable coalitions and instead
shifted their alliances based on different issues (2006, pp. 68–71).
Because the Third National Tax Convention (1947) did not take roll calls, there was
no comparable evidence between the Third Convention and the previous two conventions.
However, there was still anecdotal evidence illustrating such a policy preference divergence.
For instance, the relationship between President Miguel Alemán (1946–1952) and Gover-
nor Baltasar Leyva Mancilla of Guerrero (1945–1951) shows how the staggered timing of the
presidential and gubernatorial elections created the policy preference divergence between the
two levels of government. In 1944, General Leyva Mancilla was picked by President Ávila
Camacho to run for the gubernatorial election in Guerrero. Despite having a strong and
popular opponent (Senator Nabor Ojeda) and his reluctance to run, with President Ávila
Camacho’s support, Leyva Mancilla won the 1944 PRM primary and the 1945 gubernatorial
election. However, the supportive President Ávila Camacho left office in 1946 and Miguel
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Alemán became the new president. Instead of an Alemanista, Governor Leyva Mancilla had
close ties with President Alemán’s national opponents (Gillingham, 2009, p. 182). Unlike
the Chinese provincial leaders, who in similar situations would have been removed and re-
placed, Governor Leyva Mancilla stayed in office and finished his full term. For the rest
five years when he governed Guerrero, the state witnessed elite conflicts and peasant mobi-
lization against the governor. It caused the federal government to commission a statewide
investigation in 1948 and made the press believe that the governor would be removed. How-
ever, partly as a result of the presidential weakness in late 1948 and early 1949 and partly
because the governor took a compromising stance when dealing with the federal government,
Leyva Mancilla was successfully rehabilitated. Not only did he himself finish his full term,
he also left a personal legacy in the state. His former private secretary, Alejandro Gómez
Maganda, became the next governor. In the 1960s, he continued his political career, as the
leader of the state PRI and later a Senator to represent Guerrero. A key member of his
clique, Caritino Maldonado, became the governor of Guerrero in 1969 (Gillingham, 2009,
pp. 188–189). This example shows as a result of the staggered timing of the elections, the
president occasionally needed to tolerate governors who were not his loyalists.
Systematically, Díaz-Cayeros coded the ideological positions of the presidents and the
485 governors for the period from 1936 to 1994 and found that indeed the governors nom-
inated “did not simply reflect presidential ideal policy positions” (2006, p. 113). The time
period relevant for this chapter, namely from 1936 to 1948, covers presidents Cárdenas, Ávila
Camacho, and Alemán. According to Díaz-Cayeros’s coding, the leftist president, Cárdenas
(1934–1940), nominated 30.88% leftist governors, 48.53% centrist governors, and 20.59%
rightist governors. Compared to Cárdenas, the rightist president, Ávila Camacho (1940–
1946), nominated fewer governors who shared his ideological position than those who were
opposite to his position. Among the governors nominated by Ávila Camacho, only 25.58%
were rightist governors while 27.91% were leftist governors. He nominated similar percentage
of centrist governors as Cárdenas (46.51%). The strong rightist president, Alemán (1946–
1952), nominated more governors who shared his rightist positions (46.51%) than his two
predecessors and much fewer governors who were leftists (13.95%). The percentage of cen-
trist governors nominated was a little lower than his predecessors (39.53%) (Díaz-Cayeros,
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2006, p. 118).
In sum, this section (5.4.2.1) shows that Mexico’s decentralized political system made
the federal government unable to completely control the personnel of the state governors
and thus contributed to the latter’s relatively independent economic policy preferences. Such
independent economic policy preferences manifested themselves in the state delegates’ voting
records in the First and Second National Tax Conventions, as well as the ideological gaps
between the presidents and the state governors they nominated. Without strong reward-
punishment mechanism, the relatively high policy preference divergence between the two
levels of government would easily translate into a low policy deviation threshold and cause
state governments to deviate from the federal government’s policy agenda. I turn to the
reward-punishment mechanism in Section 5.4.2.2.
Before discussing the reward-punishment mechanism, it is helpful to clarify my argument
and its differences from Díaz-Cayeros’s findings.
This section builds on the great work done by Díaz-Cayeros, but I use his evidence to
make a different argument. Based on the coexistence of the political centralization trend
and the fiscal centralization trend in the postrevolutionary Mexico, Díaz-Cayeros argues
that a higher level of political centralization in the 1940s made fiscal centralization possible.
Specifically, he contended that through political centralization, by the 1940s, the federal
government could make a credible commitment to the state leaders (which had not been
possible in the 1920s): the states could trust the federal government’s promise of delivering
the fiscal transfers, and the state officials themselves could benefit electorally by supporting
the federal government.
On the one hand, I agree with his argument that political centralization increased the
federal government’s capacity to centralize the fiscal resources and authority. On the other
hand, this dissertation tackles a different problem: why did the federal government want to
centralize the fiscal authority? Again, my answer is that the federal government wanted to
centralize the fiscal authority because the political decentralization levels were high through-
out the period from the 1920s to the 1940s.
Two distinctions are helpful to clarify the differences between Díaz-Cayeros’s argument
and mine. Firstly, the federal government’s capacity to centralize fiscal authority is different
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from its incentives. The outcome of interest for Díaz-Cayeros is the federal government’s
capacity, while the outcome of interest for this dissertation is the incentives. Secondly,
the political centralization process is different from the political centralization level. They
are related but different. I agree that the political centralization process made the political
system more centralized in the 1940s than in the 1920s, but I argue that because the political
centralization level was so low in the 1920s, the political centralization efforts in these three
decades did not make the system obtain a high level of political centralization. Especially
when we compare the 1940s Mexico with the 1950s China, Mexico’s federal government was
much less able to control the personnel of the state governors. I argue that this high level
of political decentralization can explain the federal government’s incentives to pursue fiscal
centralization policies.
5.4.2.2 SNG: Low Career Incentives Not only did the decentralized political system
help sustain the policy preference divergence between the federal and state governments,
it also could not provide the career incentives for the state officials to pursue the federal
government’s economic policy agenda.
Compared to the Chinese system, two aspects of the Mexican system contributed to its
lack of top-down reward-punishment mechanisms. Firstly, the ruling party CPC in China
had supreme authority and penetrated all government institutions; while in Mexico, the PRI
did not have such an extensive presence and influence in the state institutions, which means
that the government institutions reserved certain autonomy from the PRI. Secondly, the
CPC itself had a centralized party organization as a result of the civil war; while the PRI,
on the other hand, evolved from a territorially-based coalition of local organizations (PNR)
to a corporatist structure that incorporated the interest groups and aimed at mobilizing the
citizens to win elections (PRM and PRI).
Because of these institutional differences, in China, the CPC party leaders in Beijing were
able to discipline the provincial government leaders through the CPC organization. When
the independent-minded provincial leaders deviated from the national government’s economic
policy agenda, they were ruthlessly purged. Such purging processes created powerful career
incentives for the provincial leaders to implement the national government’s economic policy
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directives, even when such policies may lead to disasters in their localities. In comparison,
the presidents in Mexico, who were also party leaders of the PRI, did not have the tools that
their Chinese counterparts had to discipline the state governors. This led to the relatively
lack of career incentives among the governors.
In the 1920s, before the official party was established, presidents had weaker control over
the state governors’ personnel. The state governors sometimes held very different policy
preferences which could cause the presidents considerable frustrations. But even when the
presidents were frustrated, they could only remove those state governors who were politically
vulnerable. For instance, when Calles took power, he was determined to remove dissident
regional leaders, and his government was responsible for ousting over 25 governors in 15
different states. However, strong caudillos, such as Emilio Portes Gil in Tamaulipas and
Saturnino Cedillo in San Luís Potosí could still remain in power, despite their progressive
policy agenda that was much more radical than Calles’s own preferences (Benjamin, 1990, p.
80). Compared to the Chinese provincial leaders in the 1950s, the Mexican state governors
in the 1920s were much less fearful of the national government.
Over time, as the political system became institutionalized, the presidents as the leaders
of both the official party and the federal government gained more authority in nominating
and removing the state governors. However, their institutional tools to remove the governors
were quite different from the Chinese case. In China, the CPC’s centralized structure made it
possible for the central leaders to carry out political campaigns and remove provincial leaders
with unquestionable top-down party decisions. In contrast, the decision-making authority to
remove a state governor in Mexico was more dispersed, the presidents’ discretion was more
limited, and the standards to be met in order to remove a governor were higher.
Particularly, there were four ways in which a governor could be forced out of the office:
(1) to be impeached by the state legislature; (2) to be impeached by the Federal Senate; (3)
the federal government could force the governor to resign, which was to ask for a permanent
leave of absence in front of the state legislature; and finally, (4) the Federal Senate or the
Permanent Commission of the Senate when the Senate was not in session, could declare
powers void in a state and remove its governor, and appoint a provisional one or call a
special election to elect a new one (Anderson, 1971, pp. 320–321).
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Among them, the federal government often used the third and fourth procedures. Be-
tween the third and fourth, as the political system became more institutionalized and cen-
tralized, the federal government also used the third procedure, namely forcing a governor to
resign, more often than the fourth. According to Anderson, many of the forced resignation
cases were
face-saving devices for individuals threatened with removal. If the President, the state
political leaders, and the Secretary of Gobernación [Secretary of the Interior], build a
successful case against the governor, he is informed, and quietly urged to go before his
state legislature and ask for an unlimited leave of absence. Only if he refuses—will actual
removal proceedings be started in the Senate (Anderson, 1971, p. 322).
Moreover, the less frequent removals (the fourth procedure above) no longer aimed to oust
the rebellious state governors, but oftentimes to “throw a political supporter to the wolves
in order to placate public outrage” (Scott, 1959, pp. 137–138).
Thus, compared to the Chinese case, the Mexican federal government’s tools to remove
the subnational officials or force them to resign were more limited. Specifically, while the
Chinese central leadership only needed to rely on the CPC organization to remove the provin-
cial leaders; the Mexican federal leaders had to rely on political players in other government
institutions, such as the Senate and the Secretary of the Interior (head of the Secretariat
of the Interior [Secretaría de Gobernación]). Thus, the political authority involved in the
removal or forced resignation procedures was more dispersed. If the CPC had not had a
tight organization, such a contrast between China and Mexico would not have been so stark.
But given that the CPC had a highly disciplined and centralized organization, the differ-
ence between China and Mexico was substantial. For instance, the anti-localism campaign
that swept the Chinese provinces in the 1950s would not have been possible in the Mexican
context.
As a result, state governors were seldom punished for implementing different economic
policies. The major reasons why the Mexican governors were forced out of offices in the
1940s include that they were unpopular in their states, or being corrupt and incompetent.
The federal government also had a tendency to remove the brutally repressive governors,
because they encouraged popular discontent that created unrest, embarrassed the national
administration and the PRI, and could potentially destablize the regime (Anderson, 1971,
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p. 317).
This section (5.4.2.2) demonstrates the second direct consequence of having a decentral-
ized political system: the state governors in Mexico did not have strong career incentives to
implement the national government’s economic policy agenda. Particularly, when compared
with the Chinese case, the Mexican federal government did not have the disciplinary tools
that the centralized CPC organization offered. Instead, the Mexican federal government
needed to take into account other important political players’ opinions when making the
personnel decisions. With regards to forcing out a governor, the presidents needed to coop-
erate with the Senate and the Secretary of the Interior. As a result, the governors who were
removed or forced to resign tended to be the politically vulnerable ones, who were unpopular
in their states. For the strong and popular governors, the federal government was not able
to remove, even if they adopted economic policies different from the federal government’s
economic policy agenda.
5.4.3 SNG: Policy Deviations
So far, the evidence shows that the decentralized political system in Mexico led to both a
high level of policy preference divergence between the federal and state governments and
that the state governors did not have strong career incentives to implement the federal eco-
nomic policy agenda. These two conditions combined meant a low deviation threshold for
the subnational governments. The theoretical model predicts that when the subnational
governments’ deviation thresholds are low, they are more likely to engage in policy devia-
tions. Specifically, the Mexican state governors would pursue economic policies that were
different from the federal government’s economic policy agenda even when the economic
decentralization level was not very high. In the following, I show the examples of how the
Mexican governors often deviated from the federal government’s economic policies, includ-
ing two governors to illustrate the interaction between state and federal governments in the
1920s (Section 5.4.3.1) and 1930s (Section 5.4.3.2) and the state governments’ fiscal policy
deviations in the 1920s and 1930s (Section 5.4.3.3).
According to the theory, political centralization could rein in the policy deviation be-
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haviors, as it decreased the policy preference divergence and increased the career incentives.
Thus, it is expected that as the political system became more centralized from the 1920s
to the 1940s, the deviation thresholds increased over the years. The different styles of how
Governor Zuno and Governor Maximino interacted with the federal government support this
theoretical expectation.
5.4.3.1 1920s: Governor Zuno of Jalisco During the 1920s, one illustrative example
of the governors who deviated from the federal government’s policy agenda was Governor
José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández of Jalisco (1923–1926). His term overlapped with two
federal administrations, President Obregón (1920–1924) and President Calles (1924–1928).
Governor Zuno was a political ally of President Obregón (1920–1924). With the political
support from Obregón, Zuno became the governor of Jalisco. But his close ties with Obregón,
his strong preference for state autonomy, and his relatively more radical labor policies made
him clash with President Calles. Calles sought to replace Zuno and Zunistas with Callistas.
In the end, Zuno opted to resign and obstructed Calles’s strategy to impose a Callista
governor. After Zuno’s resignation, Zunismo revived in the late 1920s and Zunistas remained
influential until the Maximato.
Unlike many other regional strongmen who rose to power via a military career path, Zuno
was a civilian who became a caudillo because of his political astuteness. He was born in a
rural lower-middle-class family in Jamay, Jalisco in 1891. His family moved to Guadalajara
(the capital city of Jalisco) in 1893. He began his career as a cartoonist for the newspapers,
including El Perico in Guadalajara, El Constitucionalista in Mexico City, and Boletín Militar
in Guadalajara. He also established a painting workshop with other painters, known as the
Centro Bohemio, which “gathered artists and writers that later would become important
political and social leaders.” He met Obregón in Guadalajara in 1914. Since then, they
“developed a reciprocal friendship and loyalty that transcended political ties by establishing
family bonds through compadrazgo.” Their close relationship helped both of them to rise
politically. During Obregón’s presidential campaign in 1919, Zuno and the Centro Bohemio
actively supported Obregón in Jalisco by mobilizing the workers, artisans, teachers, women,
and peasants. Zuno later won the gubernatorial election in December 1922 and became the
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governor in 1923 (Fernández Aceves, 2009, pp. 96–97).
Although Zuno was Obregón’s political ally, he did not completely support the federal
government’s economic policies. Instead, he valued state autonomy and resisted the expan-
sion of the federal government in Jalisco. For instance, he opposed the CROM’s initiative to
dominate the local labor movement. Instead, Zuno organized and relied on the local labor
and peasant organizations, including the League of Agrarian Communities of Jalisco (Liga
de Comunidades Agrarias de Jalisco) and the Confederation of Libertarian Workers Groups
of Jalisco (Confederación de Agrupaciones Obreras Libertarias de Jalisco, CAOLJ). The
CAOLJ, which was based in Guadalajara, Jalisco, “promoted independent unions, strikes,
and struggles against CROM strikebreakers and the authoritarian policies of the federal
Ministry of Industry and Labor” (Fernández Aceves, 2009, pp. 98–99).
The conflict between Governor Zuno and the federal government became much more
intense after Calles took power. The feud between Calles and Zuno was more than policy
differences. Because Zuno had close personal and political ties with Obregón, when Calles
split with Obregón, the political strength of Zuno in Jalisco posed threats to Calles gov-
ernment’s stability. Although their division was not only caused by their policy preference
differences, those differences added the fuel. In particular, Calles sought political centraliza-
tion during his term and he relied on the CROM and its leader and his ally, Luis Morones, to
achieve this goal. On the other hand, Zuno was against the centralization policies from the
very beginning. In addition, as the federal government became more socially conservative
under President Calles, the Zunistas continued to be a radical political force that fought
against labor exploitation in Jalisco. For instance, the “Zunistas and communists united
organized labor in Jalisco into the Confederación Obrera de Jalisco” in 1927. In 1925, partly
thanks to the advocacy of the women working class, Zuno also sought to meet their needs
by establishing “the Casa Amiga de la Obrera (CAO, a day care center and school) . . .
to follow up on the postulates of Article 123 of the Constitution and the state labor law
of 1923” (Fernández Aceves, 2009, pp. 99–100). Unsuprisingly, during the First National
Tax Convention in 1925, Jalisco was one of the states that firmly voted against the federal
government that proposed the fiscal centralization reforms (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 55–56).
Because political decentralization level was very high in the 1920s, which manifested itself
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in the great political influence of Zuno in Jalisco, it was a rather costly process for Calles to
replace Zuno and Zunistas with Callistas. According to Fernández Aceves (2009)’s account,
Calles first initiated an anti-Zuno campaign with an instigated rural revolt, and he also
relied on CROMistas to weaken Zunistas in an election. As a counterattack, Zuno selected
his own men as candidates for the state elections and successfully won all the electoral
districts. Then, Callistas convinced a Zunista, Alfredo Romo, to break with Zuno. Romo
and his followers disowned Zuno as governor and demanded Calles’s recognition. On Zuno’s
part, he dismissed CROMistas from public offices and removed Callista deputies in the state
congress. The federal congress later started an investigation of the charges against Zuno,
including “dissolution of municipal governments, political assassinations, and not respecting
the federal pact.” But before the congress judged the case, Zuno resigned voluntarily. Instead
of a behavior of showing weakness, it was a strategic move on Zuno’s part. Because of his
resignation, he was able to “preserve the state’s sovereignty and to block Calles’s plan to
impose a Callista local executive” (Fernández Aceves, 2009, pp. 101–102).
The direct result of this political battle between Calles and Zuno, however, was not the
disappearance of Zunistas. As Zuno resigned, the key political positions in Jalisco remained
in the hands of Zunistas. Furthermore, Calles’s aggressive tactics against Zuno resulted in
more political violence on the streets. Instead of disappearing, due to the Cristero War in
the late 1920s, “the Jaliscan Obregonismo and Zunismo recovered, radicalizing its labor,
agrarian, and church policies.” Zunismo later declined, after Zuno left the political scene,
his ally Obregón was assassinated, and Calles further consolidated his power during the
Maximato (Fernández Aceves, 2009, pp. 102–103).
The case of the Jaliscan governor Zuno shows that in the 1920s the high level of political
decentralization made it possible for an independent-minded politician to rise and gain po-
litical power in a region; build an alliance with the national leader (Obregón), relying on his
regional influence; stay in power despite his policy preferences for state autonomy; implement
economic policies different from the federal government’s policy agenda, especially during
the Calles’s period; and finally remain influential in the state in spite of Calles’s aggressive
attacks against him and his own strategic resignation.
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5.4.3.2 1930s: Governor Maximino Ávila Camacho of Puebla An example that
shows the policy deviation behaviors during the 1930s is Governor Maximino Ávila Camacho
of Puebla (1937–1941), who was also the older brother of President Manuel Ávila Camacho.
Maximino’s term overlapped with two presidential terms: Cárdenas’s (1934–1940) and his
brother Ávila Camacho’s (1940–1946).
Maximino rose to his political position through a military career path. Maximino was
born in 1891 to a rancher’s family in Teziutlán, Puebla. He quit school at the age of twelve.
He later went to the military academy and began a military career. He became acquainted
with certain high-ranking generals, including General Obregón, in the late 1910s. In 1920,
Maximino quit the army to join Obregón’s presidential campaign. Then, in the early 1920s,
he served as a personal aide to General Lázaro Cárdenas in Michoacán. In the battle against
de la Huerta’s rebellion, Maximino and his brother Manuel fought bravely to defend Morelia,
the capital of Michoacán. Although they lost the battle, his bravery earned him a promotion
to brigadier general. In the mid-1920s, Maximino became the zone commanders in various
regions. During the Cristero War, he was sent to Guanajuato and later to Zacatecas, where
he was portrayed to be corrupt and cruel: “[w]hile only desultorily pursuing the rebels, . . .
Maximino enriched himself by selling government arms to the insurgents, . . . confiscating
property from anyone even rumored to be associated with the Cristero rebels, and killing
anyone who questioned his actions.” Despite these records, because of his ability to please
the federal government leaders with his problematic financial gains, Maximino was promoted
to be brigade general in 1929 (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009, pp. 157–160).
In 1934, when Cárdenas became the president, he made Maximino the zone commander
of Puebla. With an ambition to become the governor of Puebla, Maximino expanded the
military zone to cover the entire state in 1935. In addition, he began to build ties with
local politicians and also maintained a close relationship with President Cárdenas. In the
PNR primary, Maximino faced a former state and federal deputy, Gilberto Bosques. Bosques
was a leftist populist and had the backing of the workers and peasants. On the other hand,
Maximino had support from the army, the state party, the outgoing governor, and the leaders
at the federal level. Moreover, Maximino had a conservative tendency that drew the support
from the middle and upper classes. With such political support and the use of electoral
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fraud and violence, Maximino won the PNR primary. Although Cárdenas shared similar
leftist policy preferences with Bosques, when Bosques’s supporters traveled to Mexico City
to protest, Cárdenas ignored their demands (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009, pp. 161–162).
Unlike the conservative Maximino, President Cárdenas was the most socially revolution-
ary president in the postrevolutionary Mexico. Although historians debate over his legacy
(Bantjes, 1998, pp. xii–xiii), it is a consensus that he was a left-leaning president and sup-
ported redistributive economic policies (Krauze, 1997, pp. 438–480). At the same time,
scholars also agree that Cárdenas was not a radical ideologue.
In his early career as a general, Cárdenas was inspired by his radical friend General Fran-
cisco J. Múgica, who was the governor of Michoacán in 1920. Múgica introduced Cárdenas
to the idea that socialism could solve the conflicts of Mexico. Later, when Cárdenas became
the governor of Michoacán, he promoted socialist ideas in schools and distributed land to
peasants in the form of ejidos (Krauze, 1997, pp. 443–451). The ejido is an institution
that has its origins in the traditional indigenous system, which combines communal owner-
ship and individual use. It was abolished during the Liberal Reform in 1855, causing the
indigenous population to lose their land. As a result of the peasants’ mobilization during
the revolution, the 1917 constitution reintroduced this collective ownership to alleviate the
agrarian problems (Britannica Academic, N.d.). Cárdenas was a strong supporter of the
ejido system.
As Cárdenas became the president, he shifted the government’s emphasis from Calles’s
anticlericalism to the social reforms on the issues of land and labor. Cárdenas again promoted
socialist ideas through general education and distributed land to peasants by granting the
ejidos. As a pragmatic leftist, Cárdenas viewed the ejidos as an institution that could
solve multiple problems at once. Firstly, it could liberate the peasants from their previous
exploitation and serve the purpose of social justice. Secondly, Cárdenas also believed the
ejido to be an institution that could bring economic improvement. Finally, it could help
Cárdenas to destroy the hacienda (large estates) and the political power of the hacendados
(the owners of the large estates) (Krauze, 1997, p. 461).
Cárdenas’s labor policies were corporatist in nature. He was not a Communist. In
addition to social justice, Cárdenas also valued industrialization and economic development.
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To solve the conflicts between labor and the industrialists, he positioned the government
as the arbitrator and regulator (Krauze, 1997, p. 469). His government encouraged both
the industries and workers to compromise for the greater good for the nation. Moreover,
his government also disagreed with the labor organizations sometimes. For instance, he
opposed the CTM’s expansive strategy to recruit the peasants. Instead, he supported the
creation of the CNC to organize the agrarian forces. Neither did his government always side
with labor in the industrial disputes. But compared with his predecessors and successors,
Cárdenas indeed valued social justice and challenged the business interests, especially in the
early years of his administration before 1938 (Knight, 1994, pp. 84–85).
In contrast to Cárdenas, Maximino as a governor was not interested in the revolution-
ary ideals, such as social justice or economic nationalism. In addition to being a corrupt
politician, he also had a conservative tendency and was eager to cooperate with the rich and
traditional elites for expanding his own power and wealth.
In terms of labor policies, Maximino sought to weaken the Regional Federation of Workers
and Peasants (FROC). The FROC was the radical faction of the CROM, and later split
with the CROM and became a CTM affiliate. To decrease the FROC’s influence, Maximino
replaced its representatives in the government organizations with conservative politicians
and made more and more labor actions illegal. He also arrested prominent FROC leaders as
a way of intimidation. By 1940, Maximino was able to weaken the FROC to a great extent
so that “Puebla’s once fractious labor movement could fairly be described as a full-fledged
client of the Avilacamachista state apparatus” (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009, pp. 166–
167). But given that the federal government under Cárdenas did not ardently pursue radical
labor policies, despite their conservative tendency, Maximino’s labor policies did not clearly
contradict Cárdenas’s policy agenda.
With regard to the agrarian policies, Maximino aimed to “transform a chaotic and fac-
tionalized peasantry into an obedient clientele.” This strategy of Maximino also helped Cár-
denas to “unify peasants and workers within organizations that could be incorporated into
the machinery of the official party” (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009, p. 167). Meanwhile,
Cárdenas’s also intentionally relied on Maximino who could control the state to ensure
the official party’s domination in the region (Quintana, 2010, p. 78). But when political
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centralization level was as low as Mexico under Cárdenas, the economic policy preference
divergence between President Cárdenas and Governor Maximino had implications. In par-
ticular, it created a tradeoff between Cárdenas’s two goals: to politically control the state
of Puebla versus to pursue his economic agenda of granting ejidos as a remedy for the social
injustice in Mexico.
A case in point is the granting of ejidos in the township of Atencingo in Puebla. The-
oretically, with ejidos system, the government was supposed to tranfer land from a North
American businessman William O. Jenkins to the peasants, as a way of realizing the revo-
lutionary promises. However, in practice, because of Maximino’s conservative leanings, the
granting of ejidos in Atencingo not only did not meet the peasants’ demands, it preserved
Jenkins’s original economic operation.
Jenkins was a US-born businessman who came to Mexico in 1901 during the Porfiriato.
Before the revolution, Jenkins had established himself in Puebla’s textile industry (Paxman,
2017, pp. 66–70). The revolution disrupted the stable hacienda system of the Porfiriato and
offered Jenkins a new opportunity. During the Porfiriato, the hacendados (owners of large
estates) controlled the sugar mills in the region and hired peones (farm workers) to live and
work on the haciendas under austere conditions. The violent revolution in the 1910s inter-
rupted this hacienda system and drove away the hacendados. With his financial resources
and political influence, Jenkins took the historic opportunity and began to establish his
monopoly over the sugar industry in the region since the early 1920s. But in the meantime,
the peasants also increasingly pressured for land reforms, demanding ejidal grants of the
hacienda lands. By the mid-1930s when Cárdenas became the president, peasants gradually
received some ejidal grants. Although in terms of the quantity, a large portion of Jenkins’s
land (more than 90 percent) was redistributed to the peasants during the 1920s and 1930s;
those lands being divested were often unirrigated or in the hills. Jenkins himself still kept
the more fertile and productive land (Ronfeldt, 1973, pp. 8–16).
The political climate began to change after Cárdenas became the president. Encouraged
by Cárdenas’s national land reform program, peasants became more active in petitioning
for the better lands. With the support of the newly elected municipal head, Gil Vega, the
peasants’ petitions drew more state and federal attention. Consistent with his own policy
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preferences, in 1937, Cárdenas agreed that the peasant petitioners should receive the lands
and ordered the Agrarian Department to redistribute the land (Ronfeldt, 1973, pp. 17–18).
However, in the meantime, supported by donations from Jenkins and other economic
elites, Maximino had won the gubernatorial election in 1936. To maintain a good rela-
tionship with Maximino, Jenkins also lent loans to Maximino’s state government (Paxman,
2017, pp. 214–221). The political, economic, and personal ties between Maximino and
Jenkins, buttressed by Maximino’s innate conservative ideology, upheld an alliance between
the two. Unlike the governors in the 1920s, who would often openly contradict the federal
government’s policies and created more apparent frictions, Maximino, a strong governor
in the 1930s, on the other hand, chose a more tactical approach to deal with the federal
government.
In response to Cárdenas’s order of partitioning the fertile land, Maximino prepared a
report asserting that the peones and workers, instead of the villagers, should have first claim
to the land. The justification Maximino’s report provided was that the peones had no land
at all and were already working on the land in question, while the villagers had obtained
their ejidos and only requested enlargements. This idea of granting ejidos to the peones
intead of villagers was to Jenkins’s advantage, because the villagers were more mobilized
and independent from Jenkins’s enterprise, while the peones were more docile and subject to
Jenkins’s influence. Swayed by Maximino’s report, Cárdenas suspended the initial order. In
the meantime, Jenkins recruited an important labor leader, Blas Chumacero, and organized
his peones into the Atencingo Workers and Peasants’ Syndicate. In August 1937, to convince
Cárdenas, accompanied by a commission of the peones and workers, Maximino and some
agrarian officials traveled to Veracruz and met with the president. Jenkins also offered to
hand over the lands as a gift. As a result of these political efforts, Cárdenas decided to
completely stop the initial order of granting the ejidos to the villagers (Ronfeldt, 1973, pp.
18–19).
On March 30, 1938, based on the recommendations of Maximino, Cárdenas signed a
presidential decree. The decree
formed a single giant ejido from the widely dispersed lands of the nine haciendas. . . .
Sugar cane and rice were the only crops permitted by law. And only the former peons
and workers of the haciendas were supposed to qualify as ejidatarios. . . . While only
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ejidatarios were supposed to be admitted as associate members, the manager of the mill,
Pérez, was extended considerable power over its operation (Ronfeldt, 1973, pp. 28–29).
Hence, with the help from Maximino, Jenkins preserved his effective control of the sugar mill,
avoided transferring his land to the independent villagers, and ensured the continuation of
his previous economic operations.
We can draw two implications from the Atencingo case. First of all, compared to the
Chinese provincial leaders, Maximino did not have the strong career incentives and had an
opposite economic policy preference to Cárdenas’s preference. These two factors explained
Maximino’s economic policy deviations. Cárdenas’s original motivation of enthusiastically
advocating the ejido system was to bring social justice to the peasants, as promised by the
revolution. In addition, Cárdenas also had an incentive to weaken the large landowners,
such as Jenkins. However, in practice, the conservative governor Maximino not only was not
eager to satisfy peasants’ demands, he collaborated with Jenkins, the peasants’ opponent
and a foreign-born capitalist. By providing incomplete, and sometimes biased information to
Cárdenas, Maximino successfully convinced Cárdenas of Jenkins’s preferred solution, namely
allowing Jenkins to continue his business more or less as usual.
At the same time, the case of Atencingo also shows the impact of higher political cen-
tralization level on governors’ behaviors. In particular, there were not direct confrontations
between Governor Maximino and President Cárdenas. Maximino did not openly ignore
the federal government’s authority. Instead, by providing incomplete and sometimes biased
information, Maximino deftly convinced Cárdenas to first suspend and later completely
abandon the original plan of expropriating all Jenkins’s properties and allotting the lands to
the villagers. Maximino’s less confrontational approach, in comparison to the relationship
between Governor Zuno and President Calles, was also consistent with our expectation that
as the Mexican political system became more centralized, governors would become less likely
to defy the federal government.
In addition to Atencingo, Maximino also used land distribution to expand his influence
in other regions. He would decide whether to distribute lands to towns based on the support
he could get from such towns. In one case, Maximino scolded a mayor for ordering land
distribution to local ejidos based on federal directives but without his approval. He ordered
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the suspension of this land distribution (Quintana, 2010, p. 88).
Besides his agrarian policy deviations, Maximino also sought to build and lead an alliance
with other conservative governors, such as the governors of the State of Mexico, Morelos,
Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, and Sonora. Together these conservative regional leaders balanced the
radical mass organizations and their leaders at the federal level. After Cárdenas expropriated
foreign oil companies in 1938, Maximino also exploited the anger of the business interests
and pushed Cárdenas to adopt more conservative policies (Henderson and LaFrance, 2009,
p. 164).
The example of Governor Maximino illustrates the existence of governors’ policy devia-
tion behaviors in the 1930s Mexico. Admittedly, it is less clear how Maximino implemented
labor policies differently from Cárdenas’s expectations, since Cárdenas was not eagerly pro-
moting labor rights himself. However, provided that Cárdenas was enthusiastic about realiz-
ing the revolutionary promise about the land issue, it is more obvious that the conservative
governor Maximino had his own agenda, which was to protect the elites’ privileges and pre-
serve the previous production mode. He was also capable of achieving his own goals. The
Atencingo case reveals how Maximino succeeded in implementing land policies that he pre-
ferred. In addition, the political decentralization level was so high that Maximino was able
to build a conservative alliance with other governors that could contain the radical forces at
the federal level and pressure President Cárdenas to adopt more conservative policies by the
late 1930s. In comparison, in the 1950s China, it is almost impossible for governors such as
Maximino to survive the series of political campaigns that aimed to unify the mindsets of
provincial leaders.
5.4.3.3 State Governments’ Fiscal Policy Deviations In this section, I discuss the
state governments’ fiscal policy deviations, which directly led the federal government to
centralize fiscal resources and authority.
The postrevolutionary federal administrations aspired to modernize the country and cre-
ate a common national market. But the revolution dried up states’ treasuries and weakened
the political center, creating a fiscal anarchy where the states began to implement fiscal
policies that were more expedient for the individual states but lacked coordination among
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themselves and obstructed the federal government’s agenda of building a national market.
The high level of political decentralization allowed the independent-minded governors to
stay in power and sustain their policy deviations. Although the federal governments during
the three decades preferred to establish a common market nationally, they were not able to
constrain the state governments politically or stop their policy deviations. As a result, fiscal
centralization became a preferred option for the federal government to establish fiscal order
and build the national market.
The creation of a national market is an integral part of a nation-state’s modernization
process. In Mexico, the idea of forming a unified national market was a crucial component of
the liberal dream—building an advanced and civilized nation, where all citizens could freely
engage in economic activities. Thus, as the liberals dominated the Mexican political stage
in the 19th century, they attempted to eliminate the internal tariffs installed by the state
and municipal governments (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 20).
The revolution in the 1910s halted this modernization process as the wars disrupted eco-
nomic production and the means of transportation. For the postrevolutionary government, a
unified national market was not only an ideological desire like the earlier liberals in the 19th
century, but also became necessary for Mexico’s economic development. The decade-long
revolutionary instability left Mexico with a fiscal system that was fragmented. States gained
fiscal autonomy at the expense of the federal government’s loss of fiscal authority. Concur-
rent taxation (concurrencia fiscal), namely the federal and state governments concurrently
levied taxes on the same economic entities, became a widespread phenomenon. Such fiscal
fragmentation and anarchy led to highly inefficient tax systems, caused onerous financial
burdens on businesses, and impeded the national economic development. The postrevolu-
tionary government’s desire to modernize the country made reforming its fiscal system a
priority.
Manuel Gómez Morín, who was an influential public official in shaping the postrevolu-
tionary fiscal and monetary policies and presided the First National Tax Convention in 1925,
commented during the convention that,
with the current organization, each state is protectionist against the other states and the
whole republic. It is impossible to make plans for the national economic development, for
the technological exploitation of our natural resources, for issuing loans, for the fluid circula-
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tion and fair distribution of goods, while maintaining the preposterous fiscal fragmentation
(as quoted in Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 107, translated by the author).
Similarly, the Treasurer of the Republic at the time, Alberto J. Pani, also criticized the
fiscal anarchy and fragmentation during the First National Tax Convention. He pointed
out that by establishing their own tax systems, the states often rivaled with each other
and created “true economic wars” (verdaderas guerras económicas). In order to perserve the
taxes on production within their own states that had been improperly established in the first
place, the states further introduced real local importation rights (verdaderos derechos locales
de importación). The tax system, as a result, became increasingly burdensome, due to the
multiplicity of the quotas, fines, and surcharges. In addition to complicating the tax system,
fiscal anarchy also incurred heavy costs on the collection, inspection, and administration of
the tax revenues. Finally, fiscal anarchy led to unfair taxation, since the federal and state
governments often concurrently collected taxes from the same economic entities, but left
others untaxed (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 295).
On the states’ side, fiscally the revolutionary wars depleted their coffers. Politically,
regional strongmen who were less controlled by the federal government came to dominate
the state governments. As a result, although the federal government desired a common
national market, the states deviated from the federal government’s policy agenda, erected
internal tariffs, and perpetuated the economic fragmentation situation.
One example of state governments’ policy deviations was their reestablishment of the old
alcabalas after the revolution, although such taxes were banned in the 1917 constitution for
functioning as internal tariffs. The alcabalas originally was a colonial tax on the movement
of goods across the jurisdictions. It was banned in the late 19th century under the Porfirian
regime for hindering the formation of a national market. But as the revolutionary wars
created an urgent need for the states to raise revenues while at the same time weakened
their capacity to do so, they turned to the alcabalas once again for it was more expedient to
collect the alcabalas than the other taxes. Particularly, in the 1920s, the state governments
relied on three main sources for tax revenues, which were the property tax, the taxes on
industry and trade, and the excise taxes (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 46–47). When the federal
government eliminated the alcabalas during the last years of the Porfiriato, states resorted
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to the property tax to compensate for the revenue losses. However, as a major revenue
source, the property tax was more difficult to collect, for it required a relatively precise land
registry that was often lacking in the states. When the postrevolutionary state governments
needed the revenues but were lacking the effective ways to raise them, they reestablished the
alcabalas. In 1926, almost none of the states had the alcabalas; but by 1947, the alcabalas
existed in all states except Sonora (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 44–47; Aboites Aguilar, 2003,
pp. 72–76).
Besides the alcabalas, states also lacked the enthusiasm for the federal government’s
initiative to establish a revenue-sharing fiscal system and some states chose to stay out of
the fiscal arrangment promoted by the federal government.
Faced with the fiscal fragmentation and disorder, the postrevolutionary federal govern-
ment engaged in various reform efforts since the 1920s. Its first major attempt was the First
National Tax Convention held in 1925. In this convention, the SHCP proposed the follow-
ing reform measures: (1) to give the federal government an exclusive authority to collect
income tax and sales tax; (2) end the state taxes on industry and trade; and (3) compensate
the states’ revenue losses with unconditional transfers, referred to as the participaciones.
However, as discussed in 5.4.2.1, a group of states firmly voted against the federal govern-
ment in this convention, including the State of Mexico, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Puebla,
Nuevo León, Querétaro, and Durango (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 55). The voting pattern
at this convention reflected not only the state governments’ reluctance to abandon their
taxes on industry and trade, but also their ability to oppose the federal government’s initia-
tive without fearing the political consequences. States’ open resistence against the federal
government’s proposal in this convention was a consequence of the high level of political
decentralization. Such deviation behaviors became more pronounced when compared with
the Chinese case in the 1950s, where provincial leaders who voiced their different opinions
were ruthlessly purged.
Given the states’ fierce opposition against the taxation overhaul in the mid-1920s, the
federal government adopted a gradual approach to reform the tax system. Instead of elimi-
nating all state taxes on industry and trade at once, the federal government federalized taxes
on one industry at a time. Over the period of two decades from 1928 to 1949, the federal
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government expanded its tax authority in water resources, timber, oil and its derivatives,
electricity, minerals, tobaccos, and beer, among others (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, Chapter 5).
For each industry that the federal government established its own taxes, it tried to remove
the states’ tax authority and compensate the states’ revenue losses by dispensing a share of
the federal revenues from such industry (participaciones). Since different states were often
more invested in different industries, when the federal government focused on expanding its
tax authority in one industry, the states that were less active in this industry often lacked
the incentives to coordinate with those that had more activities. As a result, this strategy
succeeded in gradually expanding the federal tax jurisdictions from the late 1920s to the
1940s.
The urgent need to unify the national market necessitated the federal government to
equalize the costs of production among the states as much as possible and required an
orderly tax system. The federal government’s efforts to expand its tax authority in various
large industries and natural resources demonstrate its policy preferences for the common
national market as well as policy agenda of establishing the fiscal order. But instead of
pursuing the federal government’s policy agenda at the expense of the states’ interests, as
the provincial leaders in China did in the 1950s, several Mexican states chose to voice their
discontent and sought to stay out of the federal arrangement.
For instance, in the case of the mining industry, the federal government began to ex-
pand its tax authority in 1926 and caused strong dissatisfaction among states that relied on
revenues from the mining industry, such as Chihuahua. Chihuahua not only expressed its
discontent publicly, but also led the opposition of several other states against the federal-
ization of the mining industry.
In May 1926, President Calles signed the Law on the Mining Industry that prohibited
states from direct and indirect taxes on this industry and granted the federal government a
fiscal monopoly over mining activities. As a state that heavily relied on the taxes from the
mining industry, Chihuahua opposed the federal government’s initiative.
In the newspaper Excelsior, the Chihuahua delegate, Miguel Collado, criticized the fed-
eral government’s argument for equating the “nation” with the “federation.” Article 168 of
the 1926 law justifies the federal monopoly with the argument that “as all the mineral sub-
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stances were under the direct ownership of the nation and the mining industries are within
the exclusive federal jurisdiction, the states shall not impose any direct or indirect taxes”
(Government of Mexico, 1926b, p. 11, translated by the author). In the newspaper, the Chi-
huahua delegate asked, “what does the transcribed paragraph wish to say? Perhaps that the
nation is the federation?” If that is the case, then the law was based on a “false assumption,”
because the nation “is no more than the politically organized state. And the federation, or
rather the federal powers, do not become more than one of the bodies through which the
nation manifests itself.” In addition, the delegate argued that if this law assumed that the
nation meant the federation, it contradicted Article 40 of the constitution that established
the nation was composed of free and sovereign states in respect of its internal regime, but
united in one federation. In the end, one law could not take precedence over the constitution
(Excelsior, June 23, 1926, as cited in Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 128–129, translated by the
author).
In addition to expressing the state’s disagreement in the newspaper, the governor of Chi-
huahua, Jesús Almeida, criticized that the 1926 law would put the economic life of the state
in danger. Governor Almeida also led the opposition of a group of states, including Durango,
Veracruz, Sinaloa, Michoacán, and Puebla, against the 1926 law on the mining industry (Ex-
celsior, June 22, 1926, as cited in Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 166; and Aboites Aguilar, 2003,
p. 312).
The states’ opposition forced the federal government to step back from Article 168 of
the Law on the Mining Industry (May 1926). Later in August 1926, the federal government
published the Law of the Taxes on the Mining Industry, in which the states were allowed
to collect the federal tax and were granted the authority to establish a property tax on the
building and machinery of the profitable plants and metallurgical establishments in their
territories, with an annual rate lower than 0.5% (see Article 33, Government of Mexico,
1926a, p. 5).
Similar to the taxation of the mining industry, the federal government’s initiative to
federalize taxes on the oil and beer industries also encountered states’ resistence. In terms
of the oil industry, Veracruz as one of the most affected states was keen to protect its
revenues from oil and was critical of how the federal government distributed such revenues
198
after Cárdenas’s oil expropriation in 1938 (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 180–187). Similarly,
in the beer industry, the federal government began the federalization of the taxes in 1928,
but by 1930, only three states (Nuevo León, Veracruz, and Sinaloa) joined the agreement
(Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 172–173).
In sum, although the postrevolutionary federal administrations desired to build a com-
mon national market, the states notably deviated from such a policy agenda. To meet their
fiscal needs after the revolutionary wars, the state governments reestablished the alcabalas,
which impeded the flow of goods across the state borders and the national economic devel-
opment. When the federal government decided to solve the problems associated with the
fiscal anarchy through a tax overhaul, the states openly voted against the federal govern-
ment’s proposal in the First National Tax Convention in 1925. This failure to reform the
fiscal system in 1925 led the federal government under President Calles to adopt a gradual
strategy to federalize taxes on various large industries and natural resources one at a time.
Such a gradual strategy again encountered states’ disobedience, as federalizing taxes on the
industries often hurt the revenues of those states that more heavily relied on such indus-
tries. This is shown by the example of how the state of Chihuahua resisting the Law on the
Mining Industry in 1926 as well as the general lack of enthusiasm among state governments
towards the federal government’s other initiatives, such as federalizing taxes in the oil and
beer industries.
This section (5.4.3) presents the evidence with regard to the state governments’ deviation
behaviors. Specifically, I show two examples of state governors, Governor Zuno of Jalisco
and Governor Maximino of Puebla, who pursued economic policies different from the federal
government’s economic agenda. It is worth noting that Governor Maximino in the 1930s
had a less confrontational relationship with the federal government than Governor Zuno in
the 1920s. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that higher levels of political
centralization in the 1930s reduced the intensity of the state governments’ policy deviation
behaviors. In addition, this section also establishes that state governments engaged in fiscal
policy deviations. Driven by their local interests, the states did not enthusiastically follow
the federal government’s fiscal initiative to establish fiscal unity or its agenda of creating a
common national market. Instead, the states sought to keep their revenue sources, although
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such efforts may lead to a public display of frictions between the federal and state govern-
ments. Overall, the pieces of evidence are consistent with my expectations. Compared to the
Chinese case in the 1950s, the Mexican state governments were indeed more likely to engage
in policy deviations, as a result of their having more independent policy preferences and
being less concerned about their career punishments than the provincial leaders in China.
5.4.4 NG: Frustrated and Desired Higher Economic Centralization Levels
Compared to the Chinese central government, the Mexican federal government was far less
ideological. The postrevolutionary presidents indeed pursued social and economic policies
that aimed to transform the nation, such as the land reforms, but they were pragmatic in
their approaches. Even President Cárdenas, the most radical postrevolutionary president,
merely aimed to build a corporatist state, a much less radical agenda than building a com-
munist state, which was aspired by the Chinese central government in the 1950s. The theory
developed in Chapter 2 predicts that, this relatively high level of pragmatism of the Mexican
federal government would allow it to better tolerate the states’ policy deviation behaviors
than its Chinese counterpart. However, the theory also predicts that there would be a limit
to the federal government’s tolerance. In particular, the rationale for the federal govern-
ment’s tolerance is that the federal government’s benefits derived from the level of economic
decentralization, particularly the economic efficiency gains (for instance, from allowing the
states to take advantage of their better information about their own states and to exploit
the economies of scale at the state level) outweigh the federal government’s costs from not
being able to implement its preferred economic policies in the states. In this section, I show
that in the Mexican case, the federal government did not find maintaining the level of fiscal
decentralization could bring much economic efficiency, while the costs of not being able to
establish the common market were clear.
Firstly, the federal government did not find high fiscal decentralization could bring eco-
nomic efficiency. As discussed earlier, in the 1920s, the fiscal decentralization level was
so high due to the Mexican revolution that the federal government described the situation
as “fiscal anarchy.” Rather than believing that this high level of fiscal decentralization was
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conducive to economic development, federal public officials, such as Manuel Gómez Morín
and Treasurer Alberto J. Pani, regarded it as the cause for a highly inefficient system that
impeded the economic development in the 1920s.
In April 1928, faced with the rise of the internal tariffs, specifically the alcabalas, the
SHCP spoke to the Secretariat of the Interior to complain about the burden of the alca-
balas on the beer industry in various states. The Secretariat of the Interior sent several
recommendations to the state governments, but due to the weak political control of the
federal government over the states, these recommendations were not effective. Those states
continued with their previous practice to collect the alcabalas (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p.
313).
The federal government’s lack of political control over the states reinforced the federal
public officials’ belief that to improve the efficiency of the fiscal system required centralizing
the fiscal authority at the federal government. The logic was that the federal government
was in a better position to understand the interests of the whole nation than the states
that could only see the parts. Thus, only the federal government could bring fiscal order,
homogeneity, and simplification. Moreover, the federal public officials argued that the states
should not oppose the federal government’s endeavor, because the federal government could
better realize the states’ interests (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 113).
Such ideas dominated the discussions among the federal officials since the 1920s. These
ideas show that the federal government regarded the level of fiscal decentralization at that
moment to be so high that it impeded the national economic development. The federal
government did not see efficiency gains from maintaining or increasing the level of fiscal
decentralization. If anything, the federal government preferred fiscal unity and simplification
that the federal officials believed to be possible only through fiscal centralization.
Secondly, the federal government perceived the high costs of not being able to build a
common national market. Among the disadvantages of the market fragmentation, the federal
officials identified two problems: the economic wars among the states, and the inability of
the federal government to make national plans.
As discussed in the previous section (5.4.3.3), in the First National Tax Convention
(1925), Treasurer Pani criticized that the lack of fiscal coordination led to a situation that
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states rivaled each other and introduced local protectionism measures. Such rivalry further
contributed to an inefficient tax system, where the multiplicity of quotas, fines, and sur-
charges not only raised the costs of tax collection, but also imposed heavy and often unfair
burden on the economic entities (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 295). Similarly, President Cár-
denas in the 1930s also believed that it was time to strengthen the federal government. He
reasoned that it was a serious limitation that the public finance legislation varied from states
to states, regrettably provoking true economic wars between one state and another. These
economic wars were destructive to the integrated national development, which required the
fiscal legislation to follow a set of uniform standards (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 112).
In addition, the federal government also viewed the market fragmentation to be limiting
its capacity to make plans about the national development. In an SHCP’s document, which
was sent to the Congress of the Union in 1926 and aimed to solve the fiscal anarchy problem,6
the SHCP emphasized that the technological progresses in the 19th century changed the
economic relations. The invention of the telegraph, the railways, the automobiles, and the
aviation reduced the distances and boosted the transportation speed. Such developments
made the large industries possible and led to trade on a much larger scale. To adapt to
these technological advances and economic changes, each nation aimed to establish a single
economy in its territory. The old concurrent legislative powers in the fiscal matters that
had existed before the technological development in the 19th century should receive radical
reforms, in order to adjust the fiscal system to better meet the current developmental needs
(Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 125). In particular, according to Manuel Gómez Morín, who
presided the First National Tax Convention, it was necessary to solve the fiscal fragmentation
problem so that the government could make plans for the national economic development
and for exploiting Mexico’s rich natural resources (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 107).
To summarize, this section shows that although the Mexican federal governments over
time were pragmatic, they did not perceive that the high fiscal decentralization level could
bring economic efficiency gains. To the contrary, the federal governments regarded the
6After the First National Tax Convention, the SHCP prepared this document which proposed a con-
stitutional reform to solve the fiscal anarchy problem. But for some unknown reasons, this constitutional
reform initiative was not debated in the Chamber of Deputies and thus no constitutional reform was made
(Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp.124–127).
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fiscal system as highly inefficient, whose efficiency could only be improved through fiscal
centralization. In the meantime, the federal governments’ inability to control the state
governments and to create a common national market was perceived as harming the national
economic development, due to the economic wars among the states and the inability of the
federal government to make national plans.
5.4.5 Fiscal Centralization Policies and State Governments’ Responses
The previous sections have shown that the high level of political decentralization made it
more likely for the state governments to disregard the federal government’s economic agenda.
The states’ policy deviation behaviors further led the federal government to prefer a high
level of fiscal centralization in the 1920s. In this section, I discuss the federal government’s
fiscal centralization policies and the state governments’ responses.
The federal government began its fiscal centralization efforts since the 1920s under Pres-
ident Calles and continued through the 1940s. As the fiscal centralization level increased,
the state governments lost more and more revenues and autonomy so that they increasingly
depended on the federal government fiscally as well as politically. However, by the end
of the 1940s, the political decentralization level in Mexico was still much higher than the
Chinese case in the 1950s. Thus, the state governments were still more likely to engage in
economic policy deviations in Mexico than the Chinese provincial governments in the 1950s,
despite the increase in the fiscal centralization level. I argue that the state governments’
deviations were resulted from a lack of capacity instead of a lack of willingness on the federal
government’s part to establish a more centralized fiscal system.
5.4.5.1 Fiscal Centralization Policies The level of political decentralization was high
since the beginning of the postrevolutionary regime. The idea of fiscal centralization was
appealing to the federal government also since the beginning of the regime in the late 1910s
and early 1920s. Nevertheless, the fiscal centralization efforts met with strong opposition
from the states in the 1920s and the federal government could not achieve much progress in
centralizing fiscal resources and authority in the early 1920s. Beginning in the late 1920s,
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President Calles initiated a gradual strategy of fiscal centralization, which over the course
of two decades slowly but steadily increased the fiscal authority of the federal government.
The fiscal centralization process also contributed to the political centralization process in
this time period. In the late 1940s, the federal government under President Alemán moved
further in the fiscal centralization direction, by passing a proposal to institutionalize a more
centralized fiscal system in the Third National Tax Convention and establishing a national
sales tax (ISIM).
There were two major failed attempts at fiscal centralization by the federal government
in the early and mid-1920s: the attempt to establish a federal property tax since 1923 and
the initiative to reform the constitution since 1926.
In October 1922, President Obregón issued a presidential decree to establish a federal
tax at an annual rate of 0.1% on the land value. Traditionally, the property tax had always
been collected by the states and there was a widely accepted notion, shared by other federal
countries as well, that the direct taxes, such as the property tax, should be collected by the
states, and the indirect taxes, such as the taxes on consumption, should be collected by the
federal government. Hence, the 1922 decree caused strong backlash from the state govern-
ments. Immediately after the announcement of the decree, the president’s office received
more than 60 telegrams complaining about the new tax. Subsequently, in the National Land
Registry Convention (convención nacional catastral), the state delegates again expressed
their opposition against the tax and questioned its constitutionality for its potential viola-
tion of states’ sovereignty. Due to the states’ opposition, the federal government aborted
the federal property tax in 1924 and agreed in the First National Tax Convention that the
fiscal authority of the property tax should be exclusively local (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp.
114–122).
A similar failed attempt was the Calles government’s initiative in 1926 to reform the
constitution with the hope to solve the fiscal anarchy problem once and for all. This initia-
tive was first approved—despite the strong state opposition—during the First National Tax
Convention (1925), which proposed to separate the tax authority among the three levels of
governments: the federation, the states, and the municipalities. Later, in November 1926
the SHCP sent the initiative to the Congress of the Union, aiming to establish a central-
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ized organization of the public finance. Specifically, if passed, the constitutional reforms
would give the federation the exclusive tax authority over the industry and trade, which
by then had been in the hands of the states and the municipalities. But due to the states’
opposition, the initiative never received a debate in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1931, the
SHCP decided to withdraw the initiative and revise it, but it never returned to the Congress
(Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 124–129).
The setbacks in the early and mid-1920s led the federal government to temporarily aban-
don the comprehensive approach and adopt a more gradual strategy. Specifically, from the
late 1920s to the early 1940s, the federal governments used exemption of individual states’
federal contribution (contribución federal) to incentivize the states to follow the recommenda-
tions passed in the First National Tax Convention. Moreover, as mentioned earlier (Section
5.4.3.3), the federal governments also expanded its tax authority through federalizing the
taxes on the large industries and natural resources one branch at a time and established
the system of unconditional transfers (participaciones) to minimize the states’ opposition.
It is worth noting that such fiscal centralization efforts were consistent, despite the leader-
ship shifts from President and the maximum leader Calles to Presidents Cárdenas and Ávila
Camacho.
The federal contribution had its origin in the contingente, which was established in 1824
for the newly independent federal government to support itself by obtaining a share of the
states’ revenues. Its name was changed to the federal contribution (contribución federal) in
1860. The rates of the federal contribution in the postrevolutionary period varied from as
high as 60% during the Carranza period to around 25% in the late 1920s. In 1929, the federal
government began the program of exempting those states that followed the SHCP’s recom-
mendations from the First National Tax Convention. Specifically, to receive the exemptions,
the states should (1) abolish the taxes prohibited by Article 117 of the constitution, namely
the taxes on the circulation of goods (the alcabalas); (2) cancel the tax exemptions on persons
or businesses that favored certain taxpayers; and (3) cancel the contracts or agreements with
persons or corporations for tax collection purpose (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 156–158).
Overall, the exemption program was not very effective at centralizing the fiscal authority
while created its own problems. The reason for its ineffectiveness was again linked to the
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states’ policy deviation behaviors, resulting from the lack of political control of the federal
government during this period. For instance, certain states that had initially followed the
SHCP’s recommendations and obtained the exemptions, such as Tamaulipas, later estab-
lished new local taxes that were against the SHCP’s directives (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp.
159–160). In addition, the manipulation of the federal contribution also created inequalities
among the federative entities, as some entities obtained the exemptions but others did not.
States complained about the inequalities created by this program and called for the end of
the federal contribution during the Second National Tax Convention in 1933 (Díaz-Cayeros,
2006, pp. 64–66). But the federal government continued to keep the federal contribution in
the 1930s, which was eventually abolished in 1949 under President Alemán (Aboites Aguilar,
2003, p. 390).
As discussed in the section on states’ policy deviations (5.4.3.3), since the late 1920s,
the federal government gradually expanded its tax authority in large industries and natural
resources, namely the excise taxes. According to Aboites Aguilar (2003), the political in-
centive (the federal government was unable to reform the taxes on industry and trade in a
more comprehensive manner as a result of the states’ opposition) was certainly crucial for
the federal government to make the decision to federalize the excise taxes; but the federal
government also had other motivations. Specifically, the federal officials perceived that the
state governments did not have the capacity to confront the large businesses, many of which
were foreign-owned and that it was necessary for the federal government itself to deal with
such large investors (p. 165). Thus, from the late 1920s to the early 1940s, the federal
governments successively passed presidential decrees, new laws, and constitutional amend-
ments to creat new federal taxes and centralize the fiscal authority and revenues on the large
industries and important natural resources, including mining, electricity, gasoline, beer, to-
bacco, timber, and oil. To incentivize the states to give up their own tax authority, join
the federal initiatives and obey the new laws, the federal government shared with the state
governments its newly gained revenues through the unconditional transfers (participaciones)
(Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 165–187).
Up until the early 1940s, the federalization of excise taxes proved to be one of the most
effective ways at centralizing the fiscal revenues and authority during the postrevolutionary
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period. Since it was gradual, states’ obstruction was weaker and more scattered. The states’
opposition also varied across industries. For instance, it was more salient in the mining and
beer industries than in the other areas. Over time, a key feature of Mexico’s centralized
fiscal system—the system of participaciones—began to take shape. The average proportion
of participaciones in the federative entities’ fiscal expenditures increased from 2.6% in 1931
to 19.1% in 1942 (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 276). As the revenues accrued to the federal
government, the political power balance also tilted towards the federal government. States
increasingly relied on the federal government to fund their public projects. Scott (1959)
observed that the increasing financial dependence of the state governments “forced the local
officers to go to Mexico City, hat in hand, seeking grants from the national government to
satisfy the demands of their constituents” (p. 135). As a result, the federal government was
more able to leverage its fiscal power to influence the states’ politicians and rein in their
policy deviation behaviors. For instance, in 1936 Cárdenas proposed to impose a sanction
on those states that failed to coordinate with other states on a certain tax by not giving
the disobedient states their participaciones (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 269). Although there
is no evidence that this sanction was ever applied, the possibility of such a sanction was a
direct consequence of the fiscal centralization process during this period.
When President Alemán took power in 1946, the political decentralization level was much
lower than the 1920s. His administration was thus able to achieve more fiscal centralization
results than the previous administrations. But compared to the Chinese case, the political
decentralization level was still much higher, which helped sustain the federal government’s
desire of a centralized fiscal regime. The Alemán administration’s fiscal agenda was again
to establish fiscal order in the country. Specifically, his government organized the Third
National Tax Convention in 1947, in which the conventionalists passed recommendations
to establish a more fiscally centralized system. In addition, following the tax convention
and with the congressional approval, the federal government passed a law and established
a general sales tax, namely the ISIM. Both measures pushed for higher fiscal centralization
levels.
Despite the federal efforts in the 1920s and 1930s, Mexico still had a fragmented fiscal
system in the 1940s, because of the World War II. On the one hand, the federal government
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prioritized the economic activities related to the war efforts instead of reforming the fiscal
system. While at the same time, the federal and state governments were also eager to share
the economic prosperity generated by the rapid development of the private sector. As a
result, the different levels of government established new taxes, including more alcabalas
in the states, which preserved the fiscal fragmentation problem. Once again, the fiscal
disorder created obstacles for the economic and social development, including concerns about
corruption resulted from the complex tax system and the unfair and onerous fiscal burden
on the economic entities. These concerns again propelled the federal government to continue
with the fiscal centralization agenda (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 195–197).
The first major fiscal centralization effort of the Alemán administration was to hold the
Third National Tax Convention in November 1947. This convention passed the federal gov-
ernment’s proposal of a more centralized fiscal system. This system differentiated the taxes
into the exclusive revenue for the federal government and the state governments, the shared
revenue through the unconditional transfer (participaciones) system, and the concurrent
revenue.
The taxes that belonged to the exclusive revenue of the federal government included
the tariffs and income tax; while the exclusive sources of revenue of the state governments
included the property tax, the taxes on agriculture and livestock, and the taxes on the
transfer of real estate ownership. Secondly, the shared revenue through the participaciones
system included the excise taxes, most of which had been federalized before the 1940s,
as discussed earlier, and then the sales tax, which had not been federalized yet but its
federalization was on the federal government’s agenda. Thirdly, the concurrent revenue
referred to the taxes on the remaining sectors of trade and industry, and the excise taxes on
yarns and fabrics, on the production and trade of sugar, alcohol, beer, and packaged water.
The proposal stated that the concurrent revenue should tend toward more uniformity in the
future (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 200–201).
The foundation of this centralized system had already been laid by the federal government
gradually since the establishment of the regime. These efforts included the establishment
of the income tax in 1924 and the federalization of excise taxes in the large industries and
natural resources since the late 1920s. The next major task that the Alemán administration
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took on was to establish a national sales tax, the ISIM. With the ISIM, the federal government
attempted to establish a federal tax on trade and abolish the concurrent taxation. Such a
centralization effort was considered to be an essential step towards creating the common
national market.
According to the law passed in December 1947, the ISIM was set to be at the rate of
3.3%. It would replace the old stamp tax in the area of sales. But since this new law of
the ISIM did not achieve the status of the constitution,7 its legal effect in each federative
entity depended on whether the entity joined the arrangment. To motivate the federative
entities to adopt the ISIM and abolish their previous taxes on trade and industry, the 1947
law promised that the states would share the ISIM at the rate of 1.5%, while the rate for
the federal government was 1.8% (see Article 8, Government of Mexico, 1947, p. 2).
Despite the political centralization process from the 1920s to the 1940s, the responses
of the states toward the ISIM were still lukewarm. In 1948, only the Federal District and
the two federal territories, Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo, joined the arrangment.
Over the next three years, six more states joined the ISIM, including Aguascalientes (1949),
Morelos (1950), Querétaro (1950), Tlaxcala (1950), Michoacán (1951), and Sinaloa (1951).
By the end of the 1950s, only half of the states adopted the ISIM. It was only in the 1970s
did all federal entities join the ISIM (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, pp. 126–131).8
Because the states did not enthusiastically join the ISIM arrangement, the effects of the
ISIM on fiscal centralization were not as drastic as the federal government had anticipated.
The ISIM revenue received by the federal government increased from 352 million pesos in
1950 to 1,108 million in 1960 and 5,461 million in 1972. The share of the ISIM in the federal
government’s total tax revenue was approximately the same, as the federal tax revenues
during this period also increased proportionally. Specifically, the ISIM’s share was 12%,
7The federal government attempted to initiate a constitutional reform in the tax convention in 1947, in
which the federal government proposed to make the national tax laws (ley nacional de arbitrios) part of the
constitution. If the initiative had been passed, the federal government would have the authority to determine
fiscal policies not only for the federal level, but also for the local level. For instance, the law of the ISIM
could have achieved the legal effect of the constitution, which would have obliged the federative entities to
abide by it. However, due to the states’ resistance in the tax convention, the constitutional reform initiative
was not realized. Hence, the following tax laws, such as the law of the ISIM, needed to be agreed by each
federative entity (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 201–205).
8The ISIM was later substituted by a federal value-added tax under the National System of Fiscal Coor-
dination (Sistema Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal, SNCF) in 1979 (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 131).
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11%, and 11% in 1950, 1960, and 1972 respectively (see Table 2, Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p.
37). Despite the piecemeal effects, it was another step towards more fiscal centralization.
In summary, during the first three decades of the postrevolutionary regime, although
the factions that controlled the federal governments changed hands, the federal governments
consistently pursued fiscal centralization policies. These policies include some failed attempts
in the 1920s and the relatively successful pursuits in federalizing the excise taxes since the
late 1920s and the establishment the ISIM in the 1940s. These fiscal centralization measures
were mostly driven by the problems of fiscal disorder, which could in turn be attributed to
the lack of political control of the federal government over the state officials. But on the
other hand, over time, the process of fiscal centralization contributed to more concentration
of political power at the federal level, which then gave the federal government more tools to
pursue its fiscal centralization agenda.
Thus, the Mexican case shows that the relationship between fiscal centralization and
political decentralization is more nuanced than a monotonic linear relationship. Particularly,
it shows a relatively high level of political decentralization gave the federal government
the incentives to centralize the fiscal authority. But without a minimum level of political
centralization, the federal government lacked the capacity to achieve much. The actual levels
of fiscal centralization depended both on the federal government’s incentives and its capacity.
5.4.5.2 State Governments’ Responses The theory predicts that for a relatively po-
litically decentralized system, such as Mexico in the early twentieth century, the equilibrium
outcome is to set the economic decentralization level either at the subnational governments’
deviation threshold (when the national government prioritizes policy implementation), or at
a level relatively greater than the subnational governments’ deviation threshold, which im-
plies allowing some policy deviation behaviors (when the national government prioritizes the
economic efficiency gains vis-à-vis policy implementation). In the first scenario, there would
be no policy deviations; while in the second, there would be. But it is important to note that
what the model predicts is the national government’s preferred economic decentralization
level, rather than the actual level. In the Mexican case, this distinction is crucial.
In Mexico, we do observe the states’ fiscal policy deviations in the 1940s. However,
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it was not that the federal government deliberately allowed the fiscal policy deviations to
attain more economic efficiency; instead, the cause for such deviations was that the federal
government was not able to achieve the high fiscal centralization level it wanted.
In the 1940s, although the federal government under President Alemán enthusiastically
tried to unify the fiscal system and establish fiscal order, the state governments deviated
from this policy agenda by not supporting the federal government’s initiatives.
For instance, states obstructed the constitutional reforms proposed by the federal gov-
ernment in the Third Naitonal Tax Convention in 1947. In the tax convention, besides the
proposal of a more centralized fiscal system mentioned earlier, the federal government also
attempted to reform the constitution to expand the power of the federal executive, at the
expense of the states as well as the legislative and judicial branches. Among the proposed
reforms, the federal government tried to elevate the national tax law (ley nacional de arbi-
trios) to the status of the general constitution. In every six years, the Congress of the Union
would determine whether to pass the national tax law. And the national tax law would
have the authority to determine which taxes are exclusively federal. If these constitutional
reforms were passed, the federal government would greatly expand its fiscal authority that
could determine fiscal policies at both the federal and state levels (Aboites Aguilar, 2003,
pp. 202–203).
The reaction of the states was strong opposition. As a result, this attempt at the consti-
tutional reforms failed. For example, state delegates from Hidalgo, State of Mexico, Morelos,
and Puebla contended that the state governments had never opposed coordinating with the
federal government, at least since the Second National Tax Convention in 1933. Moreover,
the states already honored the federalization of the excise taxes, such as on tobacco, timber,
and maguey juice industries. Fiscal uniformity was possible within the current constitutional
framework. Hence, there was no need for the radical constitutional reform proposed by the
federal government. According to the memory of a federal delegate Armando Servín, the
state opposition against the proposal of the constitutional reforms was so strong that the
proposal was simply ignored (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, pp. 204–205).
This example shows that even after two decades of the political centralization process,
states still had their own preferences and were still able to hinder the federal government’s
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agenda without fearing career punishments. It shows that the political decentralization level
in the 1940s Mexico was still high and states’ deviation thresholds were low. The fiscal
decentralization level was not low enough to stop the states’ policy deviations.
In addition, the fact that states were able to stay out of the ISIM arrangment also
shows how they could deviate from the federal government’s agenda. Although the federal
government tried to unify the taxes on commercial transactions, very few states joined the
federal government’s endeavor enthusiastically. As mentioned earlier, only two federal ter-
ritories and the Federal District joined the ISIM in the first year. By the end of President
Alemán’s term (1946–1952), “only one-third of the states accepted a unified federal sales
tax” (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p. 127). It took approximately two decades for all states to join
the ISIM.
But it is important to add that the tone of the state governments in the 1940s was much
more moderate than the state governments in the 1920s, reflecting the increasing political
and fiscal control the federal government had over the states. Recall that in the 1920s, states
such as Chihuahua fiercely denounced the Calles’s initiative of federalizing the excise taxes
in the mining industry publicly in the newspaper Excelsior. But in the 1940s, the criticism
was much more modest. This dynamic was consistent with the contrast between Governor
Zuno in the 1920s and Governor Maximino in the 1930s, discussed in Sections 5.4.3.1 and
5.4.3.2 respectively. The political centralization process from the 1920s to the 1940s was
effective in reducing states’ confrontations with the federal government.
Although the above evidence shows how states still deviated from the federal govern-
ment’s policy agenda in the 1940s, it was not that the federal government intentionally
sacrificed policy implementation in exchange for higher economic efficiency. The federal
government’s failed attempt to change the constitutions to expand its own fiscal authority
demonstrates that it was not a lack of willingness but a lack of capacity to achieve a higher
level of fiscal centralization. Similarly, the federal government also continued to push for
the acceptance of the ISIM among the states that were reluctant to join. For instance, it
attempted to reform the ISIM in 1953 to attract more states to join, but 14 states still
refused (Aboites Aguilar, 2003, p. 215). In the 1970s, the federal government increased the
states’ share in the ISIM, promised to provide them with other benefits, and also employed
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political pressure. Only by then did all states finally join the ISIM (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006, p.
131).
In summary, despite the political centralization and fiscal centralization processes from
the 1920s to the 1940s, the states in the 1940s were still able to resist the federal government’s
fiscal policy agenda. However, I also find that this was an outcome of the lack of capacity
of the federal government to reach an even higher level of fiscal centralization, instead of an
intentional pragmatism. The situation in the 1940s Mexico did not reach an equilibrium.
This section discusses the final link of the causal mechanism in Figure 5.1. The evidence
provided by the Mexican case from the 1920s through the 1940s confirms that the federal
government indeed pursued fiscal centralization policies when the political system was rela-
tively decentralized. The consistency of the various federal administrations to pursue fiscal
centralization despite their different ideological leanings is also encouraging. The theory
predicts that as long as the system is politically decentralized and the federal government
values economic policy implementation (in this case the economic agenda was to establish
a common national market), we would observe the federal government’s tendency to pursue
a high level of economic centralization. Thus, whether the federal government was led by a
more ideologically leftist president, like Cárdenas, or by a more conservative president, like
Alemán, is not expected to influence its propensity toward more economic centralization.
On the other hand, I find that instead of completely stopping the states’ deviation
behaviors, the states in the 1940s were still able to resist the federal government’s fiscal
centralization agenda. But I argue that this was an outcome of the federal government’s
incapacity to reach its preferred fiscal centralization level.
By the end of 1940s, the political decentralization level was still high, especially com-
pared with the Chinese case, which resulted in the states’ low deviation thresholds. The fiscal
centralization level achieved in the 1940s was not high enough to curb the states’ deviation
behaviors. These two factors (low fiscal centralization level and high political decentraliza-
tion level) contributed to the states’ fiscal policy deviations. As a consequence, the federal
government in the 1940s continued to pursue the fiscal centralization agenda.
Finally, although both the Chinese and Mexican systems were party-based authoritarian
regimes, the consistent fiscal centralization policies in Mexico form a stark contrast with
213
the Chinese case. The high level of political decentralization in Mexico during this period
and the high level of political centralization in China contributed to the distinct paths of
economic (de)centralization that these two countries took.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
5.5.1 Main Findings
In summary, this chapter tests the theoretical model against the Mexican case over the three
decades from the 1920s to the 1940s. In general, I find supportive evidence for the links of
the predicted causal mechanism in Figure 5.1, except the states’ responses in the 1940s.
Firstly, as expected, Mexico during this period was highly politically decentralized, al-
though the level of political decentralization decreased over time. I identify two factors
that contributed to the decentralized nature of the Mexican system: its de jure federal con-
stitution and the de facto fragmented nature of the revolution in the 1910s. I particularly
emphasize that the Mexican revolution was a revolution without a centralized political party
or other centralized authority. This initial condition left a long-lasting legacy of political
decentralization, characterized by powerful regional strongmen and relatively autonomous
state politics. Over the three decades studied in this chapter, the federal government grad-
ually concentrated political power through the establishment and institutionalization of an
official dominant party, from the PNR to the PRM, and finally to the PRI. But the re-
gional fragmentation was so strong that by the 1940s, Mexico was still relatively politically
decentralized, especially compared with the Chinese case.
Secondly, I find supportive evidence for the second links of the causal mechanism: the
state governments had (1) independent economic policy preferences—the policy preference
divergence between the state and the federal governments was big—while (2) they lacked
strong career incentives to follow the federal government’s policy agenda. In Chapter 2, these
two factors were captured by the concept of low deviation thresholds, which are predicted to
result in states’ strong tendency to deviate from the federal government’s economic policy
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agenda.
In the Mexican case, the existence of high economic policy preference divergence between
the federal and state governments is confirmed by the states’ voting patterns in the First
and Second National Tax Conventions as well as the ideological divergence between the
presidents and the state governors. The lack of strong career incentives is supported by the
lack of institutional tools for the federal executive to remove the state governors. It is true
that over time the federal government’s leverage over a state governor’s career increased,
resulting in stronger career incentives of the governors, but by the 1940s the procedures
required to force a governor’s resignation were still much harder than the Chinese case,
where purging a provincial leader did not require much except the politburo’s, if not just
Mao’s, decision.
Thirdly, consistent with the expectations, the Mexican state governments were likely to
engage in economic policy deviations. The case of Governor Zuno of Jalisco and Governor
Maximino of Puebla showed how the low deviation thresholds made them pursue economic
policies that were quite different from the federal government’s policy agenda. In terms of
fiscal policies, although the postrevolutionary federal government had wanted to establish
fiscal unity since the beginning of the regime, the states nonetheless established local protec-
tionist taxes and sustained fiscal fragmentation. With regard to the states’ policy deviations
over time, I find that as the political system became more centralized, the relationship be-
tween the federal and state governments became less confrontational and consequently the
policy deviations became less blunt. This is evident in the comparison between Governor
Zuno in the 1920s and Governor Maximino in the 1930s, as well as in the increasingly softer
ways in which the states expressed their opposition against the federal fiscal centralization
initiatives.
Fourthly, the evidence also confirms that the states’ fiscal policy deviations led the fed-
eral government to desire a higher level of fiscal centralization. Specifically, since the 1920s,
the Mexican federal government perceived the actual high level of fiscal decentralization to
be inefficient, while at the same time, was frustrated by its inability to establish a common
national market. The federal officials, such as Pani and Gómez Morín repeatedly empha-
sized the inefficiency of the fragmented fiscal system in the country. At the same time,
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the federal government valued economic development and the establishment of a common
national market. The federal officials believed that the fiscal fragmentation obstructed Mex-
ico’s economic development by sustaining the inter-state economic rivalries and weakening
the federal government’s capacity to make national plans.
Finally, with regard to the final link, I find supportive evidence for the federal gov-
ernment’s fiscal centralization policies but opposite evidence on the state governments’ re-
sponses, namely the states still deviated from the federal government’s fiscal policy agenda in
the late 1940s. The federal administrations from the 1920s to the 1940s consistently sought
to centralize the fiscal system: the federal government tried but failed at both establishing
a federal property tax and reforming the constitution in the early and mid-1920s, gradually
federalized the excise taxes on large industries and natural resources in the 1930s and early
1940s, and established the national sales tax, ISIM, in the late 1940s. Different from the the-
oretical prediction, the states still engaged in fiscal policy deviations after the three decades
of the political and fiscal centralization. Such deviations were reflected in the states’ opposi-
tion against the federal government’s initiative to reform the constitution in 1947 and their
staying out of the ISIM arrangement. I argue that the state governments’ policy deviations
were resulted from the incapacity of the federal government to establish a higher level of
fiscal centralization, rather than an intentional decision on the federal government’s part.
5.5.2 Limitations of the Model
The Mexican case overall confirms the expected causal mechanism in Figure 5.1. At the
same time, it also sheds light on some limitations of the proposed mechanism.
Firstly, overall I do find that the high level of political decentralization in the early
period of the regime sustained the consistent efforts of fiscal centralization during the three
decades covered in this chapter. However, during the three decades, I also find feedback
mechanisms that were more complicated than the unidirectional mechanism posed in Figure
5.1. Particularly, the federal government’s fiscal centralization policies had two opposite
effects on the states’ behaviors: (1) it triggered states’ fiscal policy deviations, including
opposing the federal government’s initiatives to reform the constitution and staying out of the
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federal government’s fiscal arrangements, because states wanted to keep their fiscal resources
and authority; and (2) it indirectly reduced states’ fiscal policy deviations through increasing
the political centralization level and granting the federal government more tools to control
the states. In the Mexican case, the second feedback (fiscal centralization led to political
centralization) and the successful establishment of a dominant party, among other factors,
contributed to a faster process of political centralization. The political centralization process
strengthened the federal government’s capacity to further acquire both fiscal authority and
political authority over time from the 1920s to the 1940s.
However, hypothetically it is possible that in some cases the first feedback mechanism
can offset the second one, especially when the national government is unable to centralize the
fiscal resources and authority. In this scenario, the subnational governments are expected
to remain defiant against the national government, which in turn would trigger stronger
incentives for the national government to pursue fiscal centralization policies. In the end,
the tensions between the two levels of governments would accumulate.
Secondly, the Mexican case also highlights the important distinction between the fed-
eral government’s willingness to pursue fiscal centralization and its capacity to do so. The
theoretical model analyzes the factors that determine the national government’s preferred
economic decentralization level, namely it is a model about the national government’s incen-
tives. The causal mechanism attempts to explain the Mexican federal government’s decision
to pursue fiscal centralization policies. The actual fiscal centralization level, on the other
hand, depended not only on the federal government’s desire, but also on its ability to cen-
tralize the resources and authority it so desired. In particular, the political system in Mexico
was so decentralized in the postrevolutionary period that it was very difficult for the federal
government to achieve the high level of fiscal centralization it wanted. For instance, even in
the late 1940s, the federal government was still unable to have all the states join its ISIM
arrangement.
In this sense, my dissertation does not argue against the earlier literature’s conclusion
that political centralization brings about fiscal centralization (Díaz-Cayeros, 2006). My
dissertation discusses the effects of political decentralization on the national government’s
incentives to pursue economic centralization, while Díaz-Cayeros (2006) discusses the ef-
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fects of political decentralization on the national government’s capacity to pursue economic
centralization.
With regard to the correlational association between the levels of political centralization
and economic decentralization, it is possible that they have a U-shaped relationship: (1)
when political centralization level is very low, the national government is expected to have
strong incentives to centralize the economic resources and power. But due to its lack of
tools to pursue the economic centralization policies, the outcome is expected to be high
levels of economic decentralization; (2) when political centralization level is at its medium
level, the national government has both the incentives and the capacity to pursue economic
centralization and thus we would expect a low level of economic decentralization; and (3)
when political centralization level is at its maximum, the national government trusts the
subnational governments more and thus does not have strong incentives to maintain high
economic centralization levels, even though it still has the capacity to do so. We would
expect a high level of economic decentralization. I test this U-shaped relationship with the
large-N statistical analysis in Section 6.5 in Chapter 6.
5.5.3 Alternative Explanations
Now I analyze two alternative explanations that can challenge the theory, particularly the
need to use the high level of political decentralization to explain the fiscal centralization
policies in the Mexican case.
One may argue that the federal government could just be predatory and want to control
all the fiscal resources and authority they could obtain, regardless of whether the political
system was decentralized or not.9 This explanation is insufficient for the following reasons.
As I have shown, during the three decades, although the presidencies changed hands, the
fiscal centralization efforts were consistent. To assume all the administrations in the three
decades were predatory and only cared about maximizing their own fiscal authority is overly
simplified. It is inconsistent with the official discussions in the multiple national tax conven-
tions, where the federal government always highlighted the importance of establishing fiscal
9For instance, Díaz-Cayeros (2006) made this assumption when he analyzed the voting patterns of the
federal and state delegations in the First National Tax Convention (pp. 53–54).
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unity to create a common national market and develop the country’s economy. Although
we need to take the official rhetoric with caution, the consistent emphasis on the need for
fiscal unity over the long period of time supports that it was a genuine desire of the federal
government. Moreover, the fiscal centralization efforts not only involved the presidents but
also other federal public officials, such as those in the SHCP. That these public officials
were frustrated by the fiscal anarchy problem and also consistently pushed for fiscal cen-
tralization policies is another piece of evidence suggesting that simply assuming that the
federal government wanted fiscal centralization because the federal officials were predatory
was insufficient.
The other alternative explanation is that fiscal centralization was a logical solution to
the prevalent fiscal anarchy problem in Mexico. Thus, regardless of the level of political
decentralization, the federal government would pursue fiscal centralization policies. This ex-
planation is also incomplete. It is true that the fiscal anarchy problem was evident in Mexico
and it was logical to pursue fiscal centralization policies, but the nature of the fiscal anarchy
problem was related to the high level of political decentralization. This chapter’s main con-
tribution was to make a causal claim between the high level of political decentralization and
the state governments’ fiscal policy deviations, which made the federal government adopt
the fiscal centralization policies. Counterfactually, if Mexico had been politically centralized,
the theory would predict much weaker fiscal policy deviations and fewer needs for the fiscal
centralization policies.
5.5.4 Implications
This chapter has the following three implications.
Firstly, the political logic proved to be crucial to understand the economic centralization
outcome. The lack of a centralized political authority that won the Mexican revolution
became a key initial condition that led to a highly fragmented postrevolutionary regime.
The high level of political decentralization implied low deviation thresholds of the state
governments and a strong incentive of the federal government to pursue fiscal centralization
policies. Although this desire of fiscal centralization was a constant over the three decades,
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the federal government’s capacity to implement the fiscal centralization policies increased as
the regime consolidated. In this case, we again observe that the economic outcome, namely
fiscal centralization policies, depended heavily on the political conditions. Moreover, it is not
simply that political centralization led to fiscal centralization policies. Rather, the underlying
cause for the federal government’s continuous efforts to increase the fiscal centralization was
surprisingly the high levels of political decentralization.
Moreover, the comparison between the Mexican case and the Chinese case also highlights
two interesting differences. The first one is the importance of the initial conditions. In
China, the CPC, a highly centralized Marxist-Leninist party, led a successful campaign
that won the Chinese revolution and was able to establish a highly centralized political
regime, where the Party was able to penetrate every level of the government. This initial
condition further resulted in very high deviation thresholds of the provincial leaders and
the central government had a high level of trust in the provincial leaders to pursue the
central government’s economic policy agenda. This made the central government willing to
experiment with the economic decentralization policies in the late 1950s. But because of the
highly centralized nature of the political system, paradoxically the economic decentralization
policies did not make the provincial leaders adopt policies beneficial for their localities. In
stark contrast, the Mexican revolution itself was regionally fragmented. The revolution
ended when one faction, the Constitutionalists, took the national political stage while the
regions were still dominated by the regional strongmen, highly autonomous from the federal
government. The highly decentralized political system then led to low deviation thresholds
for the state governors, which contributed to the strong desire of the federal government to
pursue the fiscal centralization policies from the 1920s to the 1940s. By the end of the 1940s,
namely three decades after the establishment of the regime, the Mexican system became
more fiscally and politically centralized, but the state governments were still able to engage
in economic policy deviations.
Finally, the comparison between the two cases also shows the important role played by
the ruling political parties. In China, the CPC was founded very early in the revolutionary
process. It became a very centralized and disciplined institution under the leadership of
Mao Zedong and won the revolutionary war. With the help of the CPC, the revolutionary
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leaders established the regime. The historical evidence shows that not only was the regime
consolidation process relatively smooth, the new regime also obtained a centralized feature.
In contrast, the ruling party in Mexico was established much later than the establishment
of the regime. The revolution officially ended in 1917, when President Carranza established
the regime. President Calles first established the PNR in 1929 to internalize the conflicts
among the regional caudillos. President Cárdenas transformed the PNR in 1938 from a
territorially based party to a corporatist party and renamed it the PRM. President Ávila
Camacho reformed the party again in 1946 and finally established the PRI. Thus, over a long
period of time after 1917, the federal officials did not have a party institution to discipline
the state governors. The lack of a centralized political party proved critical to understand
the long-lasting political decentralization in the Mexican system.
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6.0 AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters compare the postrevolutionary regimes of China and Mexico
using the method of difference combined with theory-testing process-tracing. These two
historical cases support the theory developed in Chapter 2: in authoritarian regimes a high
level of political centralization can facilitate the economic decentralization process by re-
ducing the subnational government’s incentives to deviate from the national policy agenda
and thereby increasing the national government’s trust in the subnational officials; while
following the same logic, a less centralized political system gives the national government
incentives to centralize economic resources and authority. This theory stands in contrast
with the theories developed in democracies that often contend that a high level of political
centralization contributes to lower economic decentralization levels.
Are the two historical cases discussed in the previous chapters isolated instances? Or,
are the effects of political centralization on economic decentralization policies different in
autocracies from democracies? To test the generalizability of the top-down logic in autocra-
cies and compare autocracies with democracies, this chapter conducts statistical analyses of
59 countries over the period from 1972 to 2016. I find supportive evidence that the politi-
cal centralization’s effects on the fiscal decentralization levels are conditional on the regime
types. The results are consistent with the previous literature in that there is a negative
correlation between political centralization and fiscal decentralization levels in democracies.
But as countries become autocratic, the correlation becomes positive.
Section 6.2 reviews the previous literature on democracies and discusses the theoretical
argument for why political centralization has different effects on fiscal decentralization in
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autocracies and democracies. I expect the top-down delegation logic to be more dominant in
autocracies than the bottom-up bargaining process that prevails in democracies. Section 6.3
discusses the empirical strategy, including the measures of the key variables, the data, the
within-between random effects model, and the descriptive statistics of the sample. Section
6.4 discusses the main results of this chapter and shows that both the within effects and the
between effects components of the model lend support to the theory that political central-
ization’s effects are different in democracies and autocracies. Section 6.5 complements the
main analysis by exploring the U-shaped relationship between political centralization and
fiscal decentralization levels inspired by the Mexican case in Chapter 5; and whether politi-
cal centralization’s effects are conditional on the socioeconomic factors, as predicted by the
theoretical model in Chapter 2. Finally, Section 6.6 summarizes the results and concludes
this chapter.
6.2 POLITICAL (DE)CENTRALIZATION’S EFFECTS IN DEMOCRACIES
AND AUTOCRACIES
What causes the different economic decentralization levels across countries? As introduced in
Section 1.3.3 in Chapter 1, the current literature offers two main types of explanations. The
socioeconomic explanations emphasize general conditions, including a country’s geographic
and population sizes, its urbanization levels, and its ethnic-linguistic diversity (Arzaghi and
Henderson, 2005; Letelier S., 2005; Erk and Koning, 2010; Hooghe and Marks, 2012). The
limitation with this type of explanation is that in reality countries with similar socioeconomic
conditions can have very different economic decentralization levels. Other scholars, especially
in political science, complement the socioeconomic approach by considering the allocation of
economic resources across different levels of governments as a political problem and explore
the institutionalist explanations for economic decentralization policies.
Against the backdrop of a decentralization wave since the 1980s that coincided with the
third-wave democratization, many political institutionalist theories seek to understand how
democratization and democratic institutions affect decentralization policies. Several of these
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studies emphasize subnational political actors’ demands as the main push for economic
decentralization, and these studies are often grouped as the “bottom-up” approach. But
these explanations can hardly travel to stable autocratic contexts.
From the bottom-up perspective, scholars who study decentralization in democracies and
the democratizing countries find that a high level of political decentralization can contribute
to economic decentralization policies. In particular, these scholars identify two mechanisms
through which political decentralization can lead to the economic decentralization policies.
The first mechanism concerns the effects of direct subnational elections, which is one as-
pect of political decentralization. Direct local elections increase economic decentralization by
making subnational officials more accountable to their local constituencies and thus expand
their incentives to demand higher autonomy to serve their local constituencies. For instance,
Beer (2004) finds that the democratization process at the subnational levels in Mexico in the
1990s increased the elected state officials’ incentives to demand more fiscal resources to meet
the local constituencies’ demands. Fiscal decentralization was higher in the states where
the state elections were more competitive (pp. 192–199). In addition, direct subnational
elections facilitate economic decentralization by increasing subnational government officials’
legitimacy and thus strengthening their bargaining position against the national leaders.
Falleti (2010) shows that after Brazil introduced direct gubernatorial elections in 1982, the
state governors gained more legitimacy and were more able to demand fiscal resources from
the federal government (pp. 150–187). These studies contend that direct local elections
increase not only subnational officials’ willingness but also their capacity to demand more
economic autonomy.
The second mechanism involves another aspect of political decentralization, which is the
strong influence that the subnational government officials can exert over national policymak-
ers, especially the national legislators. Scholars argue that in democracies where political
institutions, including the party systems and the electoral systems, result in subnational
government officials having strong influence over national legislators, subnational officials
are more influential in the national policymaking process and more able to achieve their
preferred outcomes, including obtaining more economic resources and authority at the sub-
national levels. For instance, by studying five Latin American countries, Garman, Haggard
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and Willis (2001) find that countries with decentralized party systems tend to have higher
fiscal decentralization, while countries with centralized political parties tend to have lower
fiscal decentralization. Similarly, Haggard and Webb (2004) also contend that strong party
discipline can make national legislators more responsive to the national leaders as opposed
to the subnational officials and result in fiscal centralization; while in cases where the legis-
lators’ careers depend more on the subnational officials, fiscal decentralization tends to be
higher.
However, the working of the above two mechanisms is contingent on the existence of
bargaining between the national and subnational officials. The underlying assumption is
that economic decentralization decisions are made through a bargaining process between the
national and subnational leaders, with or without a formal bargaining arena, such as the
national legislature. This assumption is, however, more valid in democracies than autoc-
racies, because bargaining between the national and subnational governments is weaker or
sometimes non-existent in the autocratic context.
For instance, the working of the second mechanism—that subnational officials’ political
influence over national legislators’ careers contribute to fiscal decentralization—specifically
requires the existence of an autonomous legislature that can indeed represent subnational
territorial interests and has real power to shape economic decentralization policies. Although
scholars have shown that legislatures in autocracies are not just rubber stamps but have their
functions, such as coopting the opposition (Gandhi, 2008) and providing local information to
the ruling elites (Manion, 2015), it is not controversial that on average legislatures in autoc-
racies, if they have any, are less representative and less autonomous than their counterparts
in democracies. The lack of an independent bargaining arena would consequently limit the
bargaining between the national and subnational officials, and in some closed autocracies
render the bargaining non-existent.
Similarly, although the first mechanism above does not specificially require a representa-
tive and autonomous legislature, it does assume that economic decentralization is an outcome
of a bargaining process between national and subnational officials. Only under a bargaining
process, the additional legitimacy granted by the direct subnational elections can lead to
economic decentralization policies. However, in autocracies, even for those with local elec-
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tions, the institutional channels where bargaining can happen are weaker, less prevalent, and
sometimes non-existent. Instead, autocracies often have a top-down policymaking process,
which makes the bargaining logic less applicable but the delegation logic more relevant.
How does the delegation logic work in autocracies? What differences does it make to the
relationship between political decentralization and economic decentralization? Based on the
theoretical model and case study evidence presented in the previous chapters (from Chapter
2 to Chapter 5), I contend that the delegation logic can reverse the relationship between the
level of political decentralization and economic decentralization policies that scholars have
found in the context of democracies.
Specifically, instead of leading to higher economic decentralization levels, a high level of
political decentralization in autocracies can reduce the national leaders’ incentives to decen-
tralize economic resources and authority to the subnational levels; on the other hand, a high
level of political centralization can increase the national leaders’ incentives to decentralize
the economic resources and authority.
As discussed in the Chapter 2 and demonstrated in the Chinese case during the 1950s
(in Chapter 4), when political centralization level is very high, the national government has
strong political control over the subnational governments’ personnel. The center’s strong
political control not only enables the national government to select subnational officials who
share the national government’s economic policy preferences, but also create a strong reward-
punishment mechanism that can incentivize subnational officials to implement the national
government’s preferred economic policies. These two conditions—similar economic policy
preferences between the national and subnational officials and a strong reward-punishment
mechanism—together make subnational officials more likely to implement the national gov-
ernment’s economic agenda. Thus, under this high level of political centralization, the na-
tional government can decentralize the economic resources and authority to achieve higher
economic efficiency while still anticipating its preferred economic policies to be implemented
at the subnational levels.
On the other hand, as demonstrated by the Mexican case from the 1920s to the 1940s
(in Chapter 5), when political centralization level is limited, it becomes more difficult for the
national government to achieve the above-mentioned conditions. The national government in
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these cases may need to negotiate with regional actors to decide the personnel for subnational
offices. As a result, subnational officials can have more independent economic preferences,
which are different from the national government’s preferences. These subnational officials
are especially likely to be more driven by the local interests than their counterparts in the
centralized systems. In the meanwhile, due to the relatively lack of political control over
the subnational government offices, the national government tend to have fewer and less
strict reward-punishment mechanisms to incentivize subnational officials to implement the
national economic policy agenda. Combining these two conditions, subnational officials in
a relatively politically decentralized context are more likely to pursue their own preferred
economic policies, if given economic resources and authority. Hence, such political conditions
reduce the national government’s incentives to grant economic resources and authority to
the subnational levels.
Therefore, using the delegation logic to analyze the economic decentralization process
in an autocratic regime, as opposed to the bargaining logic in the democratic context, I
argue that political centralization can have a positive impact on economic decentralization
outcomes. This hypothesis reverses the expectation developed by the previous studies on
the democratic regimes that a high level of political centralization would result in economic
centralization policies. In this chapter, I test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 In democratic regimes, higher political centralization leads to lower economic
decentralization. In autocratic regimes, higher political centralization leads to higher economic
decentralization.
6.3 MEASURES, DATA, AND MODEL
As the literature review illustrates, the main independent variable—the political centraliza-
tion level—has multiple manifestations, including the direct elections of subnational gov-
ernment officials and the influence the subnational governments can exert on the national
policymaking process. Because the theory developed in this dissertation particularly focuses
on the national government’s political control over the subnational government personnel,
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in the following empirical tests, I use the measure that captures this dimension of political
decentralization.
In particular, I use the local government index and regional government index measures
from the V-Dem Dataset.1 In the original V-Dem Project, the concept that these two indices
measure is subnational democracy. According to Project Manager McMann (2018, p. 21),
[t]he subnational government is more democratic if its offices are elected through free and
fair elections. This follows from the electoral principle of democracy, and it promotes the
participatory principle of democracy by allowing citizens to vote for more officials. It is
also important that the elected offices have authority relative to unelected offices and can
constrain the actions of unelected officials. This enables elected officials to act on voters’
preferences and citizens, through the electoral process, to limit the actions of government.
Based on this concept of subnational democracy, the V-Dem Project aggregates indices
for two levels of subnational governments, the regional government index, corresponding to
“the second-highest level of government, just below the national government,” and the local
government index, corresponding to “the level of government below the regional government”
(Coppedge et al., 2018, Codebook, pp. 64–65). These two indices are calculated based on
the following three indicators: (1) whether there is a regional/local government; (2) whether
the regional/local government (including the executive and assembly) is elected; and (3)
the relative power of the elected regional/local government.2 Both indices are interval mea-
sures varying from 0 to 1. According to the codebook, the regional/local government indices
get the lowest score when there are no regional/local governments respectively; they get a
medium score, when the regional/local governments are elected but the elected regional/local
1 For the dataset, see Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish,
Cornell, Dahlum, Gjerløw, Glynn, Hicken, Krusell, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzi-
horsky, Olin, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Staton, Stepanova, Sundström, Tzelgov,
Wang, Wig, Wilson, and Ziblatt (2018) and Pemstein et al. (2018); for the codebook of the V-Dem Dataset,
see Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gjerløw,
Glynn, Hicken, Krusell, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Olin, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman,
Staton, Sundtröm, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt (2018); for the methodology, see Coppedge,
Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Krusell, Marquardt, Pemstein, Pernes, Stepanova, Tzelgov,
Wang, Medzihorsky and Wilson. (2018); for the country coding units, see Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lind-
berg, Skaaning, Teorell, Ciobanu and Olin (2018); and for the organization and management, see Coppedge,
Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Krusell, Olin, Pernes, von Römer and Stepanova (2018).
2Because the indicators are based on country experts’ evaluations, it is possible that certain country
experts consider the economic resources and authority controlled by the regional/local government to be one
aspect of the subnational government’s relative power. If this is the case, higher values of this indicator are
expected to be positively correlated with economic decentralization. This correlation would bias the results
in favor of the hypothesis for democracies, but against my main argument for autocracies.
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offices are “subordinate to unelected officials at the regional[/local] level perhaps appointed
by a higher-level body”; and finally, they have a high score, when the regional/local gov-
ernments “are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the
regional[/local] level with the exception of judicial bodies” (Coppedge et al., 2018, Codebook,
pp. 48–49).
Conceptualized as the national government’s political control over the subnational gov-
ernments’ personnel, the level of political centralization is the opposite of the subnational
democracy measured by the V-Dem Project: the political centralization level is higher when
the subnational democratic level is lower. Particularly, when there is no regional/local gov-
ernment, the political centralization level is the highest; when the regional/local governments
are appointed or when they are elected but subordinate to the unelected regional/local of-
ficials, the political centralization level is high; and when the regional/local governments
are elected and able to operate without constraints from other unelected officials at the
subnational levels, the political centralization level is the lowest.
Thus, to measure political centralization levels, I first average the regional and local gov-
ernment indices to calculate the subnational government index,3 and then calculate political
centralization levels as “1− subnational government index.”
The dependent variable, the economic decentralization level, is measured as the ratio of
subnational government’s fiscal expenditures over the total government expenditures. This
measure has been commonly used in the literature (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Davoodi
and Zou, 1998). The data are drawn from the IMF Fiscal Decentralization Dataset released
in December 2018 (International Monetary Fund, 2018; Lledó et al., 2018). For this dataset,
the IMF calculated fiscal decentralization indicators, based on the IMF Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook 2017 (International Monetary Fund Statistics Dept., 2018). The data
cover the period from 1972 to 2016.
In order to test whether the political centralization’s effects depend on regime types, I
use the electoral democracy index from the V-Dem dataset.4 According to the codebook,
3The subnational government index is calculated in the following way: when neither regional government
index nor local government index is missing, I calculate the subnational government index as their average.
When either one is missing, I use the other index as the subnational government index.
4For the references of the V-Dem Project, see Footnote 1.
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the electoral democracy index “seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive
to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under cir-
cumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate
freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections
affect the composition of the chief executive of the country” (Coppedge et al., 2018, Code-
book, p. 40). For the following analyses, I reverse the electoral democracy index to calculate
an autocracy index, which is “1− electoral democracy index.” The measure autocracy index
is an interval measure varying from 0 to 1. It is 1 when the regime is a highly autocratic
system and 0 when the regime is a highly democratic system. The correlation between po-
litical centralization and autocracy index in the sample that will be analyzed later in this
chapter is 0.73. Hence, the more autocratic regimes tend to be more politically centralized
than the more democratic regimes. But these two are different measures and countries that
are similarly democratic or autocratic can have different levels of political centralization.
Finally, as the socioeconomic explanations suggest, countries’ fiscal decentralization levels
also depend on their sizes, economic development levels, and urbanization levels (Arzaghi and
Henderson, 2005; Letelier S., 2005). Thus, I include the following socioeconomic variables as
controls: the natural log of a country’s total population; the natural log of a country’s GDP
per capita (GDPPC), with the GDPPC’s unit being the constant 2010 USD; urbanization
levels, measured by the ratio of a country’s urban population over its total population; and
the natural resources rents as a share of GDP. These four variables are drawn from the World
Bank Open Data (World Bank, N.d.).
The unit of the following analyses is each country-year. Given the panel data structure,
I estimate the correlation between political centralization and fiscal expenditure decentral-
ization with the “hybrid” model, proposed by Bell and Jones (2015). The model takes the
following form:
A “Within-Between” Random Effects Model
Yit = β0 + (Xit −Xi)β1 +Xiβ2 +Ui + ϵit, (6.1)
where Yit is the fiscal expenditure decentralization level of country i in year t; β0 is the
common intercept; Xit is the matrix of the independent variables of country i in year t; Xi
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is the matrix of the average levels of the independent variables in country i; β1 is the vector
of the within effect coefficients; β2 is the vector of the between effect coefficients; Ui is the
vector of residuals of country i; and ϵit is the vector of residuals of country i in year t.
Although commonly referred to as the “hybrid” model, it is a random effects model.
The model assumes that the two residuals Ui and ϵit follow two normal distributions (Bell
and Jones, 2015, pp. 142–144). However, it attenuates the unrealistic assumption of the
“standard” random effects model that the error terms are uncorrelated with the independent
variables, Xit, by including theXi as the independent variables.5 Bell and Jones (2015) refer
to this “hybrid” model as the “Within-Between” random effects model. The advantage of the
“Within-Between” random effects model is that it enables us to model the between effects,
namely the different levels of fiscal decentralization across countries (β2 in Equation 6.1),
which are theoretically important to understand but impossible to estimate with the fixed
effects model. Thus, I use this “Within-Between” random effects model to test Hypothesis
4.
The statistical analyses discussed in the next section are based on a sample of 59 coun-
tries’ 819 observations. Before I present the regression results, Table 6.1 shows the de-
scriptive statistics of the dependent variable (fiscal expenditure decentralization) and the
independent variables, including political centralization levels, the autocratic levels, and the
socioeconomic indicators.
The overall mean of the fiscal decentralization level is around 30%, with the maximum
value being 81.4% (United Arab Emirates in 2016) and the minimum value being 0.2%
(Afghanistan in 2014). The fiscal decentralization variable has an overall standard deviation
of 0.166, a significant portion of this variation exists across countries, as the between standard
5The standard random effects model refers to the following:
Yit = β0 +Xitβ1 +Ui + ϵit.
It is often likely that Xit and Ui are correlated, for instance, when some common unobserved factors
contribute to both the X and U in country i. This violates the random effects assumption that Ui is a
random draw from a normal distribution and thus is uncorrelated with the predictors. The “Within-Between”
random effects model in Equation 6.1 models the heterogeneity among the entities (the i’s) by including Xi.
In this way, the “Within-Between” random effects model accounts for the correlation between Xit and Ui.
The new Ui and the other residual ϵit can be more reasonably assumed to be uncorrelated with Xi and Xit
(Bell and Jones, 2015, p. 143).
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal Decentralization
Overall 0.295 0.166 0.002 0.814
Between 0.169 0.006 0.802
Within 0.035 0.099 0.471
Political Centralization
Overall 0.272 0.305 0.004 0.994
Between 0.329 0.005 0.989
Within 0.055 -0.030 0.556
Autocracy
Overall 0.284 0.219 0.060 0.905
Between 0.237 0.086 0.878
Within 0.052 -0.118 0.633
Ln(Total Population)
Overall 16.394 1.455 12.521 19.594
Between 1.448 12.629 19.530
Within 0.050 16.240 16.568
Ln(GDPPC)
Overall 9.471 1.226 5.921 11.425
Between 1.275 6.231 11.348
Within 0.153 8.841 10.080
Urban Population Share
Overall 69.917 15.513 22.060 97.919
Between 17.770 22.342 97.402
Within 2.243 60.291 78.117
Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)
Overall 3.852 6.657 0.000 45.434
Between 6.803 0.000 28.069
Within 2.714 -10.871 29.872
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deviation is as high as 0.169 and the within standard deviation is much lower (0.035).
The overall mean of the autocracy measure is 0.284, meaning the sample is mostly com-
posed of democratic cases. This is partly because democratic countries often have better
economic data, on both fiscal decentralization and the socioeconomic variables, than auto-
cratic countries. In this sample, the most autocratic case is United Arab Emirates in 2011,
which has an autocracy value of 0.905, while the least autocratic case is United Kingdom in
2012, with an autocracy value of 0.060. The autocracy variable’s overall standard deviation
is 0.219. Again, it is mainly attributed to the variation across countries, with the between
standard deviation being 0.237 while the within standard deviation being 0.052.
The main independent variable, the political centralization level, has an overall mean of
0.272, indicating that this sample overall has a relatively low level of political centralization.
The most politically centralized case in this sample is Kazakhstan, with a political central-
ization level as high as 0.994 from 2000 to 2012. The least politically centralized case in this
sample is Switzerland, with a political centralization level as low as 0.004 from 1990 to 2012.
The overall standard deviation of the political centralization variable is 0.305, most of the
variation again exists across countries.
Because I hypothesize that political centralization has different effects on fiscal decentral-
ization levels in autocracies and democracies, I include an interaction term between political
centralization and autocracy index in the model. As discussed in Section 6.2, based on the
previous literature on democracies, I hypothesize that political centralization has negative ef-
fects on fiscal decentralization levels for democratic regimes, so I expect the coefficient of the
political centralization term to be negative (when autocracy index is 0). In the meanwhile,
based on the theory developed in this dissertation, I hypothesize that political centralization
has positive effects on fiscal decentralization for autocratic regimes, so I expect the inter-
action term to be positive, and when autocracy index is 1, I expect the marginal effect of
political centralization to be positive.
In addition to the previous two political variables, the overall mean of the socioeconomic
variables are: 16.4 for Ln(Total Population), implying a total population of around 13 mil-
lion; 9.47 for Ln(GDPPC), implying a GDPPC of around 13,000 in constant 2010 USD;
69.9% for urban population share; and 3.85% for the natural resources rents. Similar to
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the political variables, the variations of these socioeconomic variables also mostly lie across
countries. The only exception is the natural resources rents, whose within standard deviation
is relatively higher.
6.4 MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 6.2. Correlations between Political Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization Levels
Conditional on Autocratic Levels
Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization
Within Effects Between Effects
PC
-0.126*** -0.458**
(0.0297) (0.177)
Autocracy
-0.233*** -0.192
(0.0474) (0.223)
PC * Autocracy
0.337*** 0.776*
(0.0700) (0.337)
Ln(Population)
0.105*** 0.0191
(0.0282) (0.0129)
Ln(GDPPC)
0.0263** 0.0425
(0.00904) (0.0282)
Urban Population Share
-0.00454*** 0.00126
(0.000652) (0.00160)
Natural Resources
-0.00455*** -0.000820
(0.000447) (0.00319)
Constant
-0.429
(0.359)
No. of Obs. 819
No. of Groups 59
rho 0.936
Overall R2 0.486
Within R2 0.214
Between R2 0.489
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 6.2 shows the results for Hypothesis 4’s test. The within coefficient of political cen-
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tralization is negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. As a highly democratic
country moves from complete political decentralization to complete political centralization,
its fiscal decentralization level is expected to decrease by 12.6%. The between effects are
similar. The coefficient of political centralization is negative and statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. Among the highly democratic countries, whose autocracy index is 0, the
fiscal decentralization level for a completely centralized political system is expected to be
45.8% lower than a completely politically decentralized system. The substantive effects of
political centralization are much stronger for cross-country comparison than within-country
differences. This result of a negative correlation in highly democratic regimes is consistent
with the conventional wisdom that political centralization has a negative effect on fiscal
decentralization levels.
Are autocracies similar or different? At a first glance, the within and between coefficients
of the interaction term of political centralization and autocracy index are both positive and
statistically significant, suggesting a different pattern in autocracies from democracies.
Figure 6.1. The Marginal Effect of Political Centralization Conditional on Autocracy Index
Figure 6.1 plots the marginal effects of political centralization at different autocratic lev-
els. The left panel shows the within effects coefficients of political centralization, conditional
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on a country’s autocracy index. As discussed before, when a country is highly democratic,
namely the autocracy index is 0, the effect of political centralization on fiscal decentraliza-
tion is negative and statistically significant. As the country becomes increasingly autocratic,
namely the autocracy index increases from 0 to 0.3, the negative effect of political central-
ization on fiscal decentralization shrinks from -0.126 to -0.025 and is no longer statistically
significant. In these less democratic cases, an increase in political centralization does not
affect its fiscal decentralization level. As the autocracy index continues to increase from
0.3 to 0.6, the effect of political centralization on fiscal decentralization becomes positive
(0.076) and statistically significant. The effect stays positive and statistically significant as
the autocracy index continues to increase from 0.6 to 1. Thus, in these more autocratic
cases, an increase in political centralization is expected to increase the fiscal decentralization
level. This pattern supports Hypothesis 4.
The right panel of Figure 6.1 presents the between effects coefficients of political central-
ization, conditional on countries’ autocratic scores. When comparing across highly demo-
cratic countries, whose autocracy index is 0, as discussed earlier, a country with a higher
political centralization score is expected to have a lower fiscal decentralization level. Similar
to the pattern shown in the left panel, as the autocracy index increases from 0 to 0.4, the
marginal effect of political decentralization shrinks from -0.45 to -0.14 and is not statisti-
cally significant. As the autocracy index continues to increase from 0.4 to 0.7, the marginal
effect of political centralization becomes positive (0.08), although it is not statistically sig-
nificant. Different from the within effects coefficients, the between effects coefficients are not
statistically significant as the autocracy index reaches its theoretical maximum. When the
autocracy index is 1, the between effects coefficient for political centralization is 0.31, with a
p-value of 0.114. Although it is not statistically significant, the size of the coefficient is not
small. When comparing across the highly autocratic countries, in this sample on average
a country that is more politically centralized is expected to be more fiscally decentralized.
Overall, the between effects coefficients lend partial support to Hypothesis 4.
Figure 6.2 shows the results by plotting the predicted fiscal decentralization levels against
political centralization for two cases, when the autocracy index is 0 and 1. The left panel
shows the within effects of political centralization on fiscal decentralization for a highly
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Figure 6.2. The Predicted Fiscal Decentralization Levels Conditional on Autocracy Index
democratic country (marked in blue) and for a highly autocratic country (marked in red).
The right panel shows the between effects of political centralization when the pool of countries
are highly democratic (marked in blue) and when the pool of countries are highly autocratic
(marked in red). The downward blue line shows the negative effects of political centralization
on fiscal decentralization for the highly democratic cases and the upward red line shows the
opposite pattern for the highly autocratic cases.
Although not central to Hypothesis 4, an interesting finding from the right panel of Figure
6.2 is that for the completely politically centralized systems, autocracy is positively correlated
with fiscal decentralization levels and the difference between a highly democratic country and
a highly autocratic country is statistically significant. This finding shows that the expectation
that “democracies have higher fiscal decentralization levels than autocracies” has its scope
conditions, and one of the conditions may be that the level of political centralization cannot
be too high.
In sum, the regression results provide support for Hypothesis 4. In particular, the within
effects are highly consistent with Hypothesis 4. For a highly democratic regime, its political
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centralization and fiscal expenditure decentralization levels are negatively correlated and
their correlation is statistically significant. The negative correlation decreases in its magni-
tude and reverses its sign, as the autocracy level increases. For a highly autocratic regime,
its political centralization and fiscal expenditure decentralization levels are positively corre-
lated and the correlation is statistically significant. The between effects are similar, except
that the correlation for the highly autocratic regimes is not statistically significant. When
comparing across the highly democratic regimes, countries with higher political centraliza-
tion levels are expected to have lower fiscal decentralization levels. As the regimes become
more autocratic, the negative correlation decreases in size and reverses its sign.
6.5 TESTS OF NONLINEAR EFFECTS AND CONDITIONAL EFFECTS
6.5.1 Quadratic Effects
Although I argue that the bargaining logic is less applicable to autocracies than the delegation
logic, the bottom-up demands from the subnational governments can exist in autocracies. For
instance, in the Chinese case, Shirk (1993) argues that the representation of the subnational
governments in the selectorate contributes to the economic decentralization policies in the
1980s, when the regime began the reform and opening up policies under the leadership
of Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, as Díaz-Cayeros (2006) has argued, right after the Mexican
revolution in the 1920s, state governments were so strong and autonomous that the federal
government did not have the capacity to pursue economic centralization policies. These are
different scenarios, but they imply that within autocracies, the bottom-up demands exist.
How they are expressed and how they shape the final economic decentralization outcomes
depend on the political centralization levels.
As discussed in Section 5.5 at the end of Chapter 5 on Mexico, it is possible that there
is a U-shaped relationship between political centralization and economic decentralization
levels in autocracies. Specifically, it is possible that when political centralization is low, the
national government is politically weak compared to the subnational governments, like the
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Mexican case in the 1920s and 1930s, and as a result, the national government lacks the
capacity to pursue economic centralization policies, although it may have the incentives to
do so according to the delegation logic. Hence, economic decentralization is expected to be
high. When political centralization levels are at medium levels, neither low nor high enough,
the national government has both the incentives and the capacity to pursue economic cen-
tralization policies. As a result, economic decentralization levels are expected to be at their
lowest levels. Finally, as political centralization continues to increase, the national govern-
ment has more and more political control over the subnational governments and is capable
to ensure the policy implementation at the subnational levels through political means, the
national leaders no longer need to centralize the economic resources and authority at the
center. Thus, in these cases, we would also expect a high level of economic decentralization.
To capture the possible U-shaped relationship between political centralization and eco-
nomic decentralization levels, I add a quadratic term of political centralization and an inter-
action term of the quadratic term times the autocracy variable. The regression results are
presented in Table B1 in the Appendix.
Figure 6.3. The Predicted Fiscal Decentralization Levels Conditional on Autocracy Index
Figure 6.3 plots the predicted fiscal decentralization levels against political centralization
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for highly democratic countries (in blue) and highly autocratic countries (in red). The two
blue lines in the two panels of Figure 6.3 show curvilinear relationships between political cen-
tralization and fiscal decentralization in highly democratic countries. Despite the curvature,
the relationships in both panels are mostly negative.
Is there a U-shaped relationship between political centralization and fiscal decentraliza-
tion in autocracies? The two red lines in the two panels of Figure 6.3 show the predicted
fiscal decentralization levels in the highly autocratic regimes. The within effects component
supports a U-shaped relationship between political centralization and fiscal decentralization
for a highly autocratic regime. In particular, the correlation between political centralization
and fiscal decentralization is negative and statistically significant, when political central-
ization is low. As political centralization increases, fiscal decentralization decreases until it
reaches its minimum (when political centralization is 0.36). As political centralization con-
tinues to increase, the correlation between political centralization and fiscal decentralization
becomes positive and statistically significant.
According to the between effects results, the U-shaped relationship between political
centralization and fiscal decentralization is not statistically significant. The red line in the
right panel of Figure 6.3 shows the predicted fiscal decentralization levels for autocracies,
based on the between effects coefficients. The correlation is still negative when political
centralization is low, but it is not statistically significant. Fiscal decentralization reaches
its minimum when political centralization is 0.41. As political centralization continues to
increase, the marginal effect of political centralization becomes positive and statistically
significant.
In sum, for autocracies, the within effects results support a statistically significant U-
shaped relationship between political centralization and fiscal decentralization; while the
between effects results do not offer strong support for the U-shaped relationship. Overall,
the results offer limited evidence for the U-shaped relationship inspired by the Mexican
case. Given that the sample contains 59 countries and most of them are democracies, it is
possible that the sample size is not large enough to produce statistically significant between
effects results for autocracies. Hence, future research can continue to explore the U-shaped
relationship in autocracies with larger samples.
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6.5.2 Conditional Effects
In addition to the quadratic effects, I also test political centralization’s effects conditional
on the socioeconomic factors. According to the economics literature, socioeconomic factors,
such as the size of a country and its economic development level, determine an optimal
economic decentralization level, at which level a relatively high economic efficiency can be
achieved. Building on this literature, the model developed in Chapter 2 predicts that the
socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level (the x0 term in the model) affects
whether or not the political mechanism between political centralization and economic decen-
tralization is activated and if activated, to what degree political centralization affects fiscal
decentralization.
For a small and homogeneous country, its socioeconomically optimal economic decentral-
ization level is expected to be low, so that the political mechanism would not be activated,
in the sense that regardless of its political centralization level, the economic resources and
authority are expected to be centralized. Thus, this country’s small size is expected to
lessen the effects of political centralization on economic decentralization. This is one of the
empirical implications of the theoretical model presented as Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 2. In
contrast, if a country is large and has hetergeneous regions and population, the economics
literature predicts that the country has a high socioeconomically optimal economic decen-
tralization level. It is in such countries that political centralization is expected to have a
stronger effect on economic decentralization, because now the national government can have
different preferences toward economic decentralization, influenced by its political control
over the subnational government officials. In the model, this condition implies a higher x0
that makes xI higher and allows political centralization to affect the equilibrium economic
decentralization level (recall Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2).
Therefore, I expect the effects of political centralization on economic decentralization to
be conditional on the socioeconomic factors in autocracies. When the socioeconomic factors
are conducive for a higher socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level (x0),
such as the country is large or is economically developed (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005),
I expect the positive effects of political centralization on economic decentralization to be
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stronger.
Similar to autocracies, it is reasonable to expect that socioeconomic factors can moder-
ate the effects of political centralization in democracies as well. One mechanism is through
altering the subnational governments’ bottom-up demands. For instance, in a small, un-
derdeveloped, and homogeneous country, we can expect that the subnational governments
would lack the incentives to demand more economic resources and authority, than their
counterparts in a large, developed, and heterogeneous country. Thus, in a country with a
low socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level, we can expect the economic
decentralization level to be low, regardless of its political centralization level. On the other
hand, in those democracies with high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
levels, I expect the negative correlation between political centralization and economic de-
centralization to be strong.
To test whether the effects of political centralization are conditional on the socioeco-
nomic factors and the autocracy levels, I include triple interaction terms among political
centralization, autocracy, and the socioeconomic variables. The regression table is presented
as Table B2 in the Appendix.
In the following discussions, I mainly focus on interpreting results with regard to two
socioeconomic factors, a country’s population size and its economic development level, be-
cause the previous literature has a relatively strong expectation about how they affect a
country’s socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization level (x0). Specifically, the
larger a country is and the more economically developed the country is, the higher optimal
economic decentralization level the country has.
In addition, I only focus on discussing the between effects results, because the within
effects component cannot meaningfully capture how these two socioeconomic factors affect
the impacts of political centralization on fiscal decentralization. The modeling assumption of
the within effects component treats the unit effects as nuissance and removes them before the
estimation—in this hybrid model by including the mean of each unit as other independent
variables. On the other hand, the above two socioeconomic factors, such as a country’s size
and its development level, tend to be stable within a country (see Table 6.1 for the descriptive
statistics). By removing the unit effects, the within effects component essentially loses its
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capacity to model the effects of these relatively stable socioeconomic factors.
For both the population size and the economic development level, the between effects
results confirm the expectation that political centralization’s effects on fiscal decentralization
are stronger in countries with higher socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
levels, for both autocracies and democracies.
Figure 6.4. The Predicted Fiscal Decentralization Levels and Marginal Effects of Political
Centralization Conditional on Autocracy Index and Total Population (Between Effects)
Figure 6.4 shows how political centralization’s effects are conditional on the autocratic
levels and the population sizes. The top part shows the predicted fiscal decentralization lev-
els against political centralization levels for democracies (on the left) and autocracies (on the
right), conditional on the population sizes. The blue line in both panels shows the predicted
fiscal decentralization levels for countries with small population sizes (when the total popu-
lation is around 162,764) and the red line shows the predicted fiscal decentralization levels
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for countries with large population sizes (when the total population is around 178 million).
The sizes are selected based on the smallest and largest cases in this sample. The bottom
part shows the marginal effects of political centralization conditional on regime types and
the population sizes.
When we compare across small countries, the effects of political centralization on fiscal
decentralization are small and not statistically significant. As countries’ sizes become larger,
the marginal effects of political centralization in autocracies are positive and become sta-
tistically significant, while the marginal effects of political centralization in democracies are
negative and become statistically significant. The differences between the marginal effects
of political centralization in autocracies and democracies are also statistically significant for
large countries.
This means that among large countries, the more politically centralized autocracies tend
to have higher fiscal decentralization levels than the less politically centralized autocracies;
while the more politically centralized democracies tend to have lower fiscal decentralization
levels than the less politically centralized democracies. This is consistent with the theoret-
ical expectation that political centralization’s effects (positive in autocracies and negative
in democracies) are stronger in countries with higher socioeconomically optimal economic
decentralization levels, in this case, countries with larger population sizes.
Figure 6.5 shows how political centralization’s effects are conditional on the autocratic
levels and the economic development levels. The figure’s organization is similar to the
previous one. The blue line in the top two panels show the predictions for the underdeveloped
countries, with the GDPPC being around 403 in constant 2010 USD, and the red line in
the top two panels show the predictions for the developed countries, with the GDPPC being
around 163,000 in constant 2010 USD. These values are chosen based on the minimum and
maximum of the GDPPC in this sample.
The results for the economic development levels are again consistent with the theoreti-
cal expectation. For the underdeveloped countries, the effects of political centralization on
fiscal decentralization are small and not statistically significant for either democracies or
autocracies. As countries become more developed, the political centralization’s effects be-
come stronger. Among the developed countries, more politically centralized autocracies tend
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Figure 6.5. The Predicted Fiscal Decentralization Levels and Marginal Effects of Political
Centralization Conditional on Autocracy Index and GDP Per Capita (Between Effects)
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to have higher fiscal decentralization levels than the less politically centralized autocracies;
while more politically centralized democracies tend to have lower fiscal decentralization levels
than the less politically centralized democracies. The results again support that the polit-
ical centralization’s effects are stronger in countries with higher socioeconomically optimal
economic decentralization levels.
In sum, the results support the theoretical expectation that the effects of political central-
ization are stronger in countries with higher socioeconomically optimal economic decentral-
ization levels, such as the large and economically developed countries. For democracies, the
effects are negative and stronger; while for autocracies, the effects are positive and stronger.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
The top-down delegation logic of the economic (de)centralization process in autocracies de-
veloped and evaluated in the previous chapters predicts that political centralization can
lead to economic decentralization policies. In contrast, using a bargaining framework, the
previous literature on democracies often argues that political centralization leads to lower
economic decentralization. With the expectation that the delegation logic is more relevant
for autocracies and the bargaining logic is more relevant for democracies, this chapter tests
whether the effects of political centralization on fiscal decentralization are different in au-
tocracies from its effects in democracies, using a sample of 59 countries over the period from
1972 to 2016.
The statistical results support the chapter’s main hypothesis. According to the within
effects results, an increase in political centralization in a democracy is expected to reduce its
fiscal decentralization level but increase fiscal decentralization in an autocracy. Comparing
across countries, democracies with higher political centralization are expected to have lower
fiscal decentralization; while autocracies with higher political centralization in the sample on
average have higher fiscal decentralization, although this effect is not statistically significant.
In addition, the Mexican case discussed in Chapter 5 suggests that the final economic
decentralization level not only depends on the national government’s incentives but also on
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its capacity to reach that level. In particular, there may be a U-shaped relationship between
political centralization and fiscal decentralization in autocracies. The statistical evidence
is supportive but limited. The within effects results support a statistically significant U-
shaped relationship in autocratic regimes, while the between effects results do not support a
statistically significant U-shaped relationship. It is possible that the sample of 59 countries,
most of which are democracies, is not large enough to produce statistically significant between
effects results for autocracies. Future research can continue to explore the possible U-shaped
relationship for autocracies.
Finally, the theory in Chapter 2 also predicts that the effects of political centraliza-
tion are conditional on the socioeconomic factors. Particularly, the effects are predicted
to be stronger in countries with higher socioeconomically optimal economic decentraliza-
tion levels. The statistical evidence confirms this theoretical prediction. For the small and
economically underdeveloped countries, the correlation between political centralization and
fiscal decentralization levels is weak and not statistically significant for both democracies and
autocracies. But for the large and economically developed countries, political centralization
is negatively correlated with fiscal decentralization in democracies and positively correlated
with fiscal decentralization in autocracies. This implies that the different patterns between
democracies and autocracies are more salient for the large and more developed countries
than for the small and less developed countries.
All in all, the statistical results provide strong supportive evidence for the delegation logic
in autocracies, shown by the positive correlations between political centralization and fiscal
decentralization, which are opposite from the pattern in democracies. This suggests that the
two historical cases of China and Mexico are not singular instances. The positive effects of
political centralization on economic decentralization are relatively common in autocracies.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS
Decentralization is widely considered to be critical for a country’s quality of governance.
Especially since the international development agencies began to support the decentraliza-
tion efforts in developing countries in the 1980s, scholars in both economics and political
science have studied this topic extensively. However, the scholarly views on the impacts
of decentralization have been mixed. On the positive side, the early fiscal federalism lit-
erature (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972) emphasizes that fiscal decentralization can increase
overall economic efficiency. The more recent “market-preserving federalism” literature con-
tends that federalism can limit the predatory behavior of the state and can therefore foster
economic growth (Qian and Weingast, 1996, 1997). However, these positive views of fiscal
decentralization are disputed on multiple grounds. Treisman (2006) argues that although
fiscal decentralization may reduce the local governments’ predatory behaviors, it could make
the central government more predatory. Thus, the overall impacts of fiscal decentralization
on economic performance are indeterminate. Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) emphasize
that the benefits promised by the “market-preserving federalism” require the right political
incentives of the local governments, which are often not present in either democracies or
authoritarian systems.
To evaluate the impacts of economic decentralization on a country’s economic perfor-
mance needs a better theoretical understanding of the political contexts in which the eco-
nomic decentralization operates. This dissertation has tackled one theoretical question: what
political conditions explain economic decentralization policies in autocracies?
I argue that in autocracies, a high level of political centralization can facilitate the
economic decentralization process, by increasing the national government’s trust in the sub-
national government officials and making the national government more willing to grant the
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subnational governments more economic resources and authority to achieve higher economic
efficiency. Previously the literature on democracies expects the opposite, namely a high level
of political centralization results in a low level of economic decentralization. The cause for
these different effects of political centralization in autocracies and democracies, I contend,
is the distinct policymaking processes in autocracies and democracies. The policymaking
process in autocracies is often a top-down process which follows the delegation logic, while
the policymaking process in democracies often follows the bargaining logic. These different
logics can explain why high levels of political centralization lead to economic centralization
policies in democracies but economic decentralization in autocracies.
Understanding the political conditions of economic decentralization not only can eluci-
date the economic decentralization process per se, which is an important subject in itself,
but also can disentangle the connections between political conditions and economic decen-
tralization policies, explicate the causes of the political incentives of different levels of the
governments, and finally help us to better understand the impacts of the economic decentral-
ization policies. In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the findings of this dissertation
and then discuss the implications and open questions for future research.
7.1 CENTRALIZED DECENTRALIZATION
Because of the more prevalent top-down policymaking process in autocracies, a high level
of political centralization can increase a national government’s incentives to pursue the
economic decentralization policies, while a low level of political centralization can have an
opposite effect.
Chapter 2 presents the theory that links political centralization and economic decentral-
ization policies in a different way than the theories developed in the democratic contexts.
The previous theories developed in democracies (Willis, Garman and Haggard, 1999; Beer,
2004; Falleti, 2010) often consider the economic decentralization policies as outcomes of
a bargaining process, where the national government prefers more economic centralization
while the subnational governments prefer more economic decentralization. Under this as-
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sumption, a high level of political centralization implies a weak bargaining position of the
subnational governments and thus inhibits the economic decentralization process. This view
that emphasizes the bottom-up pressure from the subnational governments is valid. Schol-
ars such as Shirk (1993) and Liu et al. (2015) also argue that the economic decentralization
process in China in the 1980s was resulted from the subnational governments’ bottom-up
demands. However, many authoritarian systems often lack the representative institutions,
where the bargaining between the national government and subnational governments take
place in democracies. Moreover, it is not always possible for the subnational governments to
confront the national leadership to demand more economic authority and resources, if the
authoritarian national leadership opposes economic decentralization. Then, why do some
of these regimes pursue the economic decentralization policies while others become more
economically centralized?
The model in Chapter 2 theorizes the incentives of the national government to pur-
sue economic decentralization policies from a top-down perspective. It directly answers the
question of why some authoritarian regimes pursue economic decentralization policies even
without bottom-up pressure from the subnational governments, while others do not. In
particular, this model identifies the relevant political factors that contribute to whether the
authoritarian national government would prefer a high or low level of economic decentral-
ization. Such political factors include the levels of political centralization, how ideological
the national government is with regard to prioritizing the implementation of their preferred
economic policies, and how developmental the national government is.
In the case study chapters, I select and compare two large party-based authoritarian
regimes with ideological and developmental national governments, which are the postrev-
olutionary regimes of China and Mexico. I test whether and how the levels of political
centralization affect the economic decentralization policies. The model in Chapter 2 shows
that the level of political centralization, referring to the degree of the national government’s
control over the subnational governments’ personnel, affects two political factors: the reward-
punishment mechanism and the policy preference divergence between national and subna-
tional governments. The ratio of these two factors constitute the subnational government’s
deviation threshold, which refers to the maximum level of economic decentralization that
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the national government can grant without triggering the subnational government’s policy
deviation. The deviation threshold in turn changes the national government’s willingness to
decentralize the economic resources and authority. For the developmental and ideological
national governments, the model predicts that a high deviation threshold leads the national
government to prefer a relatively high level of economic decentralization, and a low deviation
threshold makes the national government prefer a low level of economic decentralization.1
The game-theoretical model not only establishes a clear and rigorous theoretical frame-
work to analyze the interaction among the socioeconomic and political factors, it also facili-
tates the conceptualization of the causal mechanisms linking the level of political centraliza-
tion and the economic decentralization policies. In addition to the several other interesting
results, the model natually generates the concept of the subnational government’s deviation
threshold as a ratio of the reward-punishment mechanism and the policy preference diver-
gence. It is this concept of the deviation threshold that forms an essential link on the causal
chain between political centralization levels and economic decentralization policies.
To what degree can the theoretical model explain the economic decentralization pro-
cesses? Chapters 4 and 5 test the theory combining the method of difference and the theory-
testing process-tracing method. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 present the process-tracing results in
China and Mexico respectively.
Summarized in Figure 7.1, the PRC regime was highly centralized politically before the
economic decentralization process during the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The high level
of political centralization can be attributed to two institutional sources, namely the unitary
constitutions (the 1949 Common Program and the 1954 Constitution) and the centralized
ruling party, the CPC, which led the regime establishment and consolidation process. The
CPC’s highly disciplined party organization, its tight control over the armed forces, and the
central leadership’s strong ideological control over the members facilitated the rapid consol-
idation process of the PRC regime from 1949 to 1952. As a result, the postrevolutionary
1The national government’s preferred economic decentralization level also depends on the socioeconomic
conditions. The theory does not contend that the national government’s preferred economic decentralization
level and the deviation thresholds follows a strictly monotonic relationship, see Figure 2.5. Particularly,
there is an upper limit of the national government’s preferred economic decentralization level. Once the
subnational governments’ deviation threshold exceeds the upper limit, the national government’s preferred
economic decentralization stops increasing with the deviation thresholds.
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Figure 7.1. The Causal Mechanism between Political Centralization and Economic Decen-
tralization in China
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regime also inherited the centralized structure of the CPC.
The centralized political system allowed the central government not only to impose the
like-minded personnel to local governments’ leadership positions, but also to replace the more
independent-minded local officials with the like-minded ones through political campaigns,
such as the anti-localism movement. In addition, the centralized political system also cre-
ated strong career incentives for the local officials to implement the central economic policy
agenda. The CPC’s heavy emphasis on Party discipline, the formal setup of the disciplinary
organs in the CPC, and the less formal mechanism of periodic movements and purges all
strengthened the central government’s reward-punishement mechanisms. These two factors
together mean that the local governments in China during the 1950s had very high deviation
thresholds and would implement the central government’s economic policy agenda even with
a relatively high level of economic decentralization.
Consequently, the local governments’ behaviors during this time period confirms that
the local officials indeed implemented the central economic policy agenda. The case of
Guangdong Province shows that even though the CPC had had very weak presence prior to
1949, the local officials still faithfully implemented the land reform policies. The evidence
from Mei Xian (County) and Qiaoxiang Village illustrates that the centralized system was
so effective that even the officials at the grass-roots levels carried out the radical economic
policies made by the central government.
Under these conditions, the central leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, trusted both the lo-
cal officials, who had already survived waves of screening in the series of political movements,
to share their economic policy preferences, and the capacity of the system to continuously
screen and select the loyal local leaders. They anticipated that the local officials would follow
the central economic policy agenda after the economic decentralization. Given that in this
historical context the central leaders also had strong desires to pursue economic development
and perceived the centralized economic structure would impede China’s development, the
central government had a strong desire to pursue the economic decentralization policies.
As a consequence, the central government decentralized economic resources and authority
to the local governments during the Great Leap Forward. However, the economic decentral-
ization policies did not make local governments more responsive to local needs. Instead, the
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local governments competed with each other to reach the high targets set by the central
government, resulting the economic disaster in the Great Leap Forward. This case shows
that the political centralization level was so high that it sustained high deviation thresh-
olds for the local governments. Despite an increase in the economic decentralization level,
the historical experience suggests that it did not surpass the local governments’ deviation
thresholds.
The case of the economic decentralization process during the Great Leap Forward is
consistent with the theoretical equilibrium outcome (xI , I), presented in Section 2.5.2 of
Chapter 2. Under the developmental and ideological national government, when the sub-
national government’s deviation threshold is high enough, the national government would
set the economic decentralization level at a relatively high level (determined by the so-
cioeconomic factors); while the subnational government would still implement the national
economic policy agenda.
The postrevolutionary regime in Mexico followed the opposite path. Summarized in Fig-
ure 7.2, the Mexican regime was highly decentralized from 1917 to 1948. The federal govern-
ment had much weaker control over the state governors’ personnel. In addition to having a
federal constitution, the regionally fragmented revolutionary process also contributed to the
high level of political decentralization. In Mexico, the revolutionary wars were fought among
regional armies without a centralized authority. As a result, there was no centralized author-
ity that was able to establish a centralized regime in 1917. Instead, the postrevolutionary
political system was dominated by the regional caudillos, many of whom had military back-
ground and rose to power through fighting the revolutionary wars (Figure 5.2). Although
during the three decades from the 1920s to the 1940s, the regime became consolidated and
more centralized politically, partly due to the establishment and restructuring of the ruling
party, by the late 1940s the federal government had not gained sufficient political control
over the state governors so that it could trust the state governments with economic resources.
Due to the relatively high level of political decentralization, the state governors often
had their own economic policy preferences that were different from the federal officials’.
The state delegates’ voting patterns in the First and Second National Tax Conventions
in 1925 and 1933 respectively, as well as the ideological gaps between the presidents and
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Figure 7.2. The Causal Mechanism between Political Decentralization and Economic Cen-
tralization in Mexico
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the state governors they nominated from 1934 to 1952 all confirm a high level of policy
preference divergence between the federal and state governments. The evidence shows that
over time, as the political decentralization level decreased during the three decades, the policy
preference divergence also decreased. However, the level of political decentralization was so
high in the 1920s that despite the political centralization process, the system by the late
1940s remained more politically decentralized than the Chinese system. For instance, the
leftist governors nominated by the rightist President Alemán (1946–1952) constituted 13.95%
of all governors he dominated. In the meanwhile, the state governors also lacked strong
career incentives to implement the federal economic policy agenda, due to the relatively
weak reward-punishment mechanisms of the federal government. In the 1920s, the federal
government, even the heavy-handed President Calles, could only remove the state governors
who were politically vulnerable, while leaving the strong caudillos untouched. In the 1940s,
although the federal government gained more political authority to remove a state governor,
the authority was limited and was not used to remove governors who implemented different
economic policies but governors who were unpopular in the states, or being corrupt and
incompetent. The state governors’ independent economic policy preferences and lack of
career incentives to pursue the federal economic policy agenda together constituted their
low deviation thresholds, meaning that even a low level of economic decentralization would
trigger them to deviate from the federal government’s economic policy agenda.
As expected, the state governments indeed deviated from the federal economic policy
agenda. For instance, Governor Zuno of Jalisco (1923–1926) resisted the federal government’s
expansion in Jalisco and adopted a more radical policy position than President Calles. Calles
attempted to remove Zuno but encountered strong pushbacks. Zuno strategically resigned
and remained influential in the state after his resignation. As a conservative governor,
Maximino of Puebla (1937–1941) also implemented policies that went against the progressive
federal economic policy agenda under President Cárdenas, especially in terms of the land
reform issue. In addition, the state governments also engaged in fiscal policy deviations.
Despite the federal government’s desire to establish fiscal unity and create a common national
market, the states continued with their local protectionist fiscal behaviors that impeded the
market integration. The state governments and their delegations even openly disagreed with
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the federal agenda and disobeyed the federal fiscal policies occasionally. Again, there was a
trend that the state governments became less confrontational and more tactful when dealing
with the federal government over time, consistent with the political centralization process.
However, by the 1940s, the evidence shows that the state governments still deviated from
the federal government’s economic policy agenda.
Under these circumstances, although the federal government in Mexico was more prag-
matic than the Chinese central government, it was still frustrated by its inability to rein in
the state governments’ policy deviations and to establish a common national market. At the
same time, the federal government also did not perceive the high level of fiscal decentraliza-
tion to be efficient. In the eyes of the federal government in that period, the high level of
fiscal decentralization implied fiscal anarchy and disorder; while only the federal government
could establish fiscal order and simplicity. As a result, the federal government had a strong
desire to implement the fiscal centralization policies.
The federal government began the fiscal centralization efforts in the 1920s and the fiscal
centralization process continued and peaked in the late 1940s under President Alemán. Due
to the states’ strong resistance against the fiscal centralization policies, the initial fiscal
centralization efforts in the 1920s did not immediately succeed. The federal government
then adopted a gradual approach by federalizing the excise taxes, one industry at a time.
This approach proved successful and the fiscal centralization level gradually increased from
the late 1920s to the early 1940s. The Alemán administration aimed to institutionalize the
centralized fiscal system and established the national sales tax in the late 1940s to solve
the fiscal fragmentation problem once and for all. But because the political decentralization
remained relatively high in the 1940s, the states were still able to resist adopting the national
sales tax system and continued to deviate from the federal fiscal policy agenda.
The case of the fiscal centralization process in Mexico from the 1920s to the 1940s is
different from the theoretically predicted equilibrium outcome (xτ , I), discussed in Section
2.5.2 of Chapter 2. The model predicts that under the ideological and developmental national
government, a high level of political decentralization would result in the federal government
setting the economic decentralization level at the deviation threshold, which is lower than
the optimal level determined by the socioeconomic factors, and the state governments would
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implement the federal economic policies if the economic decentralization level is at the devi-
ation threshold. In the case of Mexico, the federal government was not able to set the fiscal
decentralization level at the state governments’ deviation thresholds. It was not a lack of
willingness but a lack of capacity to achieve that low level of fiscal decentralization. Thus,
the state governments continued deviating from the federal economic policies. The case did
not reach the predicted equilibrium outcome.
That the case did not produce the equilibrium outcome does not disconfirm the theory.
On the one hand, the federal government’s strong incentives to pursue a low level of fiscal
decentralization and its fiscal centralization policies confirm the theoretical prediction that
the high level of political decentralization increased the federal government’s willingness to
pursue fiscal centralization policies. On the other hand, the case indeed shows one of the
limitations of the theoretical model that the final economic decentralization levels not only
depend on the national government’s willingness, but also depend on its capacity to achieve
its desired outcome. The Mexican federal government had the incentives but lacked the
capacity.
The Mexican case inspires a possible U-shaped relationship between political centraliza-
tion and economic decentralization in autocracies. When political centralization is low, the
national government is expected to have strong willingness to centralize economic resources
and authority but lacks the capacity to achieve the goal. Hence, economic decentralization
is expected to be high. When political centralization is at a medium level, the national
government is expected to have both the willingness and capacity to achieve economic cen-
tralization, and economic decentralization is expected to be low. When political centraliza-
tion is high, the national government trusts the subnational governments more and becomes
more willing to decentralize economic resources and authority to subnational governments.
Therefore, economic decentralization is expected to be high again. This U-shaped relation-
ship is tested empirically in Section 6.5 of Chapter 6 and the statistical evidence offers partial
support.
Table 7.1 juxtaposes the relevant socioeconomic and political conditions in the two cases,
which refines Table 3.2 by adding the findings from Chapters 4 and 5. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the postrevolutionary regimes of China (since 1949) and Mexico (since 1917)
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Table 7.1. Comparing China and Mexico
Notes: for the following rows, population sizes, urban population shares, and GDPPC, the years to which
the statistics correspond are in parentheses.
Sources: See Table 3.2.
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shared similar socioeconomic conditions, such as the large sizes in terms of their geographic
areas and population and their urbanization levels. They differed in their development
levels and economic systems. But according to the previous theories, the differences in these
two factors gave the federal government in Mexico a stronger incentive to pursue economic
decentralization policies than the Chinese central government.
I argue that the reasons for the two postrevolutionary regimes’ distinct paths—Mexico
became increasingly fiscally centralized from the 1920s to the 1940s while China pursued the
economic decentralization policies in the late 1950s—lie in their levels of political central-
ization.
Shown in Table 7.1, the postrevolutionary political regime of the PRC was highly cen-
tralized, while the postrevolutionary political system in Mexico was highly decentralized.
Their different political centralization levels had their origins not only in their respective
constitutional designs, with China having a unitary system while Mexico having a federal
system; but also in their respective revolutionary processes preceding their regimes.
In particular, the Chinese revolution was won by the centralized Marxist-Leninist CPC,
which was established in 1921 and experienced significant political centralization since the
1920s. By the time the PRC regime was established in 1949, the CPC had already obtained
a highly centralized organization. It was the centralized ruling CPC that led the regime
establishment and consolidation process and as a result the PRC regime obtained a highly
centralized political structure.
In contrast, the Mexican revolutionary war was fought among regionally-based revolu-
tionary forces without a strong centralized authority, particularly there was not a political
party that led or won the revolution. Instead, the revolution was won by a loosely organized
faction, the Constitutionalists. The regions in the Mexican postrevolutionary regime, as a
consequence, were controlled by the regional strongmen who could easily challenge the polit-
ical authority of the center while the center had very weak control over the regional leaders
in the 1920s. In fact, the ruling party was initially established by President Calles in 1929,
the PNR, as a territorially based institution to internalize the conflicts among the powerful
regional leaders. Over the three decades studied in this dissertation, the Mexican regime
experienced regime consolidation and political centralization. The ruling party was reorga-
260
nized several times from the territorially based organization finally to a corporatist party,
became more centralized, and was renamed to PRM in 1938 and to PRI in 1946. However,
the regime was so regionally fragmented in the 1920s that after three decades of the political
centralization process, the Mexican regime was still much more politically decentralized in
the 1940s than the Chinese regime under the CPC in the 1950s.
The comparison between China and Mexico show the significant impact of the sequential
order of the ruling party’s establishment and the regime establishment on the level of political
centralization of the postrevolutionary regime. Shown in Table 7.1, the two regimes’ differ-
ent political centralization levels in turn influenced their subnational governments’ deviation
thresholds, the subnational governments’ behaviors, the national governments’ incentives to
pursue economic (de)centralization policies, and finally the economic (de)centralization pol-
icy outcomes. Particularly worth emphasizing is the stark contrast between the subnational
governments’ behaviors in the two regimes. While the Mexican state governors openly
confronted and challenged the federal government on economic policies, the Chinese local
officials, not only in the old liberated areas, but also in the new liberated areas like Guang-
dong Province, and not only at the provincial level, but also at the grass-roots levels, such
as in Mei Xian (County) and Qiaoxiang Village, pursued the central government’s economic
policy agenda. Moreover, while the Mexican state governors continued to deviate from the
federal fiscal policies after the political and fiscal centralization processes in the 1940s, the
local leaders pursued the central economic policy agenda of the Great Leap Forward after
the economic decentralization process in the late 1950s, despite the disastrous effects of the
policy agenda on their localities.
The comparison between the two cases in Chapters 3 to 5 strongly suggests that the
impacts of the economic decentralization policies heavily depend on the political contexts.
This dissertation’s main contribution is to theorize and test the causal connections between
one of the political contextual factor, namely the level of political centralization, and the
economic (de)centralization policies.
Building on the previous theories on democracies and the new theory on autocracies,
Chapter 6 conducts a large-N statistical analysis to test whether the effects of political
centralization on economic decentralization are indeed different in different regimes, based
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on a sample of 59 countries over the period from 1972 to 2016. The main results confirm that
political centralization levels are positively correlated with fiscal expenditure decentralization
levels in autocracies while negatively correlated with fiscal decentralization in democracies,
lending support to both the previous literature and the theory developed in this dissertation.
Moreover, Chapter 6 also lends moderate support that there is a U-shaped relationship
between political centralization and fiscal decentralization levels in autocracies. This is ex-
pected because when the political system is not centralized enough, the national government
has a strong incentive to pursue fiscal centralization policies but lacks the necessary political
capacity to implement such policies. In such a context, an increase in the political centraliza-
tion level gives the national government more capacity to implement the fiscal centralization
policies. Thus, the correlation between political centralization and fiscal decentralization is
negative. On the other hand, when the political system is highly centralized, the national
government has the capacity to maintain an economically centralized system but lacks the
incentives to do so, because local officials now become trustworthy agents. Thus, the corre-
lation between political centralization and fiscal decentralization is positive. The statistical
evidence supports the U-shaped pattern, although the pattern is not statistically significant
when comparing across countries. It is possible the lack of statistical significance is a result
of the small sample size. Future research can further test the possible U-shaped relationship
with larger samples.
Finally, the game-theoretical model in Chapter 2 predicts that the effects of political
centralization on economic decentralization are stronger in countries with higher socioe-
conomically optimal economic decentralization levels—the x0 term in the model. This is
because the economic systems are expected to be relatively centralized in countries with low
socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization levels (such as countries with small
sizes and underdeveloped economies), irrespective of their political centralization levels. It
is in those countries with high socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization levels
(namely high x0),2 political centralization is expected to affect economic decentralization.
In the case study chapters, the socioeconomic factors are treated as control conditions
2As a result of high x0, such countries are expected to have high xI and the effects of political centralization
are stronger for countries with high xI . For more details, see Section 2.5.2 in Chapter 2
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and are not the focus of the theory-testing, because of the small-N limitation. But the large-
N statistical analysis allows me to test this theoretical prediction. The results are consistent
with the theoretical prediction that the positive effects of political centralization on fiscal
expenditure decentralization are indeed stronger in countries with larger populations and
more developed economies. In addition, the statistical analysis also supports that the nega-
tive effects of political centralization on fiscal decentralization are stronger in democracies.
This conditional effect in democracies is not derived from the model. I conjecture that in
democracies, the population sizes and economic development levels change the subnational
government’s incentives of demanding the economic resources and authority. The subna-
tional governments from the large and more developed economies have more incentives to
demand than their counterparts from the small and less developed economies. Thus, like
in autocracies, fiscal decentralization levels are expected to be low in the small and less
developed economies, regardless of the political centralization levels. The negative effects of
political centralization are expected to be stronger in democracies with higher socioeconom-
ically optimal economic decentralization levels.
7.2 IMPLICATIONS
The main contribution of this dissertation is to theorize that a high level of political central-
ization can contribute to economic decentralization policies in autocracies. The theoretical
contribution helps us to better understand the political institutional conditions for economic
decentralization policies in autocracies. The socioeconomic conditions that have been stud-
ied extensively by the economists seem universal across countries (Arzaghi and Henderson,
2005; Letelier S., 2005), but we do observe variation in economic decentralization levels in
countries with similar socioeconomic conditions. One major source of this variation is the
different political institutional designs, which produce very different incentives for policy-
makers, involve different policymaking processes, and ultimately result in different economic
decentralization outcomes. There is already a considerable literature that examines the po-
litical institutional conditions for the economic decentralization outcomes, such as the works
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by Shirk (1993), Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999), Montero and Samuels (2004), Eaton
(2004), O’Neill (2005), Díaz-Cayeros (2006), Falleti (2010), and Liu et al. (2015), just to list
a subset of the literature. However, most of these works, except the books by Eaton (2004)
and O’Neill (2005), emphasize the bottom-up demands from subnational governments as the
main cause of the economic decentralization policies. This emphasis is valid for the economic
decentralization cases in the democratic context, as bargaining is indeed frequent in democ-
racies. But this is insufficient for understanding the economic decentralization policies in
autocracies, where the subnational interests are often not well represented at the national
level and the economic decentralization policies tend to be results of the national govern-
ment’s top-down decisions. As I have shown in this dissertation, not only do the subnational
governments have incentives to push for economic decentralization, the national governments
also have incentives to pursue economic decentralization policies. They just need to weigh
the benefits of economic decentralization policies, theorized as economic efficiency gains in
this dissertation, against the costs, such as a loss of economic resources at the center and
their potential inability to implement their preferred economic policies at the local levels. By
analyzing the political conditions for economic decentralization policies in these top-down
cases, the new theory developed in this dissertation gives a more complete picture of the
political reasons for the economic decentralization policies.
Understanding the top-down economic decentralization cases also helps shed light on
the different economic decentralization levels between autocracies and democracies. The
theoretical model in Chapter 2 makes predictions about the national government’s preferred
economic decentralization levels. None of the three potential economic decentralization levels
(xI , xD, and xτ ) reaches the socioeconomically optimal level (x0). This means if the economic
decentralization level is a top-down process, the national government never wants it to
be more economically decentralized than the optimal levels dictated by the socioeconomic
conditions. On the other hand, the bottom-up demands and the bargaining mechanisms
may compel the national government to accept economic decentralization levels higher than
the socioeconomically optimal levels. Based on the statistical results, there is evidence that
the bargaining mechanism is more prevalent in democracies than in autocracies. Thus, we
would expect that democracies tend to have higher economic decentralization levels than
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autocracies.
Scholars disagree over economic decentralization’s implications for economic governance
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Qian and Weingast, 1996). The more recent literature empha-
sizes that the effects of economic decentralization levels on economic governance depend on
the political contexts (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997). This dissertation confirms that
within a highly politically centralized system, economic decentralization policies alone do not
necessarily make the local governments more responsive to local needs or increase economic
efficiency. The answers to the question of “what political conditions facilitate/impede eco-
nomic decentralization processes” can also contribute to our understanding of “why economic
decentralization brings better economic performance in some cases but harms economic per-
formance in others.” For instance, for cases where the economic decentralization policy is
a result of a high level of political centralization, the economic performance then heavily
depends on the national government’s economic agenda. The national government’s sound
economic decisions can produce good outcomes at the local level, but the national govern-
ment’s bad economic decisions can have disastrous impacts on local economies, despite the
apparent high economic decentralization level.
Finally, this theory could potentially contribute to a better understanding of the dif-
ferent impacts of regime types on economic performance. Particularly, the findings in this
dissertation suggests that one potential mechanism through which a country’s regime type
influences its economic performance is through affecting the allocation of economic resources
and authority between the national and subnational governments. In autocracies, where the
economic decentralization policies are more likely to result from a top-down process, the eco-
nomic decentralization levels tend to be lower than in democracies, and for those autocratic
countries that have high economic decentralization levels, the subnational governments are
more likely to be responsive to the national government’s policy agenda instead of the local
needs. On the other hand, in democracies, the economic decentralization levels are expected
to be higher due to the more frequent bargaining processes, and the local governments
tend to be more responsive to the local economic needs, compared to their counterparts
in autocracies. Under these expectations, across these two types of regimes, the national
government’s role is expected to be much stronger in the autocratic context than in democ-
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racies. This could potentially contribute to the phenomenon observed by Przeworski et al.
(2000, pp. 176–178) that the economic performance of dictatorships is more volatile than
that in democracies. Because the economic performance in autocracies heavily depends on
the decisions made by the national government, the changes of the national administrations
could result in a high level of economic volatility. On the other hand, in democracies, the
economic decision-making is more decentralized, and therefore the impacts of a change at
the national level are expected to be less drastic.
7.3 MOVING FORWARD
This dissertation only tests a subset of the model’s predictions. For instance, it does not test
the theory’s predictions with regard to the pragmatic type and predatory type of national
governments. It would be interesting for future research to compare the pragmatic type
with the ideological type to examine how the national government’s ideological adherence
can affect a country’s economic decentralization levels. The expectation is that for countries
with similarly low levels of political centralization, those countries with the pragmatic type
of national government have higher economic decentralization level than the ones with the
ideological type of national government. Similarly, countries with the predatory type of
national governments is expected to have lower levels of economic decentralization levels
than countries governed by the developmental type.
This top-down model can also form a basis for further theory-building on cross-regime
comparisons. For instance, as discussed above, the dissertation offers a potential explanation
for the lower economic decentralization levels in autocracies than in democracies. That is,
the top-down processes that happen more frequently in autocracies result in lower economic
decentralization levels than those in democracies where the bottom-up bargaining processes
are more common. Further theorization can better elaborate on the differences between a
bottom-up bargaining process and a top-down delegation process.
Moreover, in this theory I only discuss the impacts of political centralization levels on
economic decentralization policies. How would the economic decentralization levels affect
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the political centralization levels? As the Mexican case shows, the fiscal centralization pro-
cess beginning in the 1920s facilitated the political centralization process. If the opposite is
also true that by granting the subnational governments more economic resources and author-
ity, economic decentralization policies also decrease political centralization levels, we may
observe a negative feedback loop and a relatively stable long-term economic and political
decentralization levels within a country. How economic decentralization levels affect polit-
ical centralization levels is another theoretical question that can shed light on the complex
relationship between political conditions and economic decentralization levels. It is worth
studying and has implications for understanding the impacts of economic decentralization.
The recent decades witness a surge of autocratic regimes in the world. Lührmann and
Lindberg (2019) identify its beginning as early as in the 1990s and term this trend “a third
wave of autocratization” (pp. 8–9). At this historical moment, it is urgent to understand not
only the process of autocratization but also its implications for societies. Answers to how
autocracies make their policies and what impacts such policies have on their citizens’ welfare
are critical for the vast population currently living under autocracies and for predicting the
durability of the autocratic systems. Although these are not new questions, they deserve
renewed attention at this historical juncture. The central-local government relationship,
conceptualized as political and economic decentralization, is one of the angles to investigate
how political institutions in autocracies affect their policy outcomes and how the pattern
is different from democracies. On the path to understand autocratic political institutions’
effects on policy outcomes, hopefully future research will continue studying the subnational
dimension, the interaction among different levels of governments, and their policy implica-
tions.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARATIVE STATICS
The discussions in this Appendix complement Chapter 2 and analyze the comparative statics
of the economic decentralization levels conditional on changes in the political centralization
parameters—the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism ( c
λS
) and the policy prefer-
ence divergence between the national and subnational governments (d)—for different types
of the national governments.
A.1 PREDATORY NG AND DEVELOPMENTAL NG WITH LOW X0
As shown in Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2, for the predatory national government or the devel-
opmental national government in countries with low socioeconomically optimal economic
decentralization levels, the SPNE outcome is complete economic centralization.
The relationship between the SPNE economic decentralization level and the subnational
government’s deviation threshold for this case is illustrated in Figure A1. It shows that
the SPNE economic decentralization level does not depend on the subnational government’s
deviation threshold. The level of political centralization does not have any effects on the
economic decentralization levels for the predatory national government, nor for the devel-
opmental type in a country with low socioeconomically optimal economic decentralization
level.
For the developmental national government in countries with high socioeconomically
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Figure A1. Complete Economic Centralization and Deviation Threshold
optimal economic decentralization levels, the level of political centralization influences the
SPNE economic decentralization levels. How the political centralization level affects the eco-
nomic decentralization levels depends on whether the national government is ideological or
pragmatic. In addition, for the pragmatic developmental national government, the impacts
of the political centralization level on the economic decentralization levels are different, con-
ditional on whether the change in the political centralization level alters the strength of the
reward-punishment mechanism or it changes the policy preference divergence between the
national and subnational governments. Specifically, the reward-punishment mechanism af-
fects economic decentralization levels only through influencing the subnational government’s
deviation threshold; the policy preference divergence can influence economic decentraliza-
tion by both changing the subnational government’s deviation threshold and changing the
national government’s cost of allowing the subnational government’s policy deviation. Due
to this reason, I separate the discussion of how a change in the strength of the reward-
punishment mechanism affects the economic decentralization outcome from how a change in
the policy preference divergence affects the economic decentralization outcome.
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A.2 IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTAL NG WITH HIGH X0
In this section, I first discuss how political centralization levels affect the SPNE economic
decentralization levels through changing the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism
and the policy preference divergence between the national and subnational governments. To
simplify the notation, from now on I use m to denote the relative strength of the reward-
punishment mechanism ( c
λS
) and use m0, m1, and m2, etc., to denote specific values of
c
λS
. The deviation threshold ( c
λSd
) is thus denoted as m
d
, a ratio of the relative strength
of the reward-punishment mechanism (m) over the policy preference divergence between the
national and subnational governments (d).
As discussed in Chapter 2, an ideological developmental national government has a strong
distaste for policy deviation at the subnational level so that it is unwilling to sacrifice policy
implementation in exchange for economic efficiency gains. For this type of national govern-
ment, only (xτ , I) and (xI , I) are possible SPNE outcomes.1 Holding the policy preference
divergence term, d, constant at d0, the relationship between the equilibrium economic de-
centralization level, x∗, and the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism, m, is shown
in Figure A2.
When the reward-punishment mechanism is relatively weak, i.e., m is low, the equilib-
rium economic decentralization level is the deviation threshold, xτ . The SPNE outcome is
(xτ , I). As the reward-punishment strengthens and the deviation threshold increases, the
SPNE economic decentralization level (x∗) increases with xτ until the m reaches mI .2 When
the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism exceeds mI , the SPNE economic decen-
tralization stops increasing with the deviation threshold. Instead, it stays at xI . The SPNE
outcome is (xI , I). At this level, the national government obtains the highest utility possible,
which is the maximum of UN(x, I).3
For the ideological developmental national government, the effects of the policy preference
1An ideological national government here describes a national government with a high λN , so that λN ≥
2θx0 − (1− θ)
d0
. This implies that xD ≤ 0 and thus xD < xτ , because the deviation threshold xτ is always
positive. In this case, (xD, D) is not an option.
2When m < mI , (xτ , I) is the SPNE outcome, where mI = xI ∗ d0.
3When m ≥ mI , (xI , I) is the SPNE outcome.
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Figure A2. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level (x∗) and the Reward-Punishment
Mechanism (m) for an Ideological Developmental National Government
divergence on the equilibrium economic decentralization levels depend on the strength of the
reward-punishment mechanism.
Figure A3. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level for an Ideological Developmental
NG, When the Reward-Punishment Mechanism is Strong (m0 ≥ xI)
Figure A3 illustrates when the reward-punishment mechanism is very strong relative to
xI , the national government always sets the SPNE economic decentralization level at its
highest, i.e., x∗ = xI , regardless of how big the policy preference divergence is.4 In this case,
the reward-punishment mechanism is so strong that no matter how big the policy preference
4When m0 ≥ xI , for all d ∈ (0, 1], m0d ≥ xI and x∗ = xI .
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divergence between the two levels of governments is, the subnational government’s deviation
threshold is always greater than or equal to xI . Thus, the national government sets x at xI
and obtains the highest utility possible UN(xI , I). The SPNE outcome is always (xI , I).
As discussed earlier, by controlling the subnational government’s personnel, high lev-
els of political centralization result in low levels of policy preference divergence between the
national and subnational governments. But in this case (when the reward-punishment mech-
anism is too strong), high levels of political centralization do not affect the SPNE economic
decentralization levels, even though it reduces the policy preference divergence between the
two levels of government.
Figure A4. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level for an Ideological Developmental
NG, When the Reward-Punishment Mechanism is Not So Strong
When the reward-punishment mechanism is not too strong, i.e., m0 < xI . For an ideo-
logical developmental national government, how the equilibrium economic decentralization
levels change with the policy preference divergence is illustrated in Figure A4.5
5The conditions for this pattern to hold are the following: m0 < xIλN ≥ (3− 2√2)θx2I
m0
; or

2−√2
2
xI < m0 < xI
2θ(xI −
√
m0(2xI −m0)) ≤ λN < (3− 2
√
2)
θx2I
m0
.
It is worth noting that when the reward-punishment mechanism parameterm0 increases in value approaching
xI , the lower bound of the ideological parameter λN for this pattern to hold decreases in value approaching
0. This is to say that when the reward-punishment mechanism is strong, the national government can be
very pragmatic while the SPNE outcomes still do not include allowing the subnational government to deviate
from the national government’s policy agenda, i.e., (xD, D) is impossible.
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In this case, when the policy preference divergence between the national government
and the subnational government is small, specifically less than m0
xI
, the national government
chooses xI as the economic decentralization level. When the policy preference divergence
is within the range (0, m0
xI
], the subnational government shares the national government’s
policy preferences enough that it has a sufficiently high deviation threshold, i.e., above xI .
The national government can set the economic decentralization level at xI , anticipating that
the subnational government pursues its policy agenda. The SPNE outcome in this case is
(xI , I). When d is in (0,
m0
xI
], a decrease in the policy preference divergence does not affect
the economic decentralization level.
As the policy preference divergence increases and exceeds m0
xI
, the national government
sets the economic decentralization level at the deviation threshold (m0
d
). Since we hold
the relative strength of the reward-punishment mechanism constant at m0, the deviation
threshold decreases as the policy preference divergence increases. Therefore, as d increases,
the SPNE economic decentralization level decreases.
In sum, for an ideological developmental national government, its equilibrium economic
decentralization levels increase with the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism until
the economic decentralization level reaches the highest level ever desired by the national
government, as illustrated in Figure A2. Once the reward-punishment mechanism’s strength
exceeds this threshold, the equilibrium economic decentralization level stays constant and
no longer increases with the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism. With regard to
the impacts of the policy preference divergence on the equilibrium economic decentralization
levels, there are two possible patterns, depending on the strength of the reward-punishment
mechanism. When the reward-punishment mechanism is very strong, how the policy pref-
erence divergence influences the equilibrium economic decentralization levels is shown in
Figure A3. In this case, the reward-punishment mechanism is so strong that no matter how
big the policy preference divergence is, the subnational government always implements the
national economic agenda and the equilibrium economic decentralization level stays at the
highest economic decentralization level ever desired by the national government. When the
reward-punishment mechanism is not so strong, the effects of the policy preference diver-
gence on the equilibrium economic decentralization levels is shown in Figure A4. In this
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case, the ideological developmental national government sets the economic decentralization
level at the highest level it ever desires when the policy preference divergence is small. When
the policy preference divergence is large, the economic decentralization level decreases with
the policy preference divergence.
A.3 PRAGMATIC DEVELOPMENTAL NG WITH HIGH X0
Different from the ideological type, for a pragmatic national government, all three SPNE
outcomes, i.e., (xD, D), (xτ , I), and (xI , I), are possible.6 (xD, D) is possible implies that
when the political centralization level is low, the national government is willing to sacrifice
the policy implementation at the subnational level in exchange for higher economic efficiency.
Figure A5. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level (x∗) and the Reward-Punishment
Mechanism (m) for a Pragmatic National Government
Holding the policy preference divergence constant at d0, the relationship between the
economic decentralization levels and the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism for
a pragmatic developmental national government is shown in Figure A5. When the strength
of the reward-punishment mechanism is lower than m, the national government allows the
subnational government to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda in exchange
6Being pragmatic describes a national government with a low λN , so that λN < 2θx0−(1−θ)d0 . This impliesthat xD > 0.
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for higher economic efficiency, making (xD, D) the SPNE outcome.7 In this case, the national
government would need to centralize to a very great extent in order for the subnational
government not to deviate. On the other hand, the pragmatic national government does
not consider it is worthwhile to sacrifice economic efficiency in exchange for implementing
its own policy agenda, and thus chooses to allow the subnational government’s deviation.
As long as the national government decides to allow policy deviation, it chooses xD as the
economic decentralization, which gives it the highest possible utility when the subnational
government deviates. When the reward-punishment mechanism is too weak, the economic
decentralization level under a pragmatic national government is higher than the level under
an ideological national government.8
As the reward-punishment mechanism strengthens and its value exceeds m but is still
less than mI ,9 the national government sets the economic decentralization level at the devi-
ation threshold. When m is within the range [m,mI ], as the reward-punishment mechanism
becomes stronger, the deviation threshold increases and the utility of setting the economic
decentralization level at the deviation threshold increases. m is the point at which the na-
tional government is indifferent between setting x at xD and setting x at xτ . From this
point onward, the national government sets x∗ at xτ . The SPNE outcome is (xτ , I). When
the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism is within the range [m,mI ], the SPNE
economic decentralization level increases as the reward-punishment mechanism strengthens.
Similar to the case for an ideological national government, as the strength of reward-
punishment mechanism continues to increase and surpasses mI , so that the deviation thresh-
old exceeds xI , the pragmatic national government also sets the economic decentralization
level at xI and gets the highest utility possible, i.e., the maximum of UN(x, I). The SPNE
outcome is (xI , I).
Unlike for the ideological type, it is possible that for a pragmatic national government,
the economic decentralization level decreases as the reward-punishment mechanism strength-
ens, when the deviation threshold is low enough. This implies when political centralization
7m = d0 ∗ (xI −
√
λNd
θ
(xI − λNd
4θ
)).
8For all m ≤ m, we have xD > md0 .9mI = xI ∗ d0, same as for the ideological national government.
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is very low, it is possible that a moderate increase in political centralization may lead to
economic centralization.10 When the reward-punishment mechanism is too weak, the prag-
matic national government sets the economic decentralization level at a relatively high level
xD; but as the reward-punishment mechanism becomes moderately stronger,11 the national
government prefers a lower level of economic decentralization than xD. It is an unexpected
result that political centralization can lead to economic centralization, given the delegation
framework.
For a pragmatic developmental national government, the effects of the policy preference
divergence on the equilibrium economic decentralization levels also depend on the strength
of the reward-punishment mechanism. This is similar to the results for an ideological devel-
opmental national government.
Figure A6. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level for a Pragmatic Developmental
NG, When the Reward-Punishment Mechanism is Strong (m0 ≥ xI)
Figure A6 is the same as Figure A3. Like the case for an ideological developmental
national government, when the reward-punishment mechanism is very strong, the pragmatic
national government also sets the economic decentralization level at xI , regardless of the
policy preference divergence.12 The SPNE outcome is always (xI , I).
When the reward-punishment mechanism is not too strong, i.e., m0 < xI , and when
10For all m1 ∈ (0,m) and m2 ∈ [m,xDd0), we have m1 < m2 and x∗(m1) > x∗(m2).
11The reward-punishment mechanism is strong enough to make the national government prefer setting x
at xτ , but not overly strong so that xτ is still less than xD.
12When m0 ≥ xI , for all d ∈ (0, 1], m0d ≥ xI and x∗ = xI .
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Figure A7. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level for a Pragmatic Developmental
NG, When the Reward-Punishment Mechnism is Not So Strong
the national government is pragmatic, the effects of the policy preference divergence on
the equilibrium economic decentralization levels are shown in Figure A7.13 Different from
the ideological developmental national government in Figure A4, this pragmatic type allows
the subnational government to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda and
(xD, D) can be an SPNE outcome.
When the policy preference divergence between the two levels of government is very
small, i.e., less than m0
xI
, this pattern is similar to the pattern for the ideological type: the
national government chooses xI as the economic decentralization level. This is because when
the policy preference divergence between the two levels of governments is low enough, the
national government can set the economic decentralization level at xI and still anticipates
that the subnational government pursues the national govenrment’s policy agenda. The
SPNE outcome is (xI , I). When the policy preference divergence (d) is low, i.e., within the
range (0, m0
xI
], a change in d does not affect the economic decentralization level.
Also similar to the pattern for the ideological type, as the policy preference divergence
13The formal expression of the conditions for this pattern to hold is the following:
{
0 < m0 < xI
0 < λN < 2θ(xI −
√
m0(2xI −m0))
.
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increases and exceeds m0
xI
but remains below d1,14 the national government sets the economic
decentralization level at the subnational government’s deviation threshold (m0
d
). The SPNE
outcome is (xτ , I). Within this range, the economic decentralization level decreases as the
policy preference divergence increases.
The range of d in which this pattern differs from the ideological type is when d is in
(d1, 1]. For the ideological type, the national government cares more about the policy imple-
mentation and thus does not allow the subnational government to deviate from the national
government’s policy agenda. Differently the national government here is very pragmatic.
As the policy preference divergence increases and exceeds d1, the national government sets
the economic decentralization at xD and the SPNE outcome is (xD, D). d1 is the point at
which the national government is indifferent between the two outcomes (xτ , I) and (xD, D).
When d is below d1, the national government prefers (xτ , I); when it is above d1, the national
government prefers (xD, D).
The political logic that drives this result is that as d exceeds d1, the deviation threshold
is too low for a pragmatic national government to set as the economic decentralization
level. This is to say that when d is greater than d1, the economic resources and authority
would be too centralized if the national government sets the economic decentralization at the
deviation threshold m0
d
. Because the national government is pragmatic, when d is too high
that renders the deviation threshold too low, the national government is no longer willing
to have a centralized economic system at the expense of the economic efficiency. Once the
national government decides to allow the subnational government to deviate, the national
government chooses x∗ = xD, higher than
m0
d
in order to achieve higher economic efficiency.
Because xD is a monotonically decreasing function of d,15 when d is high enough and
the national government chooses xD as the economic decentralization level, the economic
decentralization level decreases as the policy preference divergence increases, as illustrated
in Figure A7. Why does xD decrease with d? The reason is that when the policy preferences
of the subnational government become more different from those of the national government,
it becomes more costly for the national government to tolerate the deviation behavior of the
14d1 = 1λN (θxI −
√
θm0λN −
√
θ2x2I − θm0λN − 2θxI
√
θm0λN ).
15Recall that xD = x0 − 1−θ2θ − λN2θ d.
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subnational government. Therefore, an increase in d reduces the national government’s
incentives to pursue economic decentralization. Note that as the ideological factor (λN)
becomes smaller, the slope of xD becomes flatter, meaning that the negative effects of d on
the economic decentralization levels become smaller.
Again when the national government is pragmatic, it is possible that a decrease in the
policy preference divergence can lead to a lower level of economic decentralization.16 The
rationale for this result is the following: by reducing the policy preference divergence, polit-
ical centralization increases the subnational government’s deviation threshold. The increase
in the subnational government’s deviation threshold makes setting the economic decentral-
ization level at the deviation threshold increasingly attractive for the national government.
There is a point (d1 in Figure A7), below which it is more preferable for the national govern-
ment to set the economic decentralization level at the deviation threshold than at xD. As
Figure A7 shows, when the decrease of the policy preference divergence happens around d1,
for instance, from d1+ ϵ to d1− ϵ, where ϵ > 0, the national government switches from allow-
ing subnational government’s policy deviation to forbidding it. In this scenario, a reduction
in d can result in a reduction in the economic decentralization levels, making it possible for
political centralization to result in economic centralization.
When the reward-punishment mechanism is weak, the last pattern of how policy prefer-
ence divergence influences the SPNE economic decentralization levels is illustrated in Figure
A8. In this case, as the policy preference divergence between the two levels of governments
increases, the SPNE economic decentralization level changes from xI to xτ and xD, and back
to xτ as d approaches its theoretical maximum, i.e., d = 1.
For this pattern to hold, the reward-punishment mechanism needs to be weak and the
national government cannot be too pragmatic.17 If the reward-punishment mechanism is not
16For any dD ∈ (d1, 2θλN (xI − m0d1 )) ∩ (d1, 1], we can find dτ0 = 2θm02θxI−λNdD , so that dτ0 ∈ (m0xI , d1] and forall dτ ∈ [dτ0, d1], we have dτ < dD and x∗(dτ ) < x∗(dD).
17The formal expression of the conditions is the following:

0 < m0 <
2−√2
2
xI
2θ(xI −
√
m0(2xI −m0)) ≤ λN < (3− 2
√
2)
θx2I
m0
.
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Figure A8. The SPNE Economic Decentralization Level for a Moderately Pragmatic De-
velopmental NG, When the Reward-Punishment Mechnism is Weak
weak enough,18 more ideological national government follows the pattern shown in Figure
A4 and more pragmatic national government follows the pattern in Figure A7; the pattern
in Figure A8 is not possible.
The pattern in Figure A8 is similar to that in Figure A7, when the policy preference
divergence is lower than d2.
When d is lower than m0
xI
, the SPNE outcome is (xI , I). In this case, the subnational
government’s deviation threshold is higher than xI . The national government sets the eco-
nomic decentralization level at xI and the subnational government implements the national
government’s policy agenda.
As the policy preference divergence increases and exceeds m0
xI
but is still less than d1,19
the SPNE outcome is (xτ , I). Within the range [
m0
xI
, d1], an increase in the policy preference
divergence lowers the deviation threshold, which means that the subnational government
would choose policy deviation with increasingly lower economic decentralization levels. The
national government cannot choose xI and assumes that the subnational government fol-
lows the national policy agenda. Instead, to ensure the implementation of the national
18Here when m0 ≥ 2−
√
2
2
xI , the reward-punishment mechanism is not weak enough.
19The equation for d1 is the same as in the previous pattern, i.e., d1 = 1λN (θxI −
√
θm0λN −√
θ2x2I − θm0λN − 2θxI
√
θm0λN ).
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government’s preferred economic policies, the national government sets the economic de-
centralization level at the deviation threshold, xτ . The subnational government follows the
national government’s policy directives as a result. Within the range [m0
xI
, d1], as the pol-
icy preferences between the two levels of governments become more different, the economic
decentralization level becomes lower.
In Figure A8, as the policy preference divergence term exceeds d1 but is less than d2,20
the SPNE outcome is (xD, D). When d is within the range (d1, d2), the relatively pragmatic
national government prefers to set the economic decentralization level at xD, which is higher
than the subnational government’s deviation threshold, and thus allows the subnational
government to deviate from the national government’s economic policy agenda. As discussed
earlier, a rise in d increases the cost of the subnational government’s policy deviation for
the national government. Thus, within (d1, d2), although the relatively pragmatic national
government chooses xD and allows the subnational government to deviate from the national
government’s policy agenda, an increase in the policy preference divergence lowers the SPNE
economic decentralization levels.
Different from the previous pattern, as the policy preference divergence d continues to
increase and exceeds d2, i.e., when d is in [d2, 1], the SPNE outcome becomes (xτ , I) again.
The political logic is that as d increases, the cost of allowing the subnational government’s
deviation behavior continues to increase. Because the national government is not too prag-
matic, it still values policy implementation. d2 is the point when the national government
stops tolerating the deviation behavior of the subnational government which now has an
economic policy preference too different from itself. For the national government, when the
policy preference divergence is below d2, the costs of allowing the subnational government’s
deviation behavior and enduring having lower economic resources at its own hands are lower
than the economic efficiency gains from a relatively higher economic decentralization level.
Thus, the national government prefers (xD, D). As d exceeds d2, such costs outweigh the eco-
nomic efficiency gains. The national government prefers xτ to xD again, so (xτ , I) becomes
the SPNE outcome. When d is in [d2, 1], as it increases, the subnational government’s devia-
tion threshold decreases which leads to the decrease of the SPNE economic decentralization
20d2 = 1λN (θxI −
√
θm0λN +
√
θ2x2I − θm0λN − 2θxI
√
θm0λN )
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level.
The condition that the national government is pragmatic makes it possible for the na-
tional government to tolerate subnational government’s policy deviation, when d is at a
medium level. The condition that the national government is not too pragmatic makes the
national government prioritize the subnational government implementing the national policy
agenda, when d is high.
Like the previous pattern, the condition that the national government is pragmatic and
allows the subnational government to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda
makes it theoretically possible that political centralization can lead to economic centraliza-
tion.21 The condition for political centralization to result in economic centralization is the
same as in the previous pattern, i.e., the decrease in d must be from higher than d1 to lower
than d1. Only when d changes around d1, a reduction in d leads the national government
to change from choosing xD to xτ and results in higher economic centralization. Other than
this scenario, a reduction in d either leads to no change in x∗, when the change in d happens
in (0, m0
xI
]; or an increase in x∗, when the change in d happens in all other intervals.22
In sum, this section discusses for a pragmatic developmental national government, how
the equilibrium economic decentralization levels change with the strength of the reward-
punishment mechanism and the policy preference divergence between the national and sub-
national governments. The comparative statics are shown Figures A5, A6, A7, and A8.
Among these figures, Figure A5 shows how the equilibrium economic decentralization
level changes with the reward-punishment mechanism, holding the policy preference diver-
gence constant at d0. As the figure illustrates, for a pragmatic national government, when
the reward-punishment is weak, the national government allows the subnational government
21Similar to the result for Figure A7, for any dD ∈ (d1, 2θλN (xI−m0d1 ))∩(d1, d2), we can find dτ0 = 2θm02θxI−λNdD ,so that dτ0 ∈ (m0xI , d1] and for all dτ ∈ [dτ0, d1], we have dτ < dD and x∗(dτ ) < x∗(dD).22The formal expression of the cases in which a decrease in d leads to an increase in x∗ is the following:
let dl and dh denote two values of d and dl < dh, x∗(dl) > x∗(dh) is true when
(i) dh ∈ [d2, 1] and dl ∈ (0, dh);
(ii) or when d2 ≤ 2θλN (xI − m0d1 ), dh ∈ (d1, d2) and dl ∈ (0, 2θm02θxI−λNdh ) ∪ (d1, dh);
(iii) or when d2 > 2θλN (xI − m0d1 ), dh ∈ ( 2θλN (xI − m0d1 ), d2) and dl ∈ (0, dh);
(iv) or when d2 > 2θλN (xI − m0d1 ), dh ∈ (d1, 2θλN (xI − m0d1 )] and dl ∈ (0, 2θm02θxI−λNdh ) ∪ (d1, dh);
(v) or dh ∈ [m0xI , d1] and dl ∈ (0, dh).
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to deviate from the national government’s policy agenda. Within a range, the SPNE eco-
nomic decentralization level does not depend on the reward-punishment mechanism. As the
reward-punishment mechanism strengthens but is still not too strong, the national govern-
ment shifts its strategy and sets the SPNE economic decentralization level at the deviation
threshold. Within this range, political centralization increases the SPNE economic decen-
tralization levels. Finally, when the reward-punishment mechanism is very strong, the na-
tional government sets the SPNE economic decentralization at xI and stays constant as the
reward-punishment mechanism continues to increase.
Figures A6, A7, and A8 show how the equilibrium economic decentralization level changes
with the policy preference divergence, holding the strength of the reward-punishment mech-
anism constant at m0. Shown in Figure A6, when the reward-punishment mechanism is very
strong, the national government can always trust that the subnational government would
implement the national economic policy agenda and thus set the economic decentralization
level at the highest level it ever desires, regardless of the policy preference divergence. This
pattern is the same for both the ideological developmental type and the pragmatic develop-
mental type of the national government.
The difference between the ideological developmental type and the pragmatic develop-
mental type occurs when the reward-punishment mechanism is not so strong. There are two
possible patterns for the policy preference divergence to influence the equilibrium economic
decentralization level, shown in Figures A7 and A8, depending on the degree of pragmatism
of the national government and the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism.
When the reward-punishment mechanism is not very strong and the national government
is very pragmatic, the policy preference divergence affects the economic decentralization level
in the manner illustrated in Figure A7. In this case, as policy preference divergence increases,
the SPNE economic decentralization level changes from xI to xτ and xD. When the national
government is pragmatic, it is possible that a decrease in the policy preference divergence
can lead to a reduction of the economic decentralization level. This happens when the policy
preference divergence changes around d1.
When the reward-punishment mechanism is weak and the national government is not
too pragmatic, the relationship between the equilibrium economic decentralization level and
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the policy preference divergence between the national and subnational governments is shown
in Figure A8. For the most part, a decrease in the policy preference divergence leads to an
increase in the economic decentralization level. However, under the condition that the policy
preference divergence changes around d1, it is again possible that a reduction in the policy
preference divergence can cause a decrease in the economic decentralization level, because
the national government changes from allowing policy deviation to forbidding it.
In addition, for the pragmatic national government, as shown in Figures A7 and A8, a
decrease in the policy preference divergence affects both the national government and the
subnational government’s calculation. For the subnational government, a decrease in the
policy preference divergence reduces its incentive to deviate from the national government’s
policy agenda. For the pragmatic national government, a decrease in the policy preference
divergence reduces the costs of policy deviation by the subnational government and thus
increases the national government’s tolerance of the subnational government’s deviation
behavior.
A.4 IDEOLOGICAL VS. PRAGMATIC NG
The previous discussions show that the relationship between the strength of the reward-
punishment mechanism and the equilibrium economic decentralization level depends on
whether the national government is ideological or pragmatic. If the national government
is ideological, the relationship follows the pattern shown in Figure A2; and if the national
government is pragmatic, the relationship follows the pattern shown in Figure A5. What ex-
actly does being an ideological national government mean, holding the socioeconomic factors
constant and the developmental level of the national government constant?
Figure A9 illustrates how the relationship between the equilibrium economic decentral-
ization level (x∗) and the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism (m) is conditional
on the values of λN , the ideological factor of the national government, and d0, the policy
preference divergence between the national and subnational governments.
Conditional on the value of d0, when the national government is ideological, i.e., (d0, λN)
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Figure A9. Effects of the National Government’s Ideological Adherence (λN) on the Re-
lationship between the Equilibrium Economic Decentralization Level (x∗) and the Strength
of the Reward-Punishment Mechanism (m)
falls in Region 1, the national government does not allow the subnational government to
deviate from its policy agenda. The relationship between the equilibrium economic de-
centralization level and the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism follows the pat-
tern in Figure A2: when m ∈ (0,mI ], the national government sets x∗ at xτ ; and when
m ∈ (mI ,+∞), the national government sets x∗ at xI . On the other hand, when the na-
tional government is pragmatic, i.e., (d0, λN) falls in Region 2, the relationship between
the equilibrium economic decentralization level and the strength of the reward-punishment
mechanism follows the pattern in Figure A5: when m ∈ (0,m), the national government sets
x∗ at xD; when m ∈ [m,mI ], the national government sets x∗ at xτ ; and finally, when the
reward-punishment mechanism is high enough, i.e., m ∈ (mI ,+∞), the national government
sets x∗ at xI .
Figure A9 shows that the effect of the ideological factor is conditional on the policy pref-
erence divergence. When the policy preference divergence is high, the national government
does not need to be very high on the ideological factor for the equilibrium to follow the
285
pattern shown in Figure A2. On the other hand, when the policy preference divergence is
low, the national government needs to be very ideological for the equilibrium to follow the
pattern in Figure A2.
Figure A10. Effects of the National Government’s Ideological Adherence (λN) on the
Relationship between the Equilibrium Economic Decentralization Level (x∗) and the Policy
Preference Divergence (d)
Similarly, despite being a little more complicated, Figure A10 illustrates how the relation-
ship between the equilibrium economic decentralization level (x∗) and the poicy preference
divergence (d) depends on the ideological factor (λN) and the reward-punishment mechanism
(m).
When the reward-punishment mechanism is very strong, i.e., (m,λN) is in Region 1 in
Figure A10, the ideological and pragmatic national governments behave in the same way.
Both types would set the equilibrium economic decentralization level at xI , regardless of the
policy preference divergence. The pattern is shown in Figures A3 and A6.
When the reward-punishment mechanism is not so strong and the national government is
ideological, i.e., (m,λN) falls in Region 2, the relationship between the equilibrium economic
decentralization level and the policy preference divergence follows the pattern shown in
Figure A4: x∗ changes from xI to xτ as d increases. When the reward-punishment mechanism
is not so strong and the national government is pragmatic, i.e., (m,λN) falls in Region
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3, the relationship between the equilibrium economic decentralization level and the policy
preference divergence follows the pattern shown in Figure A7: x∗ changes from xI to xτ and
then to xD as d increases. Finally, when the reward-punishment mechanism is weak and the
national government is moderately pragmatic, i.e., (m,λN) lies in Region 4, the relationship
between the equilibrium economic decentralization level and the policy preference divergence
follows the pattern shown in Figure A8: x∗ changes from xI to xτ and xD and back to xτ as
d increases.
A.5 A SUMMARY
For a predatory national government or a less predatory national government in a country
with a low x0, the national government chooses complete economic centralization. In this
case, the SPNE economic decentralization level is always 0 and does not depend on political
centralization levels, shown in Figure A1.
For a developmental national government in a country with a high x0, the other three
SPNE economic decentralization levels are possible. Political centralization levels affect
the SPNE economic decentralization levels for these cases, via strengthening the reward-
punishment mechanism and reducing the policy preference divergence between the national
and subnational governments. The levels of ideological adherence of the national government
influence how the reward-punishment mechanism and policy preference divergence between
the two levels of governments affect the economic decentralization levels.
An ideological developmental national government does not tolerate deviation behavior
of the subnational governments. Thus, the national government either sets x∗ at the de-
viation threshold (xτ ) or at xI . Holding the policy preference divergence constant at d0,
the relationship between the reward-punishment mechanism and the equilibrium economic
decentralization level is shown in Figure A2. Holding the reward-punishment mechanism’s
strength constant at m0, the relationship between the policy preference divergence and the
equilibrium economic decentralization level is shown in Figures A3 and A4, conditional on
the strength of the reward-punishment mechanism.
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The ways in which the political centralization level affects the economic decentralization
level are more complicated for a pragmatic national government, because when the deviation
threshold is low, such a national government allows the subnational government to deviate
from the national government’s economic policy agenda. Holding the policy preference di-
vergence constant at d0, the relationship between the reward-punishment mechanism and the
equilibrium economic decentralization level for a pragmatic national government is shown
in Figure A5. Holding the reward-punishment mechanism’s strength constant at m0, the
relationship between the policy preference divergence and the equilibrium economic decen-
tralization level for a pragmatic national government is shown in Figures A6, A7, and A8.
Interestingly, for the pragmatic type of the national government, political centralization can
lead to economic centralization via strengthening the reward-punishment mechanism and
reducing the policy preference divergence.
Finally, how the relationship between the equilibrium economic decentralization level
and the political centralization level depends on the ideological adherence of the national
government is shown in Figures A9 and A10.
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION RESULTS
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B.1 QUADRATIC EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION
Table B1. Nonlinear Correlations between Political Centralization and Fiscal Decentral-
ization Levels Conditional on Autocratic Levels
Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization
Within Effects Between Effects
PC
0.173* 0.137
(0.0869) (0.481)
Autocracy
-0.0764 0.0557
(0.0664) (0.265)
PC * Autocracy
-0.582* -1.216
(0.241) (1.088)
PC * PC
-0.389** -0.616
(0.123) (0.696)
PC * PC * Autocracy
0.953*** 1.936+
(0.235) (1.143)
Ln(Population)
0.118*** 0.0293*
(0.0281) (0.0140)
Ln(GDPPC)
0.0250** 0.0421
(0.00903) (0.0282)
Urban Pop. Share
-0.00485*** 0.00109
(0.000650) (0.00161)
Natural Resources
-0.00467*** -0.00123
(0.000445) (0.00336)
Constant
-0.639+
(0.375)
No. of Obs. 819
No. of Groups 59
rho 0.937
Overall R2 0.486
Within R2 0.231
Between R2 0.525
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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B.2 POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION’S EFFECTS CONDITIONAL ON
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS
Table B2. Correlations between Political Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization Levels
Conditional on Autocratic Levels and Socioeconomic Factors
Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization
Within Effects Between Effects
PC
0.286 8.812**
(0.419) (3.140)
Autocracy
-0.872 -1.040
(0.624) (3.542)
Ln(Population)
0.158*** 0.0432
(0.0297) (0.0370)
Ln(GDPPC)
0.0111 0.0699
(0.0151) (0.0735)
Urban Population Share
-0.00456*** -0.00365
(0.00114) (0.00477)
Natural Resources Rents
0.000744 0.0100
(0.00167) (0.0133)
PC * Autocracy
2.529* -13.55*
(1.009) (6.155)
Autocracy * Ln(Population)
0.0285 0.0740
(0.0406) (0.137)
Autocracy * Ln(GDPPC)
0.118* -0.119
(0.0559) (0.333)
Autocracy * Urb. Pop. Share
-0.0110* 0.00953
(0.00515) (0.0168)
Autocracy * Nat. Resources
-0.0264*** -0.0211
(0.00586) (0.0396)
PC * Ln(Population)
-0.0616** -0.383**
(0.0238) (0.129)
PC * Ln(GDPPC)
-0.0101 -0.547*
(0.0370) (0.255)
PC * Urb. Pop. Share
0.0111*** 0.0221
(0.00277) (0.0151)
PC * Nat. Resources
-0.0111* -0.0139
(0.00497) (0.0450)
PC * Autocracy * Ln(Pop)
-0.0721 0.474+
(0.0626) (0.263)
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PC * Autocracy * Ln(GDPPC)
-0.115 1.157*
(0.0880) (0.467)
PC * Autocracy * Urb. Pop. Share
-0.00404 -0.0432
(0.00792) (0.0294)
PC * Autocracy * Nat. Resources
0.0418*** 0.00517
(0.00848) (0.0664)
Constant
-0.723
(0.918)
No. of Obs. 819
No. of Groups 59
rho 0.946
Overall R2 0.640
Within R2 0.342
Between R2 0.690
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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